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
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# LECTURES

ON THE

## HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS;

BY

DR. AUGUSTUS <sup>SC</sup>NEANDER.

EDITED BY

DR. J. L. JACOBI.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN


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## PREFACE.

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NEANDER'S Lectures on the History of Christian Dogmas were among those to which he attached peculiar importance, and which he felt special pleasure in delivering. His hearers will recollect with interest his vivid delineation of the great men whose forms he summoned to pass before them, and how, inspired by the power of Christian life in them, he described sympathetically the course of their development. Elevated himself by the truth and greatness of his ideas, he attracted his hearers into an admiration of their sublimity, and infused into them something of the love for those great minds which filled his own heart. When obliged to animadvert on their defects, he did it earnestly, yet as one who was fully conscious of his own.

Neander, in all he performed, ever kept the Ethical in closest connexion with the Scientific. Deep truthfulness was a leading feature of his character; it held him back from wishing to advance Truth itself by disingenuous methods. Of this he gave proof, frequently and plainly, when his conduct was censured (as was often the case, down to a recent period) by those who were imperfectly acquainted with his position, or less scrupulous than himself about the means they employed. It was the truthfulness, also, stamped on his works which inspired confidence, for few Historians were so well qualified to receive and to communicate the Historical with unalloyed receptivity. His method was adapted to excite cautious deliberation, for he clearly marked the respective limits of Probability and Certainty, and when Truth was found he loved to make it fruitful by protracted contemplation; but if genuine Objectivity consists not merely in confidence of assertion but

in a truthful representation of fact, seldom has it been attained by a historian in so high a degree. The temptation—one of the severest—to model History according to certain preconceived aims and opinions, whether dogmatic or not, scarcely affected him; he had overcome it beforehand by his oblivion of self, and would sometimes say, that nothing seemed easier to him, than to let historical phenomena be taken for what they were worth. And yet, possessing the feelings of a powerful soul, he was decided in his likes and dislikes; objects were not regarded by him with a cold indifference, but even in writing ecclesiastical History, he was firm in his belief that the heart made the Theologian. The same devotedness to historical fact and the same love of Truth impelled him to study the most original sources of information. He wished to learn events from their actual exhibition, and to see Persons, as it were, face to face. He fixed his steady gaze on Life in all its amplitude and depth; he penetrated, as by divination, into the hidden ground of appearances, and filled up the blank where information was wanting. If he had to treat of religious characteristics, he would sketch with cautious, but certain strokes, the outlines belonging to both Times and Persons, and from the whole of the developments would make himself master of the separate parts, especially in reference to doctrinal distinctions. Perhaps at times his apprehension of the External would be less vivid, yet his inner sense of the Christian import of events would be so much the more awake; and since he freed History from the confused multiplicity of petty details, he invested it with that meditative repose which was suited to his spirit, and corresponded to the firmness of those eternal principles of action in the contemplation of which he loved to linger. Yet, along with this simplicity and tenderness, what versatility and vividness in the conception of peculiarities! It was his favourite point of view to observe the efficiency of the one Gospel in the diversity of human gifts, and to contemplate Christianity as a divine power, which extended its saving influence to all parts of human nature. For himself, he felt most akin to those souls who by a more gentle process of conversion experienced it as an ennobling of all that was purely human; but he also knew how to estimate in their full importance the more violent agitations of a soul in which Christianity gained the ascendancy by conflict.

Hence, whether he depicted the love of the Gospel in Chrysostom, or its faith in Augustin; the elevated repose of the one under the storms of outward life, or the inward conflicts of the other, we shall find an equally sympathetic interest, an equal understanding, as if each had been a reflection of his own experience. He treats with the same loving thoroughness the meditative stillness of monastic life, and the restless activity of a Boniface. His inclination led him chiefly to the original and free developments which bordered closely on the Apostolic age; but who is there, we may ask, who has traced more accurately scholastic speculation in its strictly ecclesiastical, as well as its freer forms,—in its dialectic not less than its mystic ramifications, and with a more religious and speculative insight, than He, to whom we are indebted for new views of not a few of its performances?

What we have said of Neander's method of treating Persons, Parties, and Circumstances, will equally apply to his discussion of particular dogmas. Assuming as an axiom that Christianity, subjectively considered, is the experience of the facts of Redemption in the heart, but that Dogmas are the intellectual expression of the Christian Life, he examines them to discover how far communion with Christ is their animating principle. Every dogma was to him the answer to a question of religious need, and he strove to ascertain what this need might be—under what conditions it originated, as well as the attempt that was made to satisfy it. His patient and loving investigations were rewarded by his presenting in its native splendour the gold of divine Truth, rescued from the distorted and decaying forms in which it had lain through ages of neglect. Even in the labyrinth of the Gnostic systems, as well as under the hardest crust of Scholasticism, he could descry Christian Truth; but with joyous satisfaction he presented those developments especially, in which, as in the Protestant fundamental doctrines, the full contents of the evangelic Consciousness were to be seen in their simplest form. Yet mindful of the Apostle's words, that we have this treasure in earthen vessels, he recognised in all systems something disproportionate to the eternal contents of Divine Revelation. There alone the light was pure; everywhere else was an unequal mixture of light and shade. He believed with enthusiastic confidence in the final triumph of Truth, but he also knew the potency of Sin;



and the acknowledgment of the relative necessity of erroneous manifestations was always connected in his mind with the need of mutual complements, for presenting the truth in its just proportions. In all of them he admired the acts of the πολυποίκιλος σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ (Eph. iii. 10). He regarded it as the highest office of his historical compositions to be a witness of it, and of the peculiar power of the Christian principle of life, which, harmonizing, purifying, and controlling, is destined to make its way through all opposition, obscurity, and hindrances.

On this perception of a living and self-developing principle was founded the method of composing his historical works, which he was wont to call the organic-genetic. He possessed great tact for the detection of historical connexion; where to others differences were presented in systematic opposition, they arranged themselves for him with ease, according to the immediate and living connexion of their genesis. As in the introduction to his great historical work he alludes to the parable of the grain of mustard seed,\* so in the growth of the Christian life, even in its dogmatic processes, he saw it advancing from the germ to the stalk, and producing its ever-extending branches, and flowers, and fruit.

We know that the personal and scientific importance of the man by whom so much has been effected for the renovation of the Christian profession and theology in our Church is held in grateful remembrance, and was admirably delineated, not long ago, by Dr. Ullman. Yet it seems undeniable, that the apprehension of the simple greatness which belonged to Neander, has been continually lessening among others of his contemporaries who have lost themselves among contrarieties, which should be traced up to a higher source. Many whose Christian piety he highly valued, but in whom he deemed it a defect that they valued it exclusively in their own form, fancy that they can transcend the stage of his Christianity, and from their dogmatic standpoint look down upon him as only half a believer. Persons of this stamp are frequently too hasty—they in their turn are again surpassed, and must submit to be set down by those who are further advanced as only three-quarter believers.

General objections have been especially directed against the

\* Neander's Ch. Hist., vol. i. p. 1, Introduction.

kind and method of his Biblical criticism, as well as the standpoint and measure of his historical judgment. Those to whom faith in divine Revelation resolves itself into a mechanical and unhistorical idea of Inspiration, can scarcely find themselves in harmony with the childlike, humble faith, and free examination of the Scriptures, which he knew how to maintain. In other quarters, the absence of Objectivity has been complained of—sometimes because the points of view, under which the developments are arranged, have not been carried back to the most general forms of the intellectual process, and sometimes because they were too general, and not sufficiently narrow to fit the orthodox Church system. As to the former objection, it is a direct testimony to his historical tact, that he divested himself of abstract forms, unreal in their application, and adhered to the categories of real and living historical powers. In reference to the second, we remark that he was not, as Dr. Kurtz imagines, altogether prejudiced by “an undervaluation, or mistaken notion of the importance and value of objective Ecclesiasticism.” The description of the Middle Ages—the time when objectiveness was most vigorous in the Church—might have convinced him that Neander well understood how to value this quality, when it was the natural form of the growth of the Christian Life. The internal and most personal were certainly of more importance to him than anything else. When the predominant Christian power was connected with the objective forms of the Church, as in the time of Abelard, he regarded their ascendancy as warranted, without justifying the contemporary suppression of the germs of truth, and the reprehensible means which were employed in particular cases. And is it not confirmed by the experience of all ages, that there is no fault to which the traditionary Church party is more prone than suspicion of every deviation, and suppression of even such dissent as is legitimate? If in modern times, Individualism has increased to a bewildering excess, has it not been one principal reason, that the rights of individuals to form their own views of the Gospel, were not acknowledged as they deserved, either in the Middle Ages, or in the later decenniums of the Reformation—to say nothing of the most flourishing period of Protestant orthodoxy? Would Dr. Kurtz be willing to defend the manner in which Wickliff, Huss, and John Arndt

were treated in the name of orthodoxy ; and how, according to his notions, would Luther have been justified in setting himself against the objectivity of the Church, unless, with Neander and Luther himself, he holds, higher still, the objectivity of the Gospel ? It was not Neander's wish to set aside the objectivity of the Church, or to subordinate it to the individual, but to contract its sphere, in order to give the latter liberty of action, and that the pious members of the Church might testify of the Gospel against the Church. But it is not easy to perceive what is to be gained by the maintenance of the objectivity of the Church, especially in the department of historical study, if not a word is to be said for the other factor of [Christian] life. Hence, we are still more surprised that so accomplished a historian as Dr. Schaff should damage, by similar remarks, his otherwise cordial and intelligent appreciation of Neander's historical works. We know not why it should be a matter of reproach to him, that he more or less contrasts what belongs to Christianity generally, with that which merely belongs to the Church. Is there an ecclesiastical communion, which dare maintain that its system, taken as a whole, is, in every particular, a pure expression of the Gospel ? Is it not, therefore, a fact, that these two—the Christian and the Ecclesiastical—are everywhere striving at a reconciliation, not yet completed ; and, therefore, must be regarded more or less in contrast, relatively, and according to the stage of the Church's development ? Nor is there much force of argument in enumerating men of various periods, who have collectively strictly adhered to Church principles ; for, apart from what St. Bernard, and similar men, might have furnished for historical consideration, these stand-points are excluded, in proportion as they determinately adhered to the Church system of their times ; and if every one of them had his own claims, it appears the more necessary to fix a more general standard of what is to be regarded as Christian. Not as if this also might not be applied in a prejudiced manner ; but where it is applied with Neander's knowledge of the nature of the Gospel, the danger is manifestly less than when exclusiveness is employed against every deviation for conscience' sake.

Hence, it may be easily explained why Dr. Kahnis refuses to give Neander credit for depth in dogmatic questions. To

judge of the correctness of this censure, we refer to his treatment of that part of History where the most profound ideas are brought under discussion: the development of Augustin, and his controversy with Pelagius; of Anselm, Bernard, Thomas Aquinas, and the Reformation; not to mention the delineation of the doctrinal teaching of the Apostles. What deeper employment can there be for Christian thought, than to follow everywhere the traces of the Son of God? Even Dr. Hengstenberg has acknowledged that Neander, in writing his History of the Church, has opened a new path; that he had the faculty of discovering Christ everywhere, even where his image seemed to us darkened and disfigured.

Neander, on his part, would have found in the excessive importance attributed to dogma, in comparison with Christian life; in the unseemly weight attached to the dogmatic differences of the leading reformed communions; in the Catholic over-valuation of the authority of the Church, which conceals a Pelagianizing germ; in the unevangelical idea of official sanctity; in the Puseyite view of the Sacraments; in the introduction of the *opus operatum*;—in all these mixed influences, by which, at present, the Lutheran Theology is affected, he would probably, with greater justice, have found the marks of an incipient shallowness; and it would not have been difficult to find traces of the same in Dr. Kahnis. Perhaps, also, it was a part of Neander's deep insight in the dogmatic department, that he thought the revivification of the Lutheran dogma, in its full extent, was impossible, because the necessary premises were wanting.

We, by no means, refuse to acknowledge the talent and merit which exist on that side; but it appears to us, that under the hackneyed phrases of the authority and the objectivity of the Church, a very pretentious subjectivity and loose caprice are frequently indulged; and if really an exact agreement with the entire system of Church Dogmas be indispensably necessary to a satisfactory Christian unity, and the extension of it warrants such severe reproaches of the points of difference in Protestant Churches, as have been incessantly expressed, ought we not to expect that on this side the Conformity would be most exact. Instead of this, scarcely a more thorough representation of dogmatic ideas has been given, against which the reproach of important deviations

from the views of the Church has not been cast. For our part, we wish to make no complaint against opponents, we only notice this connexion of a far-extending Syncretism of doctrine, which exactly the most gifted men cannot resist, with a pretension to sharply-defined ecclesiastical views, as an evidence that our age, incapable of forming a new system, or to satisfy itself with a repetition of the ancient one, must keep in mind its mediative character; and we beg that persons would accord that freedom to others which they claim for themselves.

Hence we can arrive at no other conclusion than that Neander's free historical composition, imbued with humble devotedness to the Saviour, and sustained by warm sympathy for all who were animated by his Spirit, will still maintain its position; and we hope that its excellencies will not be wholly wanting to the work now presented to the reader.

A volume, prepared by himself for publication, or one of his lectures, taken down, word for word, would, doubtless, show these excellencies in a far higher degree; yet I have attempted to form into a whole the notes that have been kindly furnished by his former hearers, exactly and intelligently written from lectures, delivered when Neander was in his prime, with the aid of his General History of the Church, as far as it reaches. The principal difficulty arises from what made his lectures so very attractive—the free treatment of the subjects of them as they were continually produced afresh. It was also indispensable to correct, for reading, the somewhat loose and monotonous quality of the style, which is more easily tolerated in oral delivery. I have endeavoured to retain the excellencies of the several parts of this work, and confined myself to the most necessary alterations of the language, of which the literary references contain the most important. A greater fulness of these appeared to me unsuitable for a work intended as an Introduction to the History of Dogmas. Whoever needs more will easily obtain more extensive information from those that are here set down. Neander gave quotations from his authorities very copiously in his lectures. Hence, little more was necessary than to add the references. Yet where the understanding of the connexion or the peculiarity of the language made it appear desirable, I have placed at the bottom of the page, the

original text. Since Neander's death, several sources of information have been discovered, which render much more complete our knowledge of the Ancient Church. Though they still require to be more thoroughly examined, yet no small number of the results have been so far ascertained, that they could be introduced into this work. With the exception of the general discussion respecting Hippolytus, which seemed to me to belong to the text, I have made the additions in notes under the text, and all such are marked [J].\* Apart from these additions, the work is not merely an abstract of the dogmatic-historical portions of Neander's General History, but presents valuable additions in the Introduction, as well as in the History of Dogmas, since the Reformation, besides many separate discussions. Hence, I hope it may be used advantageously along with many meritorious works, which have lately appeared in other quarters, on the History of Dogmas.

Especially, I trust it will be found faithful to the object of the author's life, to point, amidst the disruption of parties, to HIM, who is the head, not of one contending party, but of the contending Church.

J. L. JACOBI.

*Halle, Michaelmas Day, 1856.*

\* In the translation Dr. Jacobi's name is given at length.—[T.R.]



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# THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS.

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## GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

### 1. HISTORY OF DOGMAS DEFINED.\*

In the phrase *History of Dogmas*, the two ideas *Dogma* and *History* should be carefully distinguished.

The word *Dogma* δόγμα, according to its etymology signifies *an opinion, a notion*. That this is its meaning appears from an expression in the *Cratylus* of Plato, τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόγματα: so also, the Sceptic Sextus Empiricus in his *Hypotyposes* distinguishes the different meanings of the word, and says that it denotes an assent to that which is not perfectly clear to the mind. He contrasts the σκεπτικοί, the ἀπορητικοί and especially the ἐμπειρικοί among medical practitioners who make experience their sole guide, with the δογματικοί who proceed on certain fixed principles. In the New Testament the word never occurs in the sense of a Christian doctrine, but only in that of a Statute or Decree. Thus δόγμα τοῦ Καίσαρος Luke ii. 1. Acts xvii. 7. τῶν ποστόλων Acts xvi. 4. It is true that Eusebius of Cæsarea and others understand the words in the Epistle to the Ephesians, νόμος ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασιν (compare Coloss. ii. 14) as relating to doctrine, but incorrectly.

The different meaning of the word in all other passages is a presumption against such an interpretation. Moreover, it is no New Testament idea, least of all a Pauline one, that Christ effected the abrogation of the Law by his doctrine; for

\* *Th. Kliefoth, Einleitung in die Dogmengeschichte. Parchim, 1839.*  
—*Niedner, das Recht der Dogmen, s. dess. Zeitscht. f. histor. Theolog.*  
1851. 4.



Christ's efficiency is attributed in the New Testament not to his teaching, but to his doing and his suffering. This passage is therefore not against us; *δόγματα* is here equivalent to *statutes, commandments*, that is, of the Mosaic Law, and is of cognate signification to *ἐντολαί*. The Apostles were conscious that they imparted not subjective human knowledge but the contents of a Divine Revelation, and therefore made use not of *δόγμα*, but *λόγος*, to designate Christian doctrine. This distinction has been pointed out by Marcellus of Ancyra, in a sentence preserved to us in a work written against him by Eusebius of Cæsarea; τὸ τοῦ δόγματος ὄνομα ἀνθρώπινης ἔχει τι βουλῆς τε καὶ γνώμης ("The term *dogma* has in it something of human purpose and opinion"). There were two standpoints by which the distinction was not recognised; namely, that of a harsh supranaturalism and the one diametrically opposed to it, a rationalism which could find in the New Testament nothing but what was purely human. On the former standpoint, the phrase *δόγματα θεῶν* was used at an early period by the Fathers of the Church for *λόγος θεῶν*. They confounded the peculiarly human apprehension of divine truth with divine truth as it is in itself, so that each person recognised that truth only in the form that suited his own individuality. Rightly understood, the word *δόγμα* is peculiarly fitted to mark the human side in the development of divine truth.

History is a thing purely human. No sooner does human culture begin to germinate, than we behold attempts at historical composition. Its office is to impart unity to the consciousness of Mankind when it has been divided by Time. It originates in the effort to connect the Present and the Past, and in the conviction that the vicissitudes of Time are a revelation of what is eternal and divine. Everything lies within its province which, though in itself unchangeable and exalted above Time, can be presented in the succession of events: everything which, although divine, can be propagated and developed by human agency. But such development can only be rendered intelligible by tracing the connexion of one age with another, and the conjunction of each individual phenomenon with all the rest. Such is the office of History. It forms the connecting link between two worlds, the changeable and the unchangeable; hence it has a strict relation to practical life, inasmuch as we belong to a higher order of

things, and yet in our development are subject to the vicissitudes of time. It is the highest aim of mankind to advance from the human to the divine, and to this the function of History corresponds, leading us to recognise the revelation of a higher government of the world.

To use the words of Diodorus Siculus, the Historian is the Prophet of Divine Providence (*πρόνοια*).

But does that hold good of Christianity which may be affirmed of every other idea that develops itself among men, that it can be understood only by studying the connexion of one age to another in relation to it?

Attempts have been made to trace the origin of Christianity to a mixture of the spiritual or mental tendencies that belonged to the age in which it appeared. But an enlarged unprejudiced contemplation of History will show that it cannot be explained either by any single tendency or by any combination of tendencies. The announcement of Redemption to a race burdened with sin constitutes the essence of Christianity, and consequently points to a fact which could not proceed from History, but must be of higher origin. The very idea of Redemption indicates this, and not less so the life of Christ which cannot be understood in the same way as that of any other man; but as he is to be conceived of only as the Redeemer of Humanity, so his life must be viewed as a new creation in Humanity. But though we are thus led to contemplate Christianity as something supernatural, yet, on the other hand, its appearance in the world stands in connexion with human development, and its connexion with every other development must be so much more intimate because it is the final aim of all development, and to be understood requires to be viewed in that light. The Apostle in saying that "God sent forth His Son when the fulness of time came," Gal. iv. 4 (*τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου*), indicates that all ages were made to co-operate for the appearance of Christianity. Although it entered into the world as a higher element of transformation, yet it was not designed to be propagated solely by miracles, but was subjected to the same laws of development as all other things, and is distinguished from them only by the spirit with which it develops itself according to these laws.

If we now inquire into the relation of Dogma to Christianity, it is evident that Dogma does not form an original part

of it, but is derived and secondary. The Essence of Christianity consists not in a system of Ideas, but in a tendency of the inner life. It is a pregnant saying of George Hamann, that "the pearl of Christianity is a hidden life in God consisting neither in dogmas, nor ideas nor ceremonies." Dogmas are only that form of the life rooted in God which is constructed by thought and reflection. They may exist where the essence of Christianity is wanting, though without it, their origination would have been impossible. Hence dogmatic differences may exist among men who in the essentials of Christianity stand on an equal footing. If Christ had originally established a definite system of ideas as constituting the essence of Christianity, we should require in all Christians an identity of ideas. This, however, was not his intention, but to leaven by his teaching the entire human race. He himself spoke of Christianity as a leaven, that is, a divine power taking root in the soul and the inner life. This leaven when deposited in the hearts of men, gradually transforms all the powers of the soul by working outwards from within. Hence the intellectual consciousness of Christianity could not be exhibited at once; it was first to be received into the inward experience, and then the consciousness of what this doctrine contained was gradually developed. The mode of effecting this development was determined by the mental culture of the age. No sooner had Christianity made an entrance into the inner life of Humanity than it was confronted by a hostile tendency of the Intellect which could be only gradually overcome. Hence in the first ages of the Church we observe a great variety of dogmatic ideas, and many discordant forms, and yet, under all, it was possible to maintain the continuity of the Christian life and consciousness. Now the History of Dogmas traces the genetic development of Christian doctrine; it shows in what forms the same Christian truth has been developed as doctrine, and the relation of these forms to one another and to Christianity itself.

That we are able to form such an historical survey is owing to the peculiar nature of Christianity by which it is distinguished from all other Religions. In the latter, which were not in close connexion with a divine Revelation and on that account are termed Religions of Nature, Religion was exhibited in a partial manner in the feelings which were over-

powered by the sensuous element. This stage produced only obscure religious sentiments which could not become the subject matter of any intelligible doctrine. This standpoint gave birth to *mythology* instead of Dogma, since the Ideas were not received with freedom, but arbitrarily governed the human mind, and by an interchange of the symbol and the idea an historical vehicle was formed in which the ideas were embodied; but they impressed the popular life only with a faint light and a mixture of truth and falsehood. On the other hand along with this Mythology appeared a speculative doctrine of the Priests which blended the philosophic and religious elements in strange confusion, and thus a chasm was formed between the religion of the Priests and that of the People. To both classes Religion was a one-sided affair, to the latter of the feelings, and to the former of the understanding. In this form Religion could maintain itself for centuries among the Oriental nations. In the West it was otherwise, especially under the influence and control of Grecian culture. Here a scientific method was formed, independent of Tradition; a conscious Philosophy made its appearance; free mental development entered the lists against traditionary Religion, and in the issue came off victorious. In *Judaism*, it is true we find a clear Theistic doctrine instead of Mythology; but even in this form religion was intimately amalgamated with a peculiar civil polity, and was not designed apart from that to develop itself under all the forms of human culture. Christianity first of all presented Religion as a self-subsistent power, independent of any political, poetical, or speculative element, as something which gave birth to an independent religious consciousness among all men, and to a doctrine which would be apprehended with progressive clearness in proportion to its being studied. Hence Christianity alone has furnished a history of Religion considered as doctrine. This History has no limits, for Christianity proves itself to be the only Religion which can satisfy the necessities of Man. It has nothing to dread from a conflict with other forms of culture, for it appropriates all. It has an inexhaustible fulness which can be developed in the consciousness with ever increasing profundity. Not that we obtain anything absolutely new, but we have a deeper insight into its contents. Certainly Christianity could no more than

any other religion escape a collision with the secular culture that opposed it; but while other religions fell into decay because men had outgrown them, Christianity fared differently. Although the conflict has been more fierce during the Christian era, because Natural Reason has brought to the struggle new powers derived from Christianity; yet the human mind has ever been obliged to revert to this Religion as the only one in which it can find satisfaction. It belongs to the History of Dogmas to follow the course of this development.

## 2. THE RELATION OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS TO OTHER COGNATE BRANCHES OF STUDY.

The History of Dogmas stands in very close connexion with the History of the Church, and hence used to be treated as only one department of it; for as Ecclesiastical History is occupied in tracing the development of Christianity among mankind in all its extent, its development as doctrine is necessarily included. But in a general History of the Church this can only be discussed along with whatever besides concerns the development of Christianity in the life of Humanity, and hence not with that thoroughness which it demands as a branch of clerical education. The History of Dogmas must be contemplated from two points of view, either as a section of General Church History, or as an independent study. Church History determines the extensive importance of the phenomena; the History of Dogmas estimates their intensive value. In Church History they are not noticed till their influence has been generally extended; in the History of Dogmas, conflicting opinions are traced to their germ. The former allows no place to differences till they are developed in doctrinal controversies: the latter gropes its way to their hidden origin. Church History busies itself with all the outward embroilments of controversy: the History of Dogmas is confined to the dogmatic interest.

*The History of Dogmatics* is to be distinguished from the History of Dogmas, inasmuch as the former has to do with Dogmas as they are combined in a system, while the latter treats of them in their separate capacity. Yet we cannot entirely sever one from the other. It may, indeed, often happen that the contrarieties which make their appearance are not apprehended in all their fulness, but the difference in

the contemplation of Dogmas cannot be understood, if it be not traced back to the general treatment of Dogmatics. In the development of the individual Dogma we must aim at discovering its new germinating relation to the whole.

Moreover the History of Dogmas is allied to SYMBOLIC, or the various fundamental dogmatic forms in the Confessions of the different Churches. The connexion of the two is very apparent; for Symbolic has to do with the existing differences of the Confessions, but the general tendencies which at last found expression in these Confessions, were only gradually developed. To seek out the early germs of these differences is the business of a History of Dogmas which in treating of individual dogmas has to take account of the differences of which the origin must be traced to each. The History of Dogmas proceeds from a definite historical interest, a sort of offset from Church History: *Symbolic* on the other hand sprang from a controversial dogmatic interest, and in former times was termed *Polemic*. Its object was to defend the standpoint of one Confession definitely expressed against others, and this necessarily involved giving an account of the dogmatic system that was impugned. But through the prevalence of a partial, one-sided *Polemic*, injustice was frequently done to the other standpoints, and they were not treated according to their real merits. When this defect was perceived, and attention was paid to the common Christian element which lay at the basis, the ancient art of *Polemic* was repudiated, and a substitute was found for it in the Comparative representation of the doctrinal system of the various confessions which was called *Symbolic*. The progress in impartial historical contemplation which since Planck's time has been applied to opposing standpoints, is unquestionable. But though this as a transitional measure was beneficial, it is not clear that this branch of study should always remain in the form of Symbolic, and that Polemic should be entirely superseded. Even Symbolic may be handled with Polemic partiality, as for example by Möhler. Nor is it essential to Polemic to treat an opponent's standpoint unfairly; it can be carried on very dispassionately, and opposing views may be represented with the impartiality of a justice made attractive by love. As Symbolic originally was subservient to dogmatic purposes, so now after overcoming the false tendency of

Polemic, it must return to its earlier object. Thus what has been distinguished by the name of Symbolic would be included in Polemic, and the presupposed historical development in the History of Dogmas.

The province of the History of Dogmas may be more exactly determined by noticing the points on which it touches other departments. Some might wish to include in it the development of the various Apostolic types of teaching, or the representation of the manner in which Christ himself had taught. Certainly what we have said of the nature of historical Inquiry is applicable here. The various stages and forms of the Truth imparted by Revelation are to be distinguished in their successive historical development from the Truth as presented by Christ himself. But if we make this investigation a part of the History of Dogmas, it cannot be discussed with that fulness and depth which the importance of the subject requires. Moreover, though the development of Christian truth by the Apostles was regulated by the laws of the Human and the Historical, it was distinguished from all subsequent developments by that one harmonising Spirit of Christ which so controlled the Apostles as the immediate organs of Christ's revelation that they could not fall into any irreconcilable differences. We only see in them that in a divided form which was one in Christ. Theirs was the plastic, normal, creative age; and hence the apostolic writings are the absolute source of Christian knowledge, the rule of Christian life and of Christian truth. This rule, as it was carried down the stream of Time, became the subject of controversies and contradictions, from which it must again be freed and restored to its original unity. Hence the History of Dogmas is distinguished from the history of Christian truth as it stands in the original records, which is to be regarded as the peculiar province of New Testament Theology and especially of New Testament Dogmatics. \*This stands at the head of historical studies connecting itself on one side with Dogmatics. The History of Dogmas is bounded at another point by the representation of the condition of the Church at the present time, which is the business of Statistics, a department which after a beginning had been made by Staudlin, has been principally cultivated as its importance deserves, by Schleiermacher. The History of Dogmas relates therefore to the development of

Christian doctrine in the intermediate period between pure Apostolic Christianity and the Church of the present day.

Among the secular branches of study the History of Philosophy is very closely connected with the History of Dogmas, having the same relation to it as Dogmatics to Philosophy. They have many objects in common, but their respective standpoints are very different. Philosophy develops the consciousness of reason out of itself; Dogmatics on the contrary is occupied with historical data, with the development of truths presented in the divine Word which have passed into the Christian consciousness. Two factors enter into the construction of dogmas, the religious element, and the element of scientific culture in which the Christian doctrine develops itself. As the History of Dogmas traces the development of revealed truth by the co-operation of these two factors, so no right understanding of this process of development is possible without a reference to the influence of the Schools of Philosophy. The question arises, in what relation does Philosophy stand to the spirit of Christianity, how far does it prepare the mind for Christianity, or does it introduce a hostile spirit and infuse foreign elements? On the other hand, as Philosophy cannot separate itself from historical development, so it cannot escape the influence of Christianity, and hence its own history cannot be understood without a knowledge of Christianity, and especially of the History of Dogmas.

### 3. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS FOR THE CLERGY.

The importance of the History of Dogmas in this respect will appear if we compare its design with the nature and object of theological study. In making this comparison we may set out with two distinct but not incompatible views of Theology, the one directed more to its *outward* nature, the other to its *inward*. In the former view Schleiermacher defines it to be the Science which relates to the guidance of the Church, that is, the development of the knowledge and regulations which concern the management and practical efficiency of the Church. But the Church internally considered as a spiritual community can only be guided by the administration of divine Truth, on which its very existence depends. This furnishes us with another idea of Theology, as the Science of this Truth, which is *to be drawn from its original source, to be developed*



and vindicated. The question then is, what necessary connexion has the History of Dogmas with Theology under these two aspects. The guidance of the Church requires a correct understanding of the state of the Church at the present time. But in all cases, the life of any age can only be understood by viewing it in its historical relations. For every state or condition has become what it is through its antecedents, and is only to be understood by finding out the causes which produced it, so that universally the Present can only be intelligible when viewed in connexion with the whole chain of historical developments in which one link depends upon another. Thus each particular event requires to be closely studied. We can understand the present standpoint of the Christian life and its dogmatic tendencies only by the help of the History of Dogmas. And if this is an indispensable requisite for the guidance of the Church in times of quiet development, much more so is it at critical periods. Then, in order to ascertain our real position we need to know how the various tendencies in action originated. Every man is, in one sense, an historical production; the ideas which form his mental life, have come upon him through the course of development, in which he moves. But we must raise ourselves above this dependence in order to be competent judges of our own age. There is indeed a theory which regards the prevailing mode of thinking as a *Vox Dei*, and yields to it with a blind obsequiousness. But viewed from the standpoint of Christianity and the unbiased contemplation of moral truth, this is of no value. In every age good and evil influences are mingled, and we observe the agency of God's Spirit and of the Spirit of Falsehood. Hence, it is of the greatest importance to distinguish what really belongs to an advance in the kingdom of God, and what proceeds from the re-action of the anti-Christian principle. We must follow not the Spirit of the age but the Spirit of God. It is indispensable that we should raise ourselves to a standpoint of objective truth. This will be best done by contemplating a definite period in its genetic development and learning from that, what influence it has on the development of the kingdom of God by means of the divine and anti-Christian elements which it contains. History places before us the tendencies of our age in their causes and moving principles.

*There is an opposite error which sometimes makes its*

appearance in relation to Dogmatics. Either people attach themselves slavishly to a prescribed form, as if it alone contained absolute truth; or, abjuring such one-sidedness and acknowledging the variableness of forms, they regard everything as unsettled, and would bring even essential truth within the range of changeable forms. While the former class would regard only the ancient form apart from the progressive movement of the human mind, these persons speak of nothing but movement. The former are to be met with, especially in times of defective historical culture, as in the dogmatism of the middle ages, and in the Lutheran Church of the seventeenth century. Historical Study, on the contrary, since it aims at forming conceptions of Christianity both in its rise and progress, teaches us to distinguish between the essential and the unessential in it; we learn to discern what constitutes true Christianity under various forms, and are put on our guard against confining ourselves to one form, and uncharitably condemning every other. As to the other error when on account of the human in Dogmas, the divine they contain is ignored and nothing is left of Christianity but a worthless residuum without vitality,—History is a preservative against this also; for as it teaches us the various conceptions of Christianity in their genetic development, it shows in all of them the peculiar essence of this Religion, and likewise the power with which it has penetrated the heart of Humanity.

Yet the study of History serves not merely for understanding the Present; it has an important relation to Truth in all its branches, and its own special aim. Thus the History of Dogmas is peculiarly important for Christianity, as far as it presents one branch of it, namely, that of doctrine. It shows in the development of doctrine, the process of culture which the human mind has experienced under the influence of Christianity, which does not remain as so much dead stock, but as a leaven must evolve itself more and more in the consciousness. We behold the Truth proceeding from Christ to conflict with Error and triumph over it, and we have in that a pledge of its eternally victorious power. We not only perceive what effect the consciousness of Christian truth immediately produces on men, so as to lead their thinking to new results; but also how Reason by the impulse it received from Christianity has attained to many truths which otherwise

its unaided powers could not have discovered; this thought has been admirably worked out by Augustine in his beautiful work *De verâ Religione*. As we descry in History the traces of a higher necessity, we learn to understand the self-developing process of Christian truth. Scientific inquiry finds order where ignorance sees only confusion, and what leads the latter astray, serves to confirm the former in the truth. Hence the superficial judgment to which the study of heresies seems useless and an acquaintance with dogmatic controversies a fruitless burden for the memory—is easily set aside. If we will but view such phenomena in connexion with their causes, we shall discover the deeper reasons which bear witness of the Truth, and in many a seemingly unimportant fact, a fundamental tendency of the human mind will be revealed which re-appears in our own times. If it is important for the interests of Science to understand an abnormal natural phenomenon, it is still more important to form an accurate judgment of an irregular spiritual phenomenon

#### 4. THE RIGHT METHOD OF TREATING THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

In this inquiry the various methods of treating History in general, in all departments, come under our consideration. The rudest mode of presenting History is that of *Chronicles*, in which facts and phenomena are set down and arranged only according to the order of Time. In this form History is simply an outward thing, a lifeless aggregate, a mere burden for the memory. Aristotle, it is true, seems to make History consist only of matters of detail, when he says that Poetry represents the Universal, whatever takes place according to the laws of Possibility and Necessity, and is therefore more philosophical and noble than History which only gives an account of particulars. But in this we cannot agree with him, for the province of History also includes the Universal and the Necessary. Polybius, on the other hand, justly remarks: "If we take away from History the *Why*, and the *How*, and the *for What*, nought is left save what may give momentary pleasure, but is productive of no lasting advantage." Least of all can Chronicles suffice for the History of Dogmas which relates to spiritual facts, to convictions of the Soul, which cannot be contemplated or understood in a state of isolation, but

only in connexion with what is internal. Hence we must advance from the Chronicle to what Polybius calls *the pragmatic method*, *ἐξέτος πραγματικὴς*, which contemplates the phenomena of History, under the relation of cause and effect. But even here, great variety is possible. Even Polybius distinguishes the *αἰτίαι* and the *ἀρχαί*, the internal and the external causes in History; the former being the deeply lying germ, the latter being the apparently first and immediate causes and beginnings. This distinction is of special importance in the History of Dogmas which treats of recondite causes and spiritual phenomena. Their idea and aim cannot be explained by outward Pragmatism which attempts to elucidate the greatest dogmatic phenomena from without, by external circumstances, personal partialities and the like, and especially in controversies would trace everything to worldly interests and political intrigues. Or if it should be in quest of a psychological connexion, it does not seek for the deepest such as is founded in the development of constitution of a religious life. Hence the development of doctrine appears as a blind play of chance, the greatest contrarieties seem to arise out of nothing, and Dogmas are like passing meteors. By such a mode of treatment the History of Dogmas becomes subordinate to that of political events; it possesses no unity and consequently is devoid of all interest. But nearer examination shows that this method must be very superficial. What so deeply moved men's minds could not arise merely from the vicious passions of individuals, but have some far deeper connexion with the human spirit. That outward Pragmatism confounding the outward occasion with the internal principle, imagined that it could trace many controversies to mere logomachy, as for example the Nestorian to the word *Θεοτόκος*. But this controversy could not have arisen, if the word had not had a deeper signification for the men who used it. It was the watch-word for deeper lying contrarieties. Thus also the dispute between the eastern and western churches was brought to an issue by outward occasions, but the antagonism of the two parties lay far deeper, and the dispute had been long in preparation. Outward influences of certain tendencies made their appearance, but they could not originate a dogmatic interest; they only gave another form to what was already in existence. The Church possesses a peculiar power which

opposes and repels foreign intrusions. Thus therefore, suppose the question to be decided is whether another doctrine had been formed through the Jewish-Alexandrian Platonism. The personal influence of a single individual could not avail to introduce this or that Dogma; it could only succeed, not by its arbitrary action, but as representing a general tendency. In the attempt to elevate personality above the general laws of development, History is degraded into a patchwork of individual men. This erroneous method originated in the age of Rationalism when the internal energy of Christianity and its relation to human nature were not understood. It satisfied neither the philosophic nor the religious point of view.

From outward causes we are therefore led to internal principles and their reciprocal operation. We must contemplate the essential characteristics of Christianity, and its relation to human nature; and the various peculiarities of times, nations, and individuals in relation to Christianity. It is true that in the development of Dogmas, a sound Christian spirit has not always conquered and expelled foreign admixtures; but even morbid phenomena may form a transition to a healthy Christian life; Truth makes progress by means of revolutions and re-actions. In this way Christianity verifies its power as the leaven of Humanity. This course of development pervades the whole History of the Church. Even when a tendency not resulting from the pure development of the Church gains the ascendancy, we shall find that this is not arbitrarily intruded, but corresponds to a certain stage of development. Thus the Catholic standpoint is not founded on the pure essence of the Gospel, neither has it been forced on the Church by individuals. This principle will always hold good, that nothing from without can be forced upon the developing process of the Church. The construction of a History of Dogmas according to such a Pragmatic method may be called the organic-genetic in contrast to Chronicles and mere outward histories, and as far as we regard the developing process of the Church not as an accidental aggregate, but as an internally connected Organism.

A one-sided speculative construction of History stands opposed to the outward Empiricism of a false Pragmatism. It is so far right that it seeks after an internal unity in the course of History, but it is wrong in the *à priori* method by which it would deduce that unity from an idea which can only

be learnt from the survey of events and the course of their development as it lies before us. It refers everything back to the identical contrasts of thinking without a reference to the diversity of the events. The various stages are presupposed which the idea must pass through in its development, and everything that takes place must be stretched on this Procrustes' bed. The religious contents of dogmatic phenomena lie in the very being of the Christian consciousness and only by means of it can these developments be rightly understood. This consciousness rejects any general scheme such as an ideal process would be, which resembles an arithmetical calculation in which minds are treated as numbers, and every thing is submitted to a logical necessity. If a superficial Pragmatism attributes too much to individuality, here it is all set aside since individuals only come under consideration as blind organs of an Idea and as necessary factors in its development. Still the importance of great personalities who are conscious representatives of a mental tendency must not be overlooked, but be understood in the connexion of their religious development. In historical developments a law, a divine necessity prevails which we have to study in the contemplation of events, but there is at the same time a free activity, for it is the history of a world of free agents. In the free development lies an irrational principle, and necessity can only be regarded as hypothetical and relative. Hence, not everything, as is here assumed, is subject to an equal necessity; but we recognise in History the re-actions of evil and of error, and not merely what proceeds from pure Christianity belongs to the representation of the development of Christian doctrine but also many a corruption of it; and the perfect adjustment can only take place at the completion of the History.

This leads us to the idea of Heresy. Its History forms an important element in the history of Dogmas, since it has had sensible influence on the development of Christian doctrine. In the original idea of *αἵρεσις*, which primarily means a choice, and next an opinion which a man adopts from free choice, nothing wrong or evil is implied, for among the Greeks the various principles of the Schools of Philosophy were so denominated. But the Christian consciousness understood this word in a bad sense. For Christianity presented itself

as divine Truth in opposition to arbitrary human opinion, and aimed at imparting by the truth a unity to the religious consciousness. Hence the word acquired the meaning of an arbitrary difference of opinion which stood at variance with the unity aimed at by Christianity, and denoted opinions which disturbed the unity of the Christian consciousness. Thus even in the New Testament the word *aisiōis* is applied to those arbitrary divisions which tended to break up the unity of the Christian community. (1 Cor. xi. 19).

In the application of this term we must distinguish the *historic* meaning according to which it denoted what was regarded at any time as heresy, and the *dogmatic*. In reference to the former, everything depends on the standpoint of those who used it. Not everything, which at any time was called Heresy, can be really considered as such. When men were engaged in striving after uniformity in the Church and in Dogma, it was possible to brand as heresy certain representations which rested on the same ground of Christian consciousness, and only differed in the scientific mode of viewing them. Or certain views which had a Christian basis, but contained some heretical elements, were called heresies. Even the pure Truth might be regarded as heresy when men set out with a mixture of error in their views of Christianity.

If we would develop the *dogmatic* idea of heresy, as it may be vindicated from the standpoint of the genuine Dogma, we must set out from that on which the Unity of the Christian consciousness rests—the fundamental facts of the Christian faith, and mark that as Heresy which does not receive them in their integrity and blends a foreign element with Christianity. If we contemplate the appearance of Christ, we behold an unfathomable many-sidedness, and an inexhaustible depth. No one is able to comprehend his whole life in its entirety—each one apprehends it partially, one on this side and another on that. Such was the case with the Apostles themselves, and so through the whole course of the Church's development—the partial conceptions of the Saviour complement one another. Hence it is that a variety of tendencies can co-exist. But when there is an exclusive preponderance in one direction when exaggerated and partial views are formed, then the Life of Christ becomes a one-sided fragment.

In a similar manner in the life of Christians, manifold

opposites balance each other and are bound together to form a higher Unity. But if we acknowledge only outward experience, the unity of the Christian consciousness is marred, and Heresies arise. The Truth indeed is not to be found by an outward adjustment of contrarieties, but it is in its very nature elevated above opposites and forms their reconciliation.

The earliest heretical influences found their way into the Church from Judaism and Heathenism, and those from the first-mentioned quarter not only opposed Christianity by direct conflict, but were attracted towards it, and by blending with it impaired its purity. These tendencies belonged not to one age only, but re-appear with corresponding results at various times. It is therefore our business to distinguish in every age how far heresies partially agree with Christianity and how far they are absolutely heretical.

This discussion leads us to consider the special requisites for writing the history of Dogmas. It is justly demanded of the Historian that he should write with impartiality, *sine ira et studio*. For if fixed to the standpoint of a party, he will present in glowing colours the representations that favour it, the bright side alone without any shadows; and on the other hand depreciate whatever does not agree with this standpoint. The injurious operation of theological polemics has been strikingly shown in the history of Dogmas. Thus a one-sided Catholicism has been able to see in Protestantism, not the Christian element, but only what it regards as impure additions, and as it looked at everything through the same prejudiced medium, what was historical has been branded as heresy, so that a great part of the development of the Church has appeared in a distorted shape. Protestantism stands on a higher stage of development, and thus is better able to judge of the preceding stages in a loving and equitable spirit; nevertheless there is a one-sided and narrow-minded Protestantism which is incapable of discerning what is Christian in Catholicism, though mixed with what is falsely Catholic; this is shown in the judgments passed by Protestant writers on the History of Dogmas in the Middle Ages.

But frequently the demand for Impartiality has been extended too far. The Historian has been called upon to repress his *subjective* tendencies so entirely as to render his



views and representations purely *objective*. But this is an impracticable requirement; a man cannot deny what he is; he cannot turn himself into a *tabula rasa*; the representation of any object must be conditioned by the standpoint of the observer. Such negativity and indifference would not suffice for the production of a chronological aggregate, for even this requires judgment in its arrangement. An organic, genetic arrangement would certainly be impossible, since there could be no cordial interest in the events, nor anything more than a superficial collocation and junction of them. Whoever would be correctly acquainted with the development of Christianity, must have a correct idea of Christianity and of its relation to other phenomena, as a man must have an idea of a State or of Philosophy in order to compose a History of a State or of Philosophy; complete indifference in a writer on such subjects is not possible; to enter into them he must have an analogous standpoint; and therefore for a History of Dogmas, he must have a dogmatic standpoint. And we cannot regard it as a blemish if the effect of this is visible in the historical representation. Only every writer must strive to free himself from prejudice and party-spirit. The more free and elevated the point-of-view, so much more complete will be the survey, since it will not be overcast with that obscurity which accompanies one-sidedness. We are not required to lay aside our Subjectivity, but to purify it more and more, and to surrender ourselves to Truth. Thus the historical representations will give evidence of the correctness of our dogmatic knowledge and convictions.

The question here arises, whether there is not a standpoint elevated above the history of the Church, from which we can understand the process of its development. Whoever finds himself on a higher standpoint of religious development, whoever has a purer acquaintance with the nature of Religion, will be able to judge more correctly respecting it, than the man who occupies a more prejudiced and corrupt religious standpoint. Thus we can better understand the heathen religions and Mohammedanism, than their own adherents, because we know how to distinguish the truly religious and the sensuous. And so a Philosophy of Religion will be formed by Christianity from itself, and in it the right standpoint will

be found in order to understand the History of all Religions. But how are we to manage with the phenomena that lie within the circle of Christianity itself? In modern times methods of treating the History of Dogmas have been proposed which have tried to assume a standpoint above Christianity. A distinction has been made in it between the substance of the thought and the empirical appearance which forms its envelope. Thus STRAUSS complains that Christianity has not been yet discussed with the same freedom as other Religions. But since, as we have remarked, Christianity is the absolute Religion, which alone meets all the religious wants of Man, no higher standpoint can be given for religious inquiries than itself. Moreover, religious phenomena are only intelligible by means of their principle, Religion, which has its seat in the soul of man, and not by mere intellectual notions. In fact what is presented as the essence of Christianity from the standpoint of the Intellect often consists of ideas which have no root in Christianity. Strauss, for example, endeavours to trace back the whole fulness of the divine life in Christianity to universal ideas; to an immanent reason which occupies the place of the living God and by which God and the World are interchanged or confounded; to the eternity of the Spirit in mankind which is substituted for a personal life, and which makes man as transitory as all other earthly phenomena; in fine, the idea of Humanity comes in place of the historical Christ. This mode of thinking is in direct contradiction to Christianity, and therefore cannot comprehend it. It also contradicts History; for what has exercised the greatest influence on the inner and outer life of man? not abstract ideas certainly, but Christianity in its own flesh and blood, the personal religious truths which form the vital principle of the Christian Church. So that Christianity cannot be separated from Christ and his Apostles, with whom it originated, nor from the facts which accompanied its first promulgation; our task will ever be to develop more widely that which was granted to mankind at the first appearance of Christianity. Hence, no Philosophy of Religion can explain Christianity but what is grounded on Christianity itself, as it shows itself through all ages in the Christian consciousness. Therefore for the consideration of the History of Dogmas there can be no other standpoint than that of Christianity

itself; from thence all the imperfect and erroneous modes of religion must be examined and the relation to the pure Truth pointed out.

### 5. ARRANGEMENT OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

In historical composition there are two methods of arrangement—according to the order of Time (the Synchronic), or according to the nature of the events. Following the former method, all those events would be placed together which happened at the same time; the latter method, applied to the History of Dogmas, would trace each single dogma in its development through all ages. The first arrangement has this advantage, that everything is viewed in its historical connexion, but on the other hand, it is defective in real unity. In the other arrangement, the unity that depends on the nature of the facts is prominent, but then events are dis-severed from the times in which they happened and the phenomena are too much isolated: the substantial dogmatic interest is increased but the historic is lessened. Monographs on the history of particular dogmas have, indeed, great value, yet for the reasons just mentioned it would be injurious to adopt this plan for the entire History of Dogmas. Hence the two methods must be used in conjunction. Accordingly it will be well to divide the History of the Dogma into several sections, as the development may make desirable. The division into centuries has been sometimes chosen but arbitrarily, for a development does not always tally with such periods. Certain critical periods will give us a correct basis of division; these, as Schleiermacher says, are marked junctures in development, the signals of a new creation, and hence are termed *εποχαι* Epochs, pauses or resting-places for contemplation. What exists at the epoch in the germ, is developed to a more advanced stage, and thus afterwards becomes the *Period*. The former denotes the fountain-head, the latter the stream; their limits are where a new form of culture again appears in an Epoch. The Epochs are either critical and destructive, or creative and organizing. In determining the epochs for a History of Dogmas, the question arises whether they should be made to fit the general History of the Church, or be formed independently. On the one hand, the Epochs of *Church History* mark the most universal and deeply influential

changes. And the general causes which operate destructively or creatively on life in general, must also manifest themselves in reference to particular doctrines. On the other hand the Dogma has its own special development, and appears to require its own special epochs. ORIGEN and his school, for instance, mark in the History of Dogmas a new Epoch and Period, while these in Church History begin somewhat late with Constantine the Great. But the most essential Factor in the formation of Dogmas is the religious Life which is ever the same; and hence if in the development of Dogmas a new Epoch has already been prepared, the consequences will probably first be seen in the general, new, spiritual movement, which also marks an Epoch in Church History. Thus Origen appears as the closing point of the preceding, and the preparation of the following Period; but his influence did not attain its height before the fourth century, when a new Period in Church History also begins. Accordingly we shall do well to connect the epochs and periods of Church History and of the History of Dogmas.

If we take a general survey of these divisions, we shall, first of all, have to consider how after Christianity had entered the world, the doctrine propagated by the Apostles met with opposition and developed itself among Jews and Heathens. This Period we shall designate *the Apologetic*, not merely on account of the Vindication of Christianity against Judaism and Heathenism, but principally because Christianity established itself in its peculiar character against these different standpoints. The boundary line is here marked by Origen, in whom, along with his apologetic, we descry the germ of a systematic tendency. This latter tendency was unfolded by the School of Origen, so that, with the fourth century, when the Church came forth from its struggle with the powers of Heathenism, and had gained the Victory in the Roman World, the Systematic Polemic Period begins, which lasts to the end of the sixth century. These two periods embrace the whole formative process of Christian doctrine in the classical ages. The Greek Church continued still longer in the element of Hellenic culture, but as it gradually sunk into a state of stagnation, we cannot form epochs from the events in it, but only according to the development of the nations, who by this time became conspicuous in the World's

History, and who shared not in this torpidity. The great revolution founded on the ruins of the Roman Empire was commenced chiefly by the Germanic nations. But while the centuries immediately succeeding are very important in reference to the History of the Church, and a strongly marked new life appears in them, yet from the nature of the case they were of less importance in the History of Dogmas. For Christianity must first penetrate deeply into the life of the new nations before the corresponding formative process could appear in the Dogma. On this account, we must join several centuries together, as a period of transition, in which preparation was made for a great new creation. This Period extends from the end of the sixth to the end of the eleventh century. In the following centuries that peculiar spiritual creation comes first to view which proceeded from the development of Christianity among these new, vigorous nations. During this period, the Catholic element, that is, the one-sided reference to the Church instead of Christ, which had been for some time in preparation, predominated in the life of the Church. Hence arose the secularization of the idea of the Church and of the Theocracy—the confounding of the Old and New Testament standpoints, and the fettering of the Christian spirit by an outward legal form. The principles that proceeded from this standpoint were now presented in dogmatic thought. This was the time for maturing the Catholic element, the foundation of the Catholic dogma for future ages. This also constitutes the peculiarity of Scholasticism which was now developed. For the dependence of Theology as of all Science on Tradition stands in connexion with it, and the dependence of Philosophy on Theology of which it is the *ancilla*, and from this follows a mingling of the Philosophical element with Theology. But since in the course of this development, Theology was continually losing more of its original elements, and hastening to decay, re-actions of the original Christian spirit set in and prepared the New Epoch of the Reformation. Here we discern the development of the emancipated Christian spirit in opposition to the authority of a secularized Church, and of the Christian element set free from the Jewish standpoint. As the Apostle Paul was the first who fought against a Judaizing tendency in the Christian Church, so at the Reformation the Pauline standpoint was the most influ-

ential. The principle of the Reformation is applicable to the development of the doctrines of the Christian faith, though not equally to each particular dogma. The two forms of dogma, the Lutheran and the Reformed, in which the same principle diverges in different directions, are specially to be noted. A stagnation followed the first living development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Catholic Church had become torpid with the ecclesiastical formalism; the Protestant Church was in a similar state owing to a one-sided intellectual dogmatism. As the predominant form was retained most decidedly in opposition to all free development such as the principle of Protestantism required, re-actions of the original principle were called forth both in the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. This tendency was developed in the eighteenth century as emancipation from dogmatic authority far beyond its first aim. The Reformatory aim occasioned a Revolution, because it was negative. A new general epoch of development among the nations of Christendom followed. The mental culture which had been developed under the control of the Church, sought to make itself independent. Reason, struggling for emancipation, after having been kept down by the despotism of Church power, rebelled; Christian Doctrine was obliged to enter the lists with this antagonist, but as it possessed a more powerful principle, it was able to surmount the danger. The conflict served to purify it from the corrupting human elements, and led to the harmony of the pure human with the divine. Thus in Germany particularly, beginning with SEMLER, there was a period of breaking up of established modes of thought, but this critical process was a purification and the preparation for a new Creation which proceeded principally from Schleiermacher. But this could only be developed by a renewed conflict with Rationalism, and in this conflict we are still engaged.

#### 6. OF THE SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

Of all History the sources are two-fold: immediate and mediate. The immediate furnish the raw material without elaboration; the mediate give it to a certain extent prepared. Works of the first class are those which give us an immediate counterpart of events, being their direct offspring; those of

the second class furnish us with the accounts of others respecting the phenomena, and cannot be valued as sources in the strict sense, since the facts are represented not objectively but according to individual apprehension. On this account we must here distinguish the materials, and the method and the standpoint of the narrator; we cannot rely on such information unconditionally, but must submit it to historical criticism. We have to inquire whether the narrator had the opportunity of ascertaining the Truth, and how far he was capable of taking it in; consequently, in what relation he stood to the dogmatic tendency he attempts to describe. Such a mediate source can have the value of the immediate only for the knowledge it affords of the dogmatic standpoint of the author as far as can be gained from his narrative.

Spurious sources which may be very important are to be distinguished by means of criticism from such as are genuine. But the most valuable sources of information are writings that are strictly dogmatic, such as Symbols or Confessions of Faith, both those of the General Church and those of particular Churches and individuals.\* In comparing these documents, we are to consider the points of agreement and disagreement belonging to particular tendencies and schools in their relation to what was received by the Universal Church.

\* Ch. W. F. Walch, *Bibliotheca symbolica vetus*: Lemg. 1770. Collection of the Symbols of the Lutheran Church, by Ad. Rechenberg. *Concordia pia et unanimi consensu repetita confessio fidei*, etc.: Lps. 1677, 1756. C. M. Pfaff, *Eccles. evangel. libri symbolici*: Tub. 1730. J. A. H. Tittmann, 1817. C. A. Hase, 1827, 37, 46. The Symbols of the Reformed Church; O. Ch. W. Augusti, *Corpus librorum symbolico-*, etc.: Elberf. 1828. H. A. Niemeyer, *Collectio confessionum*, etc.: Lps. 1840. *Die symbolischen Bücher der evang. reformirten Kirche, zum ersten mal vollständig übers.*: Neust. a. d. Orla. 1830-2. Thle. *Die Symbole der romisch-catholischen Kirche in Sammlungen*, von J. T. L. Danz: Vimar. 1835. E. W. Streitwolf: Gotting. 1835. *Die Symbole der Griechischen*, von E. J. Kimmel: Jen. 1843.

The acts and decrees of Councils collated by P. Labbe and G. Cossent: Par. 1671, 72, 17 t. fol. are important. Also J. Harduin, *Concill. collectio regia maxima*: Paris, 1715, 11 t. fol. Especially, J. D. Mansi, *Sacror. conc. nova et amplissima collectio*: Flor. et Venet. 1759, 31 t. folio. The Papal decrees, C. F. G. Schoenemann, *Pontificum Romanor. a Clemente usque ad Leonem Mag. epistol. genuinæ*, T. 1: Gott. 1796, 8. *Bullarum Roman. a Leone Mag. usque ad Bened. xiii. begun* by L. Cherubini, 1655, with continuations, 1727-1758, 19 t. f. *Bullarum, etc., amplissima collectio op.* C. Cocquelines: Rom. 1737, seq. 17 t. fol.

Controversial dogmatic writings are to be consulted; respecting these it is of importance to know whether the author was calm and temperate in controversy, or disposed to indulge in rhetorical forms and extravagances, led away by the ardour of debate. In reference to apologetical works we must inquire, whether the Author communicates his entire convictions, or has kept back some things; or allowed himself to practise accommodations. Sermons and Homilies are also of importance, and we must notice whether a writer allows himself to be misled by Rhetoric—to deviate from facts in the expression of the Objective; also whether a difference is presupposed between an exoteric and esoteric standpoint.\* Even ecclesiastical usages, liturgical forms,† monuments of Art, may be sources for the History of Dogmas, since a dogmatical conviction may be expressed by them though not always with a clear intention.

#### 7. THE HISTORY OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

BAUR, *Lehrb. der Dogmengesch.* p. 17. *Epochen der kirchlichen Geschichtschreibung.* 1852.

It may be easily explained how a branch of Study such as the History of Dogmas, could not exist in the first ages. Men were carried away too violently by the stream of passing events, they were too much in the midst of development to be able to reflect upon it. The dogmatical interest prevented the historical interest from springing up, and hence, in the consideration of dogmatic differences, the religious and polemical predominated. Moreover, when inquiries were instituted relating to the History of Dogmas, polemical interests were involved, and men judged of tendencies different from their own, with dogmatic partiality. The only exception was the Alexandrian School in which we find the first germ of a more historic turn of thought. For the Gnosis of the Alexandrian Theologians undertook the task of entering

\* Collections of ecclesiastical authors—*Magna biblioth. vet. patr.* a M. Bigne composita, etc.: 1664—72. *Maxima bib. vet. patr.*: Lugd. 1677, sq. 27 t. fol. And. Gallandi, *Bibl. græco-latina vet. patr.*: Venet. 1765—81, 14 t. fol. *Patrologia cursus completus accur.*: J. B. Migne, Par. (not yet completed).

† J. A. Assemani, *Codex liturgicus eccles. univer.*: Rom. 1749—66, 13 t. 4. E. Renaudot, *Liturg. Orientalium collect.*: 1716, 2 t. 4. *Cod. liturg. eccl. univ. in epitom. redact.* op. H. A. Daniel: Lps. 1847—51.



into the various forms of Philosophy and of Christian doctrine, and of considering them in relation to the common truth that lay at their basis.

In reference to this subject the language of Clement is very characteristic; he says that the sects of Philosophers among the Greeks and Barbarians had broken up the Theology of the eternal Logos into fragments of eternal truth, as according to the Myth the limbs of Pentheus were torn asunder by the Bacchanals.\* "But whoever knows how to unite together the separated parts and to represent the perfect Logos in his unity—he will discern the whole Truth." In this passage it is implied that Historical Truth in its unity has been torn asunder into disjointed contrarieties, and must be sought for by combining them again. From this standpoint an Historical Survey is possible, and therefore the Alexandrian Fathers are pre-eminent for the justice and impartiality of their judgment. In their writings we find with the first germs of other branches of Theology, the beginnings likewise of the History of Dogmas. But like many other ideas of the Alexandrian school they could not be further developed for want of a congenial soil. They were forced to give way to dogmatic narrow-mindedness, and remained only as presages of future developments. In the following centuries of the first classical development of Christian doctrine (the systematic Period), the interests of dogmatic uniformity were in the ascendant. Investigations were indeed set on foot respecting subjects of Dogmatic History such as the opinions of the early Fathers, as for example Origen and Theodorus of Mopsuestia, &c., but the interest taken in them was only dogmatic and one-sided, whether for or against, and hence confused. One important work of the sixth century was an exception, the treatise of Facundus, bishop of Hermiane in Numidia ("Pro defensione trium capitulorum," lib. xii.)† written in defence of Theodorus and distinguished by a spirit of genuine critical inquiry which was quite foreign to that age. As an isolated phenomenon we may notice at the end of the sixth century the literary undertaking of the Monophysite Stephanus Gobarus, in which contradictory opinions of the Fathers were ranged under certain rubrics, manifestly with the

\* Strom. lib. i. c. 13, § 57.

† GALLANDI, Bibliotheca Patr. xi. p. 665, sq.

design of proving the existence of these contradictions, since he made no attempt to reconcile them, which at that time would have given offence. This work is no longer extant, but an abstract may be found in Photius.\* In the following age, collections of extracts from the works of the Fathers were often compiled under the title of *Sententie*, but these were under the influence of dogmatic interest and meant to uphold the established faith. With the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the new development of the Scholastic Theology begins, yet even this great mental movement had no connexion with the historic tendency. Only one exception is to be made in favour of a man who was distinguished for the originality of his genius, the Philosopher and Theologian PETER ABELARD. While others had collected the contradictory opinions of the Fathers, in order to reconcile their discrepancies by dint of dialectic acuteness,—Abelard made a similar collection, without any such design, but rather to oppose the maintenance of a dogmatic uniformity† and to check the heresy-hunting propensity of his contemporaries by proving that even among the Fathers differences of sentiment existed. Yet he did not escape the charge of heresy himself. His tendency found no point of connexion in his age, and Scholasticism which persisted in its dependence on Tradition, continually receded from a standpoint on which an historical view would have been possible. It was not till the age which immediately preceded the Reformation, when the re-action of new mental tendencies was excited against the Scholastic Theology, that we find the germ of a free historical conception. Here ERASMUS claims our notice, who called off attention from the study of scholastic dogmas to the New Testament and the early Fathers, pointed out their differences and many things that were objectionable in dogmatic language. On this account, his edition of the works of Hilary of Poitiers deserves special attention with his preface and dedication to the Archbishop of Palermo.

The Reformation itself by the controversies to which it gave rise necessarily excited an interest in the historical study of

\* Bibliothec. cod. 232.

† The work, *Sic et non*, in the hitherto unedited works of Abelard, published by V. COUSIN: Paris, 1836. More complete in the edition by E. L. Henke and G. S. Lendenkohl: Marb. 1851.

Dogmas. For both Catholicism and Protestantism claimed an agreement with ecclesiastical Antiquity. From the standpoint of Catholicism, Protestantism was regarded as foreign to ecclesiastical development; while the latter viewed Catholicism as an adulteration of Church doctrine. A new and independent construction of the History of Christian Dogmas was not effected at once on either side. It was mixed up with Dogmatics and Polemics, and the dependence of the historical on the dogmatical standpoint prevented it from being treated with freedom. A modern Catholic theologian, HERMES of Bonn, has asserted that to treat the History of Dogmas as a special branch of Study, on account of the change in development which it presupposes, militates against the Catholic Church, and for that reason he has scrupled to give Lectures upon it. Yet even in Catholicism, an historical development may be spoken of, in which case the Councils may be regarded as its Organs. It is destitute, however, of impartiality; for where the process of development is dependent on the authority of Tradition, and the unalterable decrees of Councils, the free investigation of it is impossible. Protestantism, on the contrary, regards the Holy Scriptures alone as the absolute source of the knowledge of religious Truth, and allows a free development on all sides. It has no interest in proving that Tradition contains nothing but truth, but judges of the course of development by the standard of Holy Writ. If the formal principle of Protestantism allows a completely unfettered mode of viewing things, so its material principle, which regards Christ as the only ground of salvation, gives the point of Unity for all development, as well as its right criterion. It also furnishes motives for examining the doctrine given in Scripture, in its living development through the power of Christ's spirit, and not to regard it even in Holy Scripture itself as something rigid and immovable. Protestantism therefore gave the right standpoint, and an impulse to the investigation of the History of Dogmas; but these effects did not appear at once; many foreign elements supervened and checked the development. Although the Holy Scriptures were regarded as the only source of the knowledge of Christian Truth, yet there was, at the same time, a want of Interest in the historical development of Christian doctrine, though that is a witness of Christian Truth. And on the standpoint of Protestantism the judgment was warped by

the Interest felt in bringing forward witnesses from the earlier history against Catholicism, in order to represent it as an adulteration of later date. It was not perceived that the Catholic doctrine might exist early and yet be untrue; for the laws of historical and Christian development were not yet understood, and it was supposed that what was owned to be orthodox must have existed of old. Then followed the period of stagnation, and of the despotism of Church doctrine, the supremacy of Dogma above all other branches of Theology, so that the historical interest was depressed. The freer development originated in the re-action which called forth a renovation of the Protestant life. In the Reformed Church Arminianism was particularly influential in this respect. To this school belonged LE CLERC of Amsterdam. Only in him the critical element was strongest, and his views of Christian truth were very defective. In the Lutheran Church the re-action proceeded not only as in the case of Le Clerc, from the province of Criticism, but from that of the Christian Life. Of the former CALIXTUS was the representative; of the latter SPENER, who with his school, laboured from a practical standpoint for the emancipation of the Christian Spirit, and the free exhibition of the Christian Life. They made the distinction more palpably felt between faith and Dogma, between differences in dogmatic knowledge and in the religious life. Amidst this excitement, the first historical work on Dogmas made its appearance. The "Impartial History of the Church and of Heretics," by GOTTFRIED ARNOLD of Giessen,\* constituting an epoch by the freedom with which, unfettered by Church authority in doctrinal matters, he investigated the diversified phenomena of the Christian spirit. But though Arnold combated the one-sidedness that had hitherto prevailed, he fell into that of another kind; he showed a partiality for eccentricities, and was disposed to indulge in the fanciful. At first he encouraged a spirit of liberal inquiry respecting the history of sects; but his peculiar prejudices injured his treatment of the subject. His merits were great for giving such an impulse to historical criticism, but his own criticism was biased. Since that time, historical Theology has gradually become more unshackled. The study of it received a fresh impulse from MOSHEIM, who owes his reputation chiefly to his classical

\* Frankfurt, 1699, fol. 1729, 4to. Schaffh. 1740, 3 vols. fol.

work on the history of the Christian Church before Constantine the Great;\* he introduced a more pragmatical treatment of History, and pointed out the necessity of connecting the History of Philosophy with that of Religion. But he did not undertake a separate treatise on the History of Dogmas as a special branch of study. FRANCIS WALCH was the first person who suggested this. His "Scheme of a complete History of Heresies" (*Entwurf einer vollständigen Geschichte der Ketzereien*), which contains much matter, is a preliminary work for the purpose. A new Epoch succeeded commenced by the great SEMLER, who brought about a revolution in Theology, the effects of which have not yet ceased. He occupied himself chiefly with the History of Dogmas, and carried out the thoughts which Walch had only suggested, in his Introduction to BAUMGARTEN's "Investigations of theological controversies" (*Untersuchungen theologischer Streitigkeiten*). His merit lies in stimulating the critical element, which marks the new development of Theology, though it took in him a one-sided direction. As his criticism was not accompanied by the views of a positive theology, the product of the Christian consciousness, it wanted its proper aim, and pulled down without building up. In his attacks on the Hierarchy he became unjust to many phenomena in the History of Christianity. To the existing one-sidedness he opposed another, a principle which made him fail in justice to many of the deeper Christian phenomena, as in the case of Augustine, and which did not allow in the History of Dogmas an organic mode of treatment in which his whole theology was deficient. This destructive tendency was developed still further in its pernicious effects. It was followed by a season of decay in Theology, when the essence of Christianity was ignored, and it was looked upon as nothing better than a temporary garb for a so-called Religion of Reason. This gave rise to the outwardly pragmatic mode of treating Christianity. As there was a disposition to explain the phenomena of Dogma only from outward causes, oftentimes nothing more was discerned in them than human ingenuity and activity, instead of the peculiar aspect of Christian Truth that formed their basis. Hence, for example, the mistakes

\* *Commentarii de reb. Christianor. ante Constant. M.*: Helmst. 1753, 4to. Translated by Vidal: London, 1818—35. Reprinted with the translation completed, by Dr. Murdock: New York. 1851.

respecting Gnosticism. Not till this period was passed, could the study of the History of Dogmas flourish. Under the fresh impulse given to the Christian life, a new positive epoch succeeded the critical, for the study of History, Philosophy, and the religious nature of Man, in which the History of Dogmas could be studied according to the principles of the development of Christianity in doctrine. Modern Science has promoted a successful mode of treating it, since a taste has been formed for the deeper contemplation of historical phenomena in general. The Intellectual has been examined in its relation to the Religious, Dogma in its relation to Faith; the Christian consciousness of every age has been separated from foreign elements; the nature of the Christian Spirit at all periods and in all its stages has been investigated, in order to make historical contemplation independent of the present—and thus to gain the liberty of rising above the contrarieties of dogmatic development—and to find the right medium between aberrations in opposite directions.

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## FIRST PRINCIPAL PERIOD,

THE CLOSE OF THE APOSTOLIC AGE TO THE TIME OF GREGORY I.  
(ABOUT A.D. 600).

### FIRST PERIOD,

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE APOSTOLIC AGE TO THE TIME OF CONSTANTINE  
THE GREAT (THE BEGINNING OF THE FOURTH CENTURY).

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## THE APOLOGETIC PERIOD.

### THE GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

THE study of the first period is of special importance in relation to questions that vitally affect our present Theology, since many of the most weighty problems, such as the reality of the life of Jesus and of the authenticity of several of the most important portions of the New Testament are connected with it. Christianity entered a world that was foreign to its nature, where it had to acquire a certain form, and this form was in part dependent on existing tendencies. It was necessary first of all, to become conscious of what Christianity implied in contradistinction to the elements around; but the Christian element had also points of connexion with the existing order of things. We have, therefore, first of all, to consider Christianity as it came in contact with the two leading tendencies of the religious spirit, JUDAISM and HEATHENISM, and notice in reference to both the points of contrariety and of connexion. On this relation is founded the apologetic character of this period. The great object of attention was the conflict against Judaism and Heathenism, and the preservation of the Christian faith in its purity from those re-actions which had insinuated themselves into the development of the Church.

As to the relation of Judaism to Christianity, we might expect the points of union to be the most prominent, and those of contrariety to be less noticeable, for Christ is the end to which the whole earlier development of God's kingdom in



the Old Testament leads as a preparative economy. Hence He could say that the Law and the Prophets testified of Him, and that He came not to destroy but to fulfil. But precisely on this ground rested the possibility of an opposition. For the more important a standpoint is, as a preparative to something higher, so much more easily will it assume an attitude of opposition, and forgetting its own transitory character will either overvalue itself as the highest, or attempt to bring down what is higher to the same level. Thus the subordinate standpoint of Judaism either appeared in open hostility to Christianity, or if it subordinated to itself the Christian spirit, endeavoured at the same time to confine it within Jewish limits and to that formal standpoint which was transitory, and destined to be abolished. To this formal standpoint belonged the legal element which ought to have excited a sense of the need of Redemption and led to Christ, but which either placed itself in hostility to the Gospel, or corrupted it by legal formalities. The fact of a disunion between God and Man is assumed on the legal standpoint. On the other hand, the peculiarity of Christianity is Redemption, the consciousness of re-uniting the Divine and the Human. Now here an opposition might also arise. And thus it came to pass that the first battle Christianity had to fight was against Judaism, notwithstanding their close affinity, in part outwardly and in part on account of the Jewish elements which became mixed up with Christianity.

As to the relative position of Christianity and Heathenism, here certainly the antagonistic principle took the lead, and this circumstance presented an obstacle to a mingling of the two standpoints. Heathenism more readily than Judaism acknowledged the superiority of Christianity, and human nature showing itself more undisguised in it, the need of Redemption was more easily admitted; while Judaism offered a substitute with which men satisfied themselves. But to Heathenism belonged the Grecian Philosophy,\* which embodied a religious consciousness and excited a much stronger influence than the popular religion on the development of Christianity.

\* Tennemann's *Manual of the History of Philosophy*, Transl. by Johnson. London: H. G. Bohn, 1852. Part 1st, pp. 51—194. B. 4. Neander über d. Verh. hellenischen Ethik z. Christenthum in s. wissenschaft. Abhandlungen, herausg. v. J. Jacobi: Berl. 1851.

The philosophic Element so far resembled Judaism that it presented several points of connexion with Christianity; for in the better philosophies the ethical consciousness was prominent, and their Monotheism formed a counterpoise against the superstition of Polytheism. Yet this rendered a concealment of the real antagonism more easy, and paved the way for a mingling of the philosophic and Christian standpoints, and thereby the unavoidable corruption of the latter.

As far as Christianity exhibits itself as a Divine Revelation, it involves a supernatural element, and purposes to transform human nature by a principle of divine life. On the other hand, it is designed to reconcile all contrarieties, and employs sanctified human nature and reason as a medium for revealing its peculiar character. By the union of these two aspects Christianity stands opposed both to Heathenism and Judaism. Paul marks this opposition when he says (1 Cor. i. 22) that the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom. Among the former there was indeed a supernatural direction, but only viewed as extornal, and the supernatural was merely presented as supernatural and not as appropriated by nature; among the latter there was an all-absorbing activity of the Intellect, a striving by means of it to explain and construct everything. Among the former the sensuous in Religion predominated; divine manifestations were sensuously conceived; among the latter there was a perverted passion for knowledge; in the one a sensuous tendency of the feelings predominated; in the other, a one-sided direction of the Intellect. On the one hand, men desired a succession of sensuous phenomena for the satisfaction of those sensuous cravings by which the religious life is enveloped; on the other hand, a religion was sought which would give new speculative conclusions. It was not communion with God and power to lead a holy life which men desired; things which only the soul can understand and wish to experience, in its longings for the higher life. Thus Christianity was opposed on the one hand by a sensuous materialism, and on the other by a one-sided spiritualism. Yet, when Paul ascribed one tendency to the Greeks, and another to the Jews, we must recollect that in that age, when religious and spiritual elements were so intermingled, these two were not always nicely separated from each other. Among the Jews we shall find the influence of a

Grecian element and the antagonism to Christianity which proceeded from it; and among the Greeks a Jewish-sensuous element. But, generally speaking, the religious standpoint of Judaism was distinguished by a vivid consciousness of estrangement from God, and of the disunion in human nature; Hellenism, on the contrary, was marked by the youthful life of Nature, in which a clear consciousness of this contrariety to God was not felt,—by a bringing down of the Divine to the Natural,—and by an idolizing of human nature. In relation to Judaism, Christianity closed up the chasm between God and Man by Redemption; in relation to Hellenism, it made the disunion consciously felt, and then removed it by communicating a divine life to Humanity. To these contrarieties of the Jewish and Grecian spirit, must be added that of Orientalism, the tendency of the Indian and other natural Religions of the East. This element also had mixed itself with the Jewish and the Grecian in the Roman Empire. At its basis lay the conscious disunion in the form of grief and sadness for the limitations of human nature, and in vague aspirations after the Infinite and Absorption in God. So that in these three standpoints we have the three stages of Monotheism, Polytheism, and Pantheism, and corresponding to them—the Human separated from God—the Deification of Man—and the Absorption of Man.

As Judaism became imbued with Oriental and Hellenic elements, the same contrarieties were exhibited in it. **ESSENISM** showed a mixture of the mystic, Oriental elements with Judaism, though some writers would account for it by the influence of the Alexandrine Hellenic philosophy.

Alexandria the medium of communication between the East and the West was the focus of the most varied kinds of culture. We recognise in these effects of the career of Alexander the Great, how the great revolutions of the world are made to subserve the highest object of God towards the human race. The junction of the East and West helped to prepare the entrance of Christianity into the world. In Alexandria and the adjacent country as far as Libya a million Jews dwelt, who had been attracted thither by the favour of the Ptolemies. The circumstances in which they here found themselves must have given a peculiar character to their development. They could no longer retain that harsh, exclusive character which rejected

all foreign culture. Transported into the midst of Hellenic culture, they could not resist its influence, and unavoidably became more susceptible of foreign impressions. They perceived, indeed, that their Religion and its records were ridiculed by the Greeks, partly on account of the antagonism between the Hellenic and Jewish spirit, partly on account of the unacquaintedness of the Greeks with the language and manners of the Jewish people; but not only did their national Theism maintain its power in this position so that the Jews on the whole, instead of swerving from their faith, only learnt to set a higher value upon it when contrasted with Hellenic Mythology and Egyptian Fetichism, but they became inspired with a zeal to vindicate their Religion and Sacred Records against the Greeks, and to lead the educated among them to treat Judaism with respect. Thus they were obliged to occupy the standpoint of Grecian culture, in order to prove that what it regarded as the Highest, was contained in the Old Testament, and that what Philosophy possessed of higher Truth, was borrowed thence. Such efforts led them better to understand the import of their religious faith in relation to the development of Mankind, to go beyond the merely Empirical, and to recognise it in connexion with the ideas which were to be embodied by it. It cannot be denied that this really took place; but the danger was connected with it, of permitting too great an influence to the foreign standpoint of Hellenism to which the Old Testament and its Religion were to be rendered acceptable. Yet even apart from the apologetic interest, the Spirit of Grecian culture exercised a great influence over the learned Jews. In Alexandria the philosophic interest in connexion with the literary, was dominant. The educated Greeks spiritualized their old Religion by their Philosophy. In Alexandria the Platonic Philosophy prevailed, which was marked by the greatest susceptibility in regard to the religious wants of mankind. By means of it, the world-renowned influence of Socrates had often revived the religious consciousness, in times of Unbelief, Indifference, and Scepticism. Often this influence acted as the forerunner of Christianity, and formed the means of transition from Unbelief to the Christian Faith. And at that time it was the religious element of Platonism which attracted the Alexandrian Jews, and occasioned their forming a peculiar religious philosophy

by blending it with Judaism, as the learned Greeks had combined Platonism with the popular Religion. If Judaism owing to its Theism was peculiarly fitted for such an amalgamation, on the other hand it offered more resistance to the Platonic element than the Hellenic Religion. For Judaism was a strictly historical Religion, founded on faith in a personal God who had revealed himself in an historical relation to a chosen people. It was based on the tradition of this fact. Platonism, on the contrary, promoted the prevailing tendency to ideas in Religion, a religious Idealism. Hence these Alexandrian Jews, as appears in their chief representative, Philo,\* were misled to put the *ὁ* of Platonism in the place of the Old Testament Jehovah. They regarded the communication of the higher general ideas in Religion as the highest aim of Revelation. They looked upon the Historical portion of Scripture only as the envelope, and intended only to rouse the religious consciousness; in every part of it they found the clothing of general philosophical ideas, as, for example, the historical personages of the Old Testament were the representatives of general spiritual tendencies, and to point this out they held to be the office of an Expositor. Hence they neither studied the original text of the Old Testament nor its peculiar spirit, but confined themselves to the Septuagint Version, the very obscurity of which made it easier to foist into it their ideas of religious Philosophy. Guided by Platonism they set out from the right point of view, to wit, that the divine in its Revelation can be known only by means of the divine in man that is allied to it. Where the latter is not developed, the Spirit of Holy Writ cannot be understood. These maxims they opposed to a coarse sensuous mode of religious thought, that rabbinical exegesis which made anthropomorphic representations of divine things; but then again they were not able to connect the letter with the spirit of Scripture, but introduced a foreign spirit with a fanciful, subjective arbitrariness. Thus they obtained two different

\* Opp. Par. 1640. Francof. 1691, fol. THOM. MANGEY: Lond. 1742, 2 t. fol. The edition by E. RICHTER: Lips. 1828—30, 8 vols. 8vo., contains the writings lately discovered by A. Mai and J. B. Aucher. Besides the works already mentioned by GERÖRER and DÄHNE, see C. G. L. GROSSMANN, *Quæstiones Philonææ*: Lips. 1829, 4to. CREUZER in the *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1832, 1. DÄHNE in the same work, 1833.

standpoints in their contemplation of the Old Testament records. The ideal mode was reckoned the highest, where it was the prime object to find again in the Old Testament the general religious ideas of speculation; but they acknowledged a special divine wisdom in this, that these higher ideas of which not all men were capable, wore the garb of the Letter, which at least might call forth a certain moral culture. The Hellenic Mythology was injurious to morality; the Old Testament, on the contrary, was advantageous for all even for those who remained on the lower standpoint. This contrast of an allegorical and a literal view held by the Alexandrians was connected with one more general in the contemplation of Religion. On the higher stage of Ideas, men were raised to the pure Intuition of Truth; on the lower, they must be satisfied with what was merely outward. In the former position, man knows God as he is; he moves according to Philo, in the highest philosophical abstraction—beholds God by a mystic absorption which leaves behind everything anthropathic, so that nothing is left for contemplation but the purely simple which has no definable qualities, an abstract idea of perfection with which the exuberance of the feelings seeks to unite itself. On the other standpoint God is recognised in his revelation, in his condescension, which is necessary for common men in order to lead them by degrees to the end of their religious development. This lower stage bears the same relation to the ideal as the body to the spirit. In the one there is an *εἰσαναθροπισμὸς*, a humanized religious knowledge, in the other a dis-humanized; here, we have the positive symbolic, there the negative. Thus the contrast of an exoteric and esoteric religious knowledge, originally foreign to Judaism, was introduced. The latter (the esoteric) according to Philo characterizes the peculiar children of God—the *υἱοὶ τοῦ ὁστος*: it corresponds to the destiny of the theocratic nation, of men altogether devoted to the contemplation of divine things who are exalted above all Revelation to immediate contact with the simple essence of God, the *ὄν*. On the exoteric standpoint were to be found the *υἱοὶ τοῦ λόγου*, who knew God only outwardly in his acts. In general, the Alexandrians were not disposed to nullify the historical sense of Holy Writ, but only to place it on a subordinate standpoint; yet, in passages which they could not harmonize with their

philosophic ideas, they did not scruple to drop the historical sense altogether. In this respect Philo agrees with the mythical theory of modern times, for now such a procedure is called the mythical method; yet Philo reached it from principles diametrically opposite, namely from a Supranaturalism carried in the doctrine of Inspiration to an extravagant length. The Holy Spirit, he supposed, had designedly impelled by his inspiration the Sacred Writers to say what was historically false, and had only an ideal truth, in order to instigate the susceptible not to content themselves with the letter, but to seek for the ideal truth. Hence Philo calls such passages of Holy Writ *προσκόμματα* or *σκάνδαλα*. Yet all the Jews did not keep within the same limits of reverence for the religion of their Fathers—which was possible in this co-existence of various stages of development, but from the same premises many inferred that the Letter was nothing to those who had attained to a knowledge of the Idea. If the Sabbath was only a symbol of the consecrated rest of the Spirit, and Circumcision a symbol of purification from all uncleanness, those who recognised these truths need not trouble themselves about the external observances. This ultra-idealism which came into collision with external Judaism is controverted by Philo in his remarkable tract, *De migratione Abrahami*. Addressing its abettors he says, "You might have reason on your side if we were souls without bodies; but as it is, we need the Letter as well as the Idea. We must also seek to retain the good reputation of piety among the people." This Alexandrian religious Philosophy was of great importance in the subsequent History of Dogmas. It made the rigid Jewish Spirit more susceptible of Christianity, though on the other hand, its one-sided contemplative intellectualism was likely to suppress the deeper wants of the Soul. Christianity was adulterated by amalgamation with it, especially as it re-introduced the aristocratic distinction of the higher knowledge in contrast to the symbolic popular faith which Christianity had abolished. A kind of *Gnosis* in opposition to the limited sensuous standpoint was formed, which even in the Apostolic Age made its way into the Church. After Christianity, at the earliest period had combated the contracted Jewish view which would not recognise in Christianity a new creation, there was formed out of the elements of Judaism which were partly allied to

Essenism, partly to the Alexandrian religious Philosophy, an ascetic Theosophy which aimed at something higher than the common standpoint of Christianity. It has indeed been asserted that the germ of this tendency cannot be detected before the appearance of the Gnosis so called in a narrower sense in the second century. Hence in modern times Dr. Baur has raised doubts on the genuineness of several of the shorter Pauline Epistles in which reference to it are found, as for instance in the Epistle to the Colossians. But on the other hand the sudden appearance of the Gnostic sects in the second century cannot be accounted for, if they had not been preceded by such analogous tendencies. An appeal has been made to Hegesippus\* who asserts the purity of the Church so long as it was under the guidance of the Apostles. Yet too much importance is attached to Hegesippus, for he is too uncritical, and had an interest in ascribing to these sects a post-apostolic origin. It was in the latter part of Paul's life that these contrarieties became visible. Then followed the reconciling labours of John, which were of great importance for the maintenance of Christian unity. Yet when these obnoxious tendencies had once germinated, they could not be wholly repressed. That spiritualistic tendency in the Jewish Theology which was opposed to the sensuous Judaism necessarily found fresh aliment as soon as Christianity spread among the Heathen. After John's death no powerful spirit like his stood at the head, no man of apostolic authority who might have controlled opposing views, and they now burst forth without restraint. Thus in the post-apostolic age we may discern the influence of Jewish elements: 1st. In Ebionitism strictly so called; the Judaizing tendency which would not allow Christianity to be free from Judaism and regarded it only as a complement of Judaism, which without any high view of the Messiahship of Christ had also very contracted notions of his Person.† 2nd. This influence was also perceptible where Christi-

\* Euseb. Hist. Eccles. iv. 22.

† Justin. Mart. dial. c. Tryph. § 46 (p. 264), sq. 88 (p. 315). Iren. adv. hæ. i. 26. Origen, c. Cels. II. 1, cf. in Matt. t. 16. 12. c. Cels. 5, 61, 65. In Matt. xi. 12. hom. in Jerem. xviii. 12. in Joann. t. 2. 6. Euseb. H. E. iii. 27. Epiphan. hæres. 29, 30. Hieronym. (especially in his Commentary on Isaiah). See Neander's Church History ii. 482 (Bohn's edition). The so-called Clementine Homilies with the Epistles



anity, on the whole, was received in its purity : there was still a mixture of a strong sensuous anthropopathic element. This appeared especially in the representations that were given of the kingdom of God—the idea of which was not framed in accordance with the spiritual character of Christianity but in sensuous images ; as in the extravagant expectations of the happiness of the Millennium, which were propagated by Papias of Hieropolis.\* 3rd. In opposition to such corruption of the Christian consciousness, a one-sided idealistic tendency made itself felt. A preponderance of speculation counteracted the excess of feeling and the sensuous element. Christianity attracted men from opposite poles—according as the intellect, the feelings, the love of speculation, or sensuous conceptions predominated. While from these various standpoints Christianity was subjected to impure mixtures of opposite kinds ; it had at least this salutary result, that no single one obtained an exclusive preponderance.

GNOSIS. The terms *γνώσις*, *γνωστικός*, point out the peculiarity of this tendency : that its abettors boasted of possessing a higher knowledge in distinction from the common popular faith of the Church—an esoteric religious knowledge as distinguished from the exoteric.† There were men of a speculative and poetic turn, full of forebodings, excited by the

prefixed in Cotelierius, *Patres Apost. 1*, with the lately found additions, *Clementis Romani quæ feruntur Homiliæ XX. nunc primum integræ*: ed. A. R. M. Dressel: Gott. 1853. The *Recognitiones Clem. Rom.* The *Ἐπιτομή*.—Gieseler, v. d. *Nazaräern u. Ebionten*, Winer's *Zeitschr. für wissenschaft. Theol.* 1827, 2. By the same, d. *Evangel. der Juden-christen*. Beiträg. 3 Einl. in d. bibl. Schriften: Halle, 1832, I. 268. Schneckenburger, üb. e. übersehenen Punkt in d. Lehre der Ebionit: Tüb. Zeitschrift, 1830, 1. F. Ch. Baur, der Christuspartie in Corinth u. der Apost. Petrus in Rom.: Tüb. Zeitschr. 1831. 4. vgl. 1836, 3, 1838, 3. d. christ. Gnosis. s. 300. A. Schliemann d. Clementinen u. der Schwegler, das nachapostolische Zeitalter. I.: Tüb. 1846. A. Hilgenfeld, der clementinischen Homilien u. Recognitionen nach ihr. Urspr. u. Inhalt dargestellt: Jen. 1848. G. Uhlhorn, die Homilien u. Recognitionem der Clemens Romanus nach ihrem Urspr. u. Inhalt dargestellt: Göttg. 1854.

\* *Λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξήγησις*, 5 Bb. frag. Routh *Relig. sacr. I.* Euseb. H. E. iii. 36, 39.

† Irenæus *adv. hæres. lib. v.* Hippolytus, *ἐλεγχος κατὰ πασῶν αἵρεσέων*, libb. x. (wants ii. and iii.), under the title of, *Origenis φιλοσοφούμενα*, ed. Miller: Oxon. 1851. L. Duncker et F. G. Schneidewin: Gotting. 1856. Tertullian. Clemens Alex. Origenes. Epipha-

aspirations of that eventful period, unsatisfied by the philosophical systems in vogue, and by the Asiatic religions, unsatisfied even by Judaism. The consciousness of the disunion in human nature was developed in them, and theoretically they perceived the need of Redemption. They felt that Christianity afforded them solutions of the great enigma of the World beyond any other Religion; and they recognised the great world-wide fact of Redemption in Christ. But they were hampered by their sensuous conceptions; they wanted to blend their former speculations with Christianity and could not unreservedly surrender themselves to it. Thus a mixture of various elements was formed, such as peculiarly belonged to that age, and could only take place again if Christianity should powerfully take hold of the life of those Orientals who already possess a peculiar mental culture, and if the culture of the West be added to their own, and both combined should seek in their own peculiar manner to embrace Christianity. We find an analogy in the attempt of a modern Brahmin who has endeavoured to amalgamate the ancient doctrines of the Vedas with Christianity by recasting both. Dr. Baur, in his work on the Christian Gnosis has combated this view, because it treats Gnosis as something too indefinite; but it is evident from what has been already said, that Gnosis must be in its very nature indefinite—a mixture of heterogeneous elements; and

nus adv. hæres. Theodoret. fabb. hæret. Plotinus. *πρὸς τοὺς γνῶστικούς*, Ennead. ii. lib. 9 ed. G. H. Heigl.: Ratisb. 1832. Vgl. Recens. v. Creuzer Stud. Crit. 1834, 2. Neander ü. d. welthistor. Bedeutung des Buches des Plotin. geg. d. Gnost. in s. Wissenschaftlichen Abhandl. s. 22. Massuet, dissertat. præviæ zu s. des Iren. J. Beausobre *histoire critique de Maniché et du Manichéisme*. Mosheim, de reb. Christian. ante Const. Magn. p. 333: Münter, ü. d. Kirch. Alterthümer der Gnostika.: Aurb. 1790. E. A. Lewald, de doctrina gnostica: Heidelb. 1818. Neander Genet. Entw. der vornehmsten gnost. Systeme: Berl. 1818 (Recens. v. Gieseler, Hallisch. Allg.: Littvzeit, 1823, p. 825). Neander's Church History, ii. 1—41. J. Matter, *histoire critique der gnosticisme*, 2 t. 1128, ed. 2. 1843, ü. v.: Dorner, 1833. J. J. Schmidt, ü. d. Verwandtsch. d. gnost. Lehren mit d. Religions-systemen des Orients, 1828. Möhler, Urspr. des Gnostizismus: Tub. 1831. F. Ch. Baur, die Chr. Gnosis oder Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtl. Entw.: Tub. 1835. Stud. Krit. 1837, 3. H. Ritter, Geschichte der Philosoph. B. v. (I. christ. Philos.) H. Rossell, theol. Schriften: Berl. 1837, s. 179. Jacobi in Herzog's Realencyclopæd. B. 5. Art. Gnosis—Die Kirchengesch. von Gieseler I. 179. Hase. s. 90. Niedner. s. 217.

we should do violence to Gnosis as an historical phenomenon, if, instead of an indefinite form, we gave it a sharp and defined one agreeably to modern notions. Baur regards Gnosis as a Philosophy of Religion, resting on an historical foundation from a comparison of religions with one another. But such conscious reflection was very foreign to the Gnostics. What is called Philosophy in the West is not to be found among them, but a predominant Oriental element; hence rather an unconscious representation of the Fancy, than a conscious development of the Intellect, a mixture of the religious, the poetical, and the philosophical. The Gnostics, very far from constructing a philosophy of religion with design and consciousness from a comparison of the three Religions, were actuated rather by an immediate object in view. The same questions which held an important place in the old theosophic systems of the East, and at that time more generally occupied men's thoughts, were also the object of their speculation. How is the World derived from God? How can an imperfect world proceed from a perfect God? Whence came the finite? Whence came Evil, and Matter which cannot be traced to God as a Spirit? For the solution of these Problems they made use of what the existing systems of Religion presented to them, and thus were led to compare Christianity with other Religions. Möhler the Catholic scholar takes quite a different view of Gnosis, and thinks it must have had a purely practical origin. Christianity had operated powerfully on the Gnostics; but the consciousness of sin which it called forth, gained in them a one-sided preponderance, so that they traced Nature itself to an evil principle, and in this manner reached their Dualism. Möhler availed himself of this representation, to compare the Reformers with the Gnostics; but in the Gnostics the practical interest was subordinate, and the speculative was predominant. The explanation of their Dualism is also erroneous. It cannot be traced to Christianity, but to the leading tendency of their speculative System, the standpoint from which they viewed Christianity. Christianity, indeed, exerted an influence upon them, and, in fact, a powerful one, but by this means their Dualism rather assumed a milder form. Only so far this Dualism may be said to have a practical foundation as its speculative tendency found a point of connexion in that feeling of disunion which was the key-note

of the age. This circumstance accounts for the power which Dualism was able to gain, but implies also a craving for Redemption, which opened the approach to Christianity. What Möhler asserts, that the chief Interest was a practical one is quite true of one Gnostic—we mean MARCION, who stands out distinct from all other Gnostics, and whose System was formed quite differently. Gnosticism is rather to be considered as a re-action of the standpoint of the ancient world within the pale of Christianity. When Christianity formed an independent religious consciousness on the basis of a religious life common to all without regard to difference of mental culture, the Gnostics again mingled Religion and Speculation, and would fain have derived the doctrines of Religion from a speculative Theosophy. Hence, Religion could not be the concern of all men in the same way. The mass of mankind must be satisfied with an inferior knowledge of Religion; it was granted to the Gnostics alone to attain to a knowledge of the Supreme God, while others did not rise above the limits of the Finite, the Demiurgos and his Creation. Thus the distinction was formed of the *πνευματικοί*, and the *ψυχικοί*. The *πνευματικοί* possessed the religion of knowledge, or of contemplation, which needed no outward supports; the *ψυχικοί* found themselves only on the standpoint of a faith of outward authority. The former were filled with pure love to God; the latter had a religion of fear and hope. In this way the Gnostics brought in again the Aristocraticism of Heathenism. The multitude were destined to remain enthralled in a mixture of truth and error, and to be ruled by the privileged class. Had Gnosticism gained the ascendancy, the peculiar feature of Christianity would have been lost; an esoteric religious doctrine would have been introduced along with a mythical popular religion. The Church would have been broken up into a multiplicity of speculative schools, and the Christian doctrine would have been distorted by phantasms. Re-action against the peculiar principle of Christianity, and the disruption of the Unity it effected, formed a characteristic of Gnosticism. But this involves a contrast between the religion of Knowledge and the religion of Feeling. Christianity restored the harmony between Heaven and Earth; the Gnostics again brought in the opposition between the heaven of God's people and this world of the Demiurgos; hence also

the opposition between a life of contemplation by which alone Man could rise to the Most High—and the life of practical activity which belongs to the kingdom of the Demiurgos while Christianity, by virtue of the Unity to which we have referred, produced also the Unity of the Theoretical and the Practical, of knowledge and of action. The contrariety of Gnosticism and Christianity had also other consequences in the doctrine of Christ and Redemption. It is evident, how destructive Gnosticism might have been to Christianity; but it must also be recollected, that a certain portion of truth lay at the foundation of its sounder and more moderate elements. The Gnostics felt that in Christianity lay the germ of a higher knowledge, which they found developed nowhere else; only they chose an erroneous method of attaining the object thus placed before them. The great importance of Christianity in the World's History floated before their minds, and we find that many of the better sort among them indulged in many anticipations of the future development of Christian truth, yet everything was, as yet, in a chaotic state. No phenomenon ever produced so great an effect in the development of Dogmas as Gnosticism. The relation borne to it, determined the various spiritual tendencies in the doctrines of the Gospel, and the development of Christian dogmas. In combating with it the unity established by Christianity was more clearly perceived—the peculiar nature of Christianity in distinction from the ancient standpoints was more distinctly brought out. So that we see, when, at this period the two opposing tendencies of an uncultivated Sensuousness, and of a too refined Spiritualism, sought to divide Christianity—the opposition necessarily served to bring out more distinctly the real features of Christian truth; a remarkable example of the victorious development of Christianity in conflict with its opponents.

Gnosticism operated in a two-fold manner on the development of the dogmatic Spirit, either in the way of repulsion or attraction. In the former case, a tendency was called into action to preserve the peculiarities of Christianity against Gnosticism; it wore a polemic aspect and would keep no terms with the enemy. But another tendency, though disposed to maintain Christianity against the Gnostics, acknowledged a truth lying at the foundation of their system, a real spiritual want which demanded a deeper organic knowledge of

Christianity in the mutual relation of its doctrines. It endeavoured to satisfy the want which had given birth to Gnosticism by a Gnosis of its own, built on the ground of the *risis*, and animated by a Christian spirit. It is evident that these two tendencies were exposed to different dangers. That which repelled Gnosticism might lead to one-sidedness and to condemning the true with the false; it was disinclined to scientific culture generally, from a dread of its adulterating Christianity. The other standpoint was liable to the error of yielding too much to Gnosticism, and, while wishing to appropriate the foreign elements of culture, of submitting unconsciously to be governed by it. Neither error could altogether be avoided, and thus we have on the one hand an Antignostic tendency which partook of a Jewish element, and was injurious to the scientific spirit, and on the other hand a tendency allied to Gnosis which was not suited to the simplicity of the Christian faith.

Analogous to these opposing tendencies was another more important at this period, founded on the great difference of *national peculiarities*.

The difference of national character in the Romans and Greeks was most striking. In the former there was a rigid adherence to tradition, a peculiarly practical character; the latter had greater mobility and a more scientific genius. In the former a one-sided Traditionalism prevailed; in the other an excess of the dialectic over the religious element, and a love of innovation. The generation immediately succeeding the Apostles contained, indeed, men who faithfully propagated the Apostolic Tradition, but there was a lack of eminent persons with sufficient mental power to elaborate what had been handed down to them. Here we have the most striking contrast between this age and the apostolic. Certainly the teachers of a later age are not to be compared with the Apostles, who were imbued with the classical originality of the Christian spirit; but yet the generation succeeding the Apostles stand far below the teachers of the second century, for in that period we observe a marked peculiarity in the treatment of Christian doctrine. If we turn to the consideration of particular Churches grouped according to their nationality, we shall notice in Lesser Asia the influence of John's spirit. Here were men of simple piety, worthy scholars

of this Apostle, but not capable of developing the peculiarities of his spirit. The characteristic of this school was a faithful adherence to the historical faith, in accordance with the counteraction made by the Gospel and Epistles of John to the arbitrary speculation that was beginning to show itself. Thus, when the Gnostic sects from Syria and Alexandria spread into Lesser Asia, a practical and antagonistic tendency was formed there by the school of John. A peculiar, fantastic, and mystical spirit developed itself in Phrygia, the inhabitants of which country were notorious for their fondness for the marvellous, and where the mysterious rites of Cybele originated. We observe the influence of this Spirit even in the Judaizing sect at Colossæ, and in a fondness for an enthusiastic Millenarianism. To this country PAPIAS belonged, and from it about the middle of the second century proceeded *Montanism*. In the view we take of it, we are at issue with the School of Baur on two points. They maintain, forsooth, that Montanus is not to be regarded as an historical personage, but only as a mythical designation of a wide-spread religious mental tendency derived from Ebionitism. Now we grant that the personality of Montanus is not a matter of such importance as the tendency that proceeded from him, and that minds of a higher order, as for example TERTULLIAN, influenced it more deeply. But the denial of his existence is a gratuitous assertion. Although he was an uneducated man yet his exertions could give an impulse to an influential tendency, for which there had been a preparation in the course of the development of Christianity. But the attempt to deduce it from Ebionitism depends on an indistinct notion of the real nature of Ebionitism. We must distinguish between the intermixture of a Jewish Element which was intruded on Christianity from without, and a kindred element which was formed within its pale. The latter we shall recognise in Montanism, but at the same time the impulse of what was peculiarly Christian will be conspicuous in many points. Rightly to understand this phenomenon, we must take into consideration that it stands on the boundary line between two stages of the development of Christianity. In such periods of transition tendencies readily appear which are disposed to retain permanently what was true in reference to earlier stages of development, but to these only. Christianity presupposes the disunion

in human nature between the divine and the natural. When it entered the world it was obliged at first to present the supernatural in antagonism to the natural; the divine made itself felt as the principle by which the nature alienated from God must be transformed; and the divine productiveness showed itself in the immediate operations of the Spirit; such was the character of the Apostolic Age. This state of things, however, was not to last always; but was to lead to the entrance of the divine into the human process of development, and reason itself was henceforth to serve as an organ of the divine Spirit. In this new stage, Christianity appropriated more of the instrumental agency of the human mind. But Montanism strove to make the preceding stage the model for all future ages, and hence acquired the character of a one-sided rigid Supernaturalism. Scorning the appropriation of Reason by Christianity, it ever laid the greatest stress on the supernatural Element in its immediate operation. And in this way what was truth in the Apostolic Age became changed into a falsity. Thus Montanism formed the antipodes of Gnosticism, which in an erroneous manner united the existing powers of the human mind to Christianity. Montanism, on the contrary, in order to keep Christianity free from arbitrary speculation, aimed at guiding its development only by means of supernatural revelations. According to it, the Theocracy was to be developed not from within but from without by the supernatural inspiration of a new succession of Prophets. If one tendency unspiritualized the Theocracy by mingling the Old and New Testament Economies and attempting to introduce into the Church a Priesthood on the Old Testament model; Montanism on the contrary put forward an Old Testament order of Prophets, on whom the continuance of the Church was made to depend. Montanism arrives at the same result as Rationalism, since both maintain the false notion of the perfectibility of Christianity from without. For since Montanism placed Reason in constant opposition to the Supernatural, it could not understand that anything requisite for the development of Christianity was contained in the principles of truth announced by the Apostles. Montanism held new Revelations to be necessary, because Reason was not capable of developing, even from Christian principles, what was requisite for spiritual improvement. Montanism had, especially



in this point, an affinity to Irvingism. Hence we may understand how it is that THIERSCHE in his lectures on Catholicism and Protestantism, while in the process of development during this age he unfairly sees on one side only Truth, and on the other only error,—ascribes more merit than it deserves to Montanism which yet was disowned by the Church.

There was a communication opened between the Churches of Lesser Asia and those of the West by means of the teachers who came from the former to Gaul. Of these IRENEUS\* was the most distinguished, who in his youth had been trained by those overseers of the Church who were of the school of the Apostle John. And indeed we recognise in him that inward practical element which is characteristic of John, though not without a mixture of a sensuous mode of conception. He represents the practical Christian spirit which took an Antignostic direction, though with greater moderation than Montanism. So he appears in his principal work, "The refutation of the false Gnosis."† Owing to the obscurity of the Latin Version, this work has been little circulated and read. Semler has availed himself of this, to cast suspicions on its genuineness, but his hypercritical opinion is amply refuted both on external and internal grounds. The work is all of a piece, and bears marks of the historic personality of Irenæus. The ability is remarkable with which he sets forth what is peculiar Christian in opposition to the Gnosis,—nor less so his moderation and purity in maintaining the realistic substance of Christianity, and in

\* Bishop of Lyons, A.D. 177—202. Opp. ed. Grabe: Oxon. 1702. Massuet: Par. 1710: Venet. 1734. 47, fol. Stieren, 1853. 8vo. Fragmenta anecdota ed. Pfaff, 1715. Two new fragments (the first in a double form, and less authentic) in the Spicilegium Solesmense ed. Pitra: Par. 1851, pp. 1—7. Euseb. H. E. v. 4, v. 5, 24, 26. Dodwell, dissertation in Irenæum: Oxon. 1689; Massuet, dissertat. præviæ in libr. Iren. Both of these are in Stieren, in the Apparatus. Stieren, de Irenæi adv. hæc. operis fontib. indole, doctrina et dignitate: Gött. 1836. 4to. Möhler, Patrologie, p. 330. L. Duncker, Des h. Irenæus Christologie im Zusammh. mit dessen theol. u. anthropol. Grundlehren: Göttg. 1843.

† ἑλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως, lib. v. Only complete in the Latin translation. Semler doubts its authenticity in his treatise De cavenda molesta sedulitate sacra, 1772. Compare the vindication by C. G. F. Walch, authentia libror. Iren. adv. hæc. Nov. Comment. Societ. Göttg. hist. et philcs. v. 1.

rejecting the fanciful and arbitrary speculation which Gnosticism mingled with its doctrines. We only remark as somewhat fanciful his adherence to the notion of a sensuous Millenarianism. As on the one hand he evinces his zeal for what is essentially Christian, so he shows his Christian moderation on less important points ; hence in the controversy respecting Easter he came forward as an opponent to Roman arrogance.

[HIPPLYTUS whom Photius, on good grounds, states to have been a scholar of Irenæus, certainly resembled him in mental constitution, was simple, moderate, and practical, and though less gifted, was fonder of philosophical ideas. The account given by Gelasius, bishop of Rome, that he was bishop in Arabia, arose from a misunderstanding of a passage in Ruffinus's translation of Eusebius (Hist. Eccles. IV., 20). No doubt he belonged to Rome or its immediate vicinity. A Chronicler of the year 354 represents him as in Rome, for he says that he was exiled to Sardinia with the bishop Pontianus, A.D. 235, and calls him a Presbyter. That he died there, this author does not say. An early tradition reports that a person named Hippolytus suffered martyrdom at Rome, and there was a chapel dedicated to him near Rome which PRUDENTIUS had seen. In his eleventh hymn *περὶ στεφανῶν* he describes the death of the Presbyter Hippolytus, which he removes to Portus. The description is legendary and taken from a painting in the Chapel. But the statement that he was a Novatianist, bears the stamp of historical truth, and the addition to it is not impossible that in the prospect of death he exhorted his friends to return to the Catholic Church. In the year 1551, on the site of the Chapel a statue was found, by some attributed to the third or fourth century, by others to the fifth or sixth, which represents Hippolytus sitting in the Cathedra, on which is engraven a catalogue of his writings and of the Easter Cyclis as computed by him. For understanding his life it is of the greatest importance to decide whether the work published by E. Miller, in 1851, was his composition. That it did not proceed from Origen, as Miller assumed, is clearly evident from comparing the ideas and style with Origen's known works ; and indeed this hypothesis is almost entirely given up. In support of its being written by Hippolytus we may mention, that the writer in the tenth book describes himself as also the author of a treatise *περὶ τῆς τοῦ*

παντὸς οὐσίας which is found in the catalogue on the Cathedra. Moreover, in this work the writer shows that he was at variance with the Catholics at Rome, and connected with a church party which was evidently identical with that of Novatian. Nor must it be passed over, that the author possesses the astronomical knowledge which we should expect in one capable of computing the Easter Cyclus; and there is a deference paid to Irenæus, which well agrees with the fact that Photius, following the notice of another work attributed to Hippolytus, speaks of Irenæus as his teacher. The existence of this other small polemic work, so far confirms the composition of the *ἐλεγχος* by Hippolytus, that in the introduction of the latter, reference is made to a smaller piece on the same subject which the author had written at an earlier period. Lastly, from the end of the second to about the middle of the third century, to which period the author of the *ἐλεγχος* belongs, no church teacher in connexion with Rome has been found who could be held with any appearance of truth to be its author, excepting Hippolytus or Caius. Dr. Baur has expressed himself in favour of the latter (*Theolog. Jahrb.* 1853. 1.3) but his chief reason is only this, that Photius attributes to Caius the book *περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίας*, and says that many also ascribed to him the *Labyrinthos*, evidently the same work as the *ἐλεγχος*. But Photius is too late a witness. In his second statement follows an assertion not otherwise supported, and in his first, only a marginal note in the manuscript which might very easily have been founded on the last-mentioned supposition, and does not rest on evidence by any means equal to that of much older witnesses. Lastly, what Dionysius of Alexandria and Eusebius report of Caius, particularly the relation in which he stands to the accounts about Cerinthus, (not duly estimated by Dr. Baur), tells against his identity with the author of the *ἐλεγχος*.]\*—JACOBI.

To form a judgment of the spirit of the Roman Church in relation to dogmas, it is important to decide whether its culture

\* The following writers are in favour of Hippolytus: JACOBI, *deutsche Zeitschrift f. chr. Wissensch. u. chr. Leben*, 1851, p. 25, 1853, p. 24. DUNCKER, *Göttinger gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1851. BUNSEN, *Hippolytus u. s. Zeit*, 1852. GIESELER *theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1853, 4. RITSCHL, *theol. Jahrb.* 1854. J. DÖLLINGER, *Hippolytus u. Kallistus*, 1853. The other works known under the name of Hippolytus were published by J. A. Fabricius: Hamb. 1716, 18, 2 vols. fol.

proceeded in the first instance from a Jewish-Christian or a Gentile-Christian element. In modern times the first is maintained by many, and proofs of it have been sought in the Epistle to the Romans, and in the appearance of certain doctrines respecting the person of Christ which are supposed to indicate a Jewish Spirit, and lastly in the writings of Hermas and the Clementine Homilies. Yet the weightiest reasons are on the other side. The Epistle to the Romans carries internal evidence that it was addressed to a community of whom the majority were Gentile-Christians, whose special Apostle Paul considered himself to be. Besides, in the Neronian persecution the Christians were treated as a *tertium genus*, and on that account principally were the objects of popular hatred. If the community had been of the Jewish-Christian order they would not have been recognised as an independent sect, but would have been confounded with the Jews. As to the writings of Hermas and the Clementine Homilies, it is not certain in what relation they stood to the Roman Church, and granting that there was in Rome a dogmatic tendency of which they were the expression that would prove nothing as to the prevalent constitution of the community. For in the metropolis of the World, where there was a confluence of parties from all quarters, a Jewish-Christian community might have existed from the first. But if Marcion had reason for expecting a reception of his anti-Jewish views in the Roman Church, the Jewish tendency could not have been in the ascendant there. In the "Constitutions" of that Church, Jewish points of view may indeed be noticed, but we need not trace these to an immediate influence of a Jewish kind, but rather account for them from the opposition to the original Gentile-Christian element. In many places it was connected with an original Jewish element, but here it was formed independently of any outward connexion with Judaism, because originally the idea attaching to the Church and to universal priesthood of believers had been corrupted. The political element, also, which was so powerful in Rome had its influence on the development of the Christian community. With this the conception of an external priesthood coalesced, and thus Old Testament ideas and the Old Testament spirit acquired a stronger influence.

The scientific spirit of the Roman Church had, on the whole,

only a subordinate importance; its aim was directed more to completing the constitution of the Church. But what lay at the foundation of the formation of the Christian consciousness in the Roman Church was developed with more scientific reflection in the North-African Church. It was related to the Roman Church as its scientific organ, and represented the scientific consciousness of the Western Church in general. The Roman and Punic element of culture was there to be penetrated by the Christian spirit. In the national character we recognise a depth and earnestness, and withal a certain inflexibility and roughness which also re-appears in the North-African Latinity. In this it was necessary to form words for the new ideas, and thus a certain constrained kind of terminology was constructed, which became of importance in the development of dogmatical ideas. The representative of this theology was QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS\* (A.D. 160—220), a Presbyter of Carthage, one of the most important phenomena in the development of Christian truth, a man of profound intellect and deep feeling, of a vivid, vigorous Imagination, and distinguished by wit, acuteness, and varied learning. He had arrived at the age of manhood when he embraced Christianity; and it was his noble distinction that he became a Christian with his whole soul. Impetuous, and disposed to extravagancies and prejudices, he now violently assailed heathenism, under the conviction that Christianity was something entirely new in the world. In this respect he agreed with Marcion, a man from

\* His writings are, as a whole, controversial. 1. Apologetic against the heathen. 2. Ethical and disciplinary. 3. Dogmatic and polemical. *Pre-Montanist*. 1) ad Martyres, de spectaculis, de idololatria, apologeticus, ad nationes, de testimonio animæ. 2) De oratione, patientia, baptismo, poenitentia, ad uxorem, de cultu fœminarum. 3) De præscriptionibus hæreticorum.

*Montanist*. 1) de corona militis, fuga in persecutione contra Gnosticos scorpiae. 2) de exhortatione castitatis, monogamia, pudicitia, jejuniis, virginib. velandis, pallio; 3) advers. Marcionem, adv. Hermogenem, adv. Valentianum, de carne Christi, resurrectione carnis, anima, adv. Praxeum (adv. Judæos is considered doubtful by Neander).—Opp. ed. RIGALTUS: Par. 1635. 66, fol. SEMLER et SCHUTZ, Hal. 1770, 6 t. LEOPOLD, 1839, 4 t. 8vo. F. OEHLER, 1854.—J. A. NOESSELT, de vera estate scriptt. Tertull. opp. III.: Hal. 1817. NEANDER. *Antignostikus* od. Geist der Tertullian, 1825, 49, Translated by J. E. Ryland, M.A., and published in *Bohn's Standard Library*, 1851. SCHWEGLER, *Montanismus*. HESSELBURG, Tertullian. Th. 1. Dorp. 1848. ENGELHARDT, *Tertulliana* schriftstellerischer Character. Zeitsch. f. histor. Theol. 1852, 2.

in other respects he entirely differed in his dogmatic

But Tertullian carried out his antagonism to the specially in moral Asceticism, while Marcion fol-  
t out in respect of dogmatics. As Tertullian's whole  
economy was reconstructed by Christianity, he found  
essary to create a new language for himself. It is  
ing to observe his mental toil in this respect; the  
with which he forms words to express his feelings; yet,  
1, he was not fitted to form a terminology with scientific  
d clearness in the consciousness of objective laws. The  
vity of his thinking contributed to the obscurity of his  
e; while his fondness for the pungent and severe, and  
ly training as an advocate increased the difficulty.  
versed in dialectics, he was disposed to carry everything  
extreme in controversy; hence he expressed himself  
tly when the objects he opposed were different, and we  
ot always understand literally what he says under  
suppositions. He had a deeply speculative mind, but  
ted philosophic culture; his dialectic is destitute of  
clearness; although his mind was capable of forming a  
of its own, he could not rightly develope it; for the  
urt his thinking wanted that *σωφροσύνη*, the moderation  
d sense, for which Irenæus was so noted; hence with  
profundity we find a mixture of the preposterous and  
ical. He was a zealous advocate for the original con-  
n of man as it came from God, for the voice of Nature,  
ice disposed to deduce all heresies from the philosophy  
Greeks. Although his writings contain the germ of  
gmatic speculation, he was yet a most zealous opponent  
osophy. His mind was deeply imbued with a sensuous  
t, and he could not divest his thinking of sensuous  
y; yet with all this there was joined a substantial,  
an realism, so that we must often distinguish between  
msy form of his representation and the depth of his  
is discernment. Frequently injustice has been done  
y culling some of his paradoxical positions from his  
and regarding them as characteristic of the whole;  
e phrase, *credo quia ineptum est*, has been thought to  
idea of the whole man. But Tertullian intended to  
that paradox belongs to the essence of Christianity  
osition to the triviality of the *sensus communis*; *Veritas*

*in medulla, non est in superficie*; in God everything is rational. From what we have stated it is plain, that there was something in his mind which impelled him towards Montanism, to the systematic development of which he largely contributed. Yet Montanism re-acted on him, and we must distinguish between his style of thinking before he embraced it and after that event. It is needful to ascertain to which of these periods respectively each of his works belongs. After Tertullian, Cyprian\* bishop of Carthage had great influence in North-Africa (A.D. 248—258). Tertullian whom he simply styles "the master" (*Magister*) made a powerful impression upon him; but he was inferior to him in mental depth; he was less comprehensive and without a talent for speculation; the practical interest was entirely ascendant in him; and he occupied himself chiefly in the outward government of the Church. The conflicts of his life induced him to be the champion of episcopacy, and his writings are of special importance in reference to the doctrines of the Church. He imbibed from Tertullian some Montanistic ideas which he modified in a peculiar manner, and introduced into the later development of the Church.

This antignostic tendency had a very wholesome influence on the development of Dogma. It preserved the practical Christian spirit and the essential points of Christian Dogma, and secured the victory of Christian Realism over Idealism. Yet it was not sufficient by itself alone. In opposing gnostic Idealism, this Realism easily contracted a sensuous colouring. As Gnosticism was absolutely rejected, everything belonging to philosophic culture was suspected. An Apocryphal work, a pretended Revelation of Enoch, was circulated by the Jews, in which the account, in Gen. vi., of the connexion of the sons of God with the daughters of men, was explained to mean the intercourse of fallen Angels with human beings, and to the

\* Among his writings, the following are of importance in the history of Dogmas: Testimonior. lib. 3, de unitate ecclesiæ, de lapsis; particularly also many of his Epistles. Opp. ed. N. Rigaltius: Par. 1648. J. Fell, Oxon. 1612, Brem. 1690, Francof. 1700. Steph. Baluzius, Paris, 1726, Venet. 1728. D. J. H. Goldhorn, P. II. 8vo. Lips. 1838, 39. Life by Pontius, his deacon, prefixed to the editions of his work; by Prudentius Maranus in the edit. of Baluz. (J. Gervaise) la vie de St. Cyprien: Par. 1717, 4. Thascius Cæcil Cyprianus dargestellt v. F. W. Rettberg: Gött 1831, 8. Möhler's Patrologie, i. 809.

former were attributed all the higher branches of human knowledge, such as Philosophy, Astronomy, and Astrology. This view gained acceptance among the zealous opposers of Grecian culture, who regarded all the higher knowledge of the Grecian Philosophy as a communication from evil Spirits. On this standpoint Hermias wrote his *διασυρμὸς τῶν ἔξω φιλοσόφων*. It is evident how very much this one-sided tendency must have hindered the necessary process of connecting Christianity with human culture. Montanism was its extreme. It was agreeable to the natural course of the development of Christianity, that this party should be counteracted by another which aimed at impregnating Grecian culture with the Christian spirit, and placing a true Gnosis by the side of the heretical. Such a tendency would especially spring up, when philosophising Greeks became converts to Christianity, and strove to reconcile it with their former standpoint; and hence it appeared at a time when Christianity came into more frequent contact with the Philosophy of the Greeks.

The *Platonic Philosophy* was that which exerted the greatest influence on Christianity. Hence the mutual relation of the two is of great importance, and has been the subject of frequent investigations. Marcellus of Ancyra appeared in the fourth century as an accuser of Platonism. In later times, at the rise of Rationalism, certain peculiar Christian doctrines were traced to the influence of this philosophy, as by SOUVERAINE.\* MOSHEIM† handled the subject from the opposite standpoint, yet ascribed many things to Platonism which were owing to other influences. His views were combated by KEIL.‡ But it was certainly not the right method to start from particular doctrines, and to attempt to recognise the influence of Platonism in particular forms of Dogma. The question rather should have been, What relation Platonism bore in general to Christianity. This point of view has been brought under discussion, first in modern times when more attention has been given to the peculiarities of mental phenomena, as by ACKER-

\* *Le Platonisme dévoilé*. Transl. into German by Löffler, 1782.

† *De turbata per recentiores Platonicos ecclesia*; dissert. histor. Eccles. ii.

‡ *De causis alieni Platonicoe. recent. a relig. Christ. animi*. Opuscula, ed. GOLDHORN: Lps. 1821, 1.



MANN,\* VOGT, and BAUR;† the last-mentioned writer carries out a view which is connected with his entire standpoint

More distinct attention is now paid to the gradual development through which Platonism passed; for the ages immediately succeeding the birth of Christ, when the development of the ancient world closed, gave birth to an effort to reduce antagonist views to a higher unity. As early as PLUTARCH, we find traces of it, when an irregular Eclecticism and Syncretism commenced; a fermentation in which Oriental elements were blended with Platonism. Again, in the third century these heterogeneous ingredients were kept more apart by Ammonius Saccas; he was succeeded by the great philosopher Plotinus, from whom Neo-Platonism received its completion; in him we find many things much more sharply and distinctly expressed than in Plato, and if in the latter there are still many religious elements, they dwindle away under the rigid, systematic logic by which Plotinus reduces all things to an absolute Unity. This Monism is at a greater distance from Christianity than the original Platonism. Plotinus in his *Enneads* (a work so called from being divided into nine books) directs one book against the Gnostics, which makes us acquainted with his position in reference to Christianity. Sometimes he agrees with the Fathers in their opposition to the Gnostics; at other times he combats what is strictly Christian in the Gnostics. Besides, in the influence of Platonism on the Christian Fathers, we must distinguish what has often been confounded; first of all whether they really knew the whole system, and had become influenced by it, or only come in contact with some ideas belonging to it which were afloat in society; if the latter were the case, these ideas would be understood very differently when thus detached, than in their connexion with the whole System, especially by the Church teachers in whom the religious interest was always uppermost, and who were impelled by it to busy themselves with Philosophy. Moreover, we must notice whether the peculiar spirit and ideas of this Philosophy,

\* ACKERMANN, *das Christliche in Plato u. der platonischen Philosophie*: Hamb. 1835. Reviews by Nitzsch and H. Ritter in the *Theol. Stud. u. Kritik*. 1836, 2.

† *Das Christliche der Platonismus, oder Socrates u. Christus*: Tüb. 1837.

in points where they were at variance with Christianity, had gained an influence over the Church fathers, or whether they only made use of these forms as modes of presenting Christian truths; in other words, whether the influence was material or only formal. Many who had received Christianity on this philosophic standpoint, involuntarily retained those forms of thought, or intentionally applied them to the exposition of Christian truth of which they made them the vehicle. Thus, it is to be considered, whether these teachers attached, by means of Platonic ideas, a foreign sense to Christian doctrines, when philosophic speculation overruled their Christian consciousness, or whether inversely, they conveyed Christian truth through the medium of philosophic ideas.

As to that phase of Platonism which is most akin to Christianity; it pointed to faith in objective truth—to something unconditional—to a spiritual kingdom elevated above the world of sensible appearances; it viewed all things in connexion with a religious interest, and awakened the consciousness of God, as the central point of the universe, of knowledge, and of life. As formerly Socrates and Plato came forward to oppose the arbitrary lawless scepticism of the Sophists, and their constant tendency to cleave to the sensible world, so in later ages the Platonic Philosophy in times of doubt frequently gave a new impulse to the religious interest. It would not allow the human spirit to remain in the isolation of self-sufficiency; but placed him in relation to God, and a higher spiritual world; it recognised the divine nature of the human *νοῦς* and its destiny to be the organ of the Supreme *νοῦς*. Here the key-note of the Christian consciousness which otherwise is mostly in opposition to the standpoint of pagan antiquity—finds an Analogon, as far as Plato and Plutarch use the term *ταπεινόν*, not only in a bad sense but in a good one, as denoting the feeling of dependence on a higher spiritual world. Platonism developed the principle of theistic Unity, the idea of One Supreme Being. And the Neo-platonists, even when they conformed to Polytheism, still preserved the Unity, in the idea of an Original Being, from whom all existence flowed. In the consciousness of the heavenly origin of the human soul, and its continuance in a fallen state, lies the acknowledgment that there has been a fall by which the soul in this world has descended to a lower state. Certainly the question may be raised, whether the

mythical representation and the pure scientific development are to be distinguished from one another in Plato, and, consequently, whether that which, from a certain standpoint, must be regarded as mythical, was taken strictly in Plato's sense. If the latter be the case, then the doctrine of the fall of souls, and the foreign element of the  $\psi\lambda\eta$ , cleaving to them, gave a point of connexion for the consciousness of a view of Redemption, to which we find something similar in the Neo-Platonists.

But on the other hand Platonism contained an important element antagonistic to Christianity. As to Plato himself, it is questionable whether he taught the doctrine of a personal God or only an Absolute of the Reason, the  $\delta\nu$ , or whether both are to be connected with one another. To the former Christianity could ally itself—to the latter it was diametrically opposed. There can be no doubt that the doctrine of a Supreme Being as held by Neo-Platonism, presented no point of connexion for faith in a personal God: nothing was left but the  $\delta\nu$  to which all consciousness was denied. This highest simplicity, a mere intellectual entity, was on that system the origin of all existence. If in Plato we find the doctrine of a Creation as an act of God—on the other hand among the Neo-Platonists, everything appears as the necessary process of development of the immanent Reason, according to the deduction from their first principles. The Christian doctrine of a personal super-temporal God acting freely in creation, providence, and the government of the Universe, finds here no point of connexion. The idea of sin adhering to Man is not indeed wanting, but it is too much a part of his original constitution, since evil is traced to a mixture of the spiritual life with the  $\psi\lambda\eta$ . Here again, much depends upon whether Plato spoke literally or figuratively in what he says of the formation of Chaos or the  $\psi\lambda\eta$ . The Neo-Platonists, at least, admit of no transitive act, but a necessary development, and the  $\psi\lambda\eta$  appears not as a real Chaos, but only as something negative, as the limit of the divine development of life, and the boundary between Being and Not-being. According to Plato the divine ideas must reveal themselves in the process of becoming, in the formation of the  $\psi\lambda\eta$ , but they find an insurmountable obstacle, it is founded in the nature of things, that the Divine cannot be perfectly realized in this world. Hence the Neo-Platonists came to the conclusion that evil,

since it was inseparable from the limitation, the ὕλη, is necessary in this world. On these principles, the doctrine of redemption was inadmissible. According to Plato, elevation to the Supreme is effected by Knowledge; hence an antagonism is formed between the practical life and the Idea. Only those who elevate themselves to the Idea, by philosophic Knowledge and Contemplation, fulfil the highest function of the Spirit; while the mass of sensuous men remain at a distance from perfect Religion and Morality on their inferior standpoint. In Plato's Republic, the Aristocratism of Knowledge which is peculiar to antiquity appears very prominently. The Neo-platonists also ascribe the highest religious knowledge only to the Philosophers, and speak with contempt of the masses. Exactly here we find the greatest contrast between Platonism and Christianity which is victorious over that Aristocratism because it makes the Highest depend not on Knowledge, but on the fact that the divine life has appeared in Humanity: Christ has realized the ideal of Humanity, and has taken away the Antagonism between the Idea and the Actual. It belongs to the essence of the kingdom of God that the Divine must become a matter of life and common to all. In all men there must be the same development of the divine principle of Life—the same higher communion which proceeds from an appropriation of the fact of Redemption for all. In Platonism the idealistic tendency is predominant; in Christianity religious realism; it reduces the contrarieties which the former retains, between theory and practice, between the esoteric and exoteric standpoints. From the whole it is evident, that though Platonism may promote the spiritual conception of Christianity, it is likely to occasion confusion in the development of Dogmas. The Aristotelian philosophy as far as it was not connected with the Platonic, exerted only a slight influence, and certainly rather in reference to the general tendency of thought than particular doctrines. From Platonism proceeded a conservative and contemplative tendency of the Soul; the Aristotelian philosophy, on the contrary, promoted a negative dialectic tendency of the Understanding, which was indicated in certain views of the doctrine of the Trinity.

The Apologists, and among them Justin Martyr especially, formed the medium for the operation of Platonism on the doctrines of the Christian Faith. We may trust Justin's

account in which he narrates the development of his own life, how, by birth a heathen and dissatisfied with the popular religion, he sought for truth in the various systems of Philosophy, till he arrived at Platonism which promised him the most satisfaction. Yet he was not a man of a philosophic spirit and was led to Platonism rather by a religious than philosophic interest. In other instances it has happened that when faith has lost its power, the mind has fallen back upon Philosophy. But as he was actuated by a religious impulse, he could not remain fixed in Platonism. With a mind so unsystematic as his, he certainly had not acquired a logically formed platonic mode of thinking, but found himself interested with certain ideas which stood in close connexion with the religious element, and assisted him in making the transition to Christianity. He was the first who having candidly and freely examined the Grecian Philosophy, sought in its better aspects for points of connexion with the Christian Revelation. When in his Apologies he made use of this medium to prove to Philosophers the truth of Christianity, it was not a deliberate adaptation, but his natural way of thinking, and honest endeavour to find out a junction between Christianity and his earlier standpoints. His idea is very striking of the *λόγος σπειρωτικός* as something related to the absolute *λόγος* in Christ—of traces of truth in a partial revelation to the ancient world which preceded the appearance of Christianity. As this idea is not so prominent in another work of Justin, his Dialogue with the Jewish theologian Trypho, some persons have conjectured that this work is spurious, an opinion which on good grounds others have rejected. Though a diversity of form is noticeable in these works, yet it is not difficult to perceive the agreement in their leading ideas. And in a mind like Justin's, heterogeneous elements might easily mingle together. The School of Baur has asserted that an Ebionitish element is to be found in Justin, but this we cannot admit; a Pauline mode of thought is obvious, and some mixture of a Jewish spirit furnishes no proof to the contrary. But all these points have been thoroughly examined by SEMISCH in his Monograph.\*

\* Justinus d. Martyrer: Bresl. 1840—42, 2 vols. Translated by J. E. Ryland, and published in *Clark's Biblical Cabinet*: Edinb. 1843.

Justin leads us to the Alexandrian School \* from which a scientific theology and mode of treating the truths of Christianity first emanated. It owes its earliest development to Pantænus, none of whose writings are extant. His pupil Clement carried it still further, and from Origen it received its highest improvement.

The Alexandrian Fathers, on account of their studying the Grecian Philosophy, exposed themselves to the danger of being taxed with heresy by other parties. CLEMENT frequently rebukes the "ignorant brawlers" who, as he says, are frightened at Philosophy as children at a mask. He endeavours to show the advantages and necessity of studying it, for the teachers of the Church; that they ought to know it well, even to controvert it and prove its injurious effects. But philosophic culture, he asserted, was also a necessary preparation, in order to be able to develope Christian truths in a scientific form. What the ancients said of the relation of Dialectics to Philosophy, that "it is a fence for truth,"† applied also to the relation of the culture so gained to Christian truth. Not that any addition was by this means made to its contents, but an instrument was gained for defending it against the Sophists. The zealots against Philosophy, said Clement, ascribe its origin to the influence of evil Spirits: but, granting that, they must assume the appearance of truth,‡ in order to deceive men, and even evil must subserve the designs of Providence. Here he speaks only from the standpoint of his opponents, and rejects their views, for he adds that according to this doctrine Satan would have been more benevolent to the better men among the Greeks, than divine Providence.§ He himself adopts either the ancient Alexandrian view that the Grecian systems of Philosophy had conformed themselves to the Revelations of the Old Testament, or derives the traces of truth they contained, from the spirit allied to God, which was common to both. This is connected with a leading idea of the

\* Particularly the writings of CLEMENT, ORIGEN, DIONYSIUS (Routh Rel. Sac. iii.). Also EUSEBIUS, Hist. Eccl. v. vi. vii.—J. G. MICHAELIS, de scholæ Alex. sic dictæ catechetici origine, progressu ac præcipuis doctoribus: Brem. 1745. H. E. F. GUERICKE, de schola quæ Alexandriæ floruit commentat. histor. Theol. ii.: Hal. 1824, 25. C. F. G. HASSELBAUGH.

† Strom. i. 319—*φραγμὸς οἰκείος εἴρηται καὶ θρησκευτικὸς εἶναι.*

‡ Strom. vi. 647, i. 310.

§ Strom. v. 693, C.

Alexandrian school, which after being lost sight of, has reappeared in later times — the idea of a divine education of mankind which prepared not only the Jewish nation, but collective antiquity, for Christianity as their ultimate aim. Thus he says,\* “Philosophy prepared the way for the royal doctrine of the Gospel; since by discipline, moral training, and the recognition of a Providence, it renders men susceptible of the reception of the truth. It is plain therefore, that till the advent of the Saviour, the Law was given to the Jews and Philosophy to the Greeks. From that epoch all men were called to be a peculiar righteous people through the Christian Faith, since the one God of both Greeks and Barbarians, or rather of the whole human race, has collected all together through one Lord.”† The language is very remarkable in which he shows how Christianity must appropriate the elements of Grecian culture in order to ennoble it. He uses the image of improving the wild olive tree by grafting. The fruit-bearing power of the wild plant is ennobled by the graft of the noble scion, while this in its turn gains power from the tree on which it is grafted. Thus the Grecian Philosophy is ennobled by Christianity and at the same time imparts to it a power of extension.‡

In the idea which the Alexandrians maintained respecting the true *γνώσις* and its relation to *πίστις*, we find, especially as stated by Clement, two opposing elements; on the one hand the Christian view prevails according to which the idea of Faith is presupposed as the common ground of life for all; on the other hand the Platonic view of the relation of *ἐπιστήμη* to *δόξα* is brought in, and produces the opposition of an esoteric and exoteric doctrine. The mixture of the Christian and Platonic elements belongs to the very essence of this School; for as it generally happens, when a new tendency is formed various elements traverse each other. Clement developes the sound principle (first mentioned) against the Gnostics; but in

\* Strom. i. 309.

† Strom. vi. 694; compare vi. 636.—*σαφῶς γὰρ, οἶμαι, ἐδήλωσεν τὸν ἕνα καὶ μόνον Θεόν, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἑλλήνων ἰθρικῶς, ὑπὸ δὲ Ἰουδαίων ἰουδαϊκῶς, καὶνῶς δὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν καὶ πνευματικῶς γνωσκόμενον· πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς Θεὸς ἀμφὺν ταῖν διαθήκαιν χορηγός, ὁ καὶ τῆς ἑλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας δωτήρ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, δι' ἧς ὁ παντοκράτωρ παρ' Ἑλλήσι δοξάζεται, παρίστησεν.*

‡ Strom. vi. 672.

opposing the confined sensuous standpoint of Faith, he elevates the *γνώσις* so far above the *πίστις*, that it is no longer a mere formal distinction, but two different standpoints of the Christian life are set up, and there is an actual approximation to the Gnostics. The correct view is given when he states, that the true Gnosis is founded on Faith, and is thus distinguished from the false ; that faith is as necessary for the spiritual life of the *γνωστικός*, as breathing for the bodily life \*; and when he says that by Faith a new sense is given to man for understanding divine things. "Thus saith the Lord, Behold, I make all things new; he gives eyes in order to see what no eye has seen; ears to hear what no ear has heard; new eyes, ears, and hearts. The disciples of the Lord will believe and know with these new organs; will speak and act in a spiritual manner." He describes Faith † as the knowledge of things necessary to salvation, and Gnosis ‡ as a scientific development of what is received by faith. Hence he terms *γνώσις* a scientific faith.§ In another passage he vindicates Gnosis against those who would make faith alone of any value, and say that Gnosis profits nothing; that the one thing needful is to obtain salvation, and this is possible only by Faith. In refuting these persons, Clement makes use of a Parable, in which Christ is compared to a vine; do they imagine that grapes can be obtained, without care being taken, from the first, of the branches? As grapes can only be obtained by the labour of the vinedresser, who must dig, and prune, and tend, so the contents of the Christian faith can be attained only by scientific labour.|| Gnosis, therefore, is attained, when the contents of the *πίστις* are developed; when foreign elements are separated with scientific consciousness, and the faith is proved and vindicated. To show the relation of *πίστις* to *γνώσις*, Clement quotes Is. vii. 9., which in the Septuagint Version differs from the Hebrew. "If ye do not believe, ye cannot understand.¶ Henceforward this passage was regarded

\* Strom. ii. 373.

† Strom. ii. 365.

‡ Strom. vii. 731.—'Ἡ μὲν οὖν πίστις σύντομός ἐστιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπῆν, τῶν κατεπειγόντων γνῶσις, ἡ γνῶσις δὲ ἀπόδειξις τῶν διὰ πίστεως παρελημμένων ἰσχυρὰ καὶ βέβαιος, διὰ τῆς κυριακῆς διδασκαλίας ἐκικοδομουμένη τῇ πίστει, εἰς τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης καταλεπτόν παραπέμπουσα.

§ Strom. ii. p. 381. D.

|| Strom. i. 291.

¶ 'Εὰν μὴ πιστεύσητε, οὐδὲ μὴ συνῆτε.



as the *locus classicus* on the subject, and with it the sentiment became current, that the *intellectus* must proceed from the *fides*.

Other passages in Clement's writings differ from the above, in which he speaks under the influence of Platonic Intellectualism, to the effect that genuine spiritual Christianity is only to be known on the standpoint of the *γνωστικὸς πίστις*; here appears only a sensuous faith, founded on external authority; Man is not raised by it to the true love of God, but is only determined by the sensuous motives of fear and hope.\* Life in divine Truth, disinterested love to God can be found only in the *γνωστικὸς*. With these views is connected a twofold standpoint for the interpretation of the Scriptures, the literal method and the allegorical. Clement accordingly distinguishes the standpoint which adheres to historical facts, from the gnostic, on which man raises himself to higher ideas; there are some who recognise Christ only as the Son of David; others (a few) who acknowledge Him as the Son of God.† Here is a blending of religious and philosophical knowledge, since the solution of speculative difficulties is sought for in Holy Writ, a purpose for which it was not given. Some maintained, it appears, in opposition to the Alexandrian Gnosis, that to acknowledge that which could not be understood as unintelligible, was the only knowledge possible of such subjects, Clement replied that the Gnostic understood that which was unintelligible to others, for nothing was unintelligible to the sons of God; hence there was nothing which they could not be taught.‡ Consequently, he sets no bounds to the Gnosis in reference to speculation.

We find the same principles carried out in ORIGEN. In his writings, *χριστιανισμὸς σαματικὸς* is contrasted with *πνευματικὸς*, just as in Clement *πίστις* stands related to *γῶσις*. He sets out from the idea that spiritual communion with Christ is the fountain of all divine life and knowledge; that the earthly manifestation of Christ was an image of his eternal divine activity; that the *ἐκδημία αἰσθητή* is a symbol of the *ἐκδημία νοητή*, and now it is a matter of the highest moment, by spiritual communion with Him to understand Him also in his manifestation. As on the standpoint of the Old Testament there were various stages of religious development, an *Ἰουδαϊσμὸς*

\* Strom. vi. 663.

† Strom. vi. 680.

‡ Strom. vi. 649.

σωματικός, a senuous Judaism where the παιδαγωγός was still necessary, and a higher standpoint of those, who, by the spiritual revelation of the λόγος in his ἐπιδημία νοητή, had raised themselves to the knowledge of Christianity; so within the pale of Christianity we distinguish those who, being in a preparatory stage, adhere only to the historical Christ, from those who rise above historical Christianity to its spirit, and to spiritual communion with the Logos. The latter have the Logos himself, the former have him only as incarnate; the latter have the Gnosis, the former have the Christianity of faith according to the letter. When Paul says that he would know nothing save Jesus Christ and him crucified, Origen does not understand this as characteristic of the highest Christian standpoint, but finds in it a condescension to the standpoint of the multitude.\* To remain with Christ crucified, is, therefore, in his opinion, a subordinate standpoint, which the Gnosis must surpass in order to attain to the Idea, which is the Wisdom of the Perfect. With this also was connected the literal and the spiritual exposition of Holy Writ. In correspondence with his conception of Christ he regarded the historical narrative, the εὐαγγέλιον σαρκικόν as a symbol of a summary of eternal truths, of the εὐαγγέλιον πνευματικόν, or αἰώνιον, and the highest style of exposition consisted in translating the former into the latter. At the same time, he did not search for the Spirit in the letter with a sound, scientific exegesis; but arbitrarily from his preconceived philosophical notions, attached a spiritual meaning to the letter. To speak more exactly, there was a threefold element which he assumed to exist in Holy Writ; the mere outward letter, corresponding to the body; in this was presented a general moral truth, intelligible to πίστις and corresponding to the ψυχή: lastly, there was the higher speculative truth analogous to the human νοῦς. Like Philo, Origen aimed in general to preserve the historical truth of the letter; but he found, likewise, in the Old and New Testament many things which he believed could not be explained literally; he acknowledged the discrepancies in the narratives of the Gospels, and in proof adduced difficulties similar to those brought forward in modern times by the advocates of mythical views. Instead of attempting to reconcile them, he arrived at the same conclusion as modern Hypercriticism, that

\* Com. in Joann. i. § 11.

the historical correctness was to be denied; but this hypercritical element in his dogmatic tendency resulted from his looking, like Philo, only on the Divine, while on the contrary, our modern Hypercriticism sees nought but the Human. In these discrepancies he saw something intended by the Divine Spirit, who led susceptible minds to the conviction that the investigation of the idea, in which alone is reality, the knowledge of the divine agency of the λόγος in the symbolical representations, was the highest object to be attained. Such idealistic principles might have led him to deny altogether the reality of the life of Christ, but his own Christian spirit kept him from this; yet others went further. He himself remarks on the dangers of this method, and we find passages in his writings, in which he strongly condemns it.

Having given a general description of their tendency, let us now consider the peculiar mental culture of two of its representative men, CLEMENT and ORIGEN,

CLEMENT\* was a Catechist and Presbyter of the Alexandrian Church. Among his writings, his *Stromata*, a work of a miscellaneous character, is peculiarly valuable, partly for his own thoughts, and partly for the quotations from ancient authors. In the composition of this work, in which he meant to delineate the Alexandrian Gnosis, it was, no doubt, part of his plan only to touch on several topics without fully discussing them; since, on account of other Church parties, he had reasons for not expressing with perfect distinctness many ideas of the Alexandrian Gnosis. He also wished, by the variety of its contents, to lead men of different standpoints to Christianity. Though this may serve to explain the absence of systematic completeness, yet it was partly owing to the structure of

\* His writings are: λόγος προτρεπτικός προς Ἑλληνας παιδαγωγός, 3 books; στρώματα, or στρωματεῖς, 8 books; τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλοῦσιος; Fragments of the ὑποτυπώσεις (adumbrationes); ἐκ τῶν προφητικῶν ἐκλογαί, Opp. ed.: Par. 1641, fol. Colon. 1688, fol. Potter: Oxon. 1715, 2 vols. fol. R. Klotz: Lpz. 1931—34, 4 vols. 8vo. Hofstede de Groote de Clemente Alexand.: Gron. 1826, fol. Von Cölln in der Encyclop. v. Ersch u. Gruber in Art. Clemens. Vol. xviii. p. 4. A. F. Dähne de gnosei Clementis Alex.: Lips. 1831, 46. Kling, Clem. Bedeutung für d. Eusteh. der christ. Theolog. Stud. u. Krit. 1841. Ritter, Gesch. der Philosoph. Vol. v. p. 421. Redepenning, Origines I. 70. H. Reuter, Clement Al. theologicæ moralis capitulum selectiorum particulæ: Ber. 1853. H. Lemmer, Clementis Al. de λόγῳ doctrina: Lips. 1855.

Clement's mind, which, though of a high order, was not adapted for systematic development; hence, we find in his writings many important ideas scattered abroad, many suggestions and germs of deeper investigations, but also much that is indefinite, a medley of heterogeneous elements, which required to be sifted and arranged. He was fitted to give an impulse for the development of the School, but not, strictly speaking, to be its Founder. This honour was reserved for ORIGEN,\* the greatest Church-teacher of the East. His father, a learned grammarian, gave him a very liberal education, and excited in him an ardent desire for the study of Grecian Literature; at the same time, he sought to impress his head with the truths of Christianity. These two elements proceeded simultaneously without mixing with one another. He appears to have derived from his father the current ecclesiastical direction, and a one-sided literal mode of interpreting the Scriptures. He himself refers to having occupied such a standpoint; for he says, that at one time he knew Christ after the flesh and the letter, but now he knew him so no more.† This is equivalent to saying, that his theological development was marked by two distinct stages, and that he had advanced from a literal to a spiritual mode of viewing. While restricted to the former, his ascetic zeal had led him into the error of making a literal application to himself of Christ's words in Matt. xix. 12. As he had experienced the defects of the literal standpoint, it is easily understood how he afterwards veered round to

\* His important dogmatic writings are: *Commentaries* (τόμοι), *Homilies*, some in the original Greek, others in the translation of Rufinus and Jerome; *περὶ ἀρχῶν* in *Origenes de principiis ed. et annot. instruc.* E. R. Redepenning: Lips. 1836. Compare K. F. Schnitzer, *Origenes üb. d. Grundlehren der Glaubenswissenschaft. Wiederherstellungsversuch (aus der Uebersetzung des Rufin):* Stuttg. 1835. *Contr. Celsum*, libb. viii. ed. Spencer, Cantabr. 1658, 4to. *Uebers. von Mosheim*, *Origenes*, 8 Bb. v. d. christl. Wahrheit. gegen d. Weltweis Celsum, 1745, 4to. *περὶ εὐχῆς εἰς μαρτύριον προτεπτικὸς λόγος*. Important dogmatic passages of his writings are to be found in the *Philocalia* of Basil of Cæsarea and Gregory Nazianzen. The *Commentaries*, ed. D. Huetius, 2 tom. fol. Rothomag. 1668. Par. 1679. Col. 1685. Collected editions of his works, De la Rue: Par. 733—59, 4 t. fol. Lommatzsch, 1831 sq. 25 t. 8.—*Origeniana* by Huet in his edit., and in De la Rue's, t. iv.—G. Thomasius, *Origenes e. Beitr. zur Dogmengesch.* Nürab. 1837. Redepenning, *Origenes e. Darstellung seines Lebens u. sur. Lehre.* 2 Bb. 841. 46. Ritter, *Gesh. d. Philosoph.* V.

† Com. in Matth. t. xv. § 3.

the opposite extreme, and substituted a one-sided spiritualism for a sensuous contractedness. It would assist us in understanding his development, if we knew more of the first influence of Clement over him. He could not have been subject to this in his youth, on account of the standpoint he then occupied. The Neoplatonic philosophy which he learned at the lectures of a distinguished teacher, Ammonius Saccas,\* contributed much to the change in his views. It gave his mind a new speculative, dogmatic direction, which prepared him for adopting that of Clement, and systematically developing the Alexandrian Gnosis. He endeavoured to make himself master of the most widely different systems of Eastern or Western origin, and in all of them, as they appeared from his own standpoint, to separate the true from the false. The great liberality and moderation with which he treated other standpoints, formed one of his characteristics; hence, he could put himself in communication with minds cast in very different moulds, and lead them off their own standpoint to adopt other convictions. He made too great a separation between *γνώσις* and *πίστις*, but yet the affection with which he sympathised with the *πιστικοί* is admirable, since he recognises the necessity of various stages of development. In a remarkable passage, he rebukes the haughtiness of those who despised the little ones in the Church, and did not recollect that Christ had said "*Of such is the kingdom of God*,"—in this respect Christ became a child to children.† Christianity appears to him as an image of Christ. In all his writings the apologetic interest is predomi-

\* See Euseb. Hist. Eccl. vi. 19. Ritter contends that Ammonius Saccas had been his teacher. See, on the other hand, Redepenning's *Origenes* i. 230. L. Krüger, über d. Verhältnisse des Origenes zu Am. Saccas, in Ilgen's *Zeitschrift f. histor. Theol.* 1843. 1.

† In Malth. xv. § 6, 8. Compare also the beautiful fragment of a letter to Firmilianus of Cæsarea, in Cappadocia, in the *Spicilegium Solesmense*, ed. a. B. Pitra: Par. 1852, i. 268. Exeuntes Hebræi de terrâ Ægypti et arma bellica non habentes ac præliorum certamina nescientes, terrore percussi sunt, videntes armatos Ægyptios insequentes. Propterea dicit eis Moyses: vos tacebitis et Deus pugnabit pro vobis. Si nihil hæc Scriptura significare voluisset, dici poterat; vos pugnabitis, et Deus pugnabit pro vobis. Quid vero ad timorem belli pertinebat ut diceret; (et) vos tacebitis? Nisi quia in filiis Israel non habentibus usum bellicum designabantur fideles, qui in simplicis fidei soliditate firmati et disputandi scientiam non habentes, sed regulam fidei in corde servantes, taciturnitate superant adversarios, expugnare nitentes recti dogmatis veritatem. [JACOBI]

nant against philosophic heathens and heretics. This interest for the vindication of Christian truth appears throughout, even where he concedes too much to Platonism. He was destined to prepare the way for a new period of Christian development, to harmonize contrarieties, but he did not succeed in carrying on this process successfully on all points. His dispute with Demetrius, his bishop, was attended with important consequences, for it occasioned his leaving Alexandria and going to Cæsarea. The outward cause of the controversy was the hierarchical jealousy of Demetrius; but the real ground lay deeper, and outward circumstances only served to bring that hidden cause into public notice, which was the contrariety between Origen's Gnostic tendency and the antignostic. It is to be regretted that we only possess some slight notices of the affair. A work by Origen, entitled *περὶ ἀρχῶν* (*De principiis*), which treated either of the Principles of Christianity, or, more probably, of the Principles of Being, gave the first impulse to the controversy. This work, which had been made public against his will, by his friend Ambrosius, formerly a Gnostic, contained many speculative developments and problems, which called forth a violent opposition from the other party. He was accused of falsifying the doctrines of Christianity, and suffered excommunication. Unfortunately that work, from which we might have learnt his theology, has come down to us, with the exception of a few Greek fragments, only in the incorrect Latin Version of the Presbyter Rufinus. We cannot with certainty assume, that Origen held all the opinions here expressed, at a later period. He might, perhaps, afterwards retract many of his bold assertions; and hence this work must be compared with his later writings, much of which we possess only in a Latin Version. Among his Greek works the most important are, his treatise against Celsus, and his Commentaries on the Gospels of John and Matthew, which are more valuable for the History of Dogmas than for Exegesis. Owing to his peculiar view of the business of exposition, and of its various standpoints, he brought forward his Dogmas even in his exegetical writings, and frequently sought to point them out in Scripture, after he had erroneously placed them there. His homilies are not altogether safe sources for ascertaining his peculiar Dogmas, since it is not certain whether he always brought his own opinions

before the public, or only accommodated himself to an exoteric standpoint.

During the controversy carried on after his death, between his own adherents and the antignostic Church party, the learned Pamphilus, a Presbyter at Cæsarea, in Palestine, who suffered martyrdom in the Diocletian persecution (A.D. 309), composed a Vindication of Origen, which was completed after his death by his pupil Eusebius, and of which we possess some fragments in the original Greek, and the first book in the Latin translation of Rufinus.\* That controversy shows the leading tendencies which regulated the development of Dogmas, and it was a most important consequence that they acted as counterpoises to one another. Thus the practical Christian spirit checked the idealistic tendency of arbitrary speculation; then again, a scientific tendency was diffused by the School of Origen, which spiritualized the gross sensuous element.

## THE SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

### A. THE HISTORY OF INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS.

If we now turn to the history of particular Dogmas we have, first of all, to treat of those ideas which belong to the introduction to the doctrines of Christianity. Our first inquiry is respecting the highest source of our knowledge of the Christian faith, whether it is supernatural Revelation or Reason, whether inward or outward, the Christian consciousness, or the Holy Scriptures and Tradition, whether written or oral Tradition is the highest source.

#### 1. OF WRITTEN AND ORAL TRADITION AS NORMAL SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

The inquiry, whether in the first ages of the Church oral Tradition or Holy Writ was the higher source of Christian knowledge, necessarily came under discussion at the Reformation.

\* *Apolog. pro Origene*, libb. v., lib. vi. of Eusebius. Greek fragments. Phot. cod. 109. lib. 1. in Rufinus' translation. Origen, *Opera*, De la Rue, t. iv. p. 17.

mation. This induced Archbishop USHER,\* to make a collection of passages respecting the use of Holy Writ; at a later period the subject came again under consideration in the development of German Theology, when LESSING† rejected the common Protestant view, and maintained, that in the most ancient times a *regula fidei* had been regarded as a source of knowledge. On the opposite side F. WALCH, of Göttingen, wrote his treatise on "the use of Scripture in the first three centuries," 1779. In later times F. DELBRÜCK‡ re-opened the inquiry, and by his assertions in favour of Tradition called forth the rejoinders of NITZSCH, LÜCKE and SACK.§ Lastly, A. DANIEL|| in a controversial pamphlet pleaded in favour of the Catholic view of Tradition, to which JACOBI wrote a reply.¶ In the examination of the question partial views have been taken, as often on the Protestant side as on the Catholic. The Protestants transferred their own standpoint to antiquity, and the Catholics failed to recollect that Tradition in the Apostolic Age must have been different from what it is at present. Here, as it often happens, error has arisen from the wish to retain the standpoint of an earlier age unaltered, under new developments and altered relations. If we go back to the origin of the Christian dispensation, we shall find that the Apostles were commissioned, first of all, to propagate the truth by oral announcement. To this their writings were only subsidiary, as the occasion might require in consequence of what they had taught by word of mouth. But in all cases, whatever they declared as teachers,

\* *Historia dogmatica controversiæ inter orthodoxos et pontificios de Scripturis et sacris vernaculis.* ed. Wharton: Lond. 1690.

† In his *Streitschriften gegen Götze Werke*, viii.

‡ *Melanchthon der Glaubenslehre*: Bonn. 1828.

§ *Ueber das Ansehen der h. Schrift im Verhältniss zur Glaubensregel in der protest. u. in d. alten Kirche Drei Sendschreiben an Herrn Delbrück*: Bonn. 1897.

| *Theologische Controversen.* 1846.

¶ *Die Kirch. Lehre von d. Tradition u. d. Schrift in ihrer Entwicklung.*

\*\* Compare also, W. L. Christmann, *üb. d. ursprüngl. Verhältniss von Tradition u. Schrift, Logos u. Kabbala*: Tub. 1125. C. W. Ch. Weinmann, *Darstellung u. unpartheiische Kritik der Streitfrage üb. d. Tradit. als Quelle religios. Lehren u. Ueberzeugungen*, 1825. D. Schenkel, *üb. d. ursprüngl. Verhältniss der Kirche zum Kanon.* 1838. J. Kirchhofer, *Quellensammlung zur Geschichte des neu. testamentl. Kanons bis auf Hieronymus*: Zür. 1844.



whether orally or in writing, must be of equal authority: in either way they communicated the truth of which they were conscious. As long as they lived, and while an appeal might be made to them in all cases of uncertainty, their oral tradition might be justly regarded as the prime source of Christian knowledge. But manifestly this state of things could not continue after the decease of the Apostles. Oral tradition was liable to many corruptions to which the writings of the Apostles were less liable, and hence these formed a compensation for the loss of their oral teachings. But in the succeeding age, the great alteration which the relation of Scripture and Tradition had undergone, was not clearly apprehended, and oral tradition was still principally regarded. The successors of the Apostles fondly repeated what they had heard from their lips, as Irenæus reported the sayings of Polycarp;\* and whenever persons met with them, then oral traditions were eagerly listened to. Meantime it soon appeared how they were falsified. Differences within the Church exerted their influence, and an uncritical tendency admitted crude and sensuous elements into tradition. Of this we have an example in Papias, a pious but weak-minded man. But when this defect in Tradition was noticed and the need of a corrective was felt, the importance of written records became apparent. The Apostolic writings were collected and used with those of the Old Testament as religious archives. A difference of standpoint became noticeable, according as Christian knowledge was drawn from oral Tradition or from the written Records. Thus JUSTIN asserts that he had derived his knowledge of Christianity from the ἀπομνημονεύματα of the Apostles.†

Yet, at this period appeals were also made to the testimony of living Christian consciousness without a special reference to its sources, and determined only by the inward power of evangelical truth on the soul. On this point, an expression of IGNATIUS of Antioch‡ is very remarkable, "I exhort you to do

\* Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* v. 20.

† Apol. i. 66. Compare Semisch, *d. apostolischen Denkwürdigkeiten Justins*. 1848. Hilgenfeld, *Kritische Unters. üb. die Evangelien Justins*, d. *Clement Homilien u. Marcions*, 1850.

‡ Ad Philadelph. c. 8.—Παρακαλῶ δε ὑμᾶς μηδὲν κατ' ἐριθείαν πράσσειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ χριστομαθίαν. Ἐπεὶ ἤκουσά τινων λεγόντων, ὅτι ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις (alia lectio ἀρχαίοις) εὔρω, ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ οὐ πιστεύω· καὶ λέγοντός μου αὐτοῖς, ὅτι γέγραπται, ἀπεκριθησαν μοι;

nothing *κατ' ἐπιθείαν* but according to Christian knowledge *χριστομαθίαν*." CREDNER has translated *ἐπιθεία* "according to the rules of trade," yet rather incorrectly; according to its etymology, the word may have such a meaning, but in this passage it would be unnatural; the meaning *contentiousness*, or party-spirit, suits better; so that he warned them not to do anything in a contentious manner. The *ἐπιθεία* of the Judaizing party is here condemned. Since I have heard some say, continues the writer, "if I do not find it *ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις*, then I believe not in the Gospel." In this passage there is a various reading *ἀρχαίοις*, which would mean, "if I do not find it in the archives of the Church," which then is explained as meaning that a definite written Gospel was to be regarded as genuine, and would be important for the question relative to the genuineness of the Gospels. You appeal in vain, would the opponents say, to your Gospel; if we do not find such writings in the archives of the Church, we do not believe it. But at that period there was no archives to be spoken of; the phrase sounds far too modern. Moreover, *ἐναγγέλιον* commonly means the subject matter of evangelical doctrine, and not any single writing. Therefore, the reading *ἀρχαίοις* is to be retained as genuine. The passage might be explained, "If I do not find it in the old, or in the original copies of the evangelical writings," in which a contrast to later additions might be imagined; but even this would be very obscurely expressed. It has been taken most properly as a designation of the Old Testament, the authority of which alone would be admitted by the Judaizers. These opponents accordingly said, "If I do not find it in the Old Testament, I will not believe what is given out as Gospel; and when I appeal," adds the author, "to that, that it stands written, namely, in the Old Testament, they answer '*ὅτι πρόκειται*.'" CREDNER understands this phrase to mean "*it lies open there—it is correct*;" but it is not probable, from the connexion, that the author meant to say that the Judaizing opponents would let themselves be so easily overcome. HUG in his introduction to the New Testament, explains the expression "*it precedes—it merits the preference*," i.e., the Old

ὅτι πρόκειται. Ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρχαῖα (alia lectio ἀρχαῖα) ἔστιν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, τὰ ἀθεκτα ἀρχαῖα (alia lectio ἀρχαῖα) ὁ σταυρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ θάνατος, καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ πίστις ἡ δι' αὐτοῦ· ἐν οἷς θέλω ἰν τῇ προσευχῇ ὑμῶν δικαιοῦθηναι.

Testament compared with your Gospel. This would be admissible, if the preceding context referred to something written in the New Testament Records. In this perplexity of finding the right explanation, some have conjectured that a negative before the verb has been lost, and thus the meaning would be "it is not evident;" but this is hazardous, especially as by the omission of the negative the passage becomes more difficult. We should prefer an emendation of the verb, perhaps, *πρόκειται* or *παράκειται*—"it is an addition, an interpolation—it belongs not to the text," as we well know that the Judaizers had this answer ready, in reference to many passages of the Septuagint. Upon this the author replies, "To me Jesus Christ is what is ancient; his Cross, and Death, and Resurrection, and the faith obtained through Him are inviolably from of old, by which I shall be justified." Instead therefore, of appealing to the Old Testament, he says, "everything for me depends upon the Christian consciousness."

A confession of the fundamental truths of Christianity was formed, in which every one was instructed at his baptism, and which was regarded as the unanimous doctrine of all the Churches, as the bond of all Christian communities. It was called *κανὼν τῆς ἐκκλησίας*, *κανὼν τῆς πίστεως*, *παράδοσις ἀποστολική*, *regula fidei*. It was looked upon as an independent sufficient witness in itself, handed down from the Apostles, and so regarded by universal consent. Especially in the disputes with the Gnostic heretics, who often in an arbitrary manner rejected the genuine records of the New Testament, and brought forward new ones in their stead, and also appealed to their secret tradition; this was opposed to them as the common confession of all Churches and communities. But as the predilection for what was external soon acquired a preponderance, an appeal was made to Tradition, as preserved by the Churches founded by the Apostles themselves in the *sedes apostolica*, from which other Churches had derived their doctrine. Their trustworthiness was estimated too highly, because it was overlooked how easily falsifications in their traditions might arise. Thus two sources of the knowledge of doctrine were formed. The Tradition of the Church and the Written Records, which at first stood side by side, without having their mutual relation exactly defined. Only by degrees, and as the result of their use, definite principles were formed respecting them.

We shall first consider the view taken by IRENÆUS, the representative of the Churches in Lesser Asia. He says of the Holy Scriptures — that what the understanding can daily make use of — what it can easily know — is that which lies before our eyes, \* unambiguously, literally, and clearly in Holy Writ. He does not trace the errors of the Gnostics merely to their standing aloof from the Scriptures, but to their false interpretation of them †; since they picked out the obscure, figurative passages, and interpreted by them what was clear, instead of adhering to the sound hermeneutical canon, that the dark passages of Holy Writ should be explained by such as are clear. It appears from this that, in the opinion of Irenæus, the Holy Scriptures should be explained by comparing one passage with another, and that he held them to be the complete and normal source of the knowledge of Christian doctrine.‡ Taking this ground, he stoutly combats the Gnostic principle of Accommodation, which they employed only to nullify the appeal of their opponents to Holy Writ. When they asserted that the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles could not be perfectly known from Holy Writ, since they had condescended to different standpoints, and it was, therefore, questionable what was their real opinion, Irenæus replied, that to act in this manner would have been the manner of those who wished to increase the stock of human ignorance; but the Apostles, who were commissioned to set the erring right, to give sight to the blind, and to heal the sick, did not speak in accordance with the current opinions of the day, but according to the standpoint of Truth.§ Since, under the peculiar circumstances of the Christian community, all Christians had not the needful mental cultivation to read the Holy Scriptures in a right manner, and so might be led into error by the citations of the Gnostics, Irenæus advised the laity to keep to the rule of Faith which they had received at baptism; they might then be assured that, though the Gnostics

\* Adv. Hær. ii. c. 27.—'Ο ὑγιής νοῦς καὶ ἀκίνδυνος καὶ εὐλαβὴς καὶ φιλαλήθης, ὅσα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔξουσίᾳ δίδωκεν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ὑποτίταχε τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ γνώσει, ταῦτα προθύμως ἐκμελετήσῃ, καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς προκόψῃ, διὰ τῆς καθημερινῆς ἀσκήσεως ῥαδίαν τὴν μάθησιν ἑαυτῷ ποιούμενος. Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ τε ὑπ' ὧν πίπτοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν καὶ ὅσα φανερώς καὶ ἀναυφιβόλους ἀντολεῖται ἐν ταῖς θείαις γραφαῖς λήλεκται.

† Ibid. i. 8.

‡ Ibid. ii. 27.

§ Ibid. iii. 5.

used the words of the Bible, they imposed a false sense on them. But by the rule of Faith Irenæus understood not something given independently by Tradition. He says, "If any one by an arbitrary collocation of various Homeric words made something entirely new,—something like Homer's verses,—he could only deceive those who were unacquainted with the contents of Homer's poems. Thus the Gnostics can never lead those who know the *κανὼν τῆς ἐκκλησίας*, into the error of regarding their medley of phrases called from Holy Writ, as really biblical." According to Irenæus, therefore, this *κανὼν* as the *ὑπόθεσις βιβλική*, bears the same relation to Holy Writ as the *ὑπόθεσις ὁμηρικὴ* to the contents of Homer. He understands nothing else by it than the essential contents of Holy Writ.\* When the Gnostics by an appeal to 1 Cor. ii. 6, maintained there was an esoteric doctrine delivered by the Apostles only to a few, he opposed to them the public and universal Tradition of the Church. If the Apostles, he says, had known hidden mysteries, which they wished to impart exceptionally and secretly to the Perfect, they would have imparted them first to those to whom they entrusted the care of the Christian communities.† He admits an unbroken Tradition, which was propagated from the Apostles among the bishops of the communities, and which was confirmed by the unanimous consent of all the communities.‡ Although he was convinced that persons might fully learn the doctrine of salvation from Holy Writ, yet he considered that knowledge not inseparably connected with the Scriptures, but maintained that it was self-evident, and when once received into the soul, must be maintained by the power of the Holy Spirit. Philosophical doctrine presupposes literary culture; Christian doctrine, on the contrary, maintained itself among people of the lower class, and among rude tribes who could not read the Bible. Without paper and ink, they had received the doctrine of salvation into their heads by the Holy Spirit, and proved their faith by their lives.§ He proposes the question whether, if the Apostles had left no writings behind them,

\* Adv. Hær. ii. 19. 4, 5. † Ibid. iii. 2, 3, 1. ‡ Ibid. iii. 9, 5, c. 10.

§ Ibid. iii. 4. 2. Cui ordinationi assentiunt multæ gentes barbarorum—eorum qui in Christum credunt, sine charta et atramento scriptam habentes per spiritum in cordibus sui salutem et veterem traditionem diligenter custodientes, sqq.

should we then be obliged to keep by the Tradition of the *ecclesiæ apostolicæ*? and if a dispute arose about a *modica quæstio*, should we not turn to the Presidents of the oldest Churches, in order to obtain certainty.\* It is evident that Irenæus could not here refer to the fundamental doctrines of faith, for about them, according to him, no dispute could arise; he could only refer to disputes respecting points of worship, and the like. We must perceive that at that period unanimity was desired, not only on dogmatical, but on ritual questions. It is remarkable how Irenæus was obliged to bear witness against himself. In the controversy respecting Easter between the Roman Church and those of Lesser Asia, an appeal was made by the former as to the circumstance that it professed the true Tradition, and Victor, bishop of Rome, excommunicated the latter. Irenæus entered a protest against this arrogance, and showed that unimportant differences might exist in the traditions. Inaccuracies might arise from simplicity and ignorance, and acquire a power through custom.† The same thing might be said of Tradition generally.

TERTULLIAN, in controversy with the Gnostics, wished to establish the theory of an independent self-evident proof. He attempted it in a work, which forms an era for the doctrine of Tradition on the Catholic standpoint: *De præscriptione adversus hæreticos*. *Præscriptio* denotes a general formal argument, by which the incompetency of another person is proved; for example, dismissal of a suit on account of the lapse of time. In like manner, Tertullian wished to find an argument that should take away for ever from all heretics, the right to come forward with a new doctrine against the Church.‡ For, owing to the arbitrary manner in which the Gnostics treated Holy

\*Adv. Hær. i. § 1. Quid enim? Et si de aliqua modica quæstione disceptatio esset, nonne oporteret in antiquissimas recurrere ecclesias, in quibus apostoli conversati sunt, et ab eis de præsentī quæstione sumere, quod certum et re liquidum est? Quid autem? si neque apostoli quidem scripturas reliquissent nobis, nonne oportebat ordinem sequi traditionis, quam tradiderunt iis, quibus committebant ecclesias?

† Euseb. Hist. Eccles. v. 24, 4.—τοιαύτη μὲν ποικιλία τῶν ἐπιτηροῦντων οὐ νῦν ἐφ' ἡμῶν γεγонуίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ὡς εἰκὸς κρατούντων, τὴν καθ' ἀπλότητα καὶ ἰδιώτισμον συνήθειαν εἰς τὸ μετέπειτα πεποικιλότων καὶ οὐδὲν ἔλαττον πάντες οὗτοι εἰρήνευσάν τε καὶ εἰρηνεύομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἡ διαφωνία τῆς νηστείας τὴν ὁμόνοιαν τῆς πίστεως συνίστησι.

‡ *Præscriptio vetustatis contra novitatem.*

Writ, nothing was to be gained by disputing with them. But they were also not competent for such a controversy, for the *sedes apostolicæ* were the *Ecclesiæ matrices* \*, from which the apostolic doctrine had been propagated to all other Churches; consequently, these Churches taken together form an *Ecclesiæ apostolica*, and the outward communion with this Apostolic Church, must be a mark of the profession of the true and original apostolic doctrine. The Canon of Interpretation was the *regula fidei* made use of at baptism. It had been propagated with the Apostolic doctrine in the Church, and along with it the natural interpretation of Holy Writ. Whoever falsified this doctrine must also falsify the Scriptures. In fact, the charge that the heretics had a false exegesis was, in most cases, well founded. In the *sedibus apostolicis*, says Tertullian, the succession of bishops who have taught the same doctrine, is traced back to the Apostles: the heretics, on the contrary, have made their appearance later, and have falsified the truth that was previously found. If the Gnostics said that the falsification arose from a general misunderstanding of the Apostles, he rejoined, how could the Holy Spirit have so greatly neglected his office as to allow the Churches to misunderstand the doctrine which he himself had made known through the Apostles, and how could unanimity proceed from error?" † Thus he placed the Prescription of Antiquity and the Truth, in opposition to innovation and wilful schism from the Church. Tertullian thought, indeed, that the Exposition of Holy Writ was sufficient for the refutation of error, but yet considered it important to oppose heretics by an adequate authority. Thus Tradition furnished him with a rule for expounding Scripture, against which there could be no gainsaying. He appealed also to Tradition to prove points on which Scripture offered no evidence. But these were only ritual observances. The occasion of the controversy in which he was here engaged is worthy of notice. It appears that there were laymen who maintained, that even when Tradition gave its testimony in favour of any matter, still it was insufficient without that of Holy Scripture.

On Tertullian's becoming a Montanist, he found another source for the knowledge of Christian truth, namely, the new

\* Præscript, 15 sq.

† Præscript. c. 27, 28.

‡ Corona militis, c. 2—4.

revelations of Montanus, and the other pretended prophets. He regarded them as divine revelations, necessary to the completeness of Christian knowledge. It is very evident that Montanism found a point of connexion with his former views, in the tendency of his mind to seek for certainty in an external authority. He admitted, indeed, that Heretics could be refuted from Scripture alone; but Heresy, although of foreign origin, tried to support itself by some passages of Scripture torn from their connexion, notwithstanding that other passages served to confute them. But Heresy having now extended itself far and wide, the new Revelations through the Paraclete were needed, to prevent a general unsettlement. Even Montanism professed to place itself on the immovable foundation of the Faith presented by Tradition, but added to it a new characteristic. It insisted on a progressive development, and repugned a rigid adherence to that which was given once for all. Satan's kingdom does not stand still, why should the kingdom of God? Montanism admitted various stages in the development of the Christian consciousness, until it reached the ripeness of manhood. When the conversion of the Heathen commenced, Christianity was obliged to condescend to human weakness. But the new Revelations of the Paraclete were in harmony with a more advanced standpoint, to which the Montanists assigned the promise of the Spirit to the Apostles, in the Gospel of John. Occupying this standpoint, Tertullian relied on Tradition as long as it did not come into collision with the pretended new Revelations. Thus in the passage referred to above, in opposition to those who required in every instance the authority of Holy Writ, he says, that in many cases they themselves admitted that which was only known by Tradition. He holds that the idea (*ratio*) was the internal ground of Tradition; but that, so far as outward practice was concerned, authority took the precedence, in order that men may afterwards become conscious of the *ratio*. On the other hand, he opposes Tradition, when the original tradition is sought to bear against Montanism. In this mood he says, Truth demands this, against which no prescription, no length of time, no respect of persons, can avail. For custom often proceeds from ignorance or simplicity, and thus acquires power by the lapse of time. But Christ our Lord called himself the



Truth, not Custom."\* His language here is exactly opposite to what he asserted in his *Præscriptio*.

Tertullian in this respect exerted a powerful influence on Cyprian. In the controversy respecting the baptism of heretics, he impugned the validity of custom against Stephen, the bishop of Rome. Custom without Truth, he says, is the old age of error.† Elsewhere‡ he remarks, "In vain do those who are overcome by reason, oppose custom to us, as if custom were greater than truth, or as if we ought not to follow that in spiritual things, which is better revealed by the Holy Spirit."

The Alexandrian Theologians also built on the foundation of ecclesiastical Tradition; the connexion of their Gnosis with it distinguished this as *γνώσις ἐκκλησιαστική* from the heretical. Clement recognises a *κανὼν τῆς ἐκκλησίας* which was derived from apostolical Tradition.§ He contrasts the divine basis of Christianity in Tradition, with the arbitrariness of human doctrines. He urges the unanimity in the Catholic Churches against the Gnostic systems at variance with one another, and Antiquity against novelty. Origen, also, considers the rule of Faith given in Tradition, as setting a limit to speculation beyond which it may not pass.|| But the inquisitive, scientific spirit of the Alexandrians was averse from confining the exposition of Holy Writ by such an outward rule, or wishing, like Tertullian, to put down their opponents by the authority of Tradition. Clement rather urged upon his opponents to examine for themselves that they might be convinced. To meet the objection of the Greeks that there were so many sects among Christians, he said that every one could find and learn

\* *De virginib. velandis*. c. 1.—Hoc exigere veritatem, cui nemo præscribere potest, non spatium temporum, non patrocinia personarum, non privilegium regionum. Ex his enim fere consuetudo initium ab aliqua ignorantia vel simplicitate sortita, in usum per successionem corroboratur et ita adversus veritatem vindicatur. Sed dominus noster Christus veritatem se, non consuetudinem cognominavit.

† Ep. 74. c. 9.—Nec consuetudo quæ apud quosdam obreperat, impedire debet, quominus veritas prævaleat et vincat. Nam consuetudo sine veritate vetustas erroris est.

‡ Ep. ad Jubaian, 73. c. 13.

§ Strom. vii. p. 762.

|| De princip. 1. proem. c. 2.—Illa sola credenda est veritas quæ in nulla ab ecclesiastica et apostolica discordat traditione.

the truth in Holy Writ ; how heresies led into error ; how, on the contrary, the most exact knowledge was only to be found in the Truth and the original Church.\* He regards Holy Writ as the highest criterion of Truth, and adds, " We wait for no human testimony, but bring proof of what we assert from the Word of the Lord, which is the most trustworthy, or rather the only evidence."† The relation of *πίστις* and *γνώσις* as stated by Clement, corresponds to that of a faith which proceeds from Tradition alone, and a faith which is developed from Holy Writ. Yet when any one first attains to faith, the knowledge of the essential Christian doctrines is communicated to him by Tradition, He then proceeds to examine the Scriptures for himself, and learns the doctrines of Christianity in their connexion, from the Scriptures. The Gnostic, he says, grows old in the study of Holy Writ ;‡ when it was objected to him that even the *γνωστικοί* did not take all they taught verbally from the Scriptures, he replied that they breathed in it and lived in it, and deriving their germs of thought from it, received the sense although not the verbal expression.§

But as the Platonists and Gnostics made a distinction between exoteric and esoteric Tradition, so also the Alexandrians, in accordance with the analogous distinction of the standpoints of the *πιστικός* and the *γνωστικός*, fell into the error of admitting a Gnostic tradition that belonged only to the susceptible class. A natural desire also led them to prove an historical connexion of Truth and its antiquity. It was also their prevailing opinion that the highest truths might be propagated not by writing, but only by oral communication. Clement|| treats of such an unwritten Gnostic tradition, which even the Apostle Paul preferred communicating not by letter, but in person ; and Origen says, " Certain things which we think of acquiring by much examination and inquiry, whether by God's grace or

\* Strom. vii. p. 755.

† Ibid. i. p. 757.—ἀμέλει πρὸς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων εὑρεσιν, αὐτῇ χρώμεθα κριτηρίῳ κ.τ.λ.

‡ Ibid. i. p. 762, sq.—ἀρα ἡμῖν μόνος ἐν αὐταῖς καταγράσας ταῖς γραφαῖς, τὴν ἀποστολικὴν καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικὴν σῶζων ὀρθοτομίαν τῶν δογμάτων, κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὁρθότατα βιοῖ, τὰς ἀποδειξεις, ὡς ἀν ἐπιζητήσῃ, ἀνευρίσκειν ἀναπεμπόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου, ὑπὸ τε νόμου καὶ προφητῶν.

§ Ibid. i. p. 700.

|| Ibid. v. p. 578.

our own mental power, we do not venture to commit to writing."\* Thus the conclusion was drawn that Christ revealed the highest truths not to all the Apostles, but only to Peter, John, James, and Paul, by whom they might be further spread abroad.† The re-action of the Christian consciousness against the notion of a secret doctrine and tradition was shown in a striking manner, since Clement met with opponents who appealed to Matt. x. 26, in proof that there could be nothing secret in Christianity, to whom he replied; that certainly Truth must become manifest, but only according to the degree in which men were able to receive it.‡

## 2. THE RELATION OF REASON TO REVELATION.

The Scepticism which had so long prevailed, which had rebelled against the authority of Tradition, and had demolished the popular religions, was indulged to an unlimited extent, but at last by a re-action occasioned an earnest longing after a faith. As men became sensible of the insufficiency of Reason, the need of a new Revelation was felt, and hence those persons were so readily listened to who pretended that they were in possession of higher Revelations. It was this longing which led many to Christianity. The general anxiety is shown in the fact, that the Neoplatonic Philosopher Porphyry, though an enemy of Christianity, wrote a work entitled *περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας*. He admits that he wished by means of it to satisfy the wants of many who longed after an oracle of some kind, since none of the Schools of Philosophy afforded them adequate certainty. Probably he aimed at giving a surrogate for that which led men to Christianity. Platonism generally involved a tendency to religious Tradition, to a revelation of God in History; men sought from a comparison of various religions to discover a divine Revelation. Thus Plutarch impugned a mere abstract conception of Religion, and sought for a revelation of the Divine in the traditions of Antiquity. In this direction we perceive a one-sided super-

\* *Matth.* tom. xiv. § 12.

† Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* ii. 1, from the sixth book of the Hypotyposes of Clement. Compare *Strom.* i. p. 275; vi. p. 645.

‡ *Strom.* i. p. 275.

natural tendency, which would have everything in Religion given from without; but on the other hand, there was at the same time a striving to construct everything by means of Reason alone, and to admit nothing which the mind could not unravel by its own subjectivity. According to the principles of Neoplatonism, it was granted that the human mind was unable to draw from itself alone the knowledge of divine Truth, but must surrender itself to the revelation of the Supreme Mind, the *νοῦς*, in order to obtain it. But this revelation of the *νοῦς* was not regarded as historically given and available for all, and hence presented no point of connexion for the acknowledgment of a Redeemer as an historical personage. On the contrary, every man when he entered into communion with the *νοῦς* would have to mould and redeem himself from within, and the historical Tradition was only looked upon as a means of exciting the mind to perceive the inward Revelation. How far Plotinus was from faith in an historic Revelation is shown by the expression, *τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν νοῦν ἥδη ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ προελθόν* in his work against the Gnostics, directed immediately against their fantastic speculations, but according to the views of Plotinus, against all supernatural Revelation such as Christianity demands.

This tendency to dealing so arbitrarily with historical and religious Tradition, and putting interpretations on everything as it pleased, would have gladly appropriated Christianity in order to compare it with other religions, and to find out a truth common to them all. It would have been well, if itself had not made even greater pretensions! It is therefore plain, how easily, even when Christianity was in a measure received, a subjective standpoint was formed, on which Reason was made the highest standard by which Christianity was modelled, and a separation was made of what was deemed true, and what belonged only to the symbolical covering. Perhaps we may find among the Christ-party belonging to the Church at Corinth in Paul's time, but certainly among the Gnostics, the traces of such an attempt. To this belongs the assumption of Carpocrates and Epiphanes,\* that all religious wisdom must be developed by the human mind from itself. They distinguished between those who were in subjection to the finite popular

\* Neander's General Church History, vol. ii. pp. 115—118. (Bohn's edition.)

divinities, the Demiurgos and his spirits, and those who had raised themselves by spiritual intuition to union with the Supreme Being. Of this latter class were Christ, Socrates, Aristotle, and others. Christ, therefore, appeared only as one of those who had borne testimony to the pure truth, in opposition to the popular religion, and it was possible for every true Gnostic, when he makes himself free from the limits of earth, to raise himself to the same elevation as Christ.

Yet from such individuals among the Gnostics we should not be justified in concluding, that there was nothing but Rationalism in the Gnostic system. We might be tempted to draw the same conclusion from the relation of the *Pneumatici* to the *Psychici*. For, according to the doctrine of the Gnostics, the latter were those who depended only on a faith of authority, and were convinced by miracles; the former, on the contrary, were attracted by the inward power of Truth, had no need of miracles, and stood therefore on the highest stage of the development of reason where they only acknowledged that which they knew from Reason. But here it is to be observed, that even the *Pneumatici* do not attain to this result by the development of their higher nature left to itself, but find themselves in a state of limitation; they suffer in consequence of the general corruption of the World, the mixture of good and evil; the power of the ἑλὴ and the δημιουργός confines the higher nature which cannot be developed to freedom, without the super-earthly communication of the Most High God. Accordingly the Gnostics presuppose not only for the *Psychici* but also for the *Pneumatici*, something which cannot be derived simply from the development of the universe and of the reason, and therefore, admit the necessity of a Revelation. Redemption, as a fact, they regard as important for the restoration of Harmony in the universe, to such an extent indeed, that they wish to prove that its efficacy extends to other worlds. As far therefore as the acknowledgment of a supernatural fact is concerned, the entrance of a higher spirit into this world, whose communion even the *Pneumatici* require in order to realize their proper destiny, so far Gnosticism contains a principle opposed to Rationalism. But is there not in the Docetism which the Gnostics in part connect with the doctrine of the historical Christ, an Idealism and a Rationalism? In the opinion that the sensuous body was a mere optical deception

without reality, is it not implied that everything depends on the Idea? that the redemptive power lies in *that*, and not in the historical fact? In that case it would be the same view which has been brought forward in the present day by Strauss and others. Yet, if the reality of the sensuous life of Christ is denied from the Docetic standpoint, that does not nullify the reality of Christ's historical appearance, and place something merely ideal in the place of the historical; for though the sensuous form of the appearance would not be real, yet the appearance itself would be something actual. The communication of that higher Divine Genius to Humanity, in order to fill human spirits by his Revelation, would be a fact, only it would not include the sensuous; it would evince the power of a higher spirit, that without actual sensuousness he could make himself manifest to the senses. This Docetism might be connected with a Supernaturalism carried to the extreme. For as such Supernaturalism is marked by its rejecting all connexion with the natural, this in fact is the characteristic likewise of Docetism, which places the appearance of Christ out of all connexion with Nature and preceding History, and renders it so isolated as to have only the appearance of sensuousness.

This mode of thinking comes out most plainly in Marcion, and shows, at the same time, how far it was removed from Rationalism. Captivated with the glory of Christianity, Marcion believed that nothing analogous could be found elsewhere. Hence he regarded Christ's appearance as a sudden isolated act, with no preparatory antecedents, unimagined by men, and without any connexion with Nature. As Marcion found neither in Nature nor in Humanity created by the Demiurgos, anything allied to God or to a Revelation of him, he denied the existence of a Natural Religion. He did not oppose Knowledge and Reason to the current views of the Church, but the inward Revelation of Christ. In this respect, we recognise in Marcion a Protestant spirit though mixed with error, which combated the incipient Catholic element, and opposed to the authority of Tradition the written records of Revelation (which he made to consist of the Pauline Epistles, and a Gospel attributed to Paul,\*) and the Christian consciousness, the inward Revelation of Christ to believers.

It is another question whether some of the Docetæ, if they

\* Neander's Church History, vol. ii. p. 149. (*Bohn's edition.*)

had lived in our day, would have embraced an Idealistic Rationalism. It is possible, that in many of them the germ of it existed ; but we must distinguish the times, and from the mere possibility are not warranted to infer that this element consciously existed in Docetism.\* As soon as Redemption had taken place by the higher Revelation, a glaring contrast between the Pneumatici and the Psychici appeared. For then the Pneumatici attained the consciousness they had less need of the outward Revelation, and the contrariety of the inner religion of the Spirit, to the faith resting on outward authority, acquired importance. Valentinus the Gnostic pointed to an original revelation which proceeded from the seeds of this higher nature, and he calls the beaming forth of this pneumatic nature, the law written on the heart.† As the Gnostics imagined they had the highest criterion of Truth in their outward Revelations, and on that founded the principle of Accommodation, so they treated the original records of Religion in the most arbitrary manner. They distinguished in the Apostles, and many of them even in the person of Christ, a pneumatic and a psychical principle, and it was the privilege of the Pneumatici to distinguish what belonged to them, or to the Psychici, and what was said from their own standpoint or with Accommodation. These views implied that neither Christ nor his Apostles possessed the perfect consciousness of truth.

In the Clementine Homilies, we find also a remarkable mixture of supernatural and rationalistic elements, and a subjective tendency of the reason joined to an external Super-

\* Such a standpoint may be supposed to exist in a remarkable apocryphal work, *περίοδοι ἀποστόλων* (*Travels of the Apostles*), which is found in the acts of the second Nicene Council. Mansi, xiii. p. 167. In p. 171 we are told that "during the sufferings of Christ he appeared to the surviving apostle, John, and said that he was only crucified for the lower classes in Jerusalem. He vanished again, and then showed him a cross of pure light, surrounded by a great multitude of various forms, which yet represented only one form and one image. Above the cross a divine voice, full of gentleness, sounded, which said, 'The cross of light is for your sakes called sometimes the Logos; sometimes Christ, sometimes the Door, sometimes the Way, sometimes Bread, sometimes the Sun, sometimes the Resurrection, sometimes Jesus, sometimes the Father, sometimes the Spirit, sometimes the Life, sometimes the Truth, sometimes Faith, and sometimes Grace.'"—*Neander's C. H.*, vol. ii. p. 187.

† In his homily *περὶ φθλῶν* : a fragment in Clem. *Strom.* vi. p. 641.

\* νόμος ὁ γραπτός ἐν καρδίᾳ.

naturalism. Thus it is said, that the truth implanted in us by God, contains the seeds of all Truth. It is only covered or revealed by the hand of God.\* It does not follow from this, that there is no supernatural Revelation whatever, but only that the Revelation cannot be efficient without the pre-supposition of this susceptible medium in our own minds. By Revelation we become conscious of the hidden seed within us. An original Revelation is admitted, which was transmitted from Adam, but has not remained pure, and is alloyed with many human errors. Hence we must distinguish in the Old Testament the original Judaism, which is pure truth, from the errors that have been added to it; and a purification of religious knowledge by the renewal of the original Revelation, is requisite, and has been effected, at various times, by Moses and by Christ. The mixture of truth and falsehood in the original records of Religion, will serve to test men's capability for the reception of truth. The Clementines accordingly make Religion, as far as it contains the seeds of truth, the Judge of this external Revelation as it exists in the Sacred Writings, in order to separate from it the original Revelation. The notion of a mixture of truth and falsehood in the original records of Religion, appears in other phenomena of this age—last of all in Manicheism. MANI proceeds on the assumption, that the Original Religion as given in the teaching of Christ was not pure, but mixed with Jewish elements. Hence the Manicheans subjected the writings of the New Testament to a criticism of which Reason was to furnish the criterion. FAUSTUS of Mileve, a Manichean who lived at the end of the fourth Century, says, "There are many tares in every part of Holy Writ, and therefore a sifting is needed." From the standpoint of the Catholic Church, he thus addresses the Christian, "Thou who blindly believest everything, who banishest from Humanity Reason that gift of Nature, who scruplest to judge respecting truth and falsehood, and art as much afraid of separating the good from its opposite, as children are of ghosts."†

The Alexandrian School agrees with other Church teachers

\* Hom. xvii. c. 18.—*ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐν Θεοῦ τεθείσῃ σπερματικῶς . . . . πᾶσα ἐνεστὶν ἡ ἀλήθεια, Θεοῦ δὲ χειρὶ σκέπεται καὶ ἀποκαλύπτεται.* Schliemann and Dressel fill up the hiatus by *καρδίᾳ*. Neander thinks *ἀληθείᾳ* preferable.—JACOBI.

† Aug. c. Faust. lib. xviii. c. 3.



in their recognition of a supernatural Revelation, and of the two sources of religious knowledge, Holy Writ and Tradition. Yet it is evident from the ideas of the Alexandrians respecting the relation of *πίστις* and *γνώσις*, that they differed from other parties in their manner of extracting knowledge from these sources. Irenæus says,\* “The object of knowledge in Religion is, that which is unquestionably stated in Holy Writ as well as what can be derived from Tradition, and beyond this we cannot pass;” but the Alexandrian Gnosis did not keep within these limits. Although it set out from the letter of the Bible, it was not in general content to stop there. Origen says,† “We have in Holy Writ only some elements of Gnosis; the whole of Holy Writ is no more than a very brief and slight introduction to it, and when the Gnostic has acquired an accurate knowledge of it, he must go up to Jesus himself, to receive from him the fountain of water that springeth up to life eternal.” Thus the Gnostic rises above Scripture, which forms for him only the first point of connexion.

### 3. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION (THEOPNEUSTIA).

During this period we find no coherent and systematic doctrine respecting Inspiration. Two elements met in the development of the idea. It started from the consideration of the Old Testament, since that was first of all received as the original record of Religion. Hence the Christian Fathers accepted it according to the Jewish mode of conceiving it, which represented the human mind as entirely passive in it. We have an example of this in the Alexandrian Jewish legend of the formation of the Septuagint Version, namely, that the seventy translators though occupying separate cells, agreed exactly in their translations. Philo also maintains such a verbal Inspiration, in which the Writers of the Old Testament were only the passive organs of the Holy Spirit. He after expresses himself in such a manner as to set in contrast the state of sound self-consciousness with that in which the Holy Spirit takes

\* Adv. Hær. ii. 27.

† In Joann. tom. xiii. 95.—*οἶμαι τῆς ὅλης γνώσεως στοιχεῖά τινα, ἐλαχίστας καὶ βραχυτάτας εἶναι εἰσαγωγὰς ὅλας γραφάς, καὶ πάνν νοηθῶσιν ἀκριβῶς.*—§ 6. *εἰσαγωγαὶ οὖν εἰσιν αἱ γραφαί, ἀφ’ ὧν ἀκριβῶς νενοημένων, νῦν ὀνομαζομένων πηγῆς τοῦ Ἰακώβ, ἀνεληττίον πρὸς τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ἐν οὖν ἡμῖν χαρίσεται πηγὴν τοῦ ἀλλομένου ὕδατος εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον.*

possession of the human soul, the *ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἵστας* contrasted with the *ἑσοφεισθῆναι* when the *νοῦς* is inactive, *ἑκστασις* is supreme, and the human spirit is only a blind organ of the Divine. His unhistorical Interpretation of the Scriptures is quite in accordance with this idea of Inspiration. This Jewish idea agrees with the legal standpoint of Judaism, in which the operation of the divine was supposed to be connected with the total suspension of action on the part of Man. It is otherwise in Christianity, according to which the disunion between the divine and the human is removed, and Man becomes a free Organ of God. When this traditionary idea was applied to the New Testament, a different element was added. For another relation was formed by the greater analogy which the Apostolic writings bore to the consciousness of Christians. Hence many a remark on the Writers of the New Testament occurred to the Teachers of the Church, which was based on another idea of Inspiration.

First of all, the Idea of Inspiration had to be developed in reference to the Old Testament, against the Gnostics. It was necessary to maintain against them the divine Origin of the Old Testament, not as if they ascribed it to a merely human source, but they imagined that the Being who spoke and acted was not the most High God, but the Demiurgos. It was, therefore, to be proved that the Old Testament proceeded from the same God as the New. But the views of the Gnostics respecting the relation of the Old Testament to the New, were not always the same, though the Church Teachers who knew not how to discriminate the various shades of thought presented in the peculiar Gnostic terminology, spoke of only one Gnostic idea. Two modifications, depending on different representations of the Demiurgos, are of special importance. Those who, like Marcion, regarded the Demiurgos as the enemy of God, a being standing in no connexion with him, admitted, of course, of no connexion between the Old and New Testaments; others who regarded him as a subordinate and limited God, but not hostile to the Supreme, as one who served for an Organ of the Ideas imparted by God, but not conscious of them till the appearance of Christ rendered his consciousness of God clear, admitted that this God inspired the Sacred Writers of the Old Testament with the Ideas which proceeded from the Supreme God, but in an imperfect form.

They recognised in the Prophets the higher Pneumatic Nature, which had not yet attained to consciousness. On this standpoint a peculiar idea of Inspiration in relation to the Old Testament was formed. A distinction was made between what inspired men said with clear consciousness, and the pneumatic meaning not yet clearly developed which lay in their words. They acted as Organs not yet conscious, in pointing to Christianity. They expressed, in the garb of the views of their age, the truth which the Holy Spirit communicated through them, and which Christianity brought into clear consciousness. Consequently, a peculiar view was formed of the connexion of the Old and New Testaments, and the germ of a correct historical Interpretation. The Gnostics here anticipated what has been generally developed at a later period. Their opponents, who were unable to separate the true from the false, in this view, now turned on the contrary to the Alexandrian idea of Inspiration, and maintained, like Irenæus and others, that the Prophets spoke in a state of unconsciousness. This view bore some resemblance to the common heathen representation, according to which, the Divine, like one of the powers of Nature, forcibly carried men away, as in the instances of the Pythoness, the Incubations in the temple of Esculapius, and the like. Hence the Jewish-Christian Clementine homilies\* repudiated this idea of Inspiration as heathenish; and they held the Prophecy of the Old Testament not to be true prophecy; because the human and the divine, in the language of the Prophets, could not be distinguished in the alternations of the ecstatic and common state. But they carried the idea of Inspiration to another extreme; among the marks of a true Prophet they reckoned an everpresent higher knowledge combined with clearness and self-consciousness—the constant indwelling of the divine Spirit and his illumination in reference both to Past and Future. It was the same higher Spirit which dwelt in Adam, Moses, and Christ, in order to bring

\* Hom. iii. 13.—*προφήτης γὰρ ὢν ἄπταιστος, ἀπείρω ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμῷ πάντα κατοπτεύων ἐπίσταται λανθάνων· εἰ δὲ παραδεξόμεθα ἡμεῖς, ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς προφήτης οὐ πάντοτε, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε, ὅτε ἔχει τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο προγινώσκει, ὁπότε δὲ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀγνοεῖ—ἐὰν οὕτως ὑπολάβωμεν, καὶ ἑαυτοῦς ἀπατῶμεν καὶ ἄλλους ἐνεδρεύσομεν τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον μανικῶς ἐνθουσιῶντων ἐστὶν ὑπο πνεύματος ἀταξίας, τῶν παρὰ βωμοῖς μεθύοντων καὶ ἐνίσσης ἑμπορομένων.*

forth the original religion.\* Hence their homilies adopted a singular notion of ἀποκάλυψις. The form of vision and dream is considered as very inferior, in which God stands in a mere outward relation to the soul. The highest form was the Revelation of God without outward instruction, when a new light of divine truth dawns on man in immediate self-consciousness. Hence Peter thus expresses himself respecting the revelation made to him (mentioned in Matt. xvi. 13.) "As soon as the Lord had asked, 'Whom do men say that I am?' it rose in my heart, and I said, I know not how, 'Thou art the Son of the living God!' But he, when he had blessed me, showed me that it was the Father who had revealed it to me; but I have since experienced that Revelation is to learn without teaching, visions, or dreams."†

Montanism maintained the idea of ecstatic Inspiration without any modification. This was in harmony with its general character, with the contrast between the Divine and the Human, which forms its groundwork, and according to which the human is always in a passive relation to the Omnipotence of the Divine. It is set down, therefore, as the mark of a true Prophet, that he has no power over himself, as it is said in a Montanist Oracle, "God alone is awake—Man sleeps."‡ Tertullian gives as a mark of the highest prophetic state, the *excidere sensui*.§ This one-sided conception of the Divine led to dangerous consequences; natural feeling mixed itself with the work of the Divine Spirit, in peculiar modes of excitement, and was taken for something divine. Here we meet with states that are allied to certain phenomena in the sphere of Natural Religion. During public worship, Montanist Virgins fell into a kind of somnambulism, and in that state administered remedies for diseases. But these extravagances rendered their views suspicious, and the controversy with the Montanists led

\* Hom. iii. 20.

† Lib. 1. xvii. 18.

‡ Epiph. Hær. xlviii. 4.—Εὐθὺς γὰρ ὁ Μοντανὸς φησιν, ἰδοὺ ἀνθρώπος ὡσεὶ λύρα, καὶ γὰρ ἵπταται ὡσεὶ πληκτρον· ὁ ἀνθρώπος κοιμᾶται, καὶ γρηγορῶ· ἰδοὺ κύριός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκστάνων καρδίας ἀνθρώπων καὶ διδοὺς καρδίας ἀνθρώποις.

§ Contra Marcion iv. 22.—Ratione, quam defendimus in causa novæ prophetiæ, gratiæ ecstasin, id est amentiam convenire? In spiritu enim homo constitutus, præsentim cum gloriam Dei conspicit, vel cum per ipsum Deus loquitur, necesse est excidat sensu, obumbratus scilicet virtute divinâ, de quo inter nos et psychicos quæstio est.

to a closer examination of the difference between enthusiasm and true Inspiration. Miltiades a rhetorician, wrote a book against Montanism to the effect, that a Prophet ought not to speak in ecstasy,\* and maintained on the contrary, that a Prophet must be perfectly conscious of his own ideas. On this assumption it was attempted to find the developed Christian truth in the Prophets of the Old Testament. The teachers of the Alexandrian Church, Origen particularly, believed that the Prophets, by spiritual communion with the Logos (*ἐπιδημία νοητή*), arrived at a clear knowledge of revealed truths.

There is a trace worth noticing of a peculiar opinion respecting the nature of Inspiration in the Old Testament, which was held by certain opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity, of whom Origen speaks.† They said that the Holy Spirit in the Prophets, was not the same as the Holy Spirit in the Apostles. We might suppose this founded on the Gnostic distinction of the inspirations of the Demiurgos and of the Supreme God; but the Gnostics do not thus make use of the name of the Holy Spirit, and Origen distinguishes from them the persons who employed such language. We must compare what Eusebius says of such an Antitrinitarian party, since he accuses them of an arbitrary critical treatment of Holy Writ; and then adds that some of them had positively denied the Law and the Prophets, and under the pretence of Grace had maintained an antinomian and impious doctrine.‡ It is of special importance, that they pleaded the doctrine of Grace as a cloak for their sentiments; that is, they professed to extol the manner in which God operated through Christ; they were at issue with the Church respecting the authority of the Old Testament; they lowered that, and placed Christianity so

\* Euseb. Hist. Eccles. v. 17.—*περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προφήτην ἐν ἐκστάσει λαλεῖν.*

† In epist. ad Titum, ed. Lommatzsch. v. p. 288.—*Sed et si qui sunt, qui spiritum sanctum alium quidem dicant esse, qui fuit in prophetis, alium autem, qui fuit in apostolis Domini nostri Jesu Christi unum atque idem delictum impietatis admittunt, quod illi, qui, quantum in se est, naturam deitatis secant et scindunt, dicentes unum legis et alterum evangeliorum deum.*

‡ Euseb. Hist. Eccles. v. 28, fin.—*ἐνιοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ παραχαράσσαν ἤλιωσαν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἀρνησάμενοι τὸν τε νόμον καὶ τοὺς προφήτας ἀνόμου καὶ ἀθέτου διδασκαλείας προφάσει χάριτος εἰς ἰσχυατὸν ἀπωλείας ὀλεθρον καταλίσθησαν.*

much the higher, in opposition to those who were disposed to find it already in the Old Testament. This account of them appears to agree with the description given by Origen.

In the first ages of Christianity, the Platonic philosophy had led to many interesting inquiries among the heathen, respecting the idea of Inspiration. On one side there was the Unbelief of those, who saw in all Religion nothing but human Institutions, and made use of Oracles and the like under this notion; on the other side were those who maintained that every response was verbally inspired by the gods. Differing from both these parties, Platonism constructed another view. Setting out from the idea of a natural operation of God on the human soul, Plutarch\* maintained that the excitement of the religious consciousness proceeded from God, but that the particular form in which it presented itself, depended on human agency. Such ideas could be readily applied to the Christian idea of Inspiration; we actually find in the Church teachers† the comparison which Plutarch employs, of an inspired soul to a musical instrument. But they attach quite a different meaning to it, since they do not lay any stress on what is peculiar in the instrument, and which modifies the style of the Inspiration in its actual manifestation; but only adopt it so far as to say, that the instrument is made to vibrate from without, to illustrate the pure passivity of man. The Platonic ideas, which we find elsewhere in the most ancient Church teachers, are not placed in connexion with the idea of Inspiration. Justin Martyr transfers the Platonic relation of the νοῦς to the νοερόν in Man, to the relation of the λόγος to the σπέρμα λογικόν, the human reason allied to God. From a perpetual Revelation of the divine λόγος to what is allied to it in Man, proceeded all the seeds of truth in the ancient world; but only something fragmentary, not the full Revelation of the divine λόγος could be effected by the σπέρμα λογικόν. Human prejudice and short-sightedness produced errors and contrarieties in the ancient world; but in Christ we have the complete self-revelation of the divine λόγος, and in him alone absolute Religion and Truth.‡ CLEMENT of

\* *De Pythiæ Oraculis*, capp. vii. x. xx. xxi.

† (Just. Mart. ?) *Cohortat. ad Græcos*, § 8.

‡ *Apol. ii. c. 10.* — Μεγαλειότερα μὲν οὖν πάσης ἀνθρωπείου διδασκαλίας φαίνεται τὰ ἡμέτερα διὰ τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον τὸν

Alexandria traces all that there was of truth among the heathen before Christ, to the suggestions of the Divine Spirit, who for this purpose made use of individuals who were capable of training their fellow-men. Clement accounts for error by the mixture of the human, and in this respect distinguishes the Holy Scriptures from all other books.\* He believed, that if we could collect the various contrarieties freed from the human prejudices, through which the scattered rays of Truth are presented, we should possess the pure Christian Truth. Yet Clement, no more than Justin, made use of these notions for distinguishing the divine and human in the idea of Revelation; Clement did not separate from one another the form and essence of Revelation, but regarded everything in them as a divine operation. Philo, though the magical idea of Inspiration is the leading one in his writings, has admitted a remarkable distinction of three stages of Inspiration.† The highest stage is that in which God speaks in his own name. Here the person of the Prophet is altogether out of sight, and the Divine is presented immediate and pure, without any human admixture. The second stage is that in which the Prophet inquires of God, and God answers; here a mixture of the divine and human begins. In the third stage, the Prophet speaks in his own name, although he announces what is divine. Here there is also enthusiasm; but the human, the individual, animated by the Divine Spirit, also comes into play. In Origen‡ we find a similar distinction, though it is

φανέντα δι' ἡμᾶς Χριστὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν. "Ὅσα γὰρ καλῶς αἰεὶ ἐφθέγγαντο καὶ εὗρον, οἱ φιλοσοφῆσαντες ἢ νομοθετήσαντες, κατὰ λόγον μέρος εὐρέσεως καὶ θεωρίας ἐστὶ πονηθέντα αὐτοῖς. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ πάντα τὰ τοῦ λόγου ἠγνώρισαν, ὅς ἐστι Χριστὸς καὶ ἐναντία ἐαυτοῖς πόλλ' αἰεὶ εἶπον.

\* Str. vi. 693 A.—ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐναρέτων ἀνθρώπων ἐπίνοιαι κατ' ἐπίνοιαν θείαν γίνονται διατιθεμένης πιστῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διαδιδόμενου τοῦ θείου θελήματος εἰς τὰς ἀνθρωπίνους ψυχὰς τῶν ἐν μέρει θείων λειτουργῶν συλλαμβανομένων εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας διακονίας. Cf. i. p. 287 C.

† Vit. Moysis iii. p. 681, sq. ed. Francof. 1691.

‡ In Joann. vi. 18.—ὥστε σοφὰ μὲν καὶ πιστὰ λέγειν καὶ σφόδρα ἐπιτεταγμένα τὰ ἀποστολικὰ, οὐ μὴν παραπλήσια τῷ "τάδε λέγει κύριος παντοκράτωρ." Καὶ τοῦτο ἐπίστησον, εἰ, ἐπὶ ἅν λέγει ὁ Παῦλος "πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος καὶ ὠφέλιμος" ἐμπεριλαμβάνει καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ γράμματα, ἢ οὐ τὸ, "ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οὐχ ὁ κύριος," καὶ τὸ "ἐν πάσαις ἐκκλησίαις διατάσσομαι," καὶ τὸ "ὅλα ἔπαθον ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ, ἐν Ἰκονίῳ, ἐν Ἀύστρῳ," καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια ἐνίστε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γραφέντα καὶ κατ' ἐξουσίαν, οὐ μὴν τὸ εἰλικρινές τῶν ἐκ θείας ἐπιπνοίας λόγων.

not clear that he derived it from PHILO. He distinguishes the idea of Inspiration in the strictest sense, and applies it to a case, in which also the human element is noticeable. He inquires whether Paul, when in 2 Tim. iii. 16., he speaks of Holy Scripture as *Θεόπνευστος*, intended to include his own writings. The Apostolic writings were, indeed, wise and trustworthy, and very weighty, but not equal to those in which it is said, "*Thus saith the Lord, the Almighty.*" In the former, there was not the same pure inspiration of the Divine Spirit as in the latter. His critical acuteness might have led Origen to notice other passages of the New Testament, to illustrate the distinction of the Divine and the Human. Yet where he observes differences in the narratives of the Evangelists, he explains them, according to his common idea of Inspiration. He disputes with other Christians, who found no difficulty in the admission of these discrepancies, and concludes that, because such differences are irreconcilable, they must have been designed. They were intended to lead to the acknowledgment that the Truth was ideal, that the Fact was internal, and only represented as external. He would rather give up the full reality of facts than admit any differences. He says,\* "We believe that the Gospels were written down under the co-operation of the Holy Spirit; no error, no falsehood, can be allowed in the Evangelists; the discrepancies do not arise from defect of memory."† This idea of Inspiration led many to a Hypercriticism; for since they could not see their way through the discrepancies of the Gospels, they attached themselves to one Gospel for which they had a special preference, and rejected the rest as unapostolic.

IRENÆUS also, though he has not formally developed his ideas on Inspiration, shows traces of his recognition of two factors — the divine agency, and the conditions of human individuality. For instance, in the writings of Paul, he does not attribute everything to divine inspiration, but makes the quality of Paul's style to depend on his mental characteristics

\* In Joann. vi. 18.—*καὶ ἀκολουθὸν γε, μηδενὸς σφαλλομένου τῶν Ἐυαγγελιστῶν, μηδὲ ψευδομένου, ὡς εἶποιεν ἂν οἱ πιστεύοντες, ἀμφότερα κατὰ διαφόρους καιροὺς εἰρηκέναι—οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς οἰονταί τινες, οἱ ἀπομνημονεύοντες διαφόρως ἠνέχθησαν μὴ ἀκριβοῦντες τῇ μνήμῃ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων ἢ γεγενημένων.*

† See Hagenbach's *Observ. circa Origenis method. interpretandæ Script. S.*: Basil. 1823.



— on the prodigious force and pressure of his thoughts.\* We find the like in TERTULLIAN, who, by the circumstance that the idea of Inspiration became more intense in the Montanistic Prophecies, was induced to mark degrees in Inspiration. He perceived that the ecstatic form could not be attributed to the Apostles, and hence supposed a mode of Inspiration, in which the human element was active.† He remarks that Paul in his manner of treating the Old Testament, was not always consistent, and attributes his dispute with Peter (Gal. ii.) to the ardour he felt as a Neophyte.‡ This implies that he viewed the operation of the Divine Spirit to be conditioned by a person's natural course of development. He supposes that Paul's mind was gradually transformed by the influence of Christian principle. As Tertullian varies in his mode of expressing himself, so, when he wishes to establish the authority of the apocryphal Book of Enoch, he gives an uncertain and very hazardous idea of Inspiration. What relates to ourselves is not to be rejected, and what serves for edification is divinely inspired.§

## B. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATICS.

### a. THEOLOGY IN THE STRICT SENSE.

#### 1. THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF GOD.

The Church Teachers in this age had little occasion to contend with atheists; but since they endeavoured to establish

\* Adv. Hær. iii. 7, 2.—*Quoniam autem hyperbatis frequenter utitur apostolus, propter velocitatem sermonum suorum et propter impetum qui in ipso est Spiritus, ex multis quidem aliis est invenire.*

† De Monagam. c. 3, on 1 Cor. c. 7.—*Denique conversus ad alteram speciem dicendo: nuptis autem denuncio, non ego, sed dominus, ostendit illa, quæ supra dixerat, non dominicæ auctoritatis fuisse sed humanæ æstimationis.*

‡ Adv. Marc. i. 20.—*Nam et ipsum Petrum ceterosque, columnas apostolatus, a Paulo reprehensas opponunt, quod non recto pede incederent ad evangelii veritatem, ab illo certe Paulo, qui adhuc in gratia rudis, trepidans denique, ne in vacuum cucurrisset aut curreret, tunc primum cum antecessoribus apostolis conferebat. Igitur, si ferventer adhuc, ut neophytus, adversus Judaismum aliquid in conversatione reprehendendum existimavit, etc.*

§ De Cult. Fem. i. 3.—*Sed cum Enoch eadem scriptura etiam de domino prædicaret, a nobis quidem nihil omnino rejiciendum est, quod*

the doctrine of one God against polytheism, they were engaged in frequent discussions respecting the proof of the idea of God. Their writings are all pervaded by it; only they vary in the method of their proof, according to the various stages of their culture, some of them being prepared by Platonism, and others were not philosophic. JUSTIN MARTYR calls faith in God the conviction implanted in human nature of something ineffable.\* THEOPHILUS of Antioch answers the heathen who asks, "Show me thy God, that I may believe in him," by rejoining, "Show me first thy man; then I will show thee my God. The impure man cannot understand God. It is his fault that the consciousness of God lying in his breast is undeveloped. Give thyself to the Physician, that he may heal the eyes of thy soul."† CLEMENT of Alexandria denies that the being of God can be proved; for all demonstration is from something already known; but the idea of the Supreme Being precedes all others, and can be apprehended only by faith, by grace, by God's self-revelation.‡ Clement evidently refers to the doctrine of the Philosophic Schools, on the absolute to the conditioned, of the Immediate to the Mediate. Probably a passage in Aristotle was floating before his mind.§ He evidently confounds two ideas which belong to different departments, namely, the idea of the logical absolute, which, according to the doctrine of the ancients, could not be reached by scientific inquiry; and the idea of a living God, which belongs to the religious consciousness. He connects with the idea of an unconditioned rational principle, an element which had been formed in his mind from Christianity. He also points to the undeniable existence of a consciousness of God, when he says that there is in all men an efflux from God, by virtue of which, even against their own will, they must accipere ad nos. Et legimus omnem scripturam ædificationi habilem divinitus inspirari. (2 Tim. iii. 16.)

\* *Apol.* ii. § 6.—τὸ θεὸς προσαγόρευμα οὐκ ὀνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα τοῦ δυνάμει ἰμμεντος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα.

† *Ad Autolyc.* i. init.

‡ *Strom.* ii. p. 364.—εἰ δὲ τις λεγοι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου, ἀκουσάτω, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι.—Πίστει οὖν ἐφικέσθαι μόνον οἶοντε τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς. *Ib.* v. p. 588.—λείπεται δὲ θεὸς χάριτι καὶ μόνῃ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἀγνωστὸν νοεῖν.

§ *Aristot. Ethic. Magn.* i. p. 1197. ed. Bekker.—Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεων ὄντων ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ὥστ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς.

knowledge the one eternal God.\* ORIGEN reckons the idea of one God among the ideas that are common to the consciousness of all mankind.† He regards the traces of a consciousness of God in man, as a proof of the affinity of his nature to God.

TERTULLIAN was a foe to Philosophy, but he also from the fulness of the religious consciousness expresses himself strongly respecting the undeniableness of the Divine Existence. The Being and essence of God, he thinks, can as little be denied as they can be comprehended. Other Fathers often collected from ancient Literature references to the Unity of God, that they might defeat the heathen on their own standpoint, and in so doing have often quoted by mistake apocryphal passages, which had been interpolated by the Jews. One attempt of this kind is Justin's work, entitled *περὶ μοναρχίας*. Tertullian took quite a different method. He was disposed to look on Science and Art as a falsification of the original truth in mankind, and rather appealed to the involuntary witnesses in the common life of men which testified against polytheism. These he calls the *eruptiones animæ naturaliter Christianæ*, the *sensus publicus*, the original dowry of the Soul, which, though enthralled by lusts, fettered by erroneous training, and serving false gods, yet, when roused from its slumbers, invokes God and looks up not to the Capitol, but to Heaven.‡ He composed a short treatise on this subject, entitled, *De testimonio animæ naturaliter Christianæ*.

He had to develop these ideas in his controversy with MARCION.§ Marcion resembled Tertullian in his rude, fiery temperament and the predominance of feeling, in an aversion to

\* Protrep. p. 45.—Πᾶσιν γὰρ ἀπαξαπλῶς ἀνθρώποις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἐνδιατρίβουσιν ἐνίσταται τις ἀπόρροια θεϊκή. Οὐ δὲ χάριν καὶ ἀκοντές μὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἵνα τι εἶναι θεόν, ἀνῶλεθρον καὶ ἀγέννητον.

† Contra Cels. i. 4.—The κοινὰ ἐννοιαί. He then says, διόπερ οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, τὸν αὐτὸν θεόν, ἕπερ εἰδίδασκε διὰ τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τοῦ σωτήρος ἐγκατεσπαρκεῖναι ταῖς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς.

‡ Apol. c. 17. Compare Neander's *das Eine u. das Mannigfaltige im Christenthum*, p. 9.

§ Tertullian *Adv. Marcion*, lib. v. Irenæi *Adv. Hæres.* i. 27. (Pseudo.) Origenes *De Recta in Deum Fide*, ed. J. R. Wetstein: Bas. 1674. Hyppolyti *Ἐλεγχος κατὰ πασ. αἱρεσ.* vii. 29. Epiphaniï *Hæres.* Marcion's Confession of Faith, from the Armenian of Archbishop Esnig (fifth century), in Illgen's *Zeitschr. f. Hist. Theol.* 1834. A. Hahn, *De Gnesi Marcionis*. Regiom. 1820, 21, 4. (Progr.)

what preceded Christianity, in antagonism to Nature, and in striving to form an entirely new World by means of Christianity. But Tertullian had received the spirit of the Gospel in greater purity, and under its ameliorating influence acknowledged God in Nature, and the original revelation of Him in the universal consciousness. But Marcion was led further against Nature by his Dualism; neither it nor History appeared to him to present anything similar to the glory of Christianity; hence Christianity seemed to enter suddenly into the World without any preparation, by means of the Old Testament. The severe just God of the Old Testament was quite different from that of the New, the perfect and holy one who is the God of Love. He failed to discern there, as in Nature, the God that was partially hidden, because he would admit no Revelation of him but such as was whole and complete. Nature, he says, points to a rigid, imperfect Spirit, who is destitute of omnipotence since he cannot overcome the opposition of matter, the blind destructive force of Nature. Thus, then, was nothing previously in the human spirit that was analogous to the God of Christianity. A creation of the Demiurgos, the Soul had no idea of holiness and love; an entirely new life issued from Christianity. Marcion, accordingly, was a denier of all original consciousness of God, and of all Natural Religion. There was for him only a Christian consciousness, that appeared suddenly, and developed itself at once. Tertullian, on the contrary, says, when vindicating the original endowment of the consciousness of God—"God cannot be concealed—he must always be perceived and reveal himself. All we are, and in which we are, testify of Him, A God whose existence must first be proved, would not be the true God."\*

Those Gnostics who did not, like Marcion, regard the Demiurgos as a being hostile to the Supreme God, but only as a limited and subordinate God, were able to affirm that the idea of one God always lay at the basis of the consciousness of higher natures. Thus Valentine appeals to the laws written on the heart in his Homily *περὶ φιλων*.†

\* *Contra Marc.* i. 9, 10.—*Nunquam Deus latebit, nunquam Deus deerit; semper intelligitur, semper audietur, etiam videbitur quomodo volet. Habet Deus testimonia, totum hoc, quod sumus et in quo sumus. Sic probatur et Deus et unus dum non ignoratur alio adhuc probari laborante.*

† *Clem. Strom.* vi. p. 641.

## 2. THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

We now proceed to the fuller development and more exact discrimination of the idea of God. Christianity has here to combat with two opposite tendencies; There is the sensuous anthropomorphism, which does not conceive of God as pure Spirit, but transfers its sensuous conceptions to God. This mode of contemplation was the common one in Pagan Antiquity, as the religious consciousness was generally drawn down to sensuousness through the religion of Nature. Even the Stoics were not able to rise to the idea of a pure Spirit. We learn from the remarks of Origen, how very much, even in his time, thinking was fettered by the tendency that was the result of these earlier views.\*

In Judaism, indeed, the theistical standpoint, the elevation above the mere contemplation of Nature, and the teachings of the Old Testament respecting the Divine attributes, might have led to a purer style of contemplation: but the sensuous tendency was promoted by cleaving to the letter; and understanding the figurative representations of the Old Testament in accordance with that, men thought of God as a being extended in space, in human form. Another tendency aimed at putting down this rude, sensuous anthropomorphism, but fell into a one-sided abstraction and Spiritualism; for the idea of the living God it substituted the doctrine of a logical Absolute. This holds good of the *δν* of the Neoplatonists; and even Philo, while combating the sensuous tendency, erred in a similar subtilization of the religious consciousness.

Placed between these two extremes, it was the office of Christianity on the one hand, to establish the idea of God as a Spirit, and on the other, to introduce a religious realism into human life. It effected the Spiritualization not by imparting particular ready-made notions of the Nature of God; this would have been of no service; for such ideas, in order to be intelligible, demand as a prerequisite, a new sense, a higher stage of spiritual development. Even the clear announcement—“*God is a Spirit*,” was not understood, since men accustomed to sensuous representations would think of a Spirit, as Origen says, only as a higher and more refined kind of Body. Christianity had to give an impulse to the Spirit to

\* In Ev. Johan. c. iv. v. 24.—*πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*, etc. t. xiii. § 21, ff.

develope and cherish from within itself the spiritual idea of God. This was effected by the new tendency of the religious Spirit proceeding from Redemption, by withdrawing from the exclusive contemplation of Nature, by the Revelation of God in the life of Christ, by spiritualising and giving a new impulse to the whole thinking faculty. Hence during this period to a gradual process of purification, where we find sensuous representations of God, we must not attribute them entirely to a sensuous standpoint, but shall often see them combined with great depth and fulness of the consciousness of God. The sensuous conception might have a relative correctness in opposition to the subtilisation of the idea of God, as far as it contained a religious Realism which could not yet release itself from sensuous forms. Thus the Clementine Homilies condemn those who think of God as formless, under the pretence of glorifying him. They even maintain that man could not rely on such a God, or pray to him.\*

The crudest form of anthropomorphism, proceeding from a misapprehension of the expression "*Image of God*" in Genesis, represented God as Man *per eminentiam*. It was held by Melito, bishop of Sardis in the second century, who wrote a book entitled *περὶ ἐνσωμάτου Θεοῦ*,† which treated not, as some suppose, of the Incarnation, but of the corporeity of God in a sensuous human figure, as Origen testifies.‡ Somewhat more refined is another form according to which God was conceived of as an ethereal being of light. This view is maintained in

\* Homil. xvii. 11.—τινὲς δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀλλότριον ὄντες, —προφάσει δοξολογίας ἀσχημάτιστον αὐτὸν λέγουσιν, ἵνα ἀμορφος καὶ ἀνείδεος ὢν μηδενὶ ὁρατὸς ᾖ, ὅπως μὴ περιπόθητος γένηται· νοῦς γὰρ εἶδος οὐχ ὁρῶν Θεοῦ κενός ἐστιν αὐτοῦ· πῶς δὲ καὶ εὐχεται τις οὐκ ἔχων ἐς κενὸν ἐκβαρεύεται.

† In Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* iv. 26. Orig. in *Gen. Opp.* t. ii. p. 25.

‡ Under the name of Melito of Sardis, an Apology in the Syriac language has been published by Cureton in his *Spicilegium Syriacum*: London, 1855, and ascribed to that author. It is not identical with that of which there is a fragment in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* iv. 23; it also contains no anthropomorphical representations of God, but indicates a more spiritual mode of thinking on the part of the author, who, at all events, is not Melito, but, according to several indications, was a writer in Syria or its vicinity, and the Emperor Antoninus addressed by him is probably Caracalla, so that the date of the composition must be at the beginning of the third century. See Jacobi, *Deutsche Zeitschrift f. chr. Wissenschaft*, &c. 1856. No. 14. On Melito in general, see Piper, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1838. Part I. [JACOBI.]

the Clementine Homilies, and even by Tertullian; notwithstanding the depth and purity of his religious feelings, he says—"Who shall deny that God is a body, although God is a Spirit."\* He maintains that there is nothing uncorporeal, except what does not exist.† Spirit is Body of a peculiar quality.‡ Some have tried to excuse him as if he only wanted another word in order to express real existence. But this is certainly unfounded. The errors of thought and language here exactly coincide. Tertullian, with his vivid religious feeling and his robust realism, knew not how to separate the ideas of Reality and Corporeity. We remark similar representations in Lactantius, who combats those who deny that God possesses form and affections.§ When we read in writers of this period that God is *sine corpore*, it does not follow that they conceived of him as a purely spiritual Being, but possibly they only meant to express a contrariety to earthly bodies.

The development of the Christian doctrine counteracted this sensuous tendency in two ways; mediately by the influence of Christianity on the whole style of thinking, and immediately through the already existing philosophical culture. In the first mode, the new tendency operated from the Natural to the Ethical, in which the Church Teachers were active from a practical, sober, religious standpoint. Among them Irenæus is conspicuous, whose discreet religious spirit acknowledged the incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature. He invites men to elevate themselves to God by devotion, and says, they must direct their eye to that which is said in the Bible on the relation of God to Man, and rise to him by love. He combats the sensuous fancies of the Gnostics, and traces their errors to their asserting that of God which only suits a changeable nature; all that we predicate of God is only an Image. Love, indeed, thus expresses itself; but there is something deeper in feeling, than words can express.¶ This should lead men to be aware of

\* *Adv. Praxeam*. c. vii.

† *De carne Christi* xi.—Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est.

‡ *Adv. Praxeam* vii.—Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie.

§ *De Ira Dei*, c. 2.—A philosophis irretiti et falsis argumentationibus capti aliter de unica illa majestate sentiunt, quam veritas habet, qui aut figuram negant habere ullam Deum aut nullo affectu commoveri putant: qui sit omnis affectus imbecillitatis, quæ in Deo nulla est.

¶ *Adv. Hær.* ii. 13, 3, 4.—Est autem et super hæc et propter hæc

he difference between the Image and the Reality. Novatian expressed the same opinions. He describes God as inconceivable in his Essence, who alone knows what he himself is; the human spirit feels what God is more than it can express.\* He remarks that Christ used anthropomorphical images of God, but more sparingly than the Old Testament, in order to lead the human mind to a higher mode of contemplation.†

Among those who from the standpoint of philosophic culture combated the sensuous mode of conception, the Alexandrians were pre-eminent, especially ORIGEN. He shows in what contradictions they involve themselves who take literally the figurative representations of God in the Old Testament.‡ In his exposition of the words "*God is a Spirit*"§ he attacks both the ancient Philosophers, who did not think of God as a pure spirit, and the Christians, who gave a sensuous meaning to the terms Spirit, Light, and the like. He asserted that God could not create and govern the material world, if he were not distinct from it; he would otherwise be composite, like other bodies, and hence be subject to change and dissolution. He expresses himself with remarkable clearness in his work *περί ψυχῶν*. The word *ἀσώματος*, which the Philosophers apply to God, is not found in Holy Writ. Yet the fact itself is implied in the Biblical expressions, not indeed in the sense in which the word is used in common life, as designating more refined bodies, but as referring to pure Spirit.|| Men very

narrabilis. Sensus enim capax omnium bene et recte dicetur, sed non imilis hominum sensui; et lumen rectissime dicetur sed nihil simile ei, quod est secundum nos, lumini. Sic autem in reliquis omnibus mater hominem pusillitati; et dicitur quidem secundum hæc propter dilectionem, sentitur autem super hæc secundum magnitudinem.

\* Regul. fid. c. 6.

† More spiritual representations are to be found in Hippolytus, and with some traces of a Platonic influence. τὸ γὰρ ὄν αὐτὸς ὁ πατήρ ἦν, ἐξ οὗ τὸ γεννηθῆναι αἰτίον τοῖς γινόμενοις. Ἐλεγχος, x. 33, p. 335, ed. Miller. [JACOBI.]

‡ In Genes. Opp. t. ii. p. 25.

§ In Joann. t. xiii. § 21.

|| Lib. i. Introduct. c. 8, 9.—In consuetudine vero hominum omne quod tale non fuerit, incorporeum simplicioribus vel imperitioribus nominatur: velut si quis aërem istum quo fruimur, incorporeum dicit, quandoquidem non est tale corpus, ut comprehendi ac teneri possit urgentique resistere. Quæremus tamen si vel alio nomine res ipsa Græci philosophi *ἀσώματος*, id est incorpoream, dicunt, in Scripturis sanctis, invenitur. Cf. a. 1.



easily fall into sensuous representations when they seek for words in order to express the vivid feeling of the Divine Omnipotence. CLEMENT combats such an error when he says "God is exalted above all space and all time."\* Thus ORIGEN sets himself against the doctrine taught by the Stoics, of a general extension of the Divine Essence, and substituted for it the Divine Power, which embraces all things.† The Church Teachers thus avoided the error of the deistical view which wants the living consciousness of the Divine Omnipotence, and ignores the immediate relation of God to the World.

Anthropopathism is to be distinguished from Anthropomorphism; being that mode of contemplating the divine attributes which has for its basis the analogy of God to the human spirit. Considered in itself, this is not untrue; for we can only think of God as the Archetype of our own spirit, and the idea of God can no longer be retained by us if we lose sight of this analogy. Anthropomorphism must be supplanted by Christianity; Anthropopathism is not supplanted, but spiritualised and refined. Only what is false must be rejected; that crudeness which transfers to God human passions (πάθη) and defects, for want of recollecting the elevation of the Supreme Being, as well as his relationship to Man. Christianity must teach us to distinguish what is owing to the corrupting influence of sin, from what constitutes the true analogy between God and Man. In heathenism a false Anthropopathism prevailed, since polytheism presented in its gods the apotheosis of human qualities, not only of virtues, but of vices; and withal, a deification of the power manifested in Nature. Among the common, carnally minded Jews there was a corresponding crudeness in their views of the divine attributes; for omnipotence was represented as unlimited caprice, and punitive justice as perfectly analogous to human wrath. PHILO combated this tendency from his philosophic standpoint; but Neoplatonism, which in its opposition to Anthropopathism regarded God as the abstract *Ὀν*, the highest absolute simplicity, the negation of all that is definite, led Philo to indulge in a similar

\* *Strom.* ii. p. 361 A.—οὐ γὰρ ἐν γνόφῃ ἢ τόπῳ, ἀλλ' ὑπεράνω καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου καὶ τῆς τῶν γεγονότων ιδιότητος διδ' οὐδ' ἐν μέρῳ καταγίνεται ποτε οὔτε περιέχων, οὔτε περιεχόμενος· ἢ κατ' ὁρισμὸν τίνα ἢ κατ' ἀπορομήν.

† *Contra Cels.* vi. § 71.

reaction; though, on the other hand, he experienced a reaction from the Theism of the Old Testament.

Here also the task was committed to Christian Realism of finding its way between the extremes. Christianity produced a genuine Anthropopathism by the consciousness of the image of God in Man, and of its obscuration, as well as of its exact representation in Christ, through which men learnt to view the Archetype in all its grandeur; in Redemption the attributes of omnipotence, righteousness, and love were united in harmony. Thus, on the one hand, there was the idea of God in its Reality, and on the other its illusion, according to the analogy of the restored image of God in Man; the realised idea of Humanity in Christ. A deeper Anthropopathism passed over from the Jews to the Christians. There were not wanting some persons, who believed things of God, that they would not impute to the most part of their fellow-men. This promoted the other extreme of diluting the idea of God\*, and thus the peculiar system of Gnostics was formed.

Before the Christian era, the Old Testament idea of the holiness and righteousness of God had often been misunderstood by the heathen. The crude conceptions of the Jews might have contributed to this, but the real cause lay deeper in that dual religious standpoint of Pagan Antiquity which the Old Testament opposed. What Holiness was, what were the holiness and righteousness of God, could only be understood by means of a correct consciousness of Sin, and of that strict moral standpoint, which was given first and alone in the Old Testament. These profound ideas could not be appreciated by Heathenism, which regarded Evil as a mere infirmity — a necessity of Nature. The Gnostics also were led to a similar misunderstanding. They regarded the representations of God in the Old Testament not as absolutely false, but as mere human conceptions; but they ascribed them to a real Being, whom they considered as an actual principle, different from the Christian God. Thus they adopted a Dualism in the doctrine of Revelation, and of the divine attributes. To the perfect God they ascribed Love; he could only redeem; the Demiurgos, on the contrary, was the source of inexorable justice; Love and Holiness were foreign

\* *Orig. περί ἀρχῶν*, lib. iv. c. 8.

to his nature. This separation found support in Philo's views. He often says, God himself does not punish immediately, from him comes nought but good; punishment is inflicted by ministering spirits, who by many are regarded as God himself. The Gnostics separated the Demiurgos still further from God, since to him alone they attributed justice. Marcion, by overstretching the Christian standpoint, went to the length of allowing no union between love and justice. Wholly occupied with the love of God, as revealed in Redemption, he excluded the other attributes. God grants only blessings of which the redeemed partake; about the rest of mankind he takes no care, but leaves them in the hands of the Demiurgos.

Against this dualistic view, the Church Teachers had to vindicate the standpoint of the Old Testament, and to show the connexion between the Justice and the Love of God. The conflict was carried on, in part on the philosophic and idealistic standpoint of the Alexandrians, and in part on that of the prevalent Realism.

The Alexandrians were especially inclined to oppose all crude Anthropopathisms, but they were not successful in correctly separating the real and the sensuous view, and hence were led into a subtilizing of the divine attributes. Clement attributes all errors in the apprehension of the Old Testament to the sensuous and liberal mode of understanding it, which led men to represent after human fashion, the nature of God, who is exalted above all human passions. The Prophets could represent God to us, not as he is, but only as we sensuous men can understand it.\* Origen also sees in the Old Testament a condescension of God to the weakness of Man. In fact there is no wrath in God, but he must appear as if wrathful to the bad, on account of the sufferings which their own evil conduct entails upon them.† The Alexandrians disputed the self-subsistence of God's primitive Justice, and merged it in the idea of a *δικαιοσύνη σωτήριος*, a disciplining reformatory love.

\* Strom. p. 391.—*ἡμεῖς δέ, ὡς ζοικειν, οὐ πανόμεθα τὰ τοιαῦτα, σαρκικῶς νοοῦντες τὰς γραφάς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παθῶν ἀναγόμενοι, τὸ βούλημα τοῦ ἀπαθοῦς Θεοῦ, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἡμεδαποῖς κινήμασιν ἀπεκδεχόμενοι· ὥς δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀκοῦσαι δυνατοί, οὕτως ἔχειν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντοκράτορος ὑπολαμβάνοντες, ἀθέως πλανώμεθα· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔχει τὸ Θεῖον, οὕτως οἶον τε ἦν λέγεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὡς οἶον τε ἦν πατεῖν ἡμᾶς σαρκὶ πεπεδημένους οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐλάλησαν οἱ προφῆται, συμπεριφερομένου σωτηρίως ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσθενείᾳ τοῦ Κυρίου.* † *Hom. 18 in Jerem.*

ments according to them were only means of reformed by God, in order to lead fallen beings to a their estrangement, and at last to a re-union

s forms the transition to the realistic standpoint, regards punishment as something developing itself in, as something inseparably connected with sin. He says, God does not punish immediately, in order to it punishment is that which follows sin of itself; the fountain of all happiness, and those who abide in union with Him, receive all good from Him, so that all evil from Him is the source of punishment. If IRENÆUS, NOVATIUS, and LACTANTIUS, in their moralism, sometimes used expressions liable to be misunderstood, yet they maintained not the less, that God must be understood to act at all times differently from man, since He acts not from mere feeling or passion, but according to the dictates of divine wisdom. Tertullian, especially, who enters deeply into these discussions, defends the idea of divine justice against Marcion, by showing the necessary con-redeeming love and justice. Does not redemption, he asks, presuppose the existence of guilt in God's view? Marcion is illogical\*, since he denies the justice of God, yet maintains the fact of Redemption. Tertullian shows, however, that the idea of divine justice has a deeper basis than what Marcion supposes it does not spring from a mere threat of the punishment of evil, but rests on an original justice of God, on Creation generally, where it is equivalent to *justitia architectonica*, since God has fixed definite laws for every being; the goodness of God, he says, created the world, and his justice regulates it.† To set aside the anthropopathisms is preposterous; if Marcion would only not refuse to believe in God's wrath and punitive

arc. i. 26. iv. 10 — Sed et peccata dimittere an ejus posset et retinere, et an ejus sit absolvere, cujus non sit etiam an congruat, eum ignoscere, in quem nihil sit admissum.

. c. 12.—A primordio dumque creator tam bonus, quam creator utrumque processit, bonitas ejus operata est mundum, utilata est. Justitiæ opus est. quod inter lucem et tenebras annuntiata est inter diem et noctem, inter cœlum et terram, ut bonitas concipit, ita justitia distinxit, totum hoc dispositum et ordinatum est.

justice, he must also deny the other attributes of God; but instead of drawing down God to human limitation, we must rise to Him. "Why dost thou imagine anything human in God, and not that everything is divine?"\* The limits which cleave to the development of the divine in Man must all be abstracted. The long-suffering and compassion of God must be understood otherwise than in the case of human beings. From such a standpoint, he vindicated "the speaking after the manner of men," occurring in Holy Writ. God, he says, could not come into close contact with man, unless he appropriated human affections, a condescension that softens the exceeding splendour of his majesty, which otherwise would be too much for human weakness. Perhaps in itself it is not worthy of God, but for man it is necessary, and, therefore, worthy of God, since nothing can be so worthy of God as what contributes to the salvation of Man.† He pronounces it inconsequent to believe in Christ, and yet to be inclined to deny the condescension of God in the Old Testament, in which he saw a preparation for the condescension of God in Christ.‡ Tertullian sometimes expresses himself, as if he thought that moral goodness had no internal necessity, but was only made such by an act of the divine will. "We must not obey it because it is good," he says; "but we must obey, because God has commanded it."§ Yet he would not affirm that God has arbitrarily determined this or that to be good. He only designed to refute those who would limit the authority of the divine law by a reference to the creature. In another passage he guards against such a misapprehension, and asserts that in God everything must be natural, eternal, and grounded in his Essence.||

*The Idea of the Divine Omnipotence.* From the standpoint

\* Adv. Marc. ii. 16.

† Ibid. c. 27. cf.—*Conversabatur Deus, ut homo divina agere doceretur; ex æquo agebat Deus cum homine, ut homo ex æquo agere cum Deo posset: Deus pusillus inventus est, ut homo maximus fieret.*

‡ Ibid. c. 16.

§ De Pœnit. c. 4.—*Audaciam existimo de bono divini præcepti disputare. Neque enim quia bonum est, idcirco auscultare debemus, sed quia Deus præcepit. Ad exhibitionem obsequii prior est majestas divinæ potestatis, prior est auctoritas imperantis quam utilitas servientis.*

|| Contra Marc. i. 22, 23.

of Antiquity, where the consciousness was confined within the limits of Nature, the divine presented itself as subject to a higher Nature. Christianity introduced the idea of Omnipotence as something new in opposition to the Pagan view; it was of peculiar importance to Christians; simple believers appealed to it as the ground of their confidence. Certainly its development presented difficulties, when not viewed in connexion with the essential nature of God. It was then perverted into the idea of infinite arbitrariness, or the limitations of human consciousness were transferred to God. Such a transference was made by the elder Pliny, in order to remove the reality of the idea.\* Celsus reproached the Christians with referring on all occasions to the divine omnipotence. "God," he says, misunderstanding the idea, "can do nothing irrational, unnatural, or wicked."† Origen defending the idea against such objections thoroughly discusses the question. He distinguishes Nature in the ideal sense, which is one with the divine arrangement of the Universe, from Nature as it actually appears. If Nature be understood in the former sense, we may indeed say, God cannot and will not do what is against Nature. On the other hand, the laws of phenomenal Nature cannot bind God. There may be a standpoint raised above these laws, and hence, when anything happens according to the divine will, we cannot consider this as against Nature. These views are important in relation to his idea of miracles. A miracle certainly does not correspond with the laws of common phenomenal Nature, the φύσις κοινότερον νοουμένη, but founded on the higher law of Nature, on the general principles of the divine government. As far as this involves any precise statement, Origen maintains that the divine omnipotence is not to be considered as infinite. But he denies infinity in a different sense. It was a doctrine of the ancient Philosophers, that no consciousness can embrace an infinite series, which, applied to God, was an indirect Anthropopathism.‡ Thus some came to the conclusion, since consciousness implies limitation, no consciousness can be ascribed to the Supreme Being; so it was in the idea of the Neoplatonic Όν. Origen sincerely maintained the idea of a personal and self-conscious God; § but in-

\* Hist. Natur. ii. c. 5.

† Orig. c. Cels. v. 14, 23.

‡ Plutarch. de Defectu Oracul. c. 23, 24.

In Joann. t. xxxii. § 18.—ὅτε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενος περιωπῇ,

voluntarily influenced by the Philosophy of his age, he adopted the supposition above-mentioned as a truth, at the same time actuated by a Christian interest for a Providence which extended over all things, he thought that the divine Omnipotence could only embrace a limited range of existence. This is important in relation to his doctrine of Creation, the pre-existence of souls, and the development of the Universe. He assumed that God had created a definite number of spirits, and accordingly beheld in the development of the world only a change of Forms.\* By this specimen we perceive what an influence the Platonic Philosophy exerted on the Alexandrians, though the religious interest of Theism acted as a counterpoise.

### 3. THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION.

On this doctrine particularly, Christianity effected a revolution in the prevailing views. Natural Religion, formed by the contemplation of Nature, and a comparison of it with human relations, was unable to rise to the idea of a creation as the free act of God; an absolute act of unconditioned freedom performed by God was a thought totally foreign to antiquity. The phenomenal world was supposed to spring of itself out of Chaos; many attributed the same origin to the gods. Even when no Autonomy was ascribed to the World, no pantheistic view adopted, no development of Nature from itself allowed, but a Supreme Spirit was regarded as the Framer of the Universe, this was not considered as an unconditioned, absolutely free act on the part of God, but conditioned by a pre-existent matter: with this assumption was connected the assertion of a necessary principle of Evil and Defect in the World. As long as Evil was regarded as founded in Nature, and necessary, the Divine agency must be supposed to be conditioned. When

*ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ γνώσει καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ θεωρίᾳ οὐσὴ μελζονε τῆς ἐν νύφ θεωρίας, ὡς ἐπὶ Θεοῦ χρη νοεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, δεῖ λέγειν, ὅτι εὐφραίνεσαι ἅρα τὸν τινα εὐαρίστησιν.*

\* *Περὶ ἀρχῶν.* ii. c. 9.—In illo ergo initio putandum est tantum numerum rationabilium creaturarum, vel intellectualium, vel quoquomodo appellandæ sunt quas mentes superius diximus, fecisse Deum, quantum sufficere posse prospexit. Certum est quippe quod præfuisse aliquo apud se numero eas fecit: non enim, ut quidam volunt, finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non est, nec comprehensio ulla nec circumscriptio esse potest. Quod si fuerit, utique nec contineri vel dispensari a Deo quæ facta sunt, potuerunt. Naturaliter nempe, quicquid infinitum fuerit, et incomprehensibile erit.

Plato represented God as the being who organized the ὕλη, it may be disputed whether this was not given by him as a mere mythical conception. The formation of the ὕλη takes place when the divine idea is realized in it. But Dualism is never wholly overcome. The power that withstands the Divine never allows it entirely to succeed. This form was too mythical for the later Neo-Platonism, and not sufficiently intelligible. It substituted absolute Monism for Dualism — changed the acting God of Plato into the Absolute; the transitive act into the unconditioned development of an immanent rational necessity, from the Absolute down to the last point of existence, where the ὕλη had its place as the necessary limit of this process.

In Judaism, on the contrary, we find the distinctive mark of Theism — the doctrine of a Creation — the absolute free act of the Divine Omnipotence — the highest elevation of the human mind to which no Philosophy of Heathenism could attain. Christianity found this doctrine already in existence, and only announced it afresh, and purified it from those corruptions which it had acquired among the Jews.

The idea of Creation out of nothing denoted in opposition to Pagan Antiquity, an absolutely free act of God, conditioned by no pre-existent matter. The Dogma is found in the Shepherd (ποιμήν) of Hermas, "God who brought all things into being out of nothing."\* But this Idea found its way only by degrees, and when an entirely new direction had been given to the religious spirit and thinking. The speculative and popular mind, thinkers and simple people, as Tertullian remarks, took offence at it;† especially that Oriental speculative tendency of the Gnosis rebelled against it. The religious doctrine of the ancient World was connected with a speculative Cosmogony. Christianity, by its doctrine of Creation, dissolved this connexion, and thus established the independence of religious doctrine. The re-introduction of such a Cosmogony would have altered the essential character of Christianity. It was a first principle of the Gnostics that from nothing, nothing is made, and thus no agreement with them was possible from the Christian standpoint. For they were not willing to admit the fact as a matter of faith, but required an explanation *how* the Finite could be educed from the Infinite. To make this intelligible, they imagined a development of the perfection

\* II. Mandat. i.

† De Resurr. Carn. c. 11.



contained in the essence of the Supreme Principle, a necessary and gradual unfolding of the germ of existence that lay in him. Creation was thus made a necessary process of Nature, to which the Divine Being himself was subjected; in short, an Emanation. They chose many images to illustrate the process of Emanation from God; the development of thoughts from reason and from one another; the light that streams forth in manifold rays from the primeval light; the numbers, that proceed from one highest unity.\* Valentine called the products of Emanation *αἰῶνες*, because they are representatives

\* I add here a few remarks on the principles of Basilides which differ in part from the Gnosis, in which I follow Hippolytus in his *ἑλεγχος*, vii. 20. A comparison with the statements of Clement Alex. makes it certain that we there have a description agreeing in all essential points with it, and founded on authentic sources. This is demonstrated against Hilgenfeld by Uhlhorn (*Das Basilidianische System.*: Gött. 1855). See also Hase's Church History, 1854, p. 94. Basilides laboured to avoid all limiting ideas of God. He was not satisfied with calling him *the Being*, but placed him above all existence by the idea of the *οὐκ ὢν*. We find exactly similar language in Plotinus and other Platonists. The influence of Platonism is unmistakeable, though Uhlhorn will not allow it. In his doctrine of Creation, Basilides denies the existence of matter independent of God, as well as an Emanation or Evolution from God; according to him the Biblical representation of a creation by the almighty word of God comes nearest the truth. But the form and expression of the idea of creation, although unavoidably expressed according to the human *usus loquendi*, must be understood in a superhuman manner. God created first of all a seed of the World (*σπέρμα τοῦ κόσμου, πανσπερμία*), the potentiality of all being, of which the germ lay therein, chaotic and undeveloped (*σύγχυσις ἀρχική*). As far as this is not yet the world definite and developed in form, it may be called a non-existent world, and hence Basilides said, that God created the world *οὐκ ὢν οὐκ ὄντα ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*. First of all, the most spiritual entities were developed—the *νιδρής Θεοῦ*—in a threefold gradation; then the other created beings on a descending scale. Above all is enthroned the Not-Being (*οὐκ ὢν*), longing after whose infinite beauty all things tend upward from below. The idea of a *σπέρμα τοῦ κόσμου* is probably taken from the Stoics; but it leads to unfounded and forced meanings if, like Uhlhorn, we find nothing in Basilides respecting God, the Creation, and the development of the universe, but the stoical notions of an original unity of God and matter, and of an independent separation of both, clothed in Christian phraseology, and modified in their results by Christian teleology. When Basilides repeatedly says that God has sent forth the seed of the world (*τὸ κατεβλήθην ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐκ ὄντος Θεοῦ*) by the word of the speaker, it would really be his opinion that the seed of the world had produced God; he held it to be a too physical representation

of the Eternal. The divine powers appear hypostasized by the Gnostics, while Western thinkers would have described them as attributes of God. They wished to explain the different stages of existence by the stages of Emanation. Many attempted to make it conceivable how personality and consciousness originated, and placed at the head an unconscious principle, from which the personal conscious Spirit first proceeded, the *ἐνθύμησις*, *ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ*. But after all, the origin of the material world was not explained; for it and Spirit appeared to the Gnostics to form a necessary quality, and not to be referrible to a higher Unity. The Existence also of Evil and of Defect, seemed also to require a different explanation. The derivation of Evil from the freedom of the creature did not satisfy them, for in this way they thought it would be ultimately traced back to God. But as they wished to find the source of Evil elsewhere than in God, they fell into Dualism, which under various forms was dominant in that age. How great its power was is strikingly shown in the Gnostic Apelles, a scholar

that God should allow beings to emanate from himself, but thought it worthy of God that he should develope himself from chaos. The *νιότης* must be identical with God, who separates himself from matter, since these beings of Light are *Σεῶ ὁμοούσιοι*: and yet it is said that they develope themselves as the first from the *πανσπερμία*, but not God, who rather stands above the whole—has designed beforehand the plan of the universe, and attracts the children of God to himself by overpowering glory—who cannot, indeed be in the full sense *ὁμοούσιοι* with him, because they are not equal among themselves. In the abstract idea of God, and in the contemplation of the Universal Life, we may recognise Pantheistic influences, but they do not occur in the first of these, and in the second only in the Stoical ideas above mentioned. It is far too confidently asserted that Stoicism was the most widely spread philosophy, the vital air of the second century—the century in which Plutarch, Justin, and Clement lived. We cannot recognise in Basilides so much of Pantheism, and so little of Dualism, as Uhlhorn does, though he allows that the latter could not be altogether concealed. Basilides, in his attempt to abolish Dualism, and then relapsing into it, resembles Valentine. He adheres to it when he contemplates *πανσπερμία* in the aspect of formlessness, as *ἁμορφία*; perhaps also in supposing an antagonism between the living, formative light-seed, and the material in the *πανσπερμία*, but it appears clearly when he relegates the higher element in the apocatastasis typically described in Christ, *ἔπαθεν οὖν τοῦτο διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ σωματικὸν μέρος, καὶ ἀπεκατέστη εἰς τὴν ἁμορφίαν*. Compare J. L. Jacobi, *Basilidis philosophi gnostici rustentis*: Regiom. 1852.—[JACOBI.]

of Marcion, who, when he saw himself compelled to abandon Dualism, admitted that he believed in an original Being, but how he could be, he was unable to comprehend. He could not conceive how there could be one eternal God.\* The Gnostics were obliged to join together Dualism and the doctrine of Emanation; they proceeded on the assumption that the Evil Principle had mixed itself with the kingdom of Light, and the Soul with Matter; whence the earthly world originated. Respecting the origin of this mixture, there was ample scope for Speculation and Fancy. Some said that the ὕλη sought to penetrate the Kingdom of Light. Others represented the powers of the Kingdom of Light as not able to keep within its boundaries, but sinking down into the Kingdom of Darkness. At the head of this outward World, originating on the ground of Matter, stands the Demiurgos, whose character forms the principal difference in the Gnostic systems—according as they represent him in absolute Antagonism to God, or as only a Being subordinate to him, and an unconscious Organ in the Creation and Government of the World.† The Gnostics of the first class were obliged to admit an absolute contrariety between the earthly World and the highest order of the Universe; whence it followed that Christianity stood in this contrariety to the earthly World, and that a Redemption could never take place in it. Then either pride, or an ascetic contempt of the world, was the result, or the contrariety took a decidedly immoral direction, since it appeared a matter of indifference how men acted. It was thought that the higher life could not find its consummation in these earthly forms. Men must show their contempt of sensuality,—must despise it. Thus a bold Antinomism arose. Other Gnostics were more moderate; they admitted that the germs of divine Ideas had been unconsciously placed in the World by the Demiurgos; but Christianity had first brought the Framer of the World to a consciousness of the Supreme God, and had developed the ideas with clearness. Christianity, therefore, has given the consciousness of the design for which the world was created, and the destiny

\* Euseb. Hist. Eccl. v. 18. Hippolyt. ἑλεγχ. p. 529.

† On the principal attempt at pointing out the differences in the Gnostic systems, see the article *Gnostiker* in Herzog's Real-Encyclopædie für Theologie.—[JACOBI.]

of the human race. A deep scientific Idea lies at the foundation of these views of the Gnostics, only (according to their peculiar mode of thinking and expression) they represent objectively, as a development of the Demiurgos, what belongs to the Reason and the Mind of Man.

Irenæus opposed the arbitrariness of the Gnostics. If we do not desire to explain everything—since many things are reserved for a higher life—we shall retain our faith; the errors of the Gnostics arise from their wishing to acknowledge no bounds to their speculations.\* In opposition to the separation of God and the Demiurgos, he says, “God has formed all things in himself and from himself, that is, according to his own ideas.”† He also informs us what is the positive meaning of the idea of Creation out of nothing, namely, “that existence is derived from the power and will of God.” This cannot be explained according to the analogy of human workmanship.‡ He adheres to the opinion that the world had a beginning, and rejects the subtleties that have been started respecting it; what God had done before he created the World, Holy Writ does not reveal; the answer to such questions must be referred to God.

In the writings of the Platonizing fathers, we recognise a mixture of the Platonic forms. Philo had expressed himself as if he admitted a pre-existent Hyle which received a form from God. Yet it is a question whether Philo deviated so far from Judaism. In a fragment preserved by Eusebius§ he says, that God prepared exactly as much Hyle as he used for the Creation. This appears to contradict the opinion above-mentioned. The Apologists of the Platonic School followed his example. Justin Martyr says,|| “God formed all things out of an unorganized matter.” Yet according to the connexion of his style of thinking we cannot suppose that he approved of the Platonic Hylozoism. His Scholar Tatian serves to explain his views, for he also

\* Adv. Hæres. ii. 28.

† Ibid. ii. c. 7, 8.

‡ Ibid. ii. 28, § 3.—Ut puta, si quis interrogat: antequam mundum faceret Deus, quid agebat? dicimus quoniam ista responsio subiacet Deo. Quoniam autem mundus hic factus est apotelesos a Deo, temporale initium accipiens, scripturæ nos docent; quid autem ante hoc Deus sit operatus, nulla scriptura manifestat.

§ Præpar. Evangel. vii. 21.

|| Apol. i. § 10.—Πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα δημιουργῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης δι’ ἀνθρώπους, δεδιδάγμεθα.

says, all things were fashioned from a formless Hyle, which, however, was first brought forth by God. If a mere formal agreement with Plato is here expressed, yet to this form a view may be attached which perfectly retains the Platonic idea of the Hyle; we find this to be the case with Hermogenes,\* a painter who lived in North Africa towards the end of the second century. He rejected both the Gnostic Emanation doctrine, and the Church doctrine of Creation; the former contradicted the unchangeable nature of God, and necessitated attributing to him the Origin of Evil; the latter was contradicted by the nature of this World;† for if the Creation of the perfect God had been conditioned by nothing, a perfect world must have been the result. Hence he believed that Creation supposed something conditioning, and this he thought must be the Hyle which he received from Platonism into connexion with the Christian system. He did not think that he gave up the doctrine of the *μοναρχία* as long as he admitted a ruling all-powerful principle, and ascribed to God such a supremacy over the Hyle. He regarded the Hyle as altogether undetermined, predicateless,‡ in which all the contrarieties which afterwards appeared in the world, were as yet unseparated and undeveloped; neither motion nor rest; neither flowing nor standing still, but an inorganic confusion. It was the receptive; God alone the creative; his formative agency called forth from it determinate existence. But with this organization there was a residuum which withstood the divine formative power. Hence the defective and the offensive in Nature; hence also Evil. Had he been logical he must have admitted a Creation without a beginning; he could not have regarded it as a single and transitive act of God, but as immanent and resulting immediately from the relation of God to Matter. He said, God was always a ruler, consequently he must always have had dominion over Matter.§ This would

\* Tertull. adv. Hermogenem. Hippolyt. *ἐλεγχος*, viii. 17.

† Tertull. adv. Hermog. c. 2.

‡ Ibid. c. 28.—Unde ergo compertus est Hermogenes, informem et confusam et inquietam illam fuisse, quæ ut invisibilis latebat?—c. 35, prima, inquit, facie videtur nobis incorporalis esse materia, exquisita autem ratione recta invenitur neque corporalis neque incorporalis.—c. 41. Inconditus et [in]confusus et turbulentus fuit materiæ motus. Sic enim et ollæ undeque ebullientis similitudinem apponis.

§ Ibid. c. 3.

imply that in fact God and Matter were never separated, and that the Hyle always existed along with the organization. He compared the operation of God upon it to the attractive power\* which Beauty according to its nature exerts on beholders; or to the attraction of the Magnet, which according to its nature operates on iron. Consequently, like the Neo-Platonic School, he admitted a Universe that was always becoming, which in this form exists from all Eternity, so that God, and his formative agency, and Matter, must always be presupposed, and the idea of Hyle is only attained by separating what lies at the basis of the material world. In the Hyle is always to be distinguished what is allied to the divine formative power, and what is counter-active and destructive; from the later proceeds the destruction and dissolution that take place in the present life. If his view was charged with being unscriptural, he rejoined that his opinion was founded in reality, and the *Tohu Vabohu* (תוהו ובוהו) of Genesis was a designation of Chaos; and, on the other hand, Creation out of nothing, had it been a fact, must have been clearly and expressly signified. By logical development Hermogenes would have been led through the Neo-Platonic idea of Creation to a different idea of God, but we must take care not to blame him for what can only be logically inferred. We have to notice the course of development in a man of this age, who probably in early life adopted the philosophical principles of a Neo-Platonic school, was then attracted by Christianity, and in whose mind what he imbibed of the influence of Christianity remained in conflict with his speculative principles. Tertullian, from whose reply we learn the doctrine of Hermogenes, objects that God is not acknowledged as the only one if he is not regarded as the sole, unconditioned Originator of all existence. In the History of the Creation in Genesis, the phrase "*in the beginning*" indicates no pre-existent matter, but the gradual sequence of the divine arrangement;† lastly, we must distinguish the absolute attributes of God belonging to his Essence, and the relative attributes referrible to Creation. The former are eternal; the latter mark a relation to the World, and therefore might originate with it.‡

ORIGEN on one side adhered to the doctrine of the Church ;

\* Tertull. adv. Hermogenem. c. 44.

† Ibid. c. 19.

‡ Ibid. c. 3.

on another he went beyond it, where it had not given express decisions; he attempted to harmonize traditionary dogmas with the standpoint of the Gnostics. He points out as a biblical doctrine that this world had a beginning, that it was created out of nothing,\* but what there was before this world is left undetermined, and here Gnosis has free scope. The doctrine of an absolute beginning of Creation appeared to him untenable; the operative divine attributes being presupposed in Creation, no reason can be imagined why they should not always have been at work;† and as little can it be imagined how in God a transition could be made from rest to activity. On the contrary, he advances the idea of an eternal Creation, a derivation of the creature from God by virtue of an ideal beginning. Origen did not assert it of this actual world, which rather presupposed a foregoing History, but he imagined a pure spiritual creation as a beginning, and God as the original source of a spirit-world allied to him, but yet at an infinite distance from him, which constituted his eternal Self-revelation. He combats the doctrine of the Gnostics of the *ἀμοούσιον* of spiritual natures with God, and beholds in the spirit-world only a partial reflection of the divine glory.‡ He endeavoured to defend the doctrine of Creation out of nothing, as he derived everything immediately from God and not conditioned by pre-existent matter; and with that he was able to connect a certain spiritually conceived emanation of the spirit-world from God.

This doctrine of Origen was controverted by Methodius, Bishop of Tyre, towards the end of the third century.§ He

\* *Περὶ ἀρχ.* i. præfat. 4. c. 3, § 3.

† Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ ἔχοντα τι τῶν πρεπόντων αὐτῷ τὸν Θεόν, εἰς τὸ ἔχειν ἐληλυθέναι; ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε παντοκράτωρ οὐκ ἦν, αἰεὶ εἶναι δεῖ ταῦτα, δι' ἃ παντοκράτωρ ἐστὶ, καὶ αἰεὶ ἦν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κρατούμενα, ἀρχοντῇ αὐτῷ χρώμενα.—3. πάντα τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη αἰεὶ ἦν· ἀλλ' οὐ δὴ τις ἐρεῖ καὶ τὸ καθ' ἑν ἀριθμοῦ· πλὴν ἐκατέρως δηλοῦται, οἱ οὐκ ἠρξάτο ὁ Θεὸς δημιουργεῖν ἀργήσας ποτέ. Ep. Justiniani ad Mennam Patriarch Mansi, ix. 528. *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, p. 4, ed. Redepenning.

‡ In Joann. t. xxxii. § 18.—(οἶμαι) φθάνειν μέντοι γε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπαυγάματος τούτου τῆς ὕλης δόξης μερικά ἀπαυγασματα ἐπὶ τὴν λοιπὴν λογικὴν κτισιν· οὐκ οἶμαι γὰρ τινα τὸ πᾶν δύνασθαι χωρῆσαι τῆς ὅλης δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀπαύγασμα ἢ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ. t. xiii. § 25.

§ In his work *περὶ τῶν γεννητῶν* (v. Lardner's "Credibility of the Gospel History," ch. 57. Works iii. p. 303, ed. 1788), an abstract in Photius Bibl. cod. 235.

quoted the language of Origen correctly, that the World proceeds in an eternal *becoming*, without beginning, from God; but his mind was not speculative enough to enter into the train of Origen's ideas, so that many of his objections did not apply. He transfers the relation that a piece of human workmanship has to its maker to the dependence of creatures on God, and hence asserts that the world must have been completed at some time, and therefore God must have passed from making to not-making. Origen would not have granted this, for he regarded the Spirit-world not as ever completed, but as always becoming,—proceeding in an eternal process from God, and depending upon Him. Further, Methodius objected that Origen's scheme removed the distance between God and the creature. But Origen denied that the creature in its essence possessed self-subsistence; he would rather have described God's upholding agency as a constant creative energy, conditioned by the creature. Origen's doctrine, as to its form at least, could sooner be met by the third objection, that it was at variance with the self-sufficiency of God, who requires nothing out of himself for his satisfaction. But this Origen would not maintain, but only say that the contemplation of the divine Perfection would lead us to expect a constant Revelation of God in his works. He referred this in nowise to the form of the universe as it now is, but to the original spiritual Creation. In this reference, we must rightly understand the tenor of his ideas as they were developed in opposition to Gnosticism. When the Gnostics maintained that the Universe could not proceed from one original Being, but that the contrarieties in it were referrible to three different principles, the *πνευματικόν*, the *ψυχικόν*, and the *ὕλικόν*, Origen endeavoured to prove that another explanation was possible. When the Gnostics subordinating the Ethical to the Physical, traced ethical differences to an original diversity of natures, it comported with his views to establish physical contrarieties by the Ethical. The direction of the will, according to him, is the lever of the Universe, and from the contrarieties founded on that, proceed all other differences. Now the Gnostics maintained that if the World owed its origin to one Supreme original being, its constitution would correspond to his perfection, and we must find in it only what was like himself; granting them that, he arrives at the presumption of an original Creation of



spirits allied to God, and then endeavours further to show that later contrarieties proceeded from the tendency of their wills. In that blessed world of spirits allied to God, the adherence to communion with God was determined by their free will. By a free yielding of themselves to God they might continue in the good and the divine, or it was possible for them to apostatize; and from this apostacy of the Spirits from God, the total revolution of the Universe and all its contrarieties are to be derived. The misunderstood idea of the divine righteousness had also led him into the error of carrying the Unity into that original Spirit-world so far, that he thought of them as all alike, endowed with equal gifts of power, and differing only in number from one another; hence it followed that the individual, characteristic difference had an ethical ground and was deducible from Sin. As soon as these contrarieties had been formed, and with them the manifoldness of existence, God reduced them to a higher unity and formed out of them a world of which the aim is, to bring back fallen beings to their original unity (*ἀποκατάστασις*). In his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν* he applies the idea of the soul of the world to the animating divine power by which unity is educed from these contrarieties. Lastly, the question occurs, whether Origen was not forced by the untenability of his notion of the original perfect equality of Spirits, to modify it in some degree; for subsequently he describes the Logos as the collected reflection of the divine glory, and the individual spirits as a partial reflection; this language would imply that what is one in the Logos, becomes individualized in the Spirit-world. Probably, then, an original difference in the spirits is supposed.

As to the relation of Matter to the original Creation, in his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, he regards it as questionable whether any created spirit can exist without a body,\* so that the body is so constantly connected with it as to be distinguished only in idea. Many persons have so understood this as if Origen held bodies to be only ideal, that is, founded on the idea of a created being—the

\* *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, ii. c. 2, 2.—Si vero impossibile est hoc ullo modo affirmari, id est quod vivere præter corpus possit ulla alia natura præter Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, necessitas consequentiæ ac rationis coarctat intelligi, principaliter quidem creatas esse rationabiles naturas; materialem vero substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solum separari ab eis, et pro ipsis vel post ipsius effectam videri, sed nunquam sine ipsa vel vixisse vel vivere.

expression of objective limits the natural boundary of created existence. According to this notion the contrariety between Spirit and body would cease, and body would be nothing but the finite, limited essence of Spirit. Yet his words do not express so much, but only contain the question whether with the existence of every created Spirit, a body is given because it cannot exist without body. But according to other expressions it would seem that the contrariety between Spirit and Body vanishes, since he often speaks of Matter as simply undefined, which may acquire higher or lower qualities. He ascribes to it an infinite capability of refinement, so that at the highest shape it is entirely spiritualized. Hence it seems traced back to the idea of mere potentiality of Existence, which in its manifestations may be advanced to different stages, and that this potentiality is to be regarded as given with Creation. But it must not be overlooked that in the passages referred to from the book *περὶ ἀρχῶν* he expresses himself doubtfully, and that there are other passages in which is assumed the pure immateriality of the Spirit-world.\*

#### 4. THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE.

This doctrine as now held throughout Christendom, belongs to those that were peculiarly new, though being grounded on the religious nature of man it has met with a general response. In the religions of Antiquity only the World as a whole was regarded as an image of God; whereas in Christianity every man appears as a self-revelation of God—no longer as a mere part of the great whole, but as a peculiar object of the divine regard, with which the whole must co-operate, so that this doctrine was connected with all the leading truths of Christianity, —with the whole scheme of salvation and redemption. To the heathen, the importance which Christianity attached to the individual, seemed to be arrogance. “How can it be that the great orbs of Heaven should perish but Man be eternal?” The wide-

\* In Joann. t. xix. § 5.—ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δεικνύμενος κόσμος, ὑλικὸς γενόμενος διὰ τοὺς δεηθέντας τῆς ἐνύλου ζωῆς, τόπους μὲν ἔχει διαφόρους, οἵτινες δὴ πάντες, ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὰ αὔλα καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα ἀτά εἰσιν, οὐ τόσον τῷ τόπῳ, ὅσον τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἀόρατα συγκρίσει. *ibid.* of the κόσμος ἀόρατος, κόσμος νοητός: εἴη ἂν τοσοῦτον ποικιλώτερος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κόσμου καὶ διαφέρων, ὅσῳ διαφέρει γυμνὸς πάσης ὕλης τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου λόγος τοῦ ἐνύλου κόσμου οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς μετοχῆς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σοφίας τῶν κοσμοῦντων τῇν ὕλην κεκοσμημένων.

spread belief in an *εἰμαρμένη*, an unalterable necessity which controlled even the gods, presented an obstacle to the doctrine of a *πρόνοια*. The Stoical system spoke indeed of a *πρόνοια*, but the doctrine stood here in connexion with Pantheism; it corresponded to the unalterable laws of the Universe to which everything was subservient, every individual life was sacrificed, so that nothing was left but Zeus. In Platonism we must distinguish the more popular religious view and the logical system of Plotinus. The point of view of the latter is opposed to the Christian *πρόνοια*; from the Absolute down to the utmost verge of existence, an unconditioned necessity of development prevails; so that as little can be said of a conscious divine Providence as of a Creation formed for a special end; there is nothing but a necessity of immanent reason. From this standpoint Plotinus not only combats the scheme of the Gnostics, but, equally with that, the strictly Christian view.

In the Gnostic view of Providence, we again meet with the relation of the Demiurgos to the Supreme God; those who made the former an unconscious organ of the latter, could also admit a Providence unconsciously administered by him; on the other hand, those who placed him in a hostile position to God, must admit one *πρόνοια* of the Demiurgos and another of the Supreme God. Each would care for his own; the Supreme God only for the Pneumatici, while the rest were beyond his pale. Many Gnostics ascribed to Fate a limited influence;\* in the kingdom of the Demiurgos the decree of the Spirits of the Stars was absolute, till by Redemption the

\* Thus Bardesanes supposes three Factors by which Man is determined—Nature, Fate, and Free Will. What is similar, and takes place in all of us, proceeds from Nature; what is dissimilar is from Fate; and Free-Will leads us as we may wish. Fate has not power over all things; for what we call Fate rests on a co-operation of the higher powers (i.e., the Spirits of the Stars) and the elements, regulated by God. See the "Book of the Laws of the Lands," which W. Cureton has published in Syriac and English in his "Spicilegium Syriacum," containing remains of Bardesan, Meliton, Ambrom, and Mara bar Serapion: London, 1855. It is the same work of which Eusebius, in his *Præpar. Evang.* vi. 10, gives a fragment, and to which he affixes the title *περὶ εἰμαρμένης*. See his *Hist. Eccles.* iv. 30. That in its present form it was written by Bardesanes himself is not so probable as that one of his pupils gave this account of his doctrines in a dialogue form. Compare Jacobi *Deutsch. Zeitschr. f. Chr. Wiss. u. Chr. Leb.* 1856. N. 15.—[JACOBI.]

Pneumatici were committed to the Providence of the Supreme God. This aristocratic preference for the Pneumatici is not found in Marcion, but there is another mixture of error and truth. He makes Providence relate to believers in Christ, and thus adopts the idea of *providentia specialissima*. There is truth in it so far, that in order that the design of God in training and forming men for his kingdom might be fulfilled, resignation to it in faith is required; but Marcion makes out of the subjectively conditioned, an objective distinction; all those who do not enter into communion with the Redeemer he places under the dominion of the Demiurgos. On the other hand, among the first-named class of Gnostics, BASILIDES is worthy of special notice for his ideas on this subject. He represents\* the πρόνοια as implanted in created beings at their Creation. This might harmonize with the Platonic idea according to which Providence appears not as the conscious procedure of divine love in training men's souls, but as an immanent necessity of Reason; but this was not the meaning of Basilides. He supposes a connexion between the original creation and the divine government of the world, and attributes to the Demiurgos the checks to its developments. Indeed, the divine government could not be carried on, unless laws are presupposed which were implanted in creatures at Creation, but neither can

\* Clem. Strom. iv. p. 509.—ἡ πρόνοια δε, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχοντος, ὡς φάναι, κινεῖσθαι ἀρχεται, ἀλλ' ἐγκατεσπάρη ταῖς οὐσίαις σὺν καὶ ᾧ τῶν οὐσιῶν γένεσι πρὸς τοῦ τῶν ὅλων Θεοῦ.

Hippolytus, in his representation of the system of Basilides, states this especially: the great Archon rules and governs the Firmament as far down as the Moon; in the region of the Moon, and of the Star-spirits, the lower Archon governs, who takes the place of the World-former. Over the lower stages of the πανσπερμία, our own, there is no overseer, manager, or former, but the law of rational thought implanted by God suffices, according to which the What, the When, and the How of all that is becoming, is determined (p. 237, ed. Miller). But that this does not imply an absolute exclusion of the agency of the lower Archon, but that even for the lowermost region the Star-spirits exert an influence determining the development, and, indeed, that this influence is included in the divine principle of things is evident from the assertion that Christ's birth and work of redemption were determined by the stars; ἦν γάρ, φησὶν, αὐτὸς ὑπὸ γένεσιν ἀστέρων καὶ ὥρων ἀποκαταστάσεως ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ προλελογισμένος σωρῶ (i. e., τῇ πανσπερμίᾳ). This note is in answer to the objections in Uhlhorn's Essay, p. 24. I have not asserted that the lowermost stage had an Archon or former of its own.—[JACOBI.]

these laws be efficient unless everything is guided by the superintending agency of a personal, omnipresent God.

The Church Teachers had, accordingly, to develop the idea of *πρόνοια* in opposition to the Gnostics. Many important questions arose respecting the relation of Providence to human freedom, and the harmony of the freedom of the creature with the divine Prescience. Origen devoted his special attention to these inquiries; he canvassed the Sophism common among the Heathen of the so-called *λόγος ἀρχαίος*—God foreknew this—consequently it was necessary,—consequently there can be no such thing as Freedom, and all motive to action is taken away. Origen exposes the confusion of ideas in this argument, and distinguishes between *knowing* simply in itself and *determining*—between absolute and hypothetical necessity; he regards foreknowledge not as the cause of an event, but as conditioned by it. From the Christian standpoint he attempts further to prove that the doctrine of an unconditional predestination contradicts the whole analogy of biblical doctrine, the admission of a divine judgment, and what Paul says of the necessity of our own exertions (1 Cor. ix. 24). In these discussions he also examines the difficult passages in the Pauline Epistles on which the doctrine of absolute Predestination is founded. The Gnostics, moreover, made use of expressions in the Old Testament in order to inculcate the God of the Old Testament; and many uneducated persons within the Church, as Origen says, made unworthy representations of God, by taking passages in their most literal sense, as if he were an arbitrary tyrant. From these he distinguishes others who do not decide on such passages, who avoid erroneous representations, and reserve difficulties for future solution. The Church Teachers in general were shy of carrying things to an extreme, and always endeavoured to maintain the freedom of the creature. They agreed in this—that instead of confining themselves to single passages torn from their connexion, they aimed at knowing all that the Scriptures taught of the Love and Righteousness of God. Irenæus thus explains the hardening of Pharaoh's heart—that the operation of the events brought to pass by God, is transferred to God himself,—the *Mediate* is represented as *Immediate*. Thus we say of the Sun that it blinds, while this effect depends on the relation of the eye to the sunlight.\* Origen propounds

\* *Adv. Hær.* iv. c. 29, 30.

a peculiar theory connected with his system. He brings the divine guidance of rational beings on earth into connexion with a secret earlier existence. It belongs to this guidance that God places them in such situations that the slumbering evil is brought into consciousness, and its final cure is effected. Thus a wise physician allows the hidden morbid matter to break forth in order to heal the malady.\*

#### 5. THE THEODICY.

The doctrines of Creation and Providence are necessarily connected with a Theodicy. In the controversy with the Gnostics, Creation out of nothing and an all-comprehending Providence could only be maintained by repelling the objections which are founded on the existence of Evil. They always asserted that a Creation out of nothing carried back the causality of Evil to God; and as to the distinction between permission and causation, they rejoined that if God could have prevented Evil and did not prevent it, he must be the cause of it.† But the manifold gradations in existence and the diversities among men appeared to them proofs that the world in its present form could not have proceeded from the perfect God. As they divided men into three classes: first, the ὕλικοί, χοϊκοί, driven by blind impulses and destitute of all moral elements; secondly, the πνευματικοί, in whom a divine principle of life shows itself; and thirdly, the ψυχικοί between the other two, governed by the rational element, depending on the faith of authority—standing between good and bad, determined by fear and hope, but who are not able to attain the intention of perfect Truth,—so, parallel to these three classes, they assumed three principles of existence: the Supreme God; the Demiurgos; and the Hyle, according to one view, the kingdom of Ahriman, according to another, a blind power of Evil and its representative, Satan.

Irenæus directed his attention to what was of practical importance. Men will go on most safely, he says, if they distinguish what is certain to simple Faith from what we cannot explain, and God himself has kept back. He regards as important and certain that God foreknew the fall of his

\* *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, iii. p. 19, ed. Redep.

† *Clem. Strom.* i. p. 310.—οἶδα πολλοὺς ἀδιαλείπτως ἐπιφυσμένους ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ μὴ κώλυον αἰτίον εἶναι λέγοντας—ὃ γὰρ κωλῦσαι δύναμις ἦν, τοῦτω καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ συμβαίνοντος προσάπτεται.

creatures, and from the beginning ordained its punishment, but the causes why some remained faithful and others apostatized from God, we cannot determine.\* Yet he was disposed to attempt at least to explain the divine permission of Evil. He found it in this, that by contrast the essential quality of Evil must appear with so much greater clearness, and the Good would attain greater constancy in goodness.† But this would lead to the conclusion that Evil is a necessary step in development, and would nullify the idea of freedom. LACTANTIUS was really inclined to regard Evil as necessary, for he says it is nothing but *the foil of goodness (interpretamentum boni)*. The contrast of Good and Evil corresponds to that which pervades the Universe between spirit and body, light and darkness; everywhere there exists a *concordia discors*, a Harmony in opposites. As a principal passage for his dualistic theory‡ is wanting in many manuscripts, it has been taken for a Manichean interpolation, but it agrees exactly with the views of Lactantius,§ which on this point are strikingly in unison with those of the Clementines. HERMOGENES zealously combated this theory; he would not admit as valid his argument for the necessity of Evil; Good, he asserted, was something independent, and which required no contrast to make it conspicuous. He was only confirmed in his own view, that evil resulted from the opposition of the ὕλη to the divine formative power.

In the system of ORIGEN, the Theodicy occupied an important position, for he made use of it to justify the doctrine of the Monarchy in the Creation of the World.|| He con

\* Adv. Hær. ii. c. 23.—Similiter autem et causam propter quam, quum omnia a Deo facta sint, quædam quidem transgressa sunt et abscesserunt a Dei subiectione, quædam autem, immo plurima, perseverarunt et perseverant in subiectione ejus qui fecit: et cujus naturæ sunt quæ transgressa sunt, cujus autem naturæ quæ perseverant, cedere oportet Deo, etc.—Nos super terram, quemadmodum et Paulus ait (1 Cor. xiii. 9) ex parte quidem cognoscimus et ex parte prophetamus.

† Adv. Hær. iv. c. 39.—Mens per utrorumque experimentum disciplinam boni accipiens firmior ad conservationem ejus efficitur obediens Deo: inobedientiam quidem primum respuens per poenitentiam, quoniam amarum et malum est; deinde ex comprehensione disciens quale sit quod contrarium est bono et dulcedini, ne tentet quidem anquam inobedientiam gustare Dei.

‡ *Instit. Div.* vii. 5.

§ *Ibid.* ii. 12, vi. 13.

|| *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, i. 8, § 2. Cf. c. Celsus vi. 44.

templated the Universe under the assumption of a prior derangement in the Spiritual World, and as arranged for purification and restoration to its original communion with God. The phrase *καταβολή κόσμου* (Matt. xiii. 35), he understood of an overthrow, a catastrophe, from which this world arose.\* The difference of more refined or grosser bodies corresponded to the quality of the souls that had been rendered unequal by the Fall.† The spirit must be developed in a conflict with the heterogeneous organs of the body. He distinguishes the purifying agency of God in his book *περί ἀρχῶν* by the name of *the Soul of the World*. If we were able (so he thought) to survey the whole course of History in the development of rational beings, we should recognise in it the divine love and righteousness. In the *περί ἀρχῶν* he expresses himself problematically, on the question whether a metempsychosis can actually exist; but at a later period he undoubtedly denied it, and regarded it only as spiritual and symbolical. The final end of the World's development must consequently be a restoration to its original state; but it is remarkable that Origen connects with the derivation of Evil from the freedom of the will (at least in the *περί ἀρχῶν*) the opinion that Evil will continually break forth again, and that after every return to Harmony a new fall will again occur. According to this, the World's development is not directed to one final aim, but moves in a perpetual circle of alternate Harmony and Fall. As he was a most strenuous advocate of Freedom, he was obliged to regard Evil as necessary, as a disease constantly breaking forth afresh. Yet it is questionable whether later reflection and a deeper acquaintance with the Scriptures did not lead him to renounce this opinion. An expression in his work against Celsus deserves attention; it requires (he says) special examination whether Evil when it has once been blotted out will break out afresh.

We close Theology, in the strict sense, with the doctrine in which the development of the Christian idea of God is brought to completion; that is,—

\* *Περί ἀρχῶν* iii. c. 5, § 4.

† *Ibid.* § 4.—Puto ergo—quod non indiscreto vel fortuito aliquo casu vel principatus teneant principatum, vel ceteri ordines suum quisque sortiatur effcium, sed pro meritis suis gradum dignitatis hujus adepti sunt, licet non sit nostrum vel scire vel quærere, qui illi actus fuerint per quos in istum ordinem venire meruerint. Cf. ii. c. 9, § 2, in *Joann. t. i.* § 17.



## 6. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

MARTINI, pragmatische Geschichte des Dogma von der Gotthirt Christi in den ersten 4 Jahrh. Rost. 1800. B. i.

SCHLEIERMACHER über d. Gegensatz der Sabell. u. Athanas. Trinitätslehre, Theol. Weike, b. ii.

J. A. DORNER, Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi. 1888. 45 Abth. i. 1, 2.

F. CH. BAUR, die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 1841-43. Th. i.

G. A. MEIER der Lehre von der Trinität. Hamb. 1844. Th. i.

In reference to the historical development of this doctrine, we must distinguish between its practical or economical importance, and its speculative construction. Its practical, Christian value is closely connected with the doctrine of Jesus the Redeemer, and presents the three-fold distinction of Christian Theism, the doctrine of one God as the Creator and Father of Men, who has revealed himself in Christ,—of the Son of God through whom he has revealed himself,—and of the source of divine life which has been conveyed from the Son to the human race. This doctrine of God, the Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier of Humanity in Christ was essential to the Christian consciousness, and therefore has existed from the beginning in the Christian Church.\* In the various recensions of the Apostles' Creed it is announced as the peculiar article of Christian faith in opposition to Judaism and Paganism, and has been received by the whole Church. But the intellectual construction of this doctrine is something different, and was not fixed till a later period in that definite, dogmatic form of expression which now prevails. We have to treat of the manner in which the relation of the Trinity to Unity was determined,—of the speculative construction of the doctrine of God's being in Christ, and of the Holy Spirit in connexion with the Unity of the Divine Being.

As its relation to the Historical Christ is the central point of the doctrine of the Trinity, on which its special Christian importance depends, so also the genetic development of this doctrine (as may be proved) proceeded from the revelation of God in Christ; on this account we must set out from the doctrine of the Divine nature in Christ. With all independent proofs of Christian doctrine, existing ideas have found a junction, and have served as a substratum for the development of Christian ideas; they have exerted not a material, but a

\* Compare 2 Cor. xiii. 13; Rom. xi. 36.

formal influence, and their apparent analogy and wide-spread circulation may be regarded as ordained by divine Providence. These elements, as far as they come here under consideration, are the Pagan-oriental; secondly, the Platonic and Neo-Platonic; and thirdly, the amalgamation of the Jewish, Oriental, and Platonic, in Alexandria.

Among the elements derived from the East,\* is the Indian and Parsee idea of the distinction of a concealed divine essence, and of a first revelation of it as the medium of the whole development of Life from God; an idea which at that time was spread abroad in a variety of forms. The divine essence, which holds all its perfections enclosed in itself, unfolds itself first of all in an act of self-revelation; hence an Intelligence is originated which forms the medium between the concealed God and the Creation. This idea has already been mentioned in connexion with the Gnostic systems. The Hindoo Triad of Brama, Seva, and Vishnoo, has been particularly noticed by Dr. Baur as analogous to the Christian Trinity. But this is only possible, when instead of the religious reference to Christ, the speculative resemblance is made prominent. The Indian doctrine points to the recognition of the Divine Being, in creating, destroying, and preserving existence,—an evolution and destruction of worlds in eternal change, an everlasting circle without a final aim, according to a thoroughly pantheistical unteological scheme of the Universe. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity in its peculiar characteristics is exactly the opposite to Judaism and Paganism, and instead of the impassable gulf between God and the Creation, and the whole legal standpoint of the former, it realizes the consciousness of the divine communication with the Creation,—while at the same time, in opposition to Paganism, it teaches the elevation of God above the Creation; it thus opposes the false separation as well as the false confounding of God and the World,—excludes Deism as well as the Pantheism on which the scheme of the Indian Trimurti rests.

\* P. F. Stühr, *die Religionssysteme der heidnischen Völker des Orients*. 1836.—Colebrooke, *sur la Philosophie des Hindous*, traduit de l'Anglais par Pauthier: Par. 1833, 2 p.—Rhode, *relig. Bildung, Philosophie u. Mythol. d. Hindus*, 1827, v. Bohlen, *d. alte Indien mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Ägypt*, 1830.—Kleuker, *Zendavesta im Kleinen*. Th. ii. Rhode, *die heilige Sage u. d. Religionssyst. d. Zendvolks*. 1820.

Plato, in his *Philebus*, rises to the recognition of a personal God, a Supreme Spirit (*νοῦς*) who is the former and governor of the World; in his *Republic* he substitutes the idea of the Absolute, the Good in itself, the *αὐτοαγαθόν*. Is the former designation exoteric, and the latter esoteric? All things considered, this supposition is not probable. We should rather understand a reference to two different departments, to the Ideal and the Real: the Absolute stands at the head of the Ideal World; the Supreme Spirit rules over all real existence. In his *Timæus*, Plato delineates the formation of the World out of the Hyle by the Supreme God who gives to it an animating spirit.\* He regards the World thus originated and animated as a living reflection of the Supreme Being. He designates it the *θεὸς γεννητός*, the *becoming God*, in relation to God in himself, the Being, the *᾽Ον*. In the Supreme God, in his Reason, dwells the Idea, the *παράδειγμα*, according to which he forms the World, and which he realizes in the becoming of the World. Three ideas are here presented, that of the Absolute,—that of the personal God,—and that of the Revelation of the divine Reason in the Universe. Here is, then, a Triad, but which having been formed on the speculative standpoint, has no further analogy to the Christian Trinity.

The Neo-Platonists assumed that these three ideas belonged to one department. Their thinking had an idealistic tendency; they aimed at putting everything on a logical basis, without distinguishing between the logical and the real. At the head stands the idea of the Absolute, the *᾽Ον*, the purely simple, unpredicable and motionless, an absolute idea without personality or consciousness; for that would pre-suppose an antagonism. From this proceeded the second principle, the *νοῦς*, the Supreme Spirit, in whom the manifoldness of existency originates, but yet subsists as Unity, the conscious Intelligence, the spiritual All of idea, the ideal world, but yet conceived of as hypostasized. This principle corresponds to Plato's personal God, and the *νοητὸν παράδειγμα*. The third is the *ψυχή*, the World-forming Soul which constitutes a medium between the ideal world of the *νοῦς* and the real Being; it corresponds to Plato's Soul of the World.

The Church Teachers, especially if they had seen previously

\* Böckh. ub. d. Bildung der Weltseele in *Timæus* des Plato; in Daub u. Creuzer Studien, b. iii. p. 1.

Neo-Platonists, expected to find in this Triad the Christian's Trinity, and easily converted Neo-Platonic ideas into Christian ones. But this doctrine is throughout different from the Christian; it asserts not the living God as a Creator and Governor; the divine freedom is not acknowledged, but an immanent necessity of Reason. The Church Teachers found a very close analogy between the *νοῦς* and the Christian *λόγος*, the former being regarded as the medium between the human Spirit and the Absolute, the source of all revelation of the Absolute by which alone men could become partakers of the divine life. On the other hand, Man has something in his nature allied to the *νοῦς* and the *ψυχή*. The comparison of the *ψυχή* with the Holy Spirit was less successful, but a connexion so far offered itself, inasmuch as the Spirit of God is also the Spirit of Life in Creation.

We now turn to the development of this doctrine in the Old Testament Theocracy. The Old Testament, it is true, owing to its legal standpoint, placed a wide chasm between God and Nature, but at the same time, its development aimed at accomplishing a medium and restoration of communion through the Prophetic element. This medium was formed by the representation of a Spirit of God who operates in the World, and particularly of a Word of God, by whom he creates, commands, acts, helps, and saves. This idea of the Word led to such ideas. Thus the idea of a principle of Revelation that was given in the Word, must have been formed from the very nature of the Old Testament Revelation. Hence it is easy to refute the opinion that the designation *λόγος* used in the religious philosophy of the Jews at Alexandria, sprang out of Platonism. Had this been the case, the term *νοῦς* instead of *λόγος* would certainly have been employed. Only, when the idea of the *λόγος* had already been formed, a point of connexion might be found in Plato's Terminology; for example, in the *λόγος ἱερώτατος* by which he designated the divine regulation of the World, or in the *λόγος* and the *διάνοια* Θεοῦ, by which the plan of the world in the divine *νοῦς* is designated in the *Timæus*. The idea of the *λόγος* is therefore a translation of the Old Testament *דְּבַר יְהוָה*. It was rendered complete by the representation in the Theophanies, as when among the three Angels mentioned in Gen. xviii., one is distinguished who represents the others. The idea arose of an Angel of the

Covenant, the *מְבַרֵךְ מְלִיץ* which was connected with that of the *λόγος*. Moreover in the Proverbs of the book of Sirach the idea of the personified divine wisdom was presented.

THE AMALGAMATION OF PLATONIC AND JEWISH-ORIENTAL IDEAS.—Many of Philo's descriptions of the Logos belonged to Jewish ideas which he found already existing. The distinction of a concealed God and a Revelation of him, was connected with the Old Testament idea of Theophany. But by tracing back all Theophanies to the one principle of Revelation lying at their basis, and by making it their objective, the idea of the Logos was attained, as Philo also conceived it, but he modified it according as the Platonic influence was more or less strongly felt. In proportion as he occupied the standpoint which divested the Divine Being of human qualities, or that which favoured Anthropomorphism, the ideal or the symbolical, might not the *λόγος* appear as a power of God or as a hypostatic being? He describes the *λόγος* as the first-born before all existence, the *πρωτόγονος υἱός τοῦ Θεοῦ*, as the perfect reflection of God, as the *ἀρχάγγελος* among the Angels, as the original power of the divine powers. Alluding to the *νοητὸν παράδειγμα* of Plato he describes him as the world-constructing reason; he compares the World to the *ζῶον* of Plato and the *λόγος* to the soul of the World; he calls him God's Vicegerent in the world, *ὑπαρχος*; he gives him the office of Mediator between God and the Universe, since the connexion of phenomena with God is effected through the Reason revealed in the world. Hence he is the High Priest of the World, the advocate, *παράκλητος*, for the defects of men with God, and generally the revealer of the divine Nature to the Universe. The Logos is the Archetype of the Reason which is formed not after the Absolute himself, the *Ὄν*, but after the Logos. He, as the Revelation of the Absolute in the Reason, is the Image of God, after which Man, according to Genesis, was created. In this connexion he calls the Logos, the Ideal Man; and alluding to a Jewish mystical idea, the Original Man. In the Logos is the unity of the collected revelations of the Divine Being which is individualized in Man. In general, everything is traced back to the distinction between the Divine Being as he is in himself, and his Revelation in the Logos, or the *εἶναι* and the *λέγεσθαι*. The Revelation of God in Creation,—in all positive Revelation,—in the commu-

nication of separate ideas by peculiar Organs, all this forms part of the knowledge of the revealed God in the phenomenal World, and of the symbolical knowledge from the standpoint of the *ὡς τοῦ λόγου*, over which the standpoint of the *ὡς τοῦ ὄντος* is raised.

If the religious Idealism, which regards the historical Christ as something with which the Ideal of Humanity might connect itself, were true, then the religious philosophy of Philo would have been Christian, and adherence to historical Christianity, as held by the Church, would have been really a retrograde movement. Philo's doctrine would not itself suggest the application of the idea of the Logos to any historical appearance whatever; for the Revelation of the Logos refers not exclusively to any single fact, but to everything relating to the Revelation of God in Nature and History. If, according to John's Gospel, the appearance of the Logos is the highest and only medium of communication with God, then communion with the Logos in Philo's sense, can only be a subordinate standpoint; for on the highest, man immediately apprehends the Absolute. Yet out of this religious Idealism a preparation and a medium might be formed for Christian realism, when what was here taken in a merely ideal sense showed itself as realized in Humanity. Christianity referred the Logos to the perfect revelation of God in human nature, to the one revelation in Christ; and substitutes for the immediate apprehension of the Absolute, the historically founded communion with God revealed in Christ. The symbolical meaning of Philo's Paraclete was elevated by the reference to the historical Christ as the only High-priest. Thus the Alexandrian ideas formed a bridge to Christianity.

But we cannot regard the doctrine of a union of the Logos with Humanity, in all the forms under which it appeared, as a reflection in the first place of Christianity, but must doubtless presuppose a tendency of this kind before the Christian era. A yearning of the spirit goes before great events,—an unconscious longing for that which is to come. This must especially have been the case in that greatest revolution which the religious development of Humanity experienced. It was preceded by an unconscious feeling of a revelation of the spiritual world to Humanity—a longing which hastened to meet the new communications from God

It was not difficult for those who regarded the Logos as the medium of Revelation, by which God made himself cognizable to pious souls; and, on the other hand, who held the Messiah to be the highest of God's messengers, to suppose a particular connexion between him and the Logos. Various manifold ideas of spiritual appearances, and of the appearance of the highest Intelligence, the Logos, were spread abroad. In the fragment of an apocryphal Jewish writing before the Christian era, the *προσευχή* 'Ιωσήφ,\* the patriarchs of the Old Testament are represented as incarnations of higher spirits, and Jacob as the *ἀρχάγγελος*, the first begotten before all living, so that we have here suggested to us an Incarnation of the Logos.

Among the modifications of the Logos doctrine which existed among the Jews was the notion,† according to which the Logos was a power which came forth from the divine essence and returned hither. This might lead to the representations of a Jewish party, who held all angelic appearances to be only symbolical forms of the one revelation of God in the Logos. In the apocryphal Gospel, *κατ' Αἰγυπτίους*, it appears that Christ commonly speaks of Father, Son, and Spirit, but then said to his disciples in confidence, under all these names the same being is mentioned to you. In the Clementine Homilies, *σοφία* is the power which God sends out from himself, and receives back again. This Jewish conception is

\* Orig. in *Joann.* t. ii. § 25.—ὁ γὰρ λαλῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ Ἰακώβ και 'Ισραήλ, ἄγγελος Θεοῦ εἰμι ἐγὼ και πνεῦμα ἀρχικόν, και 'Αβραάμ και 'Ισαάκ προ ἐκτίσθησαν πρὸ παντὸς ἔργου· ἐγὼ δὲ 'Ιακώβ, ὁ κληθεὶς ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων 'Ιακώβ, τὸ δὲ ὄνομά μου 'Ισραήλ ὁ κληθεὶς ὑπὸ Θεοῦ 'Ισραήλ, ἀνὴρ ὁρῶν Θεόν, ὅτι ἐγὼ πρωτόγονος παντὸς ζῶου ζουμένου ὑπὸ Θεοῦ.—Κἀγὼ 'Ισραήλ ἀρχάγγελος δυνάμειος κυρίου και ἀρχιχιλίαρχός εἰμι ἐν υἱοῖς Θεοῦ.

† Justin. Mart. *Dial.* c. *Trypho.* § 128.—ἐπεὶ γινώσκω και τινας φάσκειν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων φανῆσαν τῷ Μωϋσῇ ἢ τῷ 'Αβραάμ ἢ τῷ 'Ιακώβ ἀγγέλων καλεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους προόδῳ, ἐπειδὴ δι' αὐτῆς τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀγγέλλεται—ἀνδρα δὲ ποτε και ἀνθρωπον καλεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν μορφαῖς τοιαύταις σχηματιζόμενος φαίνεται, αἴσπερ βούλεται ὁ πατήρ· και λόγον καλοῦσιν ἐπειδὴ και τὰς παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, ὅνπερ τρόπον τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φασὶ φῶς ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ἀτμητον και ἀχώριστον ὄντος τοῦ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ και ὅταν δύσῃ, συναποφέρεται τὸ φῶς· οὕτως ὁ πατήρ, ὅταν βούληται, λεγοισι, δύναμιν αὐτοῦ προπηδᾷ ποιεῖ, και ὅταν βούληται, παλιν ἀναστέλλει εἰς ἑαυτόν. Κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον και τοὺς ἀγγέλους ποιεῖν αὐτὸν διδάσκουσιν.

particularly important for the first period of our history, for it seems to explain the appearance of a whole class of opponents of the Church doctrine of the Trinity.

Prevalent as was the idea of the Logos, it was by no means universal, as appears from the controversies of the Fathers (Justin Martyr, for example) with the Jews, and from the express statements of Origen\* and Eusebius.† The deistical Monotheism of the common legal standpoint strove against the admission of a divine communication of life. To its abettors the idea of the Logos appeared as a polytheistic corruption. Accordingly, it contemplated the Messiah only as a Man, not as originally divine, which at a later period was applied by the Judaizing party to Christ, and checked the free unfolding of the Christian spirit. Even when the idea of the Logos was adopted, the effects of the Jewish view of the great gulf between God and Man were not overcome, so that an original divine existence of the Logos in Jesus was not allowed; but it was supposed that at the Messianic inauguration, the Logos descended upon him. The Man Jesus was thus only an accidental historic point for the union of God with Man.

There was a time of unsettledness respecting Christian doctrines, when attempts were made to deduce the whole doctrine of the Trinity from these views; it was a superficial view, in which form and idea were confounded, and which more recently has been set aside by a deeper and stricter scientific spirit. Yet at the present time, reactions of the tendency that had subsided have appeared. Dr. Baur,‡ indeed, declares himself opposed to this external Pragmatism, and maintains that the development of the doctrine of the Trinity is to be deduced from the internal nature of the development of the Christian idea, and from his peculiar stand-point, arrives at a view which we must equally regret, and can show to be historically unfounded. Although the doctrine of the Logos proceeded from the very essence of the Christian consciousness, and outward influences only affected

\* *C. Cels.* ii. 81.—ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς Ἰουδαίοις καὶ σοφοῖς γε ἐπαγγελλομένοις εἶναι συμβαλὼν, οὐδενὸς ἀκήκοα ἐπαινοῦντος τὸ, λόγον εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

† *C. Marcellum*, i. 1.

‡ *Die Christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung.* Theil i.



its form, still he assumes that this doctrine was not prominent till long after the apostolic age, an assumption which stands in connexion with his view of John's Gospel. The point in debate here is, whether the idea of Christ in the Christian consciousness is only a necessary impress of the historical Christ, and whether in this appearance all was given, which afterwards, having passed into the consciousness, developed itself in the subjective conception; or whether the historical appearance was only a subordinate matter—only a point of connexion for what was higher—for the idea of the Unity of the Divine and human, to the development of which this individuality had given the impulse. On the latter standpoint, various positions can be taken which represent the subjective development of the Idea. The Ebionitish view, according to which Jesus was the Anointed with the Spirit, must have prevailed first of all, according to Baur. The Pauline Epistles must form the transition to the second stage, but the idea of a pre-existent nature of Christ was not yet held, but was first developed in the second century, by means of the idea of the Logos brought from without, which new modelled the form. In this latter age, the Gospel of John must have originated, which presupposes the existence of this Idea; on the other side, Monarchianism appeared as the reaction of the older view. We, on the contrary, must set out on the supposition that the transference of this idea to Christ, was called forth by what is founded in the appearance and sayings of Christ; that by it only a form was given, into which his self-representation and his witness of himself were received. The application to Christ of the idea of an Incarnation of the Logos might indeed find acceptance with those to whom such representations were familiar, but it would soon have vanished, had not there met in him an agreement of the Idea with the facts of History. For this is the signal fact, that the historical Revelation of God in him corresponded to such an idea, and that this agreement entered into the Christian consciousness. The historical reality of this constitution of the person of Christ is confirmed by our finding in the three first Gospels the same view of Christ at the basis, which is fully disclosed in the Gospel of John. In them the whole Christ shows himself as conscious of the Divine nature, and presenting it in Humanity. One proof of this is contained in his being

designated by the titles, "*Son of Man*," and "*Son of God*." The same view of his higher nature is implied in the words, Matt. xxii. 42, when the question was put to the Pharisees how they understand Ps. cx.; also the expressions in Matt. xi. 27, "No one knoweth the Son but the Father," &c. What is said in the shorter Pauline Epistles, as in the Epistles to the Colossians and Philippians, of the Pre-existence of Christ, corresponds to John's description of the Logos. These Epistles are not spurious, as Baur asserts; yet, apart from them there are also in the earlier Pauline Epistles, references to that idea, as in 1 Cor. viii. 6, which is to be understood, not with Baur, of the moral Creation, but of Creation in an absolute sense; 2 Cor. viii. 9, where the riches of Christ are spoken of in reference to his divine nature, and his becoming poor; compare Phil. ii. 6, &c. The Epistle to the Hebrews, the production of a distinguished apostolic disciple of the Pauline school is important, on account of its rising the word *ἡμεῖς*, so as to form a link between *בְּרֵךְ* and *λόγος*, and thus constitutes a natural point of connexion with John's Gospel. But there are stages within the apostolic doctrine on which the higher consciousness was gradually formed. The Logos idea furnished the Apostle John with the peculiar term by which to express what had been derived from immediate impressions, and had become matter of certainty to the Christian mind. Possibly he might have taken this word itself from the Greek language, to designate that by which the concealed divine nature was revealed; but it is far more probable that he chose this designation as serving to connect his views with a phraseology that was already current.

Certainly the doctrine of the Logos could not have gained acceptance in the Church, if it had not been introduced by an authority like that of John. Only the influence of such a name can explain how it came to pass, that an Idea only partially acknowledged before, gained so universal a Triumph.

The Church Teachers \* attached themselves at first to this existing idea of the Logos. They conceived of the Logos as the highest Intelligence derived from God, in opposition to the Jewish-Christian representation, which regarded the Logos as a transient power beaming forth from God. They

\* See Dorner, *Entwicklungsgesch. d. Lehre von d. Person Christi*, i. 2, p. 414.

attached themselves to the idea of Emanation, since the Logos was conceived to emanate from God before the Creation of the World. The term *λόγος* leads to the two-fold idea of Reason, or of Thought and Discourse, the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and the *λόγος προφορικός*. The Logos was thought of as originally one with the divine reason, and then coming forth. With this view was joined the other of Subordination, which was the original notion; for only by degrees could the necessity be felt, of conceiving the idea of the Logos in such a manner as to harmonize with the Unity of Christian consciousness of God, and to develop the consciousness, that in Christ we have not something different from God, but God himself. Two tendencies may here be distinguished: in the East, the formation of the Doctrine of Emanation and Subordination; in the West, the striving to determine more exactly the Unity in the relation of the Logos to the Father.

Justin Martyr proceeds on the principle that the Supreme God exalted above every designation, could not reveal himself in an immediate manner.\* He charges the Jews with believing that the Creator of the Universe had left the heavenly region, and had come down to this grain of sand, the Earth. There was a mediating principle, by which he had done it in all ages. This was the Logos, simply the messenger of God, who appears in all the Theophanies of the Old Testament,—who revealed himself according to the necessities of men, until he himself appeared as Man. Christ is the Son of God in a peculiar sense, *φύσει υἱὸς Θεοῦ*, in distinction from men, who only become so through him. He came into existence quite in a different manner from created beings; he is the Logos, who was with God before all creatures, and was begotten by him in the beginning, when God created all things by him.† Here, therefore, the two ideas of the immanent God, and of the Logos hypostasized for the Creation are distinguished. He calls the Logos the firstborn of God, who hence is also God.‡ To mark the Emanation and to express

\* Apol. i. 63. C. Tryph. 56.

† Apol. ii. 6.—'Ο δὲ υἱὸς ἐκείνου, ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως υἱὸς, οὗ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνῶν καὶ γεννώμενος, ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ ἔκτισε καὶ ἐκόσμησε, κ.τ.λ.

‡ Apol. i. 63.—θεὸς καὶ λόγος πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχων.—Duncker, d. Logoslehre Justins des M. Göttg. 1848.

the difference of his origin from that of a created being, he applies to the Logos the terms *προβάλλειν, προϊέρχασθαι*. God had begotten from himself a *λογικὴ δύναμις* before all creatures. He illustrates the Emanation by comparisons, which must show that he did not admit a transformation of the Divine, as when a man communicates his thoughts outwardly, without any division in his mind, or as when a fire kindles another without being diminished itself.\* In the generation of the Logos, he supposes an antecedent conditioning will of the Father, in order to exclude the idea of a natural necessity. Although he so carefully distinguishes the origin of the Son from Creation out of nothing, yet he scruples not to apply the term *ἐκτίσασθαι*, Prov. viii. 22 (LXX.), to the Logos; for at that time no dispute had arisen respecting the difference of the idea of generation and of creation. He made use of the idea of the Logos in Christ, in order to represent Christianity as the centre of all Divine Revelation to Mankind, and of their whole religious development. The Logos is the eternal Revelation of the Divine Essence—the fountain of all truth for all men. In the human soul is something allied to the Logos—a seed of it implanted (the *λόγος σπέρματικός*).† in which the Revelation of the Logos finds a point of connexion. Hence, in all ages, those persons who gave themselves up to the Logos were enabled to attain a sure knowledge of the Truth, and to testify against error. From this relation of the partial to the absolute Logos, he deduces the traces of the consciousness of (religious) truth in the Heathen World. All persons, he says, who followed the voice of the Logos, stood in unconscious connexion with him. Hence, they steadfastly persisted in conflict against the world, and were the forerunners of Christians. He calls them disciples of the Logos—Christians before Christianity; and classes together Abraham and Socrates.‡ He makes use of this doctrine to vindicate against the heathen the lateness of Christ's Advent, and to meet the objection that men before that period could not have

\* C. Tryph. § 61.—The words *ἀλλ' οὐ τοιούτων* are the later addition of an orthodox Dogmatist who thought the comparisons unsuitable. The words would not agree with what Justin intended to say.

† Apol. ii. § 13.—*ἕκαστος γὰρ τις ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σπέρματικοῦ Θείου λόγου τὸ συγγενὲς ὄρων καλῶς ἐφθέγγετο*. Cf. § 8.—*τὸ ἐμφυτον παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου*.

‡ Apol. i. § 46.

been responsible, because they were ignorant of the Truth. He rejoins, that even these, if they only wished to cherish the seeds of the Logos, would have recognised one portion of Truth. The controversy with the Heathen gave no occasion for showing how the belief in such a Logos could harmonize with the Divine Unity; but this was called for in relation to Jewish Monotheism. In combating this standpoint, he says, God the Father is the fundamental principle,—the *αρχή*, who performs all things by his own will and power, by virtue of which the Logos emanated from Him, differing in number, but not in disposition, from the Father.\* Here is Unity accordingly founded in the participation of the divine Essence. and in a common direction of the Will. He opposes the numerical distinction to the Jewish view, that the Logos was a power flowing forth from God, and returning again. Justin speaks of the Ebionites who did not receive the doctrine of Christ's divinity, with extraordinary lenity. He only says, "I, and the majority who think as I do, do not agree with them, for Christ has commanded us not to follow men, but the declarations of the Prophets and his own teaching." Yet from this manner of expressing himself, we must not infer that he belonged to the Ebionites, or had renounced the doctrine of the divine nature in Christ. It only appears that he acknowledged the Ebionitish standpoint as a necessary historical development from Judaism, and those who belonged to it as fellow-believers, provided they did not reject Gentile Christians for not observing the Law.†

In TATIAN‡ we find on the whole the same doctrine, which

\* C. Tryph. p. 276, fin.—*ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ τὰ πάντα ποιήσαντος Θεοῦ ἀριθμῷ λέγω, ἀλλὰ οὐ γνώμῃ.* Cf. p. 358, C.

† C. Tryph. p. 267, E.—*Καὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ τινες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου (Neander thinks that possibly the reading should be ὑμετέρου, C. H. i. 501, Bohm's edition) γένους ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, ἀνθρώπον δὲ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενον ἀποφαινόμενοι· οἷς οὐ συντίθεμαι οὐδ' ἂν πλείστοι ταῦτά μοι δοξάσαντες εἴποιεν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπείους διδάγμασι κεκελεύσμεθα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς διὰ τῶν μακαρίων προφητῶν κηρυχθεῖσι καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ διδασχθεῖσιν.*

‡ C. Gentes. § 5.—*Θεὸς ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν λόγου δύναμιν παρείληφα μὲν· ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης τῶν ὅλων, αὐτὸς ὑπάρχων τοῦ παντός ἢ ὑπόστασις, κατὰ μὲν τὴν μηδέπω γεγεννημένην ποίησιν μόνος ἦν καθὼς δὲ πᾶσα δύναμις ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων αὐτος ὑπόστασις ἦν, σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα διὰ λογικῆς δυνάμεως αὐτός καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὅς ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὑπέστηκε· θελήματι δὲ τῆς ἀπλότητος αὐτοῦ πρόπηδᾷ λόγος· ὁ δὲ*

he developed rather obscurely after his manner. The Lord of the Universe, he says, was alone before the Creation, but as far as the whole visible and invisible Creation was founded in him, the Logos was in him, who as the indwelling divine reason sketched the plan of the world. Through his will, the Logos came forth, who emanated from him, not as an empty word, but as a Real Being, as the firstborn Word, in whom the divine Essence was represented. But this must be described not as a separation, but as an unfolding of the divine power,—as an *οικονομία*.

THEOPHILUS of ANTIOCH endeavoured by the emanation of the Logos to retain the Christian spiritual view, in opposition to such an origin as the heathen ascribed to the sons of the gods. The Logos was always concealed in God as the reason of the divine Spirit; before all existence he was his own Counsellor. At first God was alone, and the Logos was in him; but when the plan of the Creation was to be realized, God begat him the first of the whole Creation, without becoming emptied of him, but always remaining in connexion with his Logos.\*

ATHENAGORAS gave such prominence to the Unity of the divine Essence, that it might be supposed he held the Logos to be not a personality, but only a divine power. He says,† “God created all things by his Logos, whom we are to think of as resembling the sons of the gods; but he is the Son of God, the Logos of the Father, in reference to the divine plan of the world, and its realization (*ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ*). By him all things came into existence; he is one with the Father, for the Son is in the Father, and the Father in him. The *νοῦς* and the *λόγος*, the revelation of the *νοῦς*, are to be thought of as one.

λόγος οὐ κατὰ κενοῦ χωρήσας, ἔργον πρωτότοκον τοῦ πατρὸς (τοῦ πνεύματος) γίνεται· τοῦτον ἴσμεν τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἀρχὴν· γέγονε δὲ κατὰ μερισμὸν οὐ κατὰ ἀποκοπὴν· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτμηθὲν τοῦ πρώτου κειχῶριται, τὸ δὲ μερισθὲν οἰκονομίας τὴν αἵρεσιν προσλαβὼν οὐκ ἐνδεᾶ τὸν ὅθεν εἰληπται πεποιήκεν.

\* Ad. Autolyc. ii. 15.—οὐχὼς οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ μυθογράφοι λέγουσιν υἱοὺς Θεῶν ἐκ συνουσίας γεννωμένους, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀλήθεια διηγείται τὸν λόγον, τὸν ὄντα διαπαντὸς ἐνδιάθετον ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ· προ γὰρ τι γίνεσθαι τοῦτον εἶχε σύμβουλον, εαυτοῦ νοῦν καὶ φρονησιν ὄντα· ὁπότε δὲ ἠθέλησεν ὁ Θεὸς ποιῆσαι ὅσα ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικόν, πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, οὐ κενωθεὶς αὐτὸς τοῦ λόγου ἀλλὰ λόγον γεννήσας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ διαπαντὸς ὁμιλῶν.

† Πρεσβ. c. 10.

The Unity is one of power and of divine Essence. The Son is not brought into existence, for the Father had his Logos from Eternity in himself. When the world lay in Chaos, he came forth from God, that it might not be merely in idea but in reality.

The influence of the Alexandrian School determined the course of development for this doctrine into the fourth century. Clement says, "Love moved God to communicate life from himself; its first act was the generation of the Logos, by whom it further manifested itself in the Creation. The Logos is the divine principle of all existence, whereby everything is derived from God, and according to the idea is founded in God. The Logos is the first link in the chain of the spiritual World, and as he alone knows God, so he is the teacher of spirits. He is the educator of all rational beings, to whom his salutary operation appears in various ways."\* In order to mark the Unity, he says, "Both are one—God."† Here we are not to conceive of the Unity in such a manner as would take away the relation of Subordination, for he distinguishes the Father and the Logos as the first and second cause.‡ In Clement we first meet with the attempt to set aside the idea of Time in its application to the transition of the Logos into reality. He describes the Logos as the fundamental principle of things without beginning—as formed before all Time by God, according to his image.§ In some points the Logos doctrine of Christ is allied to Neo-platonic ideas; thus, when he says, "God is exalted above all consciousness, and cannot be known by any science; the Son on the contrary is Science, Wisdom, and Truth. To him first can discursive thinking be applied." He calls him the Unique, and compares him to a circle in which all powers are comprehended in one. In Plotinus we find pas-

\* Παιδαγ. i. 8.

† Ibid.—ἐν γὰρ ἁμῶν, ὁ θεὸς ὅτι εἶπεν, "ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος."

‡ Strom. vii. p. 708 B.—οὗτος ὁ τῷ ὄντι μονογενής, ὁ τῆς τοῦ παμβασιλέως καὶ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς δόξης χαρακτήρ, εναποσφραγισόμενος τῷ γνωστικῷ τὴν τελείαν θεωρίαν κατ' εἰκόνα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς εἶναι τρίτην ἢ δὴ τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα, κ.τ.λ. P. 700 B.—ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς, τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἐν γενέσει, τὴν ἀχρονον καὶ ἀναρχον ἀρχὴν τε καὶ ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, τὸν υἱὸν, παρ' οὗ ἐκμανθάνειν (sc. τὸ) ἐπέκεινα αἰτίων, τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὄλων, το πρεσβιστον, κ.τ.λ.

§ Strom. v. 565 B.—ἡ τῶν ὄλων ἀρχή, ἥτις ἀεικόνισται μὲν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου πρώτη καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων.

ages exactly similar, on the super-rational intellectual intuition, through which the *Neûs* is borne upwards to the "On. What Plotinus says of the *νοῦς* as the *ἐν πᾶσι*, is transferred by Clement to the Logos.\* These doctrines of the Neo-platonic school are older than Plotinus,† and therefore might have been received by Clement. A similar mixture of the speculative element with what might be deduced from the Christian consciousness itself respecting the communion of the human spirit with God, appears when Clement says, "To believe in Christ is to be one with him; Unbelief is, to be in a state of dissension and separation."‡ Photius, in his abstract of the Hypotyposes, objects to many things in Clement's doctrine.§ He blames Clement for not calling the Son of God in a strict sense Logos, and distinguishing him from the divine Reason strictly so called. This distinction was certainly necessary, according to Clement's ideas, who could not allow the two-fold relation of the Logos as *ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικὸς*. In order to get rid of the idea of Time, he placed jointly with the eternal Logos, the Reason in God—the Revelation outward, the Logos as an Image of the divine Reason. In accordance with this distinction he speaks in his treatise, *τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος*; || of the Revelations of the Logos respecting the Logos of the Father. At the same time it is evident that a logical adherence to Neo-platonic ideas would not have allowed such a separation. They were at variance with the Christian elements of his Logos doctrine.

\* Strom. iv. 537 B.—ὁ μὲν οὖν θεός, ἀναπόδεικτος ὢν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικὸς· ὁ δὲ υἱὸς σοφία τε ἔστι καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτῳ συγγενῇ.—καὶ δὴ οὐ γίνεται ἀτεχνῶς ἐν ᾧ ἐν οὐδὲ πολλὰ ὡς μέρη ὁ υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὡς πάντα ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ πάντα κύκλος γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς ἑν εἰλουμένων καὶ ἐνουμένων.

† Compare Plotinus, *Enn.* iii. 7.

‡ Strom. iv. 537 C.—διὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ πιστεῦσαι, μοναδικὸν ἔστι γενέσθαι, ἀπερισπάστως ἐνούμενον ἐν αὐτῷ· τὸ δὲ ἀπιστήσαι, διατάσαι ἔστι καὶ διαστήναι καὶ μερισθῆναι.

§ Cod. 109.—λόγους τε τοῦ πατρὸς δύο τερατολογῶν ἀπελέγχεται, ὢν τὸν ἥττονα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιφανῆναι, μαλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ἐκείνον φησὶ γὰρ λέγεται μὲν καὶ ὁ υἱὸς λόγος, ὁμωνύμας τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗτος ὁ σὰρξ γενόμενος οὐδὲ μὲν ὁ πατρὺς λόγος, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τις τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅλον ἀπόρροια τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ, νοῦς γενόμενος τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καρδίας διαπεφοίηκε. See Hagenbach, *Dogmengesch.* p. 91.

|| Sect. 6.—ὁ λόγος περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς λόγου.



In Origen's system the Logos doctrine is connected with his peculiar view of God and the Cosmogony. According to his spiritual doctrine of Emanation, he considers God as the original source of all existence, who ensures a portion of his own divine life to the world of spirits that has sprung from him. Continuing in communion with him, they enjoy blessedness. He is God in the absolute sense, God simply (*αυτῷ Θεῷ ἀπλῶς Θεός*); while by virtue of the communicated relation to the life from God, the Spirits in a certain sense can be also called *Θεοί*. On this account he recognises some truth in Sabæism, respecting the homage paid to the God-allied spirits in the stars.\* When God in an absolute sense is intended, like Philo, he prefixes the article, *ὁ Θεός*, but leaves it out when designating the divinity in a derived sense (*Θεός*). Now, the Logos is the medium of the Life that flows from the essence of the Father; he is in the most intimate connexion with the original fountain and the bond between him and all other beings. Other spirits are only *μερικὰ ἀπαυγασματα*† of God, but the Logos is his entire Revelation (*ὅλκον ἀπαύγασμα*), the Reason revealing the Supreme God, and conveying his knowledge to all creatures. God, in the absolute sense, is the absolute Supreme even in relation to the Logos; but the Logos, as the totality of the divine self-revelation, stands in a similar relation to all created Reason; he is *αὐτόλογος*, the Logos simply (*ὁ λόγος*). It was of importance to Origen to hold this, in order to guard the idea of a pure Monotheism against a separating Subjectivism. Not every spirit has its own autonomous reason, its own special source of divine knowledge; there is only one autonomous reason, the Logos, and in him the one revelation of God. Man, like the rest of the world of spirits, must recognise God in his Revelation, and created beings must perceive this communion of the consciousness of God. As certainly as there is one Logos, there is one Truth; therefore in the Proem of John's Gospel, he is called *λόγος* simply,

\* In Joann. t. ii. § 3.

† Ibid. t. xxxii. § 18.—*ἅλης μὲν οὖν οἶμαι τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπαύγασμα εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, κατὰ τὸν εἰπόντα Παῦλον, “ὅς ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης.” φθάνειν μέντοι γὰρ ἀπὸ ἀπαυγασματος τούτου τῆς ἅλης δόξης μερικὰ ἀπαυγασματα ἐπὶ τὴν λοιπὴν λογικὴν κτίσιν οὐκ οἶμαι γὰρ τίνα τὸ πᾶν δύνασθαι χωρῆσαι τῆς ἅλης δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀπαύγασμα ἢ τὸν υἱόν αὐτοῦ.*

without the addition of Θεῶν, as the universal revealer of God.\* With this doctrine of the Logos, Origen connects his own peculiar view of the various standpoints in knowledge and in life; although always one and the same, yet the Logos descends to the spirits on their different stages, and reveals himself to each one in the manner suitable to him. He becomes all to all in the whole creation, in order to lead them all to one end. To these different forms of Revelation Origen refers the different designations of the Logos when he is called the Word, or the Life, or the Shepherd, or the Physician, or the Saviour.† He opposes this to the Gnosis which converts these different designations of the Logos into so many Hypostases. The higher Man rises, the higher is the significance of the Logos to him; so much more will Christ be to him. Even the name Logos is explained by Origen as a symbol; he disputes first of all with those who adhere to this name as the only adequate one. He also opposes those who applied to him, without reference to their connexion, all the Old Testament passages that contained the term Logos.‡ In the same direction which Clement took to free the origination of the Logos from the idea of Time, Origen advanced further, and was the first who clearly expressed the idea of eternal generation.§ He found in Psalm ii. 7, the *σήμερον* used on purpose to express the idea of an immediate present, and to explain the beginning of a Generation. The *ἦν ὁ λόγος* in the Gospel of John he considered important, as expressive of a Being not in time.|| As the power of begetting the Son of God, belonged to the essence of the Father, this power must always have been in action, The Generation he would regard, not as taking place in time,

\* In Joann. t. ii. § 4. C. Cels. viii. § 12.—*Αὐτῷ γὰρ πειθομεθα τῷ εἰπόντι· “πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι, ἐγὼ εἰμι.”* καὶ λέγοντι “ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ἀλήθεια” καὶ οὐχ οὕτω τις ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνδράποδον, ὡς οἴεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐσία πρὸ τῶν χρόνων τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπιφανείας οὐκ ἦν.

† In Joann. t. i. § 11, 22, 23.

‡ Ibid. t. ii. § 1.

§ Ibid. t. ii. § 1.

|| Ibid. t. i. § 32.—*Ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτων πάντων οὐ σαφῶς ἡ εὐγένεια παρίσταται τοῦ υἱοῦ· ὅτε δὲ τὸ “υἱός μου εἰ σύ, ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε,”* λέγεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὃ ἀεὶ ἐστὶ τὸ σήμερον—*οὐκ ἐν γὰρ ἐσπέρα Θεοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ ἡγοῦμαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ πρῶτα, ἀλλ’ ὁ συμπαρακτείνων τῇ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ αἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ ζωῇ, ἢ οὕτως εἶπω, χρόνος, ἡμέρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ σήμερον, ἐν ᾗ γεγέννηται ὁ υἱός.—ἀρχῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ οὕτως οὐκ εὐρισκομένης, ὡς οὐδὲ τῆς ἡμέρας.*

nor as an act performed once for all, but as that relation in virtue of which the Son was always affirmed along with the Father; and the glory of God always implied at the same time the Revelation of it in the Logos.\* For the purpose of dis-severing sensuous images from this emanation, he rejects the expression of Generation from the essence of the Father, since that might seem to imply a partition of the divine Essence.† It is worthy of notice that Origen first raised the opposition against this statement in the Oriental Church, which at a later period was urged from another quarter.

The more exact statement respecting the Unity of the divine Essence and the relation of the Logos to the Father, on the part of Origen, was occasioned by his controversy with the Monarchians, as on the other hand Monarchianism was developed in consequence of Origen's theory of Subordination. Among the modern investigations on Monarchianism, Schleiermacher's Treatise‡ contains many important suggestions. We recognise in it that great man's talent for investigation, and at the same time his defects in exegetical and historical inquiries; his great talent for systematizing led him into the error of introducing his own views too much into the subject under discussion, and entering too little into the views of others. The investigations of L. Lange are too much affected by his Unitarianism,§ and those of Baur by his peculiar standpoint in the philosophy of Religion.||

\* In Jerem. Homil. ix. § 4.—ὅτι οὐχὶ ἐγέννησεν ὁ πατήρ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ ἀπέλυσεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατήρ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ γεννᾷ αὐτόν.

† In Joann. t. xx. § 16.—"Ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ "ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ," διηγῆσαντο ἀντὶ τοῦ γεγέννημαι ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ· οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας φάσκειν τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννησθαι τὸν υἱόν, οἰονεὶ μειονύμενον καὶ λείποντος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἢ πρότερόν εἶχε, τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἐπὰν γεννῆσθαι τὸν υἱόν. ὡσεὶ νοῆσαι τις τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγκυμόνων. Ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ σῶμα λέγειν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν, καὶ διτρησθαι τὸν πατέρα, ἅπῃ ἐστὶ δόγματα ἀνθρώπων, μὴδ' ὄναρ φύσιν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον πηφαντασμένων, οὐσαν κυρίως οὐσίαν.

‡ Ueber den Gegensatz zw. der sabellian. u. der athenas. Vorstellung von d. Trinität. Theolog. Werke ii. 485.

§ Gesch. u. Lehrbegriff der Unitarier vor der nicenischen Synode. Beiträge zur ältesten Kirchengesch.: Leipzig, 1831. Compare die Lehre der Unitarier vom heiligen Geiste in Illgen's Zeitschr. für histor. Theol. iii. 1.

|| Gesch. der Lehre von d. Dreieinigkeit. See also Dorner, Gesch. d. Lehre v. d. Person Christi i. 2. Meyer, Gesch. der Lehre v. d. Trinität.

It may excite surprise that exactly at this time when Christianity came forth from the midst of the Pagan World, a unitarian monotheistic interest should be awakened, when we might rather have expected the influence of the polytheistic standpoint. But since Monotheism was always enforced with special energy against Polytheism, persons without acuteness or culture might easily apprehend an injury to Monotheism in the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus Tertullian\* says, "Ignorant people are alarmed at the names of the Trinity, and accuse us of wishing to teach three Gods while they would be the worshippers of one God." Origen† also observed the same offence taken at the distinction of the Logos from God the Father. Many who profess that they love God are disturbed by believing that they admit two Gods, when they speak of the Logos and the Father. Either, they say, they deny the independent existence of the Son separate from the Father, since they confess him as God whom they call only by the name of Son, or they deny the divinity of the Son, but acknowledge his independent existence and being as separate from the Father. Here two classes of Monarchians are evidently to be distinguished; the one acknowledge Christ's Divinity, but deny the independent personal existence of the Son as distinct from the Father. They must therefore have taught that the Father is in the Son, and that the distinction is only nominal. The second party acknowledge a Son distinct from the Father, but deny his Divinity. Jesus therefore is acknowledged as man, but not as God in a special sense, but only endowed with divine powers. Also in the fragments of his Commentary on the Epistle to Titus, Origen‡ distinguishes in the first place, those who call

\* Adv. Prax. c. 3.

† In Joann. t. ii. § 2.—Καὶ τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθεῖους εἶναι εὐχομένους παρὰ τὸν θεόν, ἐβλαβεμένους δὲ ἀναγορεύσαι θεοὺς, καὶ παρα τοῦτο περιπίπτοντας ψευδίαι καὶ ἀσεβείαι δογμασιν, ἥτοι ἀρνούμενους ἰδιότητα τοῦ ἑτέρου πατρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὁμολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν μέχρι ὀνόματος παρ' αὐτοῖς υἱὸν προσαγορευόμενον ἢ ἀρνούμενους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ, τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυχάνουσιν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρὸς ἐντεῦθεν λύεσθαι δύναται.

‡ Epist. ad Tit. frag. ii. ed. Lommatzsch. t. v.—Sed et eos, qui hominem dicunt Dominum Jesum præcognitum et prædestinatum, qui ante adventum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non existerit, sed quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit deitatem, ne illos quidam sine periculo est ecclesiæ numero sociari; sicut et illos qui superstitiose magis, quam religiose, uti ne videantur duos deos dicere, neque rursum

the Lord Jesus a man foreknown and predestined by God, who did not exist substantially and properly before his earthly existence, but who, being born as Man, only had the Divinity of the Father in himself; secondly, those who in order not to admit two Gods, and yet not to deny the Divinity of the Saviour, call the Being of the Father and the Son one and the same only with two names, in other words, they receive one Hypostasis with two names; these are called in Latin, *Patripassians*. It is evident that these two classes may be compared with the former; the Patripassians correspond to those described in the first passage [from Tertullian]; and those here named along with the Patripassians are those who regarded Jesus as a man in whom the Divinity of the Father acted in a certain manner. Both classes agree in this, that they knew not how to reconcile with Monotheism the doctrine of a self-subsistent divine Logos distinct from the Father. But they differ in proportion, as either the Monotheistic interest alone influenced them or the Christian interest in the Divinity of Christ. According to the first, Jesus was a man like any other, only specially enlightened by God; the others acknowledged the divine nature in Christ only not distinct from the Father; it was God himself who appeared in humanity and occupied the place of a human rational soul in Christ. As such he was distinguished by the peculiar name of Son. These were called Patripassians because they were charged with transferring the sufferings of the Son to the Father himself. The first party viewed the great religious question only from the standpoint of Monotheism; in order to comprehend how Christ was the Son of God it satisfied them that he possessed more divine illumination than all other prophets. They approximated to the Jewish mode of thinking, but it is not necessary to derive them from the Jewish-Christian party. The others, on the contrary, were concerned about the divinity of Christ, and we may say that the Church Teachers did not do enough for them on that point. It did not satisfy their Christian wants to make the Son subordinate to the Father, the Logos

negare Salvatoris deitatem unam eandemque subsistentiam Patris ac Filii asseverant id est, duo quidem nomina secundum diversitatem causarum recipientem unam tamen ὑπόστασιν subsistere, id est, unam personam duobus nominibus subjacentam, qui latine Patripassiani appellantur.

must be the Father himself; the Christian interest had more weight with them than the Subordinationism of the Church Teachers. The first party followed a predominant dialectic tendency; from this the Patripassians were at the greatest remove, who were mainly actuated by the practical, religious interest; they were men of little cultivation, led more by the feelings than by the intellect, a great number, in short, of common Christians. In another passage Origen says, "The God of the Universe is the God of the elect, and still more the God of the Saviour of the Elect; but the Logos is perhaps the God of those who refer everything to him and call him the Father himself." The latter must be those of whom he says, "They know nought but Jesus the Crucified, and think that they have the whole Logos in the Word made flesh. This is the character of the multitude of believers."\* These were perhaps not the Ebionites of whom Origen speaks in the passage where Christ heals the blind man at Jericho, although he acknowledged only the Son of David in the Messiah.† For of these it could not be said that they constituted the great multitude of believers. Hence, also, it is thought that the mass were intended who adopted the Patripassian theory of one divine Being, and of the Union of the divine Logos with the body without the human soul in Christ.

While the Logos doctrine stood in opposition to the Monarchian standpoint, men of higher culture, whose rational views the Patripassian scheme did not satisfy, nor that of the other Monarchians their religious consciousness, attempted a middle course. According to Dr. Bauer, the Logos doctrine itself proceeded from such an attempt at mediation, but it was least of all suited to that, since it gave a shock to the Monotheism of the parties as well as to the Christian Interest of the Patripassians. These mediating ideas formed themselves in altogether a different manner; they appeared in Beryllus, Bishop of Bostra in Arabia.‡ The words of Eusebius respecting

\* In Joann. t. ii. § 3.—"Ἐτεροι δὲ οἱ μηδὲν εἰδότες εἰ μὴ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, καὶ τοῦτον ἑσταυρωμένον, τὸν γενόμενον σάρκα λόγον τὸ πᾶν νομίσαντες εἶναι τοῦ λόγου, Χριστὸν κατὰ σάρκα μόνον γινώσκουσι τοιοῦτον δὲ ἔστι το πλῆθος τῶν πεπιστευκέναι νομιζομένων.

† In Matth. t. xvi. § 12.

‡ Euseb. Hist. Eccles. vi. c. 33.—Βήρυλλος—τὸν σωτήρα καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν λέγειν τολμῶν μὴ προῤφιστάναι κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν, πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίας· μηδὲ μὴν θεότῃτα ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ'

him, which are the chief source of our knowledge, are not free from obscurity. According to these, he taught that Christ before his appearance in Humanity was not in a self-subsistent existence, that he had not an indwelling divinity of his own, but only that of the Father. The first words might lead us to identify the doctrine of Beryllus with that of the first Monarchians, as Baur has done, but the second clause says too much for this class, who ascribed to Christ only a special illumination from God, and Eusebius, if he had not held the doctrine of Beryllus to be different from that which was sufficiently well-known, would not have used so many words about it. But the passage quoted above, from Origen's Commentary on the Epistle to Titus, is also to be taken into account. Origen speaks there of two classes of Monarchians; and since one class is that of the Patripassians, it might be supposed that the other is similar to the Monarchians of the first class. But this is clearly not necessary since it cannot be maintained that Origen always contrasted only these two classes. If a new class had appeared, he might refer to that. We must say, that the words assert too much for the first class, and on the other hand, are perfectly in unison with the description of the doctrine of Beryllus given by Eusebius. Nor would Origen have expressed himself so mildly about these Monarchians. Consequently this reference to the meaning of the words is not sufficiently settled. But neither does the doctrine of Beryllus suit the standpoint of the Patripassians; for he ascribed to Christ as Man an *ἰδία οὐσία περιγραφή* but the Patripassians did not; hence the most natural conclusion is, that Beryllus belonged to neither of these two classes, but showed a conciliatory tendency which well suited his historical position. Origen, during his stay at Cæsarea, at a time when the views of Beryllus excited great attention, was called upon to oppose him, and convinced him of his error.\* Of the Synod then held, Socrates says, that in opposition to Beryllus it established the doctrine of a rational soul in Christ. Beryllus must therefore have given occasion for this opposition. This

*ἑμπολιτευομένην αὐτῷ μόνην τὴν πατρικὴν.* See Ullman, de Beryllo Bostrenso ejusque Doctrina Comm.: Hamb. 1835. 4to., and the passages quoted from Schleiermacher and Baur.—Dorner's *Gesch. d. Lehre. v. d. Person J. Christi.* i. 545.

\* Neander's Church History ii. p. 317.

Doctrine had not, at that time, been generally received, though Origen had done much for its development. It happened very favourably, that Beryllus and the Synod gave him an opportunity of developing the doctrine, and of forwarding its general reception. We must therefore admit that the doctrine of Beryllus could not harmonize with the acknowledgment of a human soul in Christ. But then, it follows, that he could not agree with the first class of the Monarchians. He repudiated their views, because they were too meagre for his Christian sympathies; but the supposition of an immediate indwelling of the Father in Christ appeared to him inadmissible. He admitted an irradiation of the divine Essence, by which the personality in Christ was formed, and which occupied the place of the human soul, so that his human consciousness was a constant emanation from the divine Essence. Thus we may account for both the statements of Eusebius respecting Beryllus. In opposition to the Monarchians, Origen defined the distinction between the Logos and the Father. The belief in the hypostatic existence of the Logos distinct from the Supreme God was connected in his mind with belief in the existence of an objective real truth. His belief in the Hypostatic and the objective Reality concurred, and hence he raised against the Monarchians the objection, that according to their doctrine the Essence of the Truth had not existed before Christ's Advent.\* Consequently he represents the Son as distinct from the Father, not merely in certain relations, but in number and self-subsistent existence. He opposes those who maintain that the Father and the Son are one not merely as to Essence, but also as to subject. He, on the contrary, places the Unity only in the Unity of Will.† Sometimes he distinguishes *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, but in other passages he considers them as identical, and with the peculiarity of the *ὑπόστασις* maintains

\* Contra Cels. viii. § 12.

† Ibid.—*εἰ δὲ τις ἐκ τούτων περισπασθήσεται, μὴ πῃ αὐτομολοῦμεν πρὸς τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας δύο εἶναι ὑποστάσεις, πατέρα καὶ υἱόν· ἐπιστησάτω τῷ ἦν δι πάντων τῶν πιστευσάντων ἡ καρδία καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μία· "ἵνα θεωρήσῃ τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἓν εἶμεν."*—Θρησκεύομεν οὖν τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὄντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ, καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος· ὡς τὸν ἰσρακότα τὸν υἱὸν ὄντα ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτῆρα τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἠρακεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ, ὅντι εἰδόνι τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸν Θεόν.



also the *ἱερότης τῆς οὐσίας*.\* The *ὁμοουσιον* with the Father appeared therefore to him as a denial of the distinction of both. The Logos is infinitely above the Creation, the Father is equally exalted above the Son, it is the prerogative of the Father that we must pray to Him alone; the Logos is the eternal High Priest, through whom we pray to God, the eternal Son of God by fellowship with whom we become the children of God, since we pray to the common Father with him as our brother.†

We shall now glance at the development in the Western Church. Irenæus‡ wished to confine himself only to what was important for the Christian Interest, and to keep clear of the error of the Gnostics would rather leave the inconceivable unexplained, and especially avoided every analogy relating to Emanation. He says§—No one can explain the origin of the Son; if any one says the Son is begotten of the Father, and uses various expressions for it such as *γέννησις*, *προβολή*,—this does not correspond to the fact, but is only symbolical and borrowed from the relation to the human Spirit. From such language we must infer that he must have opposed the notion of the Logos *ἰνδίαθετος* and *προφορικός*.|| That point in the doctrine on which he lays stress is—that the Logos always was with God, that God created all things by him, by him revealed himself in the Old Testament; and that the Logos became man in Jesus; he considered the Logos to be included in the Essence of God. God through him created all things without the intervention of any instrument; he created all things by his Word. Notwithstanding this, we cannot venture to assert

\* De Orat. c. 15.—*Kar' οὐσίαν καὶ καθ' ὑποκείμενον ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς ἱερεὺς τοῦ πατρὸς.*

† De Orat. *ibid.*

‡ Duncker, *Die Christologie der Irenæus*.

§ Adv. Hær. ii. 28.—*Deus autem quum sit totus mens, totus ratio et totus spiritus operans, et totus lux et semper idem et similiter existens, sicut et utile est nobis sapere de Deo et sicut ex scripturis discimus, non jam hujusmodi affectus et divisiones decenter erga eum subsequuntur.*—5. *Deus autem totus existens mens et totus existens Logos, quod cogitat, hoc et loquitur, et quod loquitur, hoc et cogitat. Cogitatio enim ejus Logos et Logos mens et omnia concludens mens ipse est pater. Qui ergo dicet mentem Dei, et prolationem, propriam menti donat, compositum eum pronuntiat, tanquam aliud quiddam sit Deus, aliud autem principalis mens existens.*—*Et propheta quidem sit de eo: generationem ejus quis enarrabit.*

|| Adv. Praxeam. c. 5.

Irenæus altogether excluded the Subordination. It is clear when he says—The Father wills and commands, the Father works and creates. But yet in Irenæus it may always be observed how the Western mind, more than the Eastern, laid stress on the Unity. This applies also to Tertullian. Monarchianism scarcely influenced his doctrine on this subject, since it was held in the same manner in his pre-Montanist writings. He held firmly the idea of the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορετός*, distinguished in this respect between *ratio* and *sermo*; the former was the immanent reason of God; the *sermo* emanated from it. When it was objected to him, that this led to a Monarchian view since the Speech of Man is nothing real distinct from Man himself, he rejoined, that what is absolute nothing can never come from God, but only something real, and thus by *sermo* we must understand something real.\* At the objections of the Patristians that even in the Old Testament the doctrine of the Unity of God is so clearly expressed, Tertullian rejoins, that there was no regard to opposition against those who admit other gods besides the true God, but we acknowledge only one; the Logos is not *ex numero* but only *modulo*, i.e., there is one divine essence in the Father and the Son, communicated from the Father to the Son, the *unitas substantiæ*, but a different meaning; it; thus the idea of Subordination is preserved along with that of Unity. He avails himself of the comparison of fountain and stream,—the Sun and Sunbeam.† When in the Old Testament mention is made of the One God, the Son is included, as the sunbeam is implied when we speak of the Sun.

The development of Monarchianism in the West, was likewise of great importance. After the middle of the second century we see both forms of Monarchianism spreading in a remarkable manner in the Western Church. The first class of Monarchians appealed to the antiquity of their doctrine in the

lv. Praxeas. 3. 7.—Quid est enim, dices, sermo, nisi vox et sonitus? etc. At ego nihil dico de Deo inane et vacuum prodire, ut non de inani et vacuo prolatum; nec carere substantia, sed tanta substantia processit, et tantas substantias fecit; fecit et ipse, quæ facta sunt per illum. C. 8. Sermo autem spiritus est, et, ut ita dicam, servionis corpus est spiritus.

id. c. 9.—Pater enim tota substantia est; filius vero derivatio et portio, sicut ipse profitetur, quia pater major me est.

Roman Church; and thus many inquirers in modern times, Von Colln and Bauer, have attempted to prove that Monarchianism was the original doctrine in the Roman Church, and that at a later period the Logos doctrine found admission during party conflicts. Especially in Dr. Baner's treatise this opinion is connected with another,—the originally Jewish Constitution of the Roman Church, and hence that the Ebionitish view of the Person of Christ prevailed there. Had the views of the first class of Monarchians been those generally held by this Church, Irenæus could not possibly have ascribed such great authority to it. We find even Patripassianism in Rome, and it would be absurd to pretend to find a Jewish element in that. We may admit, indeed, that in the metropolis of the world, where there was a confluence of the most heterogenous elements, Monarchian tendencies might have found an early entrance. The earliest representative of the first class that we hear of was Theodotus, a leather-dresser from Byzantium,\* He is said to have been excommunicated by Victor, but continued to propagate his doctrine. Epiphanius tells us that Theodotus had denied Christ in the times of persecution, and in order to justify himself, developed his peculiar views of Christ: but this improbable explanation appears to have arisen from a readiness to trace heretical opinions to outward motives. In the persecutions it was not enough to deny Christ but Christianity altogether and Monotheism. Hence it is possible that he denied his profession and was excommunicated, and that this drew attention to his opinions. But this is only a supposition. He is said to have declared that Christ was

\* Euseb. H. E. v. 28. Hippol. vii. 35, p. 257.—Θεόδοτος δὲ τις ἦν Βυζάντιος—τον Χριστὸν ἐκ τῆς τῶν γνωστικῶν καὶ Κηρίνθου καὶ Ἐβίωνος σχολῆς ἀποσπᾶσας φάσκει τοιοῦτω τινι τρόπῳ πεφηνέναι, καὶ τὸν μὲν Ἰησοῦν εἶναι ἀνθρώπον ἐκ παρθένου γεγενημένον κατὰ βουλὴν τοῦ πατρὸς, βιώσαντα δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ εὐσεβέστατον γεγονότα, ὕστερον (suppl. δὲ) ἐπὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος ἐπὶ τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ κερυρῆναι τὸν Χριστὸν ἀνωθεν κατεληλυθότα ἐν εἰδὲ περιστερᾶς, ὅθεν οὐ πρότερον τὰς δυνάμεις ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνηργεῖναι ἢ ὅτε (Miller, correctly for ὥστε) καθελθὼν ἀνεδείχθη ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα, ὃ εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν προσαγορεύει. Θεὸν δὲ οὐδέποτε οὗτοι (instead of τοῦτον) γεγονέναι αὐτὸν θέλουσιν ἐπὶ τῇ καθόδῳ τοῦ πνεύματος, ἱεροὶ δὲ μετὰ τῇν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν. As in the account of Hippolytus there are some variations from the representation of the fragments in Eusebius, it is by no means so certain as Dr. Baur asserts, that they were both by the same author.

merely a man, but it is questionable whether he really denied that there was anything divine in him. His being classed with other Monarchians is in favour of his opinions not having been completely Ebionitish. According to Epiphanius, who perhaps had seen his writings, he appealed to Luke i. 35, where it is said, *πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐκτελεύσει ἐν σοί*, and not *γενήσεται ἐν σοί*. According to this he appears to have rejected the doctrine of a real Incarnation of the divine Being, but yet to have admitted an original operation of divine power on Jesus from his birth. He appealed to those passages of the Old and New Testaments, in which Jesus is called a Man. The proof from the first fact, could only argue that his doctrine proceeded from a Jewish-Christian tendency. At the end of the second century, Artemon\* stands in Rome at the head of this party of Monarchians, who after him were called Artemonites. They asserted† that their doctrine was originally

\* Gieseler, in his *History of Dogmas*, edited by Dr. Redepenning: Bonn, 1855, p. 133, describes Artemon as a Monarchian who agreed with the Patripassian Praxeas, but gives no reason for it. The assertion that under Victor, in whose time Praxeas found favour at Rome, he was yet regarded as orthodox, cannot possibly be a proof. According to the account of the anonymous author in Eusebius (v. 28) respecting the Theodosians and Artemonites, there can be no doubt that the doctrine of the latter was nearly allied to the Theodotian and Samosatensian character, but not to the Patripassian.—[JACOBI.]

† On the internal relations of the church at Rome, Hippolytus, in the ninth book of his *Ἐλεγχος*, gives some important information, which confirms Neander's representation in its essential points. According to Hippolytus, Patripassianism at the beginning of the third century, had great influence at Rome. Epigonos, a scholar of Noetus, had come thither, and gained adherents. One of them, Cleomenes, laboured with success in the time of Bishop Zephyrinus, who himself embraced this doctrine, and was its promoter. At that time Callistus, of whom it is not said whether he was won over by Cleomenes, or had become a Patripassian independently of him, was active in the same cause, and still more when he succeeded Zephyrinus in the bishopric. Perhaps traces of this influence may be detected still further. Praxeas, who emigrated from Asia Minor, took up his abode at Rome in the time of Victor, the successor of Zephyrinus. Now the unknown author of the appendix to Tertullian's *Præscriptio*, who without doubt belongs to the third century, says of that Patripassian, *hæresin introduxit quam Victorinus corroborare curavit*. This may mean the Bishop Victor, a supposition which is strengthened by the expression *corroborare curavit*. In this case three bishops in succession would have been advocates of Patripassianism. Still in reference to Victor the matter is left in doubt. But it is easily explained how, when Patripassianism

in Rome, and had been maintained till the times of Bishop Victor; and that the truth had first been corrupted by his successor Zephyrinus. Since they appealed to Victor, who

was so prevalent, the opposite party of Theodotus, and that of Artemon, which was allied to it, and probably appeared after it, suffered excommunication. But if several bishops for a period of twenty years, and perhaps longer, could stand on that side, the Ebionitish Monarchianism could not have been the prevailing tradition of the church up to that time. Dr. Baur finds in this a mark of the doubtful holding of the doctrine of the Trinity; but however doubtful it may have been, the Ebionitish and the Patripassian Monarchianism are so diametrically opposite, that if the first had been the prevailing order of sentiment from the founding of the Roman church to the time of Victor and Zephyrinus, the other extreme could not possibly have won for itself bishop and people all at once. Nor less difficult would it be to conceive how in so short a time the Theodotians could have dwindled away into a quite subordinate party; for as such Hippolytus treats them, who describes the occurrences while fresh in his memory, and does not once mention the Artemonites.

It is quite different as to the doctrine of the Logos. The representation of the *θεὸς λόγος* who was in Christ might have been taken, in relation to the Father, sometimes in an identifying, sometimes in a subordinative existence, and if the differences were at first held without being precisely defined, the Patripassians might be disposed to be connected with those who subordinated the Logos, but yet always allowed God to be in Christ. If in the ideas of an individual, Irenæus, expressions favourable to the subordination theory could alternate with others which were almost Patripassian, how much more easily might the opinions of a whole church include such varieties without open controversy; and so much the more since even the Monarchian views could admit, and actually had admitted, the use of the designation *λόγος*; and no trace is in existence that this class of Monarchians had rejected the Gospel of John, but proofs of the contrary exist. Also the common opposition against the Ebionitish Monarchians united both tendencies, no doubt, for some time. But gradually the differences, reciprocally determining themselves, came forth more decidedly marked, and the time when Patripassianism gained the outward ascendancy in the Romish church, during the rule of Zephyrinus and Callistus, appears to have been the chief epoch of the conflict against the subordination view of the Logos doctrine. It appeared to Callistus, as he maintained against Hippolytus, to lead to the admission of two Gods (*διθεοὶ ἰστέ*). (Compare Tertullian Adv. Prax. 3.) Since the idea of the Logos was familiar on both sides, to the party of Callistus as well as that of Hippolytus, we may venture to conclude more confidently that it had long been current in the church. The Dogma of Callistus gave an exclusive form to the fundamental view of the unity which was most prevalent in the West; Hippolytus was perhaps influenced by the doctrinal development of the East, which maintained the subordination theory more decidedly. In the time of Zephyrinus, Origen

excommunicated Theodotus, they must either have kept from him, or he must have been excommunicated for other cause than his doctrine. In this notice Baur has an argument' to prove that in the Roman Church nally the Monarchian doctrine was predominant. But, what a great revolution must have taken place in the of the Roman Church during the short interval between or and Zephyrinus! And who tells us, that Artemon dare al with perfect right to his agreement with Rome? Yet pponent of the Artemonites (in Eusebius v. 28) remarks good reason, that not only the Holy Scriptures, but also writings of the Church teachers, who were older than or, taught the divinity of Christ. Reference might also ade to the Hymns in which the Divinity of Christ was essed. According to Theodoret, Theodotus maintained that Apostles preached his doctrine and that the divine nature Christ was not recognised in Holy Writ. Little as this ction proves anything in reference to the Bible—equally can the other for the prevalence of the Artemonite doc- in the ancient Roman Church. would have been more plausible, if the Artemonites had nowledged only the three first Gospels, but in spite of their

had been at Rome, and though young, probably not uninfluential, was early developed. This might be one of the reasons which wards induced the Roman Church to take the side of her bishop at him. In the time of Zephyrinus, Sabellius also was at Rome; st he was on friendly terms with Callistus, since their doctrines not altogether dissimilar. But it seems they fell out, as their ences were developed, and Sabellius was excommunicated. So at that time the subordination doctrine, the Dogma of Homousion in a one-sided and crude form, and Sabellianism, stood in opposi- to one another; a conflict which formed a very notable preparation he controversy between Dionysius of Rome and Dionysius of andria, and this latter appears as a link in a succession of ar differences, of which the point of development may be traced o the time of Victor. Montanism certainly excited an indirect ence on the disciplinary views of Hippolytus. In other respects olytus widely differed from him, and the Patripassians stood in a different relation to him. Hence Gieseler has not succeeded in ttempt (*Theol. Stud. u. Crit.* 1853, iii.) to include all the special ences of this controversy under the leading controversy between anism and the Catholic church. See my Essay in *d. deutschen chrift, u. s. v. v. Müller, Neander u. Nitzsch*: 1851, No. 25; 1853, 24.—[JACOB.]

arbitrary criticism on particular points, they never ventured to reject the Gospel of John and the Epistles of Paul, from which that doctrine can by no method of interpretation be expunged. We suppose therefore that they attempted to explain away certain parts of the New Testament, and that they did the same for the purpose of rendering the meaning of the old Church Teachers favourable to their own views. This will be more easily understood if we are warranted in supposing that they did not absolutely deny the divine in Christ. They are placed in the same rank with the later Samaritanians who belonged to the first class of the Monarchians. We shall therefore assume that the Artemonites believed that Christ was enlightened in a special manner by the power of God. As to their pretence of agreeing with the Roman Church till Victor's time, it may so far be true, that about the time of Zephyrinus, something occurred in the Roman Church which was unfavourable to the party. We will admit that since that time the doctrine of the Roman Church was expressed more decidedly in opposition to Monarchianism.

From the statement in Eusebius, the way in which the Artemonites might be led to their peculiar tenets is clear. There were among them men of a decidedly critical, dialectic, intellectual tendency; they occupied themselves particularly with the criticism of Holy Writ, and arbitrarily altered the manuscripts. In a charge of this sort, we must be careful not to trust implicitly to opponents. From the standpoint of orthodoxy there has been a disposition to charge Heretics with corrupting Scripture whenever they have quoted a passage on their own behalf. But on the other hand it is certain that at this time, the various sects often indulged in arbitrary criticism. Yet if we assume that peculiar tendency in the Artemonites, it can be easily explained how their one-sidedness with the want of the element of deep christian feeling might have brought them to the standpoint they occupied. It is deserving of notice that they are reported to have been addicted to the study of Aristotle. The platonizing Church Teachers were zealous defenders of the Logos doctrine. The Aristotelian tendency formed, therefore, an opposition against it.

There is still one more sect to be reckoned among the Monarchians, called by Epiphanius the *Alogi* (ἄλογοι) because

they rejected as spurious the Gospel of St. John which treats of the Logos.\* The first account we find of such opponents of John's Gospel is in an obscure passage of Irenæus.† He says nothing of their hostility to that dogma, but only of its speaking of their opposition against Montanism and the *χάρισμα προφητικόν* in the Church. We might, therefore, infer that these Alogi did not oppose the doctrine of the Logos from a dogmatic interest. Yet Epiphanius describes the Artemonites as offshoots of the Alogi. It is also improbable that they would reject John's Gospel merely because the Montanists appealed to it, since they would in other ways be easily refuted. If at that time a book so important for the Church in a dogmatic point of view as the Gospel of John were rejected, it may be presumed, that a particular dogmatic interest formed the ground of its rejection. Epiphanius, therefore, would be justified in classing together the Alogi and the Artemonites. The Alogi were induced by their aversion to the mystical element in Christianity, and the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, to declare themselves against the Gospel of John. It also agreed with this mental tendency that they were the vehement opponents of Montanism or Enthusiasm, and that they were chargeable with Hypercriticism.

The two classes of Monarchians are related to one another in their development. The class just described stands in sharper contrast to the Patripassian doctrine of the Person of Christ than even the Church teachers themselves. Hence we may imagine how the opposition against them must have called forth and promoted Patripassianism.‡

To the Patripassians belongs PRAXEAS. He appeared in Lesser Asia as an opponent of the doctrine of the Trinity and of Montanism; he then came to Rome and induced the bishop

\* Epiphan. Hær. 51. HEINICHEN de Alogis, Theodotianis, Artemonitis: Lips. 1829. DÖLLINGER, Hippolytus u. Kallistus, p. 292, makes many objections worthy of notice against the common interpretation of a passage in Epiphanius from which their Antimontaniam has been inferred; yet this is gathered from other marks of their standpoint. [JACOBI.]

† Adv. Hær. iii. 11, § 9.—Alii vero ut donum spiritus frustrentur quod in novissimis temporibus secundum placitum patris effusum est in humanum genus, illam speciem non admittunt, quæ est secundum Joannis evangelium, in qua Paracletum se missurum Dominus promisit: sed simul et evangelium et propheticum repellunt spiritum.

‡ Tert. adv. Prax.



to declare himself against Montanism. He must have possessed considerable influence in Rome, whether because he was a confessor, or on account of his hostility to the older Monarchians. His doctrinal peculiarities were not noticed, but in North Africa, whither he went from Rome, his errors were exposed, and as Tertullian asserts, he recanted. But to what this recantation amounted, is questionable. Tertullian, whose controversial treatise is the source of our knowledge of his doctrine, stands opposed to him as the impugner of Monarchianism and the defender of Montanism. His account admits of a twofold construction: on the other hand, it seems that Praxeas allowed no distinction between the Father and the Son, but taught that God the Father himself had been veiled in a human body. According to other passages we might suppose that he distinguished two relations in God—God the hidden one, the Father, and God revealing himself, the Son. As the Father he is invisible; as the Son he is visible. Perhaps this twofold representation proceeds from a misunderstanding; perhaps also Praxeas did not express himself with uniform consistency. In the same manner Noëtus and Hippolytus stand opposed to one another.\* Noëtus was an

\* The doctrine of Noëtus, Hipp. ελεγχ. 9, 10, p. 283, Miller.—*Λέγουσι γὰρ οὕτως· ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Θεὸν εἶναι πάντων δημιουργὸν καὶ πατέρα, εὐδοκῆσαντα δὲ πεφνηέναι (Mill. for πεφηκέναι) τοῖς ἀρχῇθεν δικαίοις ὄντα ἀράτον. "Ὅτε μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁράται, ἦν ἀόρατος, ἀχώρητος δὲ, ὅτε μὴ χωρεῖσθαι θέλει, χωρητὸς δὲ ὅτε χωρεῖται. Οὕτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀκράτητος καὶ κρατητὸς (cod. for καὶ κρατ. ἀκράτητος), ἀγέννητος, ἀθάνατος καὶ θνητός. "Ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν εἶναι λέγει (scil. ὁ Σκοτεινός, i. e. Νοητός) καὶ πατέρα οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ. Λέγει δὲ οὕτως· ὅτε μὲν οὖν μὴ γεγέννητο ὁ πατήρ, δικαίως πατήρ προσηγόρευτό· ὅτε δὲ ἡδόκησε γένεσιν ὑπομῖναι, γεννηθεὶς ὁ υἱὸς ἐγένετο αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ἑτέρου· οὕτως γὰρ δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν (ἀναι) ἔν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, καλούμενον οὐχ ἑτέρον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ὀνόματι μὲν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καλούμενον κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν, ἓνα δὲ εἶναι αὐτὸν τὸν φανέντα, καὶ γένεσιν ἐκ παρθένου ὑπομῖναντα, καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀνθρωπον ἀναστραφέντα, υἱὸν μὲν ἑαυτὸν τοῖς ὁρώσιν ὁμολογοῦντα διὰ τὴν γενομένην γένεσιν, πατέρα δὲ εἶναι καὶ τοῖς χωροῦσιν μὴ ἀποκρύψαντα. Τοῦτον πάθει ξύλου προσπαγέντα καὶ ἑαυτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα παραδόντα, ἀποθανόντα καὶ μὴ ἀποθανόντα, καὶ ἑαυτὸν τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀναστήσαντα τὸν ἐν μνημείῳ ταφέντα καὶ λόγχῃ τρωθέντα, καὶ ἡλοῖς καταπαγέντα, τοῦτον τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα εἶναι λέγει Κλειομένης καὶ ὁ τουτου χορός.*

The more speculatively formed doctrine of Callistus, Hippolytus represents in the following terms (9, 12, p. 289): τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν

adherent to the Patripassian doctrine at Smyrna. He maintained that Christ was most glorified by his doctrine. The passage in Rom. ix. 5, *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός*, he referred to Christ. Christ as God over all is identical with the Father. Hippolytus in opposition to him says, that God caused the Logos to proceed from him at the appointed time, when he would and as he would. He made the Unity consist in this, that the Logos was a power of the Father, and that everything is referred back to God. When Noëtus appealed to the words of Christ respecting his unity with the Father, Hippolytus rejoined that such a unity could not be inferred from them since Christ used the same expression respecting his own relation to the disciples.

Towards the middle of the third century, NOVATIAN, a contemporary of Cyprian, combated both classes of the Monarchians

*εἶναι υἱόν, αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα, ὀνόματι μὲν καλούμενον, ἔν δὲ ὃν, το πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον. Οὐκ ἄλλο εἶναι πατέρα, ἄλλο δὲ υἱόν, ἔν δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὰ πάντα γέμειν τοῦ Θείου πνεύματος τὰ τε ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῇ παρθένῳ σαρκωθὲν πνεῦμα οὐχ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν πατέρα, ἀλλὰ ἔν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ· καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι το εἰρημένον· οὐ πιστεύεις, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί (Joann. xiv. 11); τὸ μὲν γὰρ βλέπομενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτὸ εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ χωρηθὲν πνεῦμα τοῦτο εἶναι τὸν πατέρα· οὐ γὰρ, φησὶν, ἐρῶ δύο Θεούς, πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, ἀλλ' ἓνα· ὁ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος πατὴρ προσλαβόμενος τὴν σάρκα θεοποίησεν ἐνώσας ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἐποίησεν ἓν, ὡς καλεῖσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱόν ἓνα θεόν, καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ὃν πρόσωπον μὴ δύνασθαι εἶναι δύο· καὶ οὕτως τὸν πατέρα συμπεπονθέναι τῷ υἱῷ, οὐ γὰρ θέλει λέγειν τὸν πατέρα πεπονθέναι. In the last sentence there is a further modification of the doctrine of Noëtus, who regarded the Father immediately as a subject of suffering.*

The doctrine of the Trinity, as held by Hippolytus, is strictly subordinationist. The Logos originates as thought, as the summary of the creative ideas in the reason of the Father, and issues forth as a Hypostasis, and for the purpose of creating the World. 10, 32, p. 334. Θεός εἰς ὁ πρῶτος καὶ μόνος καὶ ἀπάντων ποιητὴς καὶ κύριος σύγχρονος ἔσχεν οὐδέν—Οὗτος οὖν μόνος καὶ κατὰ πάντων Θεός, λογον πρῶτον ἐκνοηθεὶς ἀπογεννᾷ οὐ λόγον ὡς φωνήν, ἀλλ' ἐνδιαθετὸν τοῦ παντὸς λογισμὸν. Τοῦτον μόνον ἐξ οὐτῶν ἐγέννα· τὸ γὰρ ὃν αὐτός ὁ πατὴρ ἦν, ἐξ οὗ τὸ γεννηθῆναι αἴτιον τοῖς γενομένοις. Λόγος ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ φέρων τὸ θέλειν τοῦ γεγεννηκότος, οὐκ ἄπειρος τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐννοίας· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ γεννήσαντος προελθεῖν πρωτότοκος τοῦτου γενομένου φωνὴν ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὰς ἐν τῷ πατρικῷ ἐκνοηθείσας ιδέας ὅθεν κελεύοντος πατρός γινεσθαι κόσμον τὸ κατὰ ἔν λόγος ἀπετελεῖτο ἀρέσκων τῷ Θεῷ.—Τούτου ὁ λόγος μόνος ἐξ αὐτοῦ, διὸ καὶ Θεός, οὐσία ὑπάρχων Θεοῦ· ὁ δὲ κόσμος ἐξ οὐδενός, διὸ οὐ Θεός.—Τὰ δὲ πάντα διοικεῖ ὁ λόγος ὁ Θεοῦ, ὁ πρωτόγονος πατὴρ καὶ παῖς, ἡ πρὸ ἐωσφόρου φωσφόρος φωνή. [JACOBI.]

at Rome; against the first he maintained the divinity of Christ on the ground that Christ was to be addressed in prayer as mediator, that he had promised to be everywhere present, and that it is said of him that like the Father he had life in himself; against the Patripassians he urged that the unity referred not to *unitas* of Person, but that there is one God over all, who has imparted the power of the divine essence to the Son; it is a *societas amoris et concordiae*.

Although LACTANTIUS often deviated from the doctrine of the Church, yet he explains himself on this doctrine in a similar manner. He says,\* "God the perfect author of all good has brought forth a spirit like himself, who is endowed with the virtues of God the Father: One God in origin and essence, the will of the one is also in the other; hence the two may rightly be called One God. The characteristic of the Western mode of thought is shown in its striving after the *unitas substantiæ*, the *ἁποούσιον*, while the Eastern Church under the influence of Origen, more generally favoured the *ἱερότης τῆς οὐσίας* of the Father and the Son. In the controversies of the fourth century a confession of faith said to have been drawn up by a scholar of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Bishop of Cæsarea in Pontus,† was appealed to, but its genuineness is questionable; internal evidence is quite against it. The second part contains distinctions which were not known till after the Council of Nice; but the first part is directed against those who deny the self-subsistence of the Logos, and its contents are such as we might expect from the school of Origen, which always combated both classes of the Monarchians. The controversy with a Monarchian who had lately appeared, Sabellius, of Ptolemais in Pentapolis, was of peculiar importance; judging from the specimens of his system which have come down to us, he was the most original and acute thinker among the Monarchians.‡ Schleiermacher

\* Instit. Div. ii. c. 8. init. Cf. iv. c. 8; c. 12; c. 13.

† Gregor. Nyssen. Opp. t. iii. p. 546, ed. Par. 1638.

‡ A fragment in the Epistles of Basil. Athanasius, Orat. contra Arianos iv. Epiphan. Hær. 62.—Yet not everything quoted proceeds from himself, but several things from his adherents. Compare also Hippol. ἐλεγχος 9, p. 285, 289. According to the last passage, it may be doubtful whether Sabellius ever resided in Ptolemais; but his doctrine might have spread thither. But it cannot be admitted that he made his first appearance after Beryllus.

in his treatise already mentioned, on the Monarchians, gives it as his opinion that the doctrine of Sabellius stood in outward connexion with that of Beryllus, and that he had formed the design of elaborating the system of Beryllus. But this outward connexion is not probable, for in what we have of Sabellius, there is not the slightest allusion to Beryllus. Yet an internal relation to the views of Beryllus cannot be denied, only the ideas of Sabellius are much more developed. The statement of Epiphanius that his doctrine was suggested to him by the Gospel κατ' Αἰγυπτίους is not to be summarily rejected, since we find in it expressions relating to the Trinity which savour of Monarchianism. Schleiermacher notices it as a characteristic of Sabellius, by which his doctrine forms an epoch, that he co-ordinated the three designations of the Trinity and placed them in antithesis to the Monas, the divine essence in itself. He did not, therefore, like the other Monarchians, subordinate the Logos to the Father, but the Revelation in the Trinity to the divine essence, or the representation of the Monas in its threefold relation to the World. This view is favoured by a saying of Sabellius, ἡ μονὰς πλατυνθεῖσα γέγονε τριάς ("The Monas being extended (or unfolded) becomes a Triad"),\* i. e., the Monas separates into three phases; but it may be doubted whether Sabellius sharply distinguished these ideas. According to other passages he regarded the name of God the Father as a designation of the divine essence in itself as when he says,† "The Father remains the same but unfolds himself in the Son and Spirit." It is also to be observed that Epiphanius points to the analogy with the doctrine of the Gospel to the Egyptians, where Christ imparts to his disciples the secret information that what he said of the Father, Son, and Spirit was always the same. We have further to compare with it the esoteric knowledge of God as the One, and the exoteric in his manifestations, of which Philo speaks; for example, the manifestation of God in the Angels, in Genesis. The peculiar view of Sabellius is, that according to him, the Triad does not continue always, but as it proceeded from the Monad, so at the end of the perfected Creation it will merge into the Monad again. Sabellius spoke of three πρόσωπα; but he understood by

\* Athanas. Orat. 4, contra Arian. § 13.

† Ibid. § 25.—ὁ πατήρ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι, πλατύνεται δὲ εἰς υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα.

that term, not self-subsistent personalities, but only three different characters,—forms of Revelation in which the divine Being presents himself. Hence he says: "According to Paul's words, 'there are many gifts but only one Spirit,' so we may also say, The Monad developes itself into a Triad in the Son and Spirit, and yet there is only one essence in three different relations."\* It is not an ontological Trinity, but simply one of Revelation that he admits: One God according to his changeless existence, but who is variously personified by Holy Writ as the occasion may require, and introduced speaking as Father, Son, or Spirit. They are different *διπονομικαὶ ἐνέργειαι* in which he manifests himself out of regard to Men. In what especially related to the Logos, Sabellius said: † "In order that we might be created, the Logos came out from God, and because the Logos came out from God, we exist. Here the question is whether he speaks of the new creation of Redemption or of the Creation of Nature. Athanasius understands it in the latter sense, and rightly. The most natural meaning is—the outcoming of the Logos from the Father is the necessary instrumentality for the existence of rational creatures. Like Philo, he regards the reason of Man as a copy of the divine Logos. If God had not come forth by his reason, outwardly active, rational creatures could not have existed. This agrees with what Sabellius says, that "God when he is silent is inefficient, but when he speaks he is mighty."‡ On the one hand the Logos marks the essence of God resting in itself; but he is the ground of the Creation as far as he comes forth from the Father, and from this outcoming of the Logos must the existence of rational beings be especially derived. Since the object of the whole creation is to reveal God, and this is first effected by means of rational creatures, he might indeed thus express himself, that the Logos came forth for the sake of men. But since this object has been thwarted by the estrangement of the human reason from God, the Logos himself must enter into humanity for the redemption of the fallen created reason, and for the

\* Athanas. Orat. 4, contra Arian. § 25.

† Ibid. § 25.—*ἵνα ἡμεῖς κτισθῶμεν, προῆλθεν ὁ λόγος, καὶ προελθόντος αὐτοῦ ἔσμεν.* Cf. § 11.

‡ Ibid. § 11.—*Τὸν θεὸν σιωπῶντα μὲν ἀνερέγγητον, λαλοῦντα δὲ ἰσχύειν.*

restoration of the original connexion between it and God. Sabellius speaks, indeed, of a generation of the Logos, yet not in the sense of the Church doctrine, but to denote the manifestation of a peculiar relation of God. Perhaps he used this expression in order to connect it with the Church phraseology. If he had expressed himself strictly according to his system, he would have used the title *Son of God*, only of the historical Christ in whom the Logos was hypostasized. Probably differences among his adherents arose from his modes of expression being sometimes more exoteric and sometimes more esoteric. All of them maintained that *Son of God* was not a designation of the Logos in himself, but some thought it denoted the Logos and Man in connexion; others, that neither the Man nor the Logos, nor both together were so called, but in the beginning the Logos was only for himself, but when he became man in that act he became a Son.\* Without doubt, Sabellius had similar views to those of Beryllus, of the Person of Christ. He also regarded the Logos in his original form, not as a hypostasis, but as a Power of God. He was first hypostasized in Christ. The whole God-man personality of Christ is nothing else than the irradiation of the power of the Logos in the body. Thus a personality originated of which the personifying principle is the hypostasized Logos. But in this Sabellius differs from Beryllus, that he regarded the hypostasized existence of the Logos not as eternal, and, therefore, admitted that the personality of Christ would be transitory; the Logos would at last come forth from his state of limitation, and like a ray return back to God and his original existence. But it is doubtful whether he supposed this would immediately follow the Ascension, or take place after the completion of the kingdom of God. A passage in Epiphanius, in which Sabellius compares the Trinitarian relation to the going forth of a ray from the Sun and its return thither, rather favours the first supposition.†

\* Athanas. Orat. 4, contra Arian. § 22.—'Εν ἀρχῇ μὲν εἶναι λόγον ἀπλῶς· ὅτε δὲ ἐνηθρώπησε, τότε ὀνομάσθαι υἱόν· πρὸ γὰρ τῆς ἐπιφανείας μὴ εἶναι υἱόν, ἀλλὰ λόγον μόνον, καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ὦν πρότερον σὰρξ, οὕτως ὁ λόγος υἱὸς γέγονε, οὐκ ὦν πρότερον υἱός.

† Hær. 62.—Πεμφθέντα τὸν υἱὸν καιρῷ ποτε, ὥσπερ ἀκτῖνα καὶ ἐργασάμενον τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀναληφθέντα δὲ αὐθις εἰς οὐρανὸν ὡς ὑπὸ ἡλίου πεμφθεῖσαν ἀκτῖνα, καὶ πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἀναδραμοῦσαν. Thus also Baur, p. 226, and Gieseler, K. Gesch. i. p. 300.

We might so reconcile it with his doctrine, that after God had received the Logos back to himself the Holy Spirit took the place of the Logos. Yet the question remains doubtful. The analogy of the distinction of the original and the temporal agency of the Logos, leads us to think that he also admitted an operation of the Holy Ghost, but different from that which was conditioned by the Incarnation of the Logos, as even at the Creation he supposed the Monad to be changed into a Triad. It is also a question what Sabellius thought on the relation of the operations of the Spirit, which ensued in consequence of the Redemption, to those of the divine Spirit in the Old Testament. He would distinguish between the immediate operations of the Spirit and those exhibited in his peculiar animation of human personalities. If Sabellius supposed a separation of the Divine Unity at the Creation, he might also distinguish various phases in History, according as one or the other of the divine forms of Revelation was specially active. Hence also it may be presumed that he adopted the common division of the History of Humanity according to Trinitarian designations, and Theodoret asserts\* that he taught that in the Old Testament God presented himself as Father and Lawgiver, at the advent of Christ as the Son, and in the Christian Church as the Holy Spirit. The final return of the Logos and the Spirit into the Monad would lead to the supposition that all individual life, as it originated from the unfolding of God, would also be dissolved and return into the unity of God. It may lend support to this notion that he certainly did not contemplate Christ's Resurrection as a pledge of the eternal personal life of believers. This struck Athanasius: he asks, "If all return again to the Father, shall we then be no more?" But he does not venture to assert that it was an avowed opinion of Sabellius. Yet there was the germ of a pantheistic tendency, though Sabellius did not pursue it to its legitimate consequences.

As Sabellius and his followers adopted the designations commonly used in the Church, of the Unity of the Father and the Son, but used them in a different sense, the distinction in the Trinity was urged against them with so much greater vehemence. Dionysius of Alexandria composed a refutation of their views in a letter to Ammonius and Eu-

\* Fab. Hær. ii. c. 9.

phrator.\* The Sabellians, though they denied the hypostasis, retained the idea of the *ὁμοούσιον*; this led Dionysius to describe the Logos as foreign to the Father in his essence, as his *ποίημα*, to speak of his having a beginning, and to make use of striking comparisons to express his Subordination. As the Western Church had already developed with great distinctness the idea of Unity of Essence, Dionysius, Bishop of Rome, took offence at these expressions as derogatory to the divine nature.† The Alexandrian Dionysius defended himself against these imputations in an apologetical letter.‡ His moderation stayed the controversy; he blamed his accusers for having laid so much stress on two comparisons, since in heavenly subjects it was not possible to use comparisons that were perfectly adequate. *Ποιῆν* was used to express the bringing forth of beings of the same kind. He also acknowledged the sameness of nature, only he scrupled to use the term *ὁμοούσιον*, as he did not find it in Holy Writ. He had called the Son *γεννητός*, not in order to express an origination in time, but the derivation of his being from the Father,—his eternity as founded in that of the Father. He marked the Unity of Essence thus: an *ἀρχή* from which every thing else is derived, and with which the Logos is inseparably combined. The peculiar tendency of the Oriental Church was confirmed still more in conflict against a Monarchian who had just made his appearance—PAUL of Samosata.§ Though he concealed himself under an ambiguous phraseology, yet his peculiar doctrines were at length ascertained; and after several Synods had been held respecting them, he was deposed about the year 272. He belonged to the first class of Monarchians, and insisted afresh on the distinction between the *λογος* *ἐκδηθείς* and *προφορετικός*. The Logos, as he taught, was the

\* See the Fragments in Athanasius, *De Sententiâ Dionysii*.

† See the Fragments of his work, in Athanasius, *De Decretis Synodi Nicenæ*.

‡ *Ἐλεγχος καὶ ἀπολογία*, a letter to Dionysius of Rome. Fragments in Athanasius, *De Sententiâ Dionysii*.

§ Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* vii. 27—30. Mansi, *Coll. Conc.* i. p. 1033, sq., especially *Epistol. Episcopar. ad Paul.* v. 393. Epiphani. *h.* 65. A. Maji, *Nov. Collect.* vii. 1, p. 68, 299, sq. Fragments in Leont. Byz. *Contr. Nestor. et Eutych.* iii. in J. G. Ehrlich, *Dissertatio de Errorib. Pauli Samos.* Lipz. 1745, 4, p. 23. G. Fuerlin, *De Hæres. Pauli Samos.* Göttg. 1741, 4. J. B. Schwab, *De Pauli Samos, vita atq. Doctr.* Herbip. 1839.



divine reason which came forth actively at the Creation. The Logos, so far, is a *δύναμις ἀνυπόστατος*, a mere power, an attribute without self-subsistent existence; he is equivalent to wisdom dwelling in God and operating out of him. Consequently he opposed the doctrine of a peculiar incarnation of the word, and admitted only a connexion in respect of qualities, *κατὰ ποιότητα*. Christ as Man was distinguished by the qualities of Reason and Wisdom, because the divine Logos operated upon him, and the divine Wisdom dwelt in him as in no other mortal. In order expressly to exclude the Divinity of Christ, he made use of the expression *Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς κάρωθεν*, i.e., who as man was born and developed, and on whom the divine Logos specially operated in the improvement of his qualities. He had always been with God, but only *ἐν προγνώσει*, according to the divine predetermination, not according to his being. He attributed the name *Son of God* not to the Logos in himself, but only to the Man, and accused his opponents of admitting two Sons, the Logos and the Man. But in this respect even he did not always express himself consistently. In the Synodal letter directed against him,\* he is accused of having excluded from the Church the hymns in praise of Christ, which had hitherto been used, and instead allowed psalms to be sung by women in his own praise. The first part of this account is not to be rejected; he probably disused the ancient Church hymns on the ground that only psalms, not human compositions, ought to be sung. As to the rest, there is probably much exaggeration. He was very vain and fond of hearing his own praises, but had too much sense to introduce hymns in praise of himself. He must have used the term *ὁμοούσιον* in order to accommodate himself to the forms of the Church; on this account the Synod held against him at Antioch, about A.D. 269, condemned this expression: a remarkable fact which clearly shows how strong the opposition against it must have been in the Eastern Church. It has been urged against the credibility of this account that it proceeded from the Arians, who were interested in casting an odium on that formula; but it is a confirmation of its truth that Basil of Cæsarea† and Hilary of Poitiers‡ do not venture to pronounce it false, but only give a different explanation of it. The interest against Monarchianism, therefore, operated in the Eastern Church even

\* Euseb. H. E. vii. 30.

† Epist. 52.

‡ De Synod. c. 86.

further for the distinction of the Logos and God the Father, according to their essence, and so for the *ἰσχωρία*, while in the Western Church the idea of Subordination was constantly supplanted by that of Unity.\*

#### 7. THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

KEL, Ob die ältesten Lehrer einen Unterschied Zwischen Sohn und Geist gekannt? in *Flatt's Magazin für christliche Dogmata und Moral*, iv. 34. K. A. KAHNIE, *Die Lehre vom heiligen Geist*: Halle, 1847.

There was not the same pressing inducement to elaborate the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as to complete that of the Son

\* The North African poet, Commodianus, was a contemporary of Paul of Samosata, and forms his counterpart; he is a witness how general and powerful in his church was the tendency to identify the Logos with the Father. Pitra, in the *Spicilegium Solesmeuse*, t. i. p. 20, has inserted an apologetic poem by him, in which, along with the idea of the Logos, he shows a Patripassian style of thought. The one, all-filling God, who appeared momentarily in the Theophanies of the Old Testament and then vanished (v. 122), appeared also in the form of the Son: it was a Revelation of his glory in the flesh without relinquishing his omnipresence in the heavens:—

v. 275. Hic pater in filio venit, Deus unus relique;  
Nec pater est dictus nisi factus filius esset.  
Nec enim relinquit cælum, ut in terra pareret,  
Sed sicut disposuit visa est in terra majestas.  
Jam caro Deus erat, in qua Dei virtus agebat.

The Incarnation consisted in the assumption of a body; in this human body God suffered for us. In truth the Father was crucified; but they are mistaken who suppose that God had intended to make this known beforehand by the Prophecies; it rather lay in the plan of Redemption to keep this secret from the Devil, and to conquer death by the Resurrection; on this account he took the name of *Son*.

v. 352. Stultia subit multis, Deum talia passum  
Ut enuntietur crucifixus conditor orbis  
Sic illi complacuit consilio neminis usus  
Nec alius poterat taliter venire pro nobis.  
Mortem adinvenit, quum esset invidus hostis  
Quam eibit Dominus passus ex interno resurgens.  
Idcirco nec voluit se manifestare, quid esset,  
Sed filium dixit se missum fuisse a patre,  
Sic ipse tradiderat semet ipsum dici prophetis  
Ut Deus in terris altissimi filius esset.

Commodian wrote in this poem, as well as in his *Instructions* throughout, in the consciousness of belonging to the Catholic Church, and agreeing with it in this dogma. Thus the Logos doctrine, connected with Patripassianism, prepared for the reception of the Nicene dogma. See JACOBI, *Commodian und die alt-kirch. Trinitätslehre*. *Deutsche Zeitschr. f. chr. Wissenschaft*, 1856. No. 26. [JACOBI.]

of God, and for a long time it remained unsettled. There was indeed a continuity in the Christian consciousness of the influence of the Holy Spirit; for in relation to the practical, in the acknowledgment of the Holy Spirit as the source of divine life proceeding from Christ, as the bond of union in all matters connected with the Church, there was complete unanimity, and this acknowledgment formed the basis of the articles of the Apostles' Creed. But the intellectual expression of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the divine essence by no means corresponded, and we here recognise a fresh instance of the disproportion between the Christian life and intellectual definitions.

#### THE CHRISTIAN TEACHERS OF THE EASTERN CHURCH.

JUSTIN\* calls the Holy Spirit the gift come down from heaven, which Christ imparted to believers after his glorification, but to the Prophets even before his Incarnation.† He distinguishes the Logos from him, but sometimes confounds their operations. Thus he says,‡ that no one can suppose the πνεῦμα, who inspired the Prophets, to be any other than the Logos. His representation in one passage is very striking.§ He enumerates as the objects of veneration among Christians, the Supreme God, the Son proceeding from him, the host of Angels, and then the Holy Spirit. It is strange that he does not name the Holy Spirit till after the Angels. The passage has given rise to much discussion, and some would substitute στρατηγόν for στρατόν, so that the Holy Spirit would be designated the leader of the Angelic Hosts; but such an alteration of the text is unjustifiable; we are not to explain Justin's words according to later expressed ideas, and must grant a nearer relation of the Holy Spirit to the Angels. When he thought of him as standing in the middle between the Logos and the Angels, as the highest being of those brought forth by the Logos, it is explicable why he mentioned the Holy Spirit especially after the Angels. This view is confirmed by another

\* Georgii, ub. d. Lehre v. h. Geist bei Justinus d. Mar. in den Studien der Geistlichkeit Württembergs von Stirn. x. 2, p. 69.

† Cohort. c. 32.

‡ Apol. i. 33.

§ Apol. i. 6.—ἀλλ' ἐκείνον τε (sc. τὸν πατέρα) καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἱσοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν, πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνούμεν.

passage,\* in which he describes the Holy Spirit as the Angel of God, as the power which is sent to our aid from God through Jesus. This representation continued to be employed as late as the fourth century. Semisch† indeed has explained the passage differently, and endeavours to prove that Justin could not have held such a view, as it would be inconsistent with his style of thinking, but Justin's style of thinking is wanting in logical development. Hence Justin might ascribe the third place in the Triad to the Holy Spirit,‡ although he places him at the head of the Angels.§

THEOPHILUS of Antioch plainly distinguishes the Holy Spirit as a self-subsistent being from the Logos; distinguishing the Logos and Sophia, he refers the passages in the Old Testament in which Sophia is mentioned to the Holy Spirit, and hence says that the Holy Spirit emanated jointly with the Logos.|| He is the first Christian writer in whom the term Triad occurs.¶

ATHENAGORAS illustrates the Spirit by the image of a ray issuing from the Sun, which might lead us to suppose that he ascribed no personality to him. But this comparison has been used for the emanation of personal Spirits. At all events, he thought alike in this respect of the Holy Spirit and of the Logos. However strong his expressions on the Unity of the divine essence, he yet admits a division in it, διαιρέσεις and a certain order in that division which includes a Subordi-

\* Dial. o. Tryph. § 116, p. 344.—ὁ ἄγγελος τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ πεμφθεῖσα ἡμῖν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπιτιμᾷ αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ διαβολῇ) καὶ ἀφίσταται ἀφ' ἡμῶν.

† *Justin der Martyrer*, ii. 305. Compare Möhler, *Theol. Quartalschr.* 1833, 1.

‡ Apol. i. 13.—ὕδιν αὐτοῦ του ὄντως Θεοῦ ἐν δευτέρᾳ χώρᾳ ἔχοντες, πνεῦμά τε προφητικὸν ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει, οὐ μετὰ λόγου τιμῶμεν, ἀποδείζομεν.

§ The Jewish-Christian sect of the Ebkesaites, who at the beginning of the third century spread themselves from Asia to Rome, asserted that they had received the contents of their sacred books by the revelation of an Angel; εἶναι δὲ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ Θήλειαν, ἧς τὰ μέτρα κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα εἶναι λέγει, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἄρσενά υἱὸν εἶναι τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὴν δὲ Θήλειαν καλεῖσθαι ἄγιον πνεῦμα. Hippol. *ἐλεγχος* 9, 13, p. 292.

¶ Ad Autolyc. 10. Cf. i. 7.

¶ Apol. ii. c. 15.—αἱ τρεῖς ἡμέραι [πρὸ] τῶν φωστήρων γεγρονυῖαι τύποι εἰσὶ τῆς τριάδος, τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ.

nation. Since he speaks of the objects of worship, and includes among them the Angels, it is probable with the other hypostases he also reckoned the Holy Spirit as one.\*

CLEMENT of Alexandria does not give any very definite views on this subject. He distinguishes between the reason of the human soul and the new divine principle of life which is communicated by the Holy Spirit to believers, and by which he stamps upon it a peculiar impression.† He designed to express himself more exactly in a treatise directed against the Montanists, but this work has not come down to us.‡

ORIGEN§ teaches that there is one Supreme cause of all Existence, God; moreover, a revealing and mediating principle by which divine life is communicated to all who are susceptible of it—the Logos; and the Holy Spirit is the sum of all divine life, the source of all its manifestations, the substance of all the gifts of grace, proceeding from God and communicated by Christ. He (the Holy Spirit) is the self-subsistent source of the divine life, which is communicated by Christ. Hence he uses expressions in accordance with the Christian phraseology—God performs all things through Christ in the Holy Spirit. As the Holy Spirit cannot be unbegotten, as he has a personal existence, but everything is through the Logos, it follows that the Holy Spirit is the first of the Spirits begotten from the Father through the Son, but without any notion of Time being applicable to his origin. He required the Son in order to become wise through him. He supposes that the Subordination which is here implied, also takes place within the sphere of his operations; all Being is in God,|| and his

\* Πρεσβ. c. 19.

† Strom. vi. p. 681 A.—ἐννατον δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ δέκατον τὸ διὰ τῆς πίστεως προσγιγνόμενον ἁγίου πνεύματος χαρακτηριστικὸν ἰδίωμα.

‡ Strom. v. p. 591.—The books *περὶ προφητείας* and *περὶ ψυχῆς*.

§ In Joann. ii. § 6.—Οἶμαι δὲ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τὴν, ἢ οὕτως εἶπω, ὕλην τῶν ἀπὸ χαρισμάτων παρέχειν τοῖς δι' αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν μετοχὴν αὐτοῦ χρηματίζουσιν ἁγίοις, τῆς εἰρημένης ὕλης των χαρισμάτων ἐνεργουμένης μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ διακονουμένης δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὑφεστῶσης δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα.

|| De Princip. p. 6, ed. Redep.—"Οτι ὁ μὲν Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ συνέχων τὰ πάντα φθάνει εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, μεταδίδους ἐκάστῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ εἶναι· ὦν γὰρ ἔστιν· ἐλάττων δὲ παρὰ τὸν πατέρα ὁ υἱὸς φθανὼν ἐπὶ μόνα τὰ λογικά· δεύτερος γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ πατρὸς· ἔτι δὲ ἥττον τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐπὶ μόνους τοὺς ἁγίους δικνούμενον ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο μείζων ἢ

influences extend to all ; those of the Logos to rational beings alone, the Holy Spirit only to the Saints.

#### THE TEACHERS OF THE WESTERN CHURCH.

IRENÆUS regarded the Son and the Holy Ghost as Principles existing before all time in God, and employed by him in the creation and government of the world. The Spirit, the regulating principle in the world, is to be distinguished as Wisdom from the Logos, the creative principle.\* Hence he referred the description in Prov. viii., which has generally been understood of the Logos, to the Holy Spirit.† He applied the theory of Subordination to the Holy Spirit: by such steps we attain to the Son through the Spirit; through the Son we ascend to the Father, to whom the Son will at last give up his work as the ultimate end.‡ He comprehends the whole doctrine of the Trinity in the words—The One God of whom are all things; the Son through whom all things; the Holy Spirit who reveals the dispensations of the Father and the Son among mankind, as the Father will.§ By the Holy Spirit we receive the image and impress of the Father and the Son. TERTULLIAN educes the Holy Spirit in subordinational rank from the Father through the Son, and employs the illustrations of the fountain, the stream, and the river—of the root, the branch, and the fruit.|| NOVATIAN says, Although in the Gospel the

*τοῦ πατρὸς παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ πάλιν διαφέρουσα μᾶλλον τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἢ δύναμις παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἅγια.*

\* Adv. Hær. iv. 20, 1.—Adest enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus, per quos et in quibus omnis libere et sponte fecit, ad quos et loquitur, dicens: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; ipse a semetipso substantiam creaturarum et exemplum factorum et figuram in mundo ornamentorum accipiens.

† Ibid. i. 3.

‡ Ibid. v. 36, 2.—Per hujusmodi gradus proficere et per Spiritum quidam (ad) filium, per filium autem adscendere ad patrem, filio deinceps cedente patri opus suum (1 Cor. xv. 25, ff.).

§ Ibid. iv. 33, 7.—εἰς ἓνα θεὸν παντοκράτορα, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα, πίστις ὁλόκληρος καὶ εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας αὐτοῦ, δι' ὧν ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ πεισμονῇ βίβαια· καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ τὰς οἰκονομίας πατρὸς τε καὶ υἱοῦ σκηνοδοτῶν καθ' ἐκάστην γενεάν, ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καθὼς βούλεται ὁ πατήρ.

|| Adv. Prax. viii.—Tertius enim est spiritus a Deo et filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus ex frutice, et tertius a fonte, rivus ex flumine, et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Nihil tamen a matrice alienatur, a qua proprietates suas ducit.

Holy Spirit is given in a peculiar manner, yet he is no ~~new~~ spirit, but the same who acted in the Prophets. Proving by this the divinity of Christ, he adds, Christ is God over all, and appears to include the Holy Spirit.\* Dionysius of Rome, in opposition to the Alexandrian Subordinationism, expresses the Unity in the most decided terms; as the Logos is united with God, so the Holy Spirit also dwells with him.

In the controversy with the Monarchians, the Logos was first discussed, and not the Holy Spirit. How was this? Either they had applied Monarchianism to the Holy Spirit, and described him as a power beaming forth from God—but this was not brought forward on account of the indefiniteness of the representations of the Holy Spirit at that time; or they gave no occasion for the discussion, because they did not distinguish the Spirit from the Logos—the latter is the most probable. They had as yet reflected little on the distinction. Sabellius first gave occasion to bring forward this point; as he regarded the Logos as the Power hypostasized in Christ, so he regarded the Holy Spirit as the representative of Christ in the souls of believers.

The party already mentioned, probably Monarchian, of whom Origen and Eusebius say that they denied the Law and the Prophets under the pretence of grace, and taught that the Holy Spirit was different in the Prophets from the Holy Spirit in the Apostles, perhaps affirmed that they glorified Christianity because they lowered the Old Testament, and referred the Holy Spirit only to the operations of God by Christ. Unfortunately, we cannot trace them any further.

Of LACTANTIUS, Jerome says, that he denied the personality of the Holy Spirit, and applied the name to the sanctifying power either of the Father or the Son.†

## b. ANTHROPOLOGY.

### 1. THE JEWISH, HEATHEN, AND Gnostic DOCTRINE OF SIN.

From its connexion with the fundamental Christian doctrine of Redemption, a peculiar direction was necessarily given to

\* De Trinit. 29, 24.

† Hieron. Epist. ad Pammach. et Ocean. c. 2.—Lactantius in libris suis et maxime in epistolis ad Demetrianum Spiritus Sancti omnino negat substantiam, et errore Judaico dicit eum vel ad patrem referri vel ad filium, et sanctificationem utriusque personæ sub ejus nomine demonstrari.

the mode of thinking in Anthropology. Such a constitution of human nature is presupposed as needs Redemption and is susceptible of it. The first point (the need of Redemption) was developed in opposition to the heathen standpoint which contemplated self-dependence, as Stoicism regarded self-sufficiency, as the highest aim ; and to the Jewish notion of the merit of works. On the other hand, the ancient view was to be set aside, which regarded Evil as a necessity of Nature, as grounded in the human Organism. Just here the Eastern dualistic view of Life found entrance, which instead of ignoring Evil made it an absolute principle, and on this Dualism the Neo-Platonic view of the  $\psi\lambda\eta$  supported itself. It was something fixed in the world which made an invincible opposition to the Triumph of Goodness, and from which Redemption and the susceptibility for it were excluded. If Evil was fixed in the necessity of Nature, the conception of sin or guilt, or the imputation of it, could have no foundation. Also the teleological view of the history of mankind was not acknowledged from the ancient standpoint. Traditions, indeed, of various kinds existed ; and either a development upward from the almost brutish state of the Autocthones to a higher stage, or a descent from a primeval golden age, was generally believed. But there was always wanting the conception of sin as a free act by which the state of mankind both generally and individually was conditioned. The prevalent view was, that the generations of mankind arise and pass away, and that the higher culture is communicated by the remains of decayed nations,—a perpetual revolution without any ultimate aim. The Christian view in opposition to this, was defined in its leading tendencies. The tradition in Genesis was distinguished from all others by giving what was practical and important for the religious consciousness with the utmost simplicity and depth. But the Jewish theologians had already taken a different view of it ; some literally, and therefore paltry and sensuous ; others allegorically, and so explaining it away. Philo, who belonged to the latter class, made the Serpent a symbol of pleasure and sensuality ; the tree of Knowledge a symbol of worldly prudence, and the whole narrative a description of mankind's sinking from higher knowledge into sensuality ; he also admitted an extension of the effects to Nature, and hoped, after the conversion of men, for the restoration of Harmony between them and Nature.



In the Clementines a view is found which may have been connected with a peculiar theological tendency of the Jews—according to which, the Fall of the first man was not admitted, but Adam was regarded as an unerring Organ of the divine Spirit for bringing into consciousness the primitive religion. Sin had its origin in the sensuous nature of the Woman, and spread itself through her influence. The Gnostics explained the expulsion from Paradise as a symbol of the banishment of souls from a higher region of the spiritual world. But the narrative as they took it differed in this respect from the common view—that it was not God, but the Demiurgos who was in direct intercourse with man. Thus the Manicheans\* could admit this tradition and yet make something quite different of it. According to one party, the Ophites,† the Demiurgos sought to hold man in bondage, and to check the development of the germs of the higher life which had manifested themselves in him. He gave him a law that he might not free himself from bondage and rise above the kingdom of the Demiurgos ; but the Serpent as the symbol of the higher philosophy of nature, opened his eyes and led him out of Innocence, which was obtuse ignorance, into Knowledge, so that he was obliged to break the commands of the Demiurgos. Through sin he first became knowing. According to the representation of the Valentinians, Man himself had a place among the Eons;‡ he is the totality of the Revelation of the Divine Being—when God revealed himself it was called Man. Man on earth is the representation of this heavenly prototype (the *ἀνθρώπος πρωτότοκος*). According to the representation of the Ophites,§ the Demiurgos with his Angels willed to create man according to his own image, but is unconsciously led by the divine wisdom, plants in him the germ of a higher life, and forms him according to the image of the heavenly prototype. When the work is completed, they perceive that something higher has entered into their kingdom. Alarmed and envious, they wished to annihilate Man. Or as Saturninus|| represents, the Demiurgos and his

\* See F. Ch. Baur, *Das manichäische Religionsystem nach den Quellen neu untersucht u. entw.*: Tub. 1831, pp. 151—159.

† Iren. i. 30, 7.

‡ Ibid. i. 1.

§ Ibid. i. 30, 6.

|| Neander's Church Hist. ii. 125. Hippol. vii. 28, p. 244, seq.—*καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἀγγέλων εἶναι ποίημα, ἀνωθεν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐθεντίας φωνῆς εἰκότος ἐπιφανείσης, ἣν κατασχεῖν μὴ δυνήθοντες διὰ τὸ*

Angel conspire to create man according to a form of light hovering before them in the Pleroma. They wished to fix by a charm the heavenly image to earth, but their man can only crawl; he is not that yet which he ought to be. No higher being can proceed from the powers of Nature. Then God takes compassion and imparts to him the germ of a higher life. Now at last man erects himself, stands there as a Revelation of God, and enters into hostility with the Demiurgos and his powers. Thus in the systems of the Gnostics there are exalted representations of the higher nature of man, and in that is grounded a susceptibility for the higher life. But MARCION acknowledges nothing in mankind before Christianity, which is analogous to the Christian life. Up to that period, everything in man has proceeded from the limited Demiurgos. But it is an inconsistency in his thinking and Christian consciousness when the Supreme God takes pity on man wholly estranged from him, and having nothing allied by which the higher life could find an entrance. Yet the Gnostics, though they ascribed a higher dignity to the Nature of Man, did not acknowledge the identity of all and the universality of Redemption. The Hylici, in whom only evil was manifested, remained altogether excluded; the Psychici also possessed no susceptibility for the higher Christian life; only the Pneumatici were fitted for it, and had, in this scheme, an inducement for a lofty contempt of the world. As far as the higher natures were kept under by the sway of the Demiurgos and the Hyle, and needed purification from a corrupt mixture, a point of connexion was presented for the need of Redemption, but the Gnostics deviated from Christian principles in tracing evil not to Man's free agency, but placing it in a necessity of Nature and an evil principle.\* The doctrine of Satan, in the Bible, has very much contributed to establish the point of view that sin is a free act, since it has clearly shown that a rational Spirit could

*παραχρῆμα, φησιν, ἀναδραμεῖν ἄνω[θεν], ἐκέλευσαν ἑαυτοῖς λέγοντες ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν· οὐ γανομένου καὶ μὴ δυναμένου ἀνορθοῦσθαι τοῦ πλάσματος διὰ τὸ ἀδρανὲς τῶν ἀγγέλων ἀλλὰ ὡς σκώληκος σκαρίζοντος, οἰκτεῖρας αὐτὸν ἡ ἄνω δύναμις διὰ τὸ ἐν, ὁμοιώματι αὐτῆς γεγονέναι, ἔπεμψε σπινθήρα τῆς ζωῆς, ὃς διήγειρε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῆν ἐποίησε. Cf. Iren. 1, 24.*

\* According to Basilides, Evil rests on the *σύγχυσις ἀρχικὴ*, the original chaotic state in the *σωρὸς*, the *πανσπερμία*, and on the material elements cleaving to it.

fall from God not owing to his connexion with Matter, but by a free act of the Will. Yet to the Gnostics, Satan was nothing else than a necessary manifestation and representation of the Hyle. By this physical conception of Sin, the acknowledgment of moral corruption and the need of Redemption again lost its significance.

## 2. THE OPPOSITION OF THE CHURCH DOCTRINE.

As the Church Teachers were chiefly engaged in combating the Gnostics, their general tendency at this period is easily understood. They had not to insist so much on human corruption and the need of Redemption, for these points had been brought forward, though in a one-sided manner, by the Gnostics; on the other hand, it was needful to lay peculiar stress on the doctrines of free determination and the general susceptibility of Redemption. Among the special topics one of the most important is,—

## 3. THE CHURCH DOCTRINE OF THE IMAGE OF GOD IN MAN.

With the twofold designation in Genesis for expressing the likeness in man to God, לְצַדִּיק and כְּמוֹת is connected the distinction which was so influential even down to the Middle Ages, of εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις τοῦ Θεοῦ, the former denoting the likeness to God in the natural constitution of man; the latter, the realization of that constitution in its matured and developed state. It is the first germ of the later important distinction between the *dona naturalia* and *supernaturalia* in the original state of Man. The Church Teachers used to regard the Image of God as comprehending all the intellectual and moral powers of Man, Reason, and Free Will, but to which communion with God must be added, in order to bring forward the likeness by which Man is raised above his natural limits. Many reckoned the body as belonging to the image of God, founded on the idea, that the peculiar human stamp and impress of the divine life must be also represented in a bodily organism.\* But this

\* Tertullian, *De Resurrectione Carnis*, c. 6.—Quodcunque enim limus exprimebatur, Christus cogitabatur homo futurus, quod et linus et caro, sermo, quod et terra tunc. Sic enim præfatio patris ad filium; faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Et fecit hominem Deus, id utique quod finxit, ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, scilicet Christi.

ruth was conceived in a very sensuous manner in the Clementine Homilies, and by Melito of Sardis, whose representations were impugned by Origen. A higher conception of this act is given by those persons who view the body in relation to Christ, who in his entire personality was to realize the image of God. So far, man was created as a type of Christ, and his bodily organism was a pledge of his Incarnation. A class of Jewish theologians had already reckoned the Immortality of the Soul among those things which did not belong originally to the image of God. The *ψυχή* was naturally mortal, and received immortal life, first by a communication of the divine spirit; when it lost the divine life by sin, it again became mortal. Hence the souls of the wicked perish, and are awakened again at the Resurrection in order to suffer punishment. Thus, too, the Clementine Homilies\* suppose that the souls of the wicked will be punished by annihilation. Tatian† and Justin,‡ likewise believed souls to be naturally mortal, but that by the will of God they will live for ever either in happiness or misery. It formed the basis of this view, that immortal life was considered not as a mere continuation of the present life, but as something specifically different and higher. In the *ἀφθαρσία* were comprehended the marks of a living holy life destined for Eternity, in the *φθοράς* those of a sinful, ungodly and transitory life. The Gnostics held that only the Pneumatici were immortal, that the Hylici would be annihilated, and the Psychici would be immortal if they turned to the good, but would be annihilated if they joined the Hylici. Against this doctrine Tertullian and Origen maintained the natural Immortality of the Soul. The former attacked Hermogenes, who derived the substance of the Soul from the *ἕλη*, and hence could not admit that the nature of

\* Hom. 7, 6.

† *Πρ.* "Ελλην. 13.

‡ *Dial.* c. Tryph. c. 6.—*ζωῆς δὲ ψυχὴ μετέχει, ἐπεὶ ζῆν αὐτὴν ὁ θεὸς βούλεται. Οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐ μετέχει ποτὲ, ὅτε αὐτὴν μὴ θέλοι ζῆν οὐ γὰρ δι' αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος οὐ διαπαντός ἐστιν οὐδὲ σύνεστιν αἰετὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ' ὅτε ἂν δέη λυθῆναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ταύτην, καταλείπει ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ, ὅταν δέη τὴν ψυχὴν μηκέτι εἶναι, ἀπίστη ἀπ' αὐτῆς τὸ ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ οὐκ ἐστίν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔτι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ ὅθεν ἐλήφθε ἐκεῖσε χωρεῖ παλιν.*

§ Olshausen, *Antiquissimorum ecclesiæ græcæ patrum de immortalitate sententiæ recensentur*. 1827. (Pragr.) See Ullman, *Stud. u. Krit.* i. 2.

the soul was allied to God, but asserted that the soul was naturally transitory and could only be restored to life by a divine miracle. It agrees with this, that he taught that the wicked will be dissolved in the ὕλη.\* However disposed Tertullian might be to sensuous representations, his deep religious consciousness of the divine constitution of the Soul kept him back from Materialism. He wrote a work entitled *De censu animæ*, which has been lost, but of which fragments and extracts are to be found in his treatise *De animâ*. In this book,† and in one controversial writing against Hermogenes, he teaches the natural immortality of the Soul. Among other proofs of it, he reckons its uninterrupted activity which is continued even in dreams. Origen maintained against Heraclion, that it is a contradiction for a being naturally mortal to be changed into one that is immortal. He reckons the ἀφθαρτον among the marks of a spiritual nature, allied to God.‡ In later years he was called from Cæsarea to a synod in Arabia to oppose those who maintained the opinion that the soul died with the body, and would awake with it at the Resurrection. Eusebius§ seems to assume that this was a novel opinion held only by some, but it is questionable whether it had not been handed down in those parts from more ancient times. He also remarks that Origen's opinion gained the victory.||

#### 4. OF THE FALL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

We might imagine that those Church Teachers in whom the antagonism to Gnosticism was specially represented, would show it with remarkable earnestness in reference to this doctrine, and hence would assert the freedom of man in the strongest terms. But such was not the case, at least to the degree that might be expected; we rather find it among those who approximated to the Gnosis. The reason of this inverted

\* Theodoret. *Fab. Hæret.* i. 19.—τὸν δὲ διάβολον καὶ τοὺς δαιμονας εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἀναχθύσεσθαι. Guil. Böhmer, *De Hermogene Africano*. Sundiæ. 1832.

† Ibid. c. 11.

‡ *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* iii. p. 26, ed. Redep.

§ Hist. Eccles. vi. 37.

|| Hippolytus assumes the immortal nature of the soul; but the separation and dissolution of the body in which death consists, was already necessarily granted with its composition out of different elements. It was perishable, in common with the world.—[JACOBEL.]

ion is very discernible. For that party which was most ledly opposed to the Gnosis, gave prominence to the natural element, the other, on the contrary, to the harmony between the divine and the human, that is, to the natural ent. Hence the former were more disposed to ally themselves to the Gnostics in the doctrine of human corruption, the latter to place in a strong light the importance of an reason, to which they would be inclined by the Grecian ent of culture.

we begin with the strictly anti-Gnostic party, since the ency of the more moderate, as distinguished from it, nes the more intelligible.

enæus had to prove to the Gnostics, that the inclination uman nature to evil did not contradict the admission of a ct Creator, and that Freedom and the capability of imement in spite of corruption, were still within every one's u. The common Gnostic dilemma was,—if God created first man good, whence then is Sin? if he created him stive, then is he the Author of Sin. To this he replies :

is neither perfect, nor yet created with faults ; but nally he was in a state of childlike Innocence ; had he ined obedient, he would also have been in communion God, and passed over to everlasting life. But left to elf, in consequence of Sin, he became the victim of morand evil (the *φθορά*). Both have passed from the first to his descendants, as a prisoner disinherits his progeny may be born during his imprisonment. In this condition, h, which forms the transit to a higher life, is rather a ing than a punishment from God.\* Irenæus considers

Will as a mark of the ineffaceable image of God in man, supposes that faith is conditioned by it.†

ræn. iv. 38 ; iii. 23.

Hippolytus also earnestly inculcates the original Freedom of man bjective ethical grounds, as well as on account of the Theodicy, p. —ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν πάντων ἀρχοντα ὁ δημιουργός (either so or with en, δημιουργῶν is to be substituted for the textual reading υργον) ἐκ πασῶν σύνθετον (instead of συνθέτων) οὐσιῶν ἰσκέυασεν, ἢν θέλων ποιῆν ἐσφηλεν, οὐδὲ ἀγγελον, μὴ πλανῶ, ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπον. ἢ ἐκτίσας θεὸς κακὸν οὐκ ἐποίησεν οὐ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν (thus Bunsen, d of οὐδὲ ποιῆ καλόν, κ. ἀ. But the οὐδὲ ποιῆ seems correct, verb between this and the following words may have dropped ἰγαθός γάρ ὁ ποιῶν. What follows is in a degree opposed to the ding thought, that man was created to rule all things. For since

Tertullian expresses most distinctly the views of the Western Church. Man, he says, has not, like God, goodness belonging to his essence; he must acquire it by his free self-determination. Had he remained faithful to the divine will he would have been exalted above all the angels. God gave Adam a law that he might accustom himself to submit his own will to the divine. Sin consisted in his desiring to detach his will from this subjection. From this, and not from the materials of sin, are all its consequences to be deduced. It was his destiny to rule over the rest of Creation, in dependence on God. By his unfaithfulness he was brought in bondage to it.\* Providence delayed the restoration of man in order to let him struggle, that man by the same freedom of will through which he was conquered, might win the victory over Evil. Original goodness, Tertullian held to be indelible. It might be checked, but not entirely crushed; the corruption of man is, as it were, his second nature, but yet the Divine remains in him as his proper nature. In the worst men there is something good; in the best, something bad. The *testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ*,† the freedom of

this is founded in his nature, and is not to be regarded as his ideal destination, it does not agree with this that he should be subject to all things according to his nature. We might suppose a hiatus, if the whole representation did not show systematic strictness in so slight a degree. Ὁ δὲ γεγόμενος ἄνθρωπος ζωὴν αὐτεξούσιον ἦν, οὐκ ἄρχον, οὐ νοῦν ἔχον (Bunsen, not without probability, reads οὐκ ἄρχοντα νοῦν ἔχον) οὐκ ἐπινοία καὶ ἐξουσία καὶ δυνάμει πάντων κρατοῦν, ἀλλὰ δούλον καὶ πάντα ἔχον τὰ ἐναντία ὃ (t. 5c) τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ ὑπάρχειν τὸ κακὸν ἐπιγεννᾷ ἐκ συμβεβηκότος ἀποτελούμενον (Bunsen supplies δὲ) μὲν οὐδὲν, ἂν μὴ ποιῇ· ἐν γὰρ τῷ θέλει καὶ νομίζειν τι κακὸν τὸ κακὸν ὀνομάζεται οὐκ ὅν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἐπιγινόμενον, οὐ αὐτεξουσίῳ ὄντος νόμος ὑπὸ Θεοῦ ὀρίζετο, οὐ ματην· οὐ γὰρ μὴ εἶχεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ θέλει καὶ τὸ μὴ θέλειν τι, εἰ μὴ (in the text καὶ) νόμος ὀρίζετο·—εἰ δὲ θέλεις Θεὸς γενέσθαι ὑπάκουε τῷ πεποιηκότι.

\* *Adv. Marcion.* ii. c. 5—9; c. 6.—Nam bonus natura Deus solus; qui enim quod est sine initio habet, non institutione est; habet illud, sed natura. Homo autem qui totus ex institutione est,—non natura in bonum despositus est, sed institutione, non suum habens bonum esse, quia non natura in bonum dispositus est, sed institutione, secundum institutorem bonum, scilicet bonorum conditorem. Ut ergo bonum jam suum haberet homo, emancipatum sibi a Deo et furet proprietas jam boni in homine et quodammodo natura de institutione adscripta st illi—potestas arbitrii quæ efficeret bonum, ut proprium jam sponte præstari ab homine, &c.

† *De Animâ*, c. 41; c. 22.

the Will, and a certain power of divination are indications of the divine nature. That sinful tendency, which, since the sin of the first man, is the disturbing element of development, he calls *vitium originis*; the passions, the lusts, everything which belongs to the *ψυχῇ ἀλογος*, he ascribes to the first disunion; he does not admit a trichotomy of human nature, but considers the soul to be endowed with higher and lower powers. His doctrine of the propagation of Sin in human nature was connected with a peculiar theory of the propagation of souls. He imagined that the soul was propagated along with the body, hence the soul of the first Man is the Mother of all souls. And since the spiritual life has been corrupted in the germ by sin, this constitution must be extended further by propagation. The doctrine obtained the name of Traducianism; it was connected with Tertullian's sensuous habits of conception, but had a deeper ground. In opposition to the Gnostic natural differences in men, he maintained the possibility of a moral change in all men, partly by free will, partly by grace. When they appealed to Christ's words, "a corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit," therefore, good can only proceed from a good nature; he rejoined, the bad tree will bring forth good fruit if it be grafted, and the good tree will bring forth bad fruit if it be not grafted. The corrupt nature of man can be purified, but even a good constitution requires fostering. This is effected by the power of grace, which is more powerful than nature, and to which the free will is subject. Whither this turns itself, thither the whole human nature turns.\* He wished to prove that there is no irresistible opposition in human nature to Christ. His words might appear to speak of a grace attracting the will irresistibly; for the doctrine of grace had already been carried to such lengths, as to crush human Freedom. But this would be at variance with his whole view of Free Will. However much controversy impelled him to one-sided expressions, yet we may fairly suppose that he wished to exhibit very strongly the power of grace for overcoming human nature, without excluding thereby the condition, i.e., the inclination of the free

\* De Animâ, c. 21.—Hæc erit vis divinæ gratiæ potentior utique natura, habens in nobis subjacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem, quod ἀντεξούσιον dicitur, quæ cum sit et ipse naturalis atque mutabilis, quoque vertitur natura convertitur.



Will. But it always deserves notice, that in his writings first of all, occur expressions which can be almost understood to point to the irresistible power of grace. In another remarkable passage,\* he says: there is many a good so great, that divine grace alone can impart it, which gives to every one as it seems good. Here he certainly speaks of an unconditional divine operation, but not in reference to morality in general, but only in reference to certain particular *charismata*, and hence in other cases, we must suppose grace to be connected with Free Will. Tertullian's Montanism was also not without its effect; it was the peculiarity of this tendency to set forth the unconditional operation of the divine Spirit, the almighty power of God, and the passivity of man. Only this principle was maintained by him, not generally, but in reference to particular cases, such as the Inspiration of the Prophets. But certainly such were his principles, that Tertullian, of all the Church Fathers of this period, asserted the power of grace in the most unconditional terms.

CYPRIAN, writing in the name of an African Council, calls original Sin a *contagio mortis antiquæ*.† He distinguishes between the evil implanted by Nature and that which has taken root by the lapse of Time. No one is pure from the stain of Sin, but freedom to believe and not to believe lies in the will of Man.‡

LACTANTIUS § considers the condition of Man in Paradise as the childhood of an innocence not yet arrived at the knowledge of good and evil. According to the relative Dualism which is to be found in him, and which makes the opposition of Good and Evil necessary for the development of the Universe, he further assumes that Man was thrust into a world of contrarieties, that by means of them he might form himself to freedom from evil.

#### THE CHURCH TEACHERS WHO OCCUPIED A MIDDLE POSITION.

JUSTIN regards the prevalence of sin and death, which he

\* De Patient. i.—Bonorum quorundam sicuti et malorum intolerabilis magnitudo est, ut ad capiendam et præstandam ea sola gratia divinæ inspirationis operetur. Nam quod maxime bonum id maxime penes Deum nec alius id quam qui possidet dispensat, ut cuique dignatur.

† Epist. 59. Baluz., 64. Goldhorn, c. 5.

‡ De Gratia Dei ad Donatum, c. 2. De Testimoniis, iii. 54, 52.

§ Instit. Divin. ii. 12.

includes in the idea of *φθέρᾳ*, as the consequence of the first sin; but adds, that every man is evil through his own will. He thus developes the connexion of these positions: if man had not departed from his union with God, he would have attained to a condition exalted above all Sin. By the first sin Evil gained power over him, but yet a reaction against it remained in him, and it is his own fault if he allow himself to be carried away by Evil.\* Against the heathen† he developes this doctrine without reference to Genesis; he rather proceeds on universal human experience, and draws a contrast between the higher life of Christians and a life on mere natural impulses. Man follows the blind impulse of his nature without the consciousness of his higher destiny as the child of necessity and ignorance, until he is enlightened by Christianity and attains to a morally free and conscious life.

TATIAN sets out from the general antagonism between *ψυχὴ* and *πνεῦμα*. The *ψυχὴ* is by nature transitory, and attains to a higher life only by its connexion with the *πνεῦμα*. Since man has estranged himself by sin from communion with God, he is no longer exalted above the rest of the Creation, the Soul has lost the higher life, and he is distinguished from the beasts only by the faculty of speech. Yet the Soul has a spark of the Divine left, and can turn again to God by its free will, can attain to Christianity and to a share in the *πνεῦμα*. The admission of this reaction against Evil is an inconsequence, but the undeniability of the fact determines him, and he places the free decision of Man exactly in this reaction, according to which he embraces the faith or not.‡

\* Dial. c. Tryph. c. 88.—*ὑπὲρ τοῦ γένους τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὃ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδάμ ὑπὸ θάνατον καὶ πλάνην τὴν τοῦ θφους ἐπεκτώκει παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αἰτίαν ἐκάστον αὐτῶν πονηρευσσάμενον. Βουλόμενος γὰρ τούτους ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ προαίρεισι καὶ αὐτεξουσίους γενομένους, τοὺς τε ἀγγέλους καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὁ Θεὸς πράττειν ὅσα ἕκαστον ἐνεδυνάμωσε δύνασθαι ποιεῖν, ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὲν τὰ εὐάριστα αὐτῷ αἰροῖντο, καὶ ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἀτιμωρήτους αὐτοὺς τηρῆσαι, ἐὰν δὲ πονηρεύσονται, ὡς αὐτῷ δοκεῖ, ἕκαστον κολάζειν.*

† Apol. i. § 61.—*ἐπειδὴ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν ἡμῶν ἀγνοοῦντες κατ' ἀνάγκην γεγενήμεθα ἐξ ὑγρᾶς σπορᾶς κατὰ μίξιν τὴν τῶν γονέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐν ἔθισι φαύλοις καὶ πονηραῖς ανατροφαῖς γεγόναμεν, ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκης τίκνα μηδὲ ἀγνοίας μένωμεν, ἀλλὰ προαιρέσειως καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀφείσις τε αμαρτιῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν προημάρτομεν τύχωμεν ἐν τῷ νοῷ, κ.τ.λ.*

‡ Ibid. c. Græc. § 12, 7, 15.

THEOPHILUS of ANTIOCH regards the paradisaical state as one of innocent childhood, from which Man might have raised himself immediately to Heaven. Moral and physical evil were the consequence of his estrangement from God. This extended itself over all nature; for previously there were no poisonous or ravenous beasts.\*

The Alexandrian teachers gave the greatest prominence to Free Will as the *conditio sine quâ non* of righteous divine judgment, in combating with the Gnostics. CLEMENT said in reply to the Gnostic dilemma quoted above,† that Man was certainly not created perfect, but endowed with all the capabilities for acquiring all the virtues, and destined to attain, through his own endeavours, a state of happiness. The Gnostics quoted many passages of Scripture, such as Job xxv. Ps. li. and liii. (on which others grounded the doctrine of original Sin) to prove their assertion that Evil was necessarily connected with Matter, and hence was involved in material propagation. Clement calls it a blasphemy against Nature, a contradiction of the blessing which God himself pronounced (as recorded in Genesis) on the propagation of mankind; he refers those passages only to the first tendency given to Man by Nature, which precedes the development of the higher consciousness; in those passages it was called Sin.‡ He pronounces death to be necessary, as founded in the natural connexion of the present development of the human race.§ It might seem as if Clement did not acknowledge a disturbance in human nature and an original sin, but regarded the present constitution of Man as necessary to his essence. But this cannot be concluded with certainty, though he had a much more undeveloped consciousness of the depravity of human nature than Tertullian. That he admitted a change in the original nature is plain, for he

\* Ad. Autol. ii. 27.

† Strom. vi. p. 662.—*ᾧ λόγῳ λύεται τὸ πρὸς των αἰρετικῶν ἀπορούμενον ἡμῖν, πότερον τέλειος ἐπλάσθη ὁ Ἀδάμ, ἢ ἀτελής; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀτελής πῶς τελείου Θεοῦ ἀτελές το ἔργον, καὶ μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος; εἰ δὲ τέλειος, πῶς παραβαίνει τὰς ἐντολάς; ἀκούσονται γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν, ὅτι τέλειος κατὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν οὐκ ἐγένετο, πρὸς δὲ το ἀναδέξασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτήδειος; διαφέρει γὰρ δηπου ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν γεγονέναι ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς; ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σωζέσθαι.*

‡ Strom. iii. p. 468.

§ Ibid. iii. p. 453.—*φυσικῇ δὲ ἀνάγκῃ, θείας οἰκομίας γενέσει θάνατος ἔπεται καὶ συνοδὸν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἢ τούτων δι᾿ ἄλλους ἀκολουθεῖ.*

says,\* Man played like a little child of God in Paradise, being seduced by the Serpent, which allegorically is explained to mean sensuality; Man became a full-grown man in disobedience, and subject to mortality, bound by sin, from the fetters of which Christ will release him. Clement, consequently, regarded the original state of Man as a childhood: it devolves upon him to obey the Divine law, but he is seduced to disobedience by sensuality. In consequence of this, he is more subjected to sensuality and to temptations, and far from *ἀπάθεια*. He considers, therefore, the present weakness of Man as the consequence of an original disturbance, although, in another passage,† he asks, how a child who has done nothing, can fall under Adam's curse. We observe a certain influence of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the origin of Evil in matter, which oppresses the Reason and produces an ignorance of good, when Clement says, The cause of evil is the weakness of matter, the irrational propensities of ignorance, the necessity which lies in unreason and ignorance.‡ Notwithstanding the dominion of sensuality, he maintains the free self-determination of Man, which makes resistance to it in the higher part of his nature, and which must be strenuously retained as a condition of all divine influence. In disputing against the Gnostics, he combats the arguments which were at a later period brought forward, for the doctrine of absolute Predestination, and which led to arbitrary interpretations of the Bible. He urges that if Man only followed a necessity of Nature, there would be no such thing as criminal unbelief or righteous condemnation.§ The Apostles were not chosen on account of any peculiar natural pre-eminence, as the presence of Judas among them shows; their election was only an act arising from the Divine prescience of their conduct.|| Paul's question (1 Cor. 1. 20), "Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" appeared to him objectionable as an interrogation, since it seemed to exclude free will, and hence he understands the words as a negative assertion—God hath not made the wisdom of the

\* *Protresst.* p. 69.—ὁ πρῶτος, ὅτε ἐν παραδείσῳ, ἐπαιζε λελυμένος, ἐπεὶ παιδίον ἦν τοῦ Θεοῦ ὅτε δὲ ὑπέπιπτεν ἡδονῇ, οφίς ἀλληγορεῖται ἡδονῇ ἐπὶ γαστέρα ἐρπουσα, κακία γήινη, εἰς ὕλας τρεφομένη· παρήγετο ἐπιθυμίας ὁ παῖς ἀνδριζόμενος ἀπειθείᾳ·—ὁ δι' ἀπλότητα λελυμένος ἀνθρώπος ἁμαρτίας εὐρέθη δεδεμένος.

† *Strom.* iii. p. 468.

§ *Ibid.* ii. p. 363.

‡ *Ibid.* vii. p. 707.

|| *Ibid.* vi. p. 667.

world foolishness,\* so that he cannot be charged with hardening men. But however important the interest of Freedom is to him, yet the need of Redemption is by no means excluded. The ways to grace are various: either it first arouses a man, or the beginning proceeds from free-will. The Father may please to draw every one to him who has lived purely; or Free Will in us which attains to the knowledge of God may overleap the bounds; without special grace the soul can never be fledged, nor made capable of being united to that to which it has an affinity.† He expresses his opinion in his treatise *τὸ ἐσθλόν πλάνον*: Man does not attain to perfection by his own exertions;‡ but when there is earnest, longing, and zealous striving in the soul, he attains it by the aid of divine power. God gives his blessing to those who make these exertions; when they give these up, God gives them up. The kingdom of God belongs not to the sleepy and the indolent, but to those who take it by force.

ORIGEN, in common with Clement, felt a strong interest in the freedom of the will, but differed from him in his clearly expressed theory of pre-existence. He refers§ to Job xiv. 4, 5, and says, this passage proceeds on the mystery of man's birth, according to which no one is free from evil. By this he does not mean the doctrine of original sin, but the mysterious doctrine of an earlier being and the Fall in this pre-existent state. Thus elsewhere he says,|| "In Adam is represented what relates to all human nature; not that we are to understand that he is a type of the good and evil tendencies of mankind, but inasmuch as the History of his Fall in Genesis is a symbolic representation of the Fall of Souls." He goes on to say,¶ "The expulsion from Paradise had a mystical sense; Paradise is a symbol of that heavenly region from

\* Strom. i. c. 18, § 89.

† Ibid. v. p. 518.

‡ Ibid. v. § 21.

§ In Matth. t. xv. § 23.—τάχα δὲ καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὴν γένεσιν οὐδεὶς ἐστὶ καθαρὸς ἀπὸ ῥύπου, οὐδ' εἰ μία ἡμέρα εἴη ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ, διὰ τὸ περὶ τῆς γενέσεως μυστήριον, ἐφ' ᾧ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Δαβὶδ ἐν πεντηκοστῇ πρώτῃ ψαλμῷ λελεγμένον ἕκαστος πάντων εἰς γένεσιν ἐληλυθόντων λέγοι, ἔχον οὕτως· "ὅτι ἐν ἀνομίαις συνελήφθην, καὶ ἐν ἀμαρτίαις ἐκίσσησέ με ἡ μήτηρ μου."

|| C. Cels. iv. § 40.—καὶ ἐν τοῖς δοκοῦσι περὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ εἶναι, φυσιο-  
λογεῖ Μωϋσῆς τὰ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως.

¶ Ibid.—καὶ ὁ ἐκβαλλόμενος δὲ ἐκ τοῦ παραδείσου ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τῆς γυναικὸς, τοῦ δερματίνου ἡμφιεσμένου χιτῶνα (οὗς διὰ τὴν παράβασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε τοῖς ἀμαρτήσασιν ὁ Θεός) ἀπόρρητόν

which Souls have fallen. The coats of skins denote the bodies which form the prison of Souls." He refers also to the estrangement from the divine life, when Satan is called a murderer,\* not because he has inflicted death on any particular person, but because he has been the agent in the fall of the whole race. He opposed the doctrine of Pre-existence to Traducianism, which was too sensuous for him, and on this point felt himself at liberty to indulge in speculation, because Holy Writ and the Church doctrine had determined nothing positive upon it.† From the passages we have quoted, it appears that the universal sinfulness of man and the need of Redemption occupied their proper place in his mind, though somewhat differently expressed from the current mode. Hence he says,‡ As no man is pure, righteous, and without sin, so no one is always pure from evil spirits; perhaps many would give as examples to the contrary, the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles, as those who could say like Christ, "I have not a demon," but we reply, these also have sinned, otherwise Paul's expressions and other words of Scripture would be untrue. But the Scriptures speak the truth. As a means of believing, he supposes a higher divine influence. On this account, he says, we do not believe because we do not recognise what Christ says, to be truth; and the reason we do not is because the eye designed by Nature to perceive truth has not been purified. It is sin by which the eye is covered and darkened.§

τινα καὶ μυστικὸν ἐχειλογον, ὑπὲρ τὸν κατὰ Πλάτωνα, τῆς ψυχῆς πτερορρύσεως καὶ δεῦρο φερομένης, ἕως ἂν στίρεοῦ τινος λάβηται.

\* In Joann. t. xx. § 21.—Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀπορρήτοτερόν τι, διὸ ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἄρχων ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, λίγω δὲ τοῦ περιγίου τόπου, ὅπου εἰσιν οὓς ἀπέκτεινεν ἄνθρωποι.

† See the Apology of Pamphilus.

‡ In Joann. t. xx. § 29.—καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὥσπερ οὐδεὶς καθαρὸς ἀπὸ ῥύπου, καὶ οὐδεὶς δίκαιος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ὃς ποιήσει ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται, οὕτως καὶ οὐδεὶς αἰεὶ ἀπὸ δαιμονίων καθαρεύσας, καὶ μηδέποτε γινόμενος τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐνεργείας ἀνεπίδεκτος.—Ἀλλ' εἰδὼς τινὰς, τοὺς ἁγίους πατριάρχας, ἢ τὸν ἱερὸν Θεράποντα, ἢ τοὺς θαυμασίους προφῆτας, ἢ τοὺς δυνατωτάτους τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ ἀποστόλους φέροντας εἰς τὴν ἐξέτασιν δυσωπήσειν ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἄρα καὶ οὗτοι εἰποιν ἂν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἰησοῦ· "ἐγὼ δαιμόνιον οὐκ ἔχω" πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· ἄρα καὶ οὗτοι ποτε ἥμαρτον, ἢ ψεῦδος τὸ· "πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ" καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς τὸ· "οὐδεὶς καθαρὸς ἀπὸ ῥύπου" οὐδὲ τεθεωρημένως εἴρηται τὸ· "οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος ἐπὶ γῆς, ὃς ποιήσει ἀγαθόν καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται." Ἀλλὰ σαφές, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς αἱ πᾶσαι γραφαί, κ.τ.λ. § In Joann. t. xx. § 26.

We perceive therefore, as the collective result, that a disturbance in human nature owing to which it needed Redemption and Regeneration, and a susceptibility of Redemption, were maintained by all the Church teachers. Nor is the doctrine of Free Will carried to the length of self-sufficiency, nor the doctrine of human depravity to the exclusion of free self-consciousness and a point of connexion for Redemption. This is characteristic of the Period; yet in Tertullian and Clement two diverging tendencies may be observed: in the one, the doctrine of the need of redemption and the transforming power of grace; in the other, that of free will, is more prominent; and in this difference lies the germ of the controversies of the following period. It is also evident that the doctrine of Redemption must be everywhere conditioned by the Anthropology.

#### C. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

Among the strictly new truths which Christianity presents, is the doctrine of a Man in whom may be recognised the perfect union of the divine and human. In the existing tendencies of the age there was nothing analogous, and it stands in opposition to the Jewish standpoint, which places a chasm between God and man, as well as to the Heathen deification of nature and man, or its depriving humanity of its characteristic qualities. If Christianity presents any apparent affinity to other religions, it must be owing to that presentiment of our nature which springs from its affinity to God. The Heathen myths of transient appearance of the gods in human form, especially the Incarnations of the Oriental gods, are connected with Pantheism, which in all forms of existence beholds the Divine made an object of the senses, and, therefore, admits an Incarnation of it in the forms of lower nature. This was something altogether different from the full revelation of the of the divine essence in the form of a definite human life which was to share all its limitations. The humiliation of Christ and his death on the cross were at variance with the conceptions of the Heathen, who delighted in sensuous splendour, and adorned with it the fabled appearances of their deities. This contrariety may be known from the fabulous description of the heroes whom they set up in opposition to the power of Christianity, as in the life of Apollonius of Tyana, by Philostratus.

tus.\* For although this history was not written with a polemical design against Christianity, yet the decoration of the life of Apollonius proceeded from the necessity of investing the sinking cause of heathenism with fresh splendour. Neo-Platonism could indeed allow some individuals to be organs of divine Revelations and thus admit of an Eclectic attachment to Christ as a teacher of Philosophy among others: but the acknowledgment of an individual as the absolute revelation of God and as the archetype of humanity, from whom all divine life proceeded, and the consequent dependence of the whole human race upon him—was in direct contradiction to this Philosophy. As the religious spirit of the age took offence at this doctrine of Christianity, it mixed itself with it to corrupt it, and the narratives of the life of Christ were remodelled according to the ideas current in society. This is the element of the Apocryphal writings. In the monstrous narratives of this kind respecting the Saviour's childhood, we see what offence was taken at the humiliation of the real life of Christ: for instance when he was learning his Alphabet and his Teacher asked him to point out A, he said B at the same time, because he connected a mysterious meaning with it.

Of the standpoints previous to Christianity there were two tendencies, which in opposite ways exploded the union of the divine nature with the human, as presented in the actual appearance of the God-Man, according as they gave prominence to the Divine or the Human alone. On the Jewish standpoint this was regarded as an impossibility. Here also the specifically Divine in Christ was denied. The Ebionitish tendency in the narrower sense gave rise to it, which as it regarded Christianity only as a continuation of Judaism, could not distinguish Christ specifically from the earlier messengers of God, but made him a sort of potentiated Moses, who at his baptism was equipped for his Messianic work by the communication of special divine powers. The other tendency presented itself in Gnosticism, which despised the human in Christ, and in a one-sided manner brought forward the divine. But there were also combinations of the Ebionitish and Gnostic views, as for example, in Cerinthus† and

\* Flav. Philostrati quæ supersunt, ed. Kayser: 1844, 2 t. Baur, *Apollonius v. Tyana u. Christus*: Tüb. 1832.

† Hippol. *Ελεγ.* vii. 38, p. 256.



Basilides; \* the Jewish element when the historical Christ was regarded as a mere man, the Gnostic in reference to the Divine which was imparted to him at baptism; the Jewish element showed itself in excluding the sufferings of the work of Redemption, the Gnostic in its speculations on the Logos. Hence two Messiahs were distinguished, an inferior and a superior Christ, the human and the real Messiah; the one taken from the Jewish standpoint, the other from the Gnostic. One consequence of the disruption of the Divine and the Human by Gnosticism was Docetism, which altogether denied the real, humanly sensuous side of Christ's life, and only acknowledged as real the Revelation of the divine Being. Preparation for this view had been made among the Jewish Theologians by the representation that it was one of the privileges of a superior spirit to appear in a variety of forms. Philo's explanation of the Angelophanies, and the Christology of the Clementine Homilies furnish evidence of this. According to that Docetic conception, the heavenly Being, whose nature is pure light, suddenly came forth as a sensuous apparition. All sensuousness is only an illusion practised by the divine Genius. Hence the latter by no means attached himself to the kingdom of Demiurgos; only an appearance of him descended into this world. We have already remarked, that

\* The Christology of Basilides, according to the representation of Hippolytus, is somewhat differently constructed from the view taken of it by Neander. The Person of Christ was formed from the composition of mundane and supermundane elements, in order that Redemption might be co-extensive with the order of the universe. The powers of the highest children of God, guided by the Holy Spirit, the *πνεῦμα διακονούν*, and further mediated by the pneumatic sons of the Archon, operate downwards through heaven, and become known to the Archon nearest the earth as the Gospel, and alight on the Virgin whose Son Christ is. Hence what took place at his baptism had not for him the same importance as if he had been a man like other men, p. 241. *Κατήλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐβδομάδος τὸ φῶς τὸ κατελθὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ὀγδοάδος ἄνωθεν, τῷ υἱῷ τῆς ἐβδομάδος, ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν τὸν υἱὸν τῆς Μαρίας, καὶ ἐφωτίσθη συνεξαφθείς τῷ φωτὶ τῷ λάμπαντι εἰς αὐτόν. Ταῦτό ἐστι, φησί, τὸ εἰρημένον· "πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σε," τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς νόστητος διὰ τοῦ μεθορίου πνεύματος ἐπὶ τὴν ὀγδοάδα καὶ τὴν ἐβδομάδα διελθὼν μέχρι τῆς Μαρίας· "καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι" (Luc. i. 35) ἡ δύναμις τῆς κρίσεως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκρωρείας ἄνωθεν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ μέχρι τῆς κρίσεως, ὅ ἐστι τοῦ υἱοῦ. See also on Basilides d. *Abhandl.* v. E. Gundert in Guericke's und Rudelbach's *Zeitschr.* 1855, 1856.*

Docetism is by no means a constant idealistic denial of the historical appearance of the divine Being—since not the reality of the Revelation of the divine Genius, but only the sensuousness belonging to it is denied. The original Docetism at least, contains a very marked supernatural element which scorned the natural development of History, and by the power which it exerted in the first ages, is a witness of the prodigious impression of Christ on the consciousness of Humanity. Only at that time could such a phenomenon have appeared. Men felt that a super-terrestrial spirit had become an historical personage; the Divine so beamed forth in the contemplation of the life of Christ that some knew not how to reconcile it with the sensuous and the human, and regarded it as an optical illusion. This was seen especially in Marcion, a man in whom the contrariety between speculative thinking and the Christian consciousness was remarkably visible, and which was quite characteristic of this age. He was deeply imbued with faith in the Historical Christ; yet though the Life of Christ had so great a value in his esteem, he denied the full truth respecting it. The Christian realism of his heart was conjoined with an idealism of speculation. At a later period the Docetic element became more allied to a rationalistic Idealism, as in Manicheism, in which the Christian element was put much further in the background. Here the appearance of Christ was nothing but an Incarnation of the spirit of the Sun, who conducts the process of purification in Nature and in Man, so that the Ethical and the Physical were completely mixed. The Incarnation had no peculiar importance attached to it; it was only a symbol of the Revelation of the Sun-spirit, and the Crucifixion was the symbol of a soul suffering in its combination with matter. It is the Son of Man related to the Sun-spirit, the Light involved in matter, to which he puts forth his rescuing hand, in order to draw it again to himself. Between Docetism and the acknowledgment of the perfectly Human in Christ, there were many intermediate tendencies. Several Gnostic sects, such as that of Valentine, did not deny the reality of the human Life of Christ, but denied his having a sensuous body, since the *Ülan* was the principle of evil, and nothing divine could appear in it. The common representation appeared to them a degradation of the higher Spirit. They admitted that

Christ had a body of ethereal texture, not subject to sensuous affections, that he eat, drank, and digested, without being moved by hunger; everything in him was imperishable. Here also the purely Human, the true Realism of Christ's Person was given up. Many distinguished in Christ the physical and the pneumatic element, and in his discourses what proceeded from the different Principles.\*

The Church doctrine developed itself in opposition to these Gnostic corruptions. The controversy against Docetism comes out in those parts of the Ignatian Epistles which bear upon them the mark of antiquity. As the truth of Christ's sufferings and Resurrection is maintained, it is said the Docetæ themselves are only men in appearance, and as they think of Christ so will it be with themselves.† But at that time the characteristics which belonged to the right development of the idea of the God-man were not fully known, and hence Docetism could not be completely overcome. Men first of all attached themselves to what fell under their observation, and brought forward the truth of the sensuous and the bodily in Christ. As the divine Logos was viewed according to the Subordination Theory, and on the other hand there was no definite idea respecting the human soul in Christ, it was more easy to imagine a divine being connected with a human body in Christ. Hence it was impossible that the purely Human in Christ should be firmly held in all its relations. The Patripassians also persisted in the assumption of a human body by God the Father, but this point was not brought forward in controversy.

Christian Realism pushed in one point to the extreme, the opposition against Docetism which shrank from the servant-form of Christ. In both eastern and western Church teachers of widely different classes we meet with the representation

\* Hermogenes taught the birth, sufferings, and resurrection of Christ according to the Evangelists. To the body he ascribed, at least after the resurrection, a finer materialism. But this could not be taken into heaven, but was left behind in the sun by Christ at the ascension. The proof of this he found in Ps. xviii. 6, *ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ ἔθετο τὸ σκῆνωμα αὐτοῦ*. Hippol. *Ἐλεγχ.* 8, 17, p. 274.

† Ad. Smyrn. 2.—*Καὶ ἀληθῶς ἔπαθεν, ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀνίστησεν αὐτὸν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἄπιστοί τινες λέγουσι τὸ δοκεῖν αὐτὸν πεπονθέναι, αὐτοὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ὄντες, καὶ καθὼς φρονοῦσι καὶ συμβῆσεται αὐτοῖς, οὐσιν ἀσωμάτοις καὶ δαιμονικοῖς.*

that Christ's outward form was ill-favoured, founded on a literal interpretation of a passage in Isaiah liii., and a misunderstood passage in John's Gospel viii. 57, from which it was inferred that Christ looked much older than he really was. This extravagance forms a contrast to the later artistic representations of Christ. It serves to mark the opposition of this first period to the æsthetic standpoint of Religion, its repudiation of art: the Holy was set in contrast with the idea of the Beautiful.

#### THE TEACHERS OF THE WESTERN CHURCH.

IRENÆUS\* in the controversy against the Gnostics asserted the existence of a true human nature in Christ, without sharply distinguishing the body and soul. He combated Docetism on the ground that we could not be exhorted to imitate Christ if he did not possess human nature in common with us; it was necessary that in real human nature he should conquer the power of evil over it. He endeavoured to point out very forcibly, how human nature in all its parts must be penetrated by the Divine, and hence was not very careful in the choice of his expressions for the Union, so that he does not distinguish the *ἡνωσις* and the *σύνκρασις*; but we must not, on this account, imagine that he really believed in a transmutation of the divine nature. So far from this, in other passages he correctly distinguishes the Divine from the Human; to the human nature he allotted temptation, suffering, and death. During these events, he says,† the Logos rested; but revealed his influence by the victory over temptation, by the endurance of suffering, by the resurrection and ascension. Notwithstanding this distinction it is not certain that he kept separate what belonged

\* *Adv. Hær.* iii. c. 18, § 6.—Si enim non vere passus est, nulla gratia ei quum nulla fuerit passio; et nos, quum incipiemus vere pati, seducens videbitur, adhortans nos vapulare et alteram præbere maxillam, si ipse illud non prior in veritate passus est; et quemadmodum illos seduxit, ut videretur iis ipse hoc quod non erat, et nos seducit, adhortans perferre ea, quæ ipsa non pertulit. Erimus autem si supra magistrum, dum petimur et sustinemus, quæ neque passus est neque sustinuit magister.

† *Ibid.* iii. 19, 3.—Ὅσπερ γὰρ ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα πειρασθῇ οὕτως, καὶ Λόγος, ἵνα δοξασθῇ ἡσυχάζοντος μὲν τοῦ Λόγου ἐν τῷ πειράζεσθαι . . . καὶ σταυροῦσθαι καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν συγγενομένου δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν τῷ νικᾶν καὶ ὑπομένειν καὶ χρηστεύεσθαι καὶ ἀνίστασθαι καὶ ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι.

to the body and what to the soul; it is possible that he ascribed to the influence of sensuousness whatever he denied to the divine nature. As a proof of the real human nature of Christ he appeals to the words, "My soul is exceeding sorrowful even unto death," and to the tears shed at the grave of Lazarus. Although a characteristic of a human soul is here presented, yet Irenæus marks it as a sign of *σάρξ* taken from the earth. Indeed, he may in this case have followed the biblical phraseology, without discriminating the various relations of the idea *σάρξ* in the Bible. It might be so, even where he speaks of the sinlessness of Christ and says,\* if any one wished on this account to ascribe to Christ some other than the *caro humana*, he would not be wrong, only we must not admit another *substantia carnis*. Further,† Irenæus had the idea that the archetype of humanity which was framed in Adam, was first realized by Christ, and he compares the animation of the body of Christ by the Logos with the animation of the body of Adam by his soul. The logical carrying out of this thought should have brought him to represent the Logos as standing in the same relation to the body of Christ, as the peculiar human soul to the body of Adam: yet probably he was not clearly conscious of what was implied in his mode of conception. He speaks with most distinctness of the soul of Christ in reference to Redemption, on which account the Lord gave his soul for our soul and his body for ours.‡ In this connexion *ψυχή* can scarcely be understood to mean life, but taking all things into consideration we cannot agree with DUNCKER§ that this doctrine is expressed with perfect clearness in Irenæus. On the one hand he felt himself compelled to admit

\* Adv. Hær. v. 14, 3.—Si quis igitur secundum hoc alteram dicit Domini carnem a nostra carne, quoniam illa quidem non peccavit, neque inventus est dolus in anima ejus, nos autem peccatores, recte dicit. Si autem alteram substantiam carnis Domino affingit, jam non constabit illi reconciliationis sermo.

† Ibid. v. 1, 3.—Quemadmodum ab initio plasmationis nostræ in Adam ea, quæ fuit a Deo adspiratio vitæ, unita plasmati, animavit hominem, et animal rationale ostendit; sic in fine Verbum Patris et Spiritus Dei, adunitus antiquæ substantiæ plasmationis Adæ, viventem et perfectum effecit hominem.

‡ Ibid. v. 1, 1.—*τῷ ἰδίῳ οὖν ἁματι λυτρωσαμένον ἡμᾶς τοῦ Κυρίου, καὶ δόντος τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν καὶ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀντὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων σαρκῶν, κ.τ.λ.*

§ Die Christologie d. h. Irenæus.

a human soul in Christ, but without being able to carry out the distinction of his nature.\*

It was different with TERTULLIAN; with great distinctness he vindicated the purely Human in Christ against Marcion. He reproached him with making Christ half a lie by his Docetism. Thou art disgusted, he says, if the child is loved and cherished in its dirty swaddling clothes, and how wast thou born thyself? Christ at least loved man in this state. For his sake he came down and humbled himself even to death; he certainly loved him whom he purchased so dearly. He loved therefore his nativity with man, and his body.† Tertullian was one of those who thought Christ had an ill-favoured body. Because the Jews wondered that he wrought such miracles he inferred, that he must have been destitute of an imposing figure. He objected to Marcion's notion of the suddenness of Christ's appearance. All things were hidden according to him, but not so with God who prepared everything beforehand.‡ In order to exclude Docetism he carefully distinguished the Divine and the purely Human in Christ's nature. We must not imagine,§ he says, any transmutation of the Divine and Human. Had a mixture taken place Christ would have been neither divine nor human, but some third being. He was rather two-fold in one person. Tertullian is the first writer

\* Hippolytus speaks in his *ἐλεγχος* of the likeness of the human nature of Christ to our own, but yet only under an ethical point of view. He represents it as consisting in the body; *τοῦτον* (scil. τὸν Δόγον) *ἐγνώμεν ἐκ παρθένου σῶμα ἀνὲρ λεηφότα καὶ τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ καινῆς πλάσεως πεφορηκότα, ἐν βίῳ διὰ πάσης ἡλικίας ἐληλυθότα, ἵνα πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ αὐτὸς νόμος γεννηθῇ, καὶ σκόπον τὸν ἴδιον ἄνθρωπον πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐπιδείξῃ παρῶν, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ ἐλῖγῃ, ὅτι μὴδὲν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς πονηρὸν.* According to the fragment from the tract against Noëtus, c. 17, if the passage is trustworthy, he would also have admitted a rational soul in Christ.—[JACOBI.]

† *De Carni Christi*. 4.

‡ C. Marcion. iii. 2.—*Subito filius et subito missus et subito Christus! Atqui nihil putem a Deo subitum quia nihil a Deo non dispositum.*

§ *Adv. Prax.* 27.—*Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed conjunctum in una persona, Deum et hominem Jesum. De Christo autem dissero. Et adeo salva est utriusque proprietates substantiæ, ut et spiritus res suas egerit in illo, id est virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit, esuriens sub diabolo, sitiens sub Samaritide, flets Lazarum, anxia usque ad mortem, denique et mortua est. Quodsi tertium quid esset, ex utroque confusum, ut electrum, non tam distincta documenta parerent utriusque substantiæ.*

by whom a perfect human nature consisting of body and soul is distinctly asserted. Christ's words on the cross expressive of his anguish he explains\* as the voice of the body and soul of his human nature. As Tertullian did not admit a Trichotomy of human nature, but only one *anima* in it, furnished† with higher and lower powers, he could only understand by the one soul in Christ the same as it was in all men. Controversy led him to express this view still more distinctly. Valentine anticipating in some degree later scientific knowledge, maintained that Christ must have in his person something analogous to all those things to which his redemption would be applicable, therefore he must have a *πνεῦμα* and a *ψυχή*; he was only destitute altogether of the Hylie nature. But he added the assumption, that this *ψυχή* had become visible, like a bodily appearance. Against this Tertullian contended, and urged that such a soul would not be identical with the human soul: but unless it were he could not redeem men: the properties of body and soul were to be distinguished in him: the soul was properly the man.

#### THE TEACHERS OF THE EASTERN CHURCH.

JUSTIN MARTYR‡ in his second Apology has a remarkable passage in reference to this doctrine. After speaking of the *σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου* among the Heathen, he contrasts with it the absolute unmixed truth in Christianity. The distinction is grounded on this, that in Christ the whole Logos and not merely a part, appeared. In the phrase *λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον*, *λογικὸν* may be taken for the masculine, and then the sense would be, *rational* in reference to the whole, but according to the contrast and the whole connexion *λογικὸν* is neuter, and the words will mean, the whole, absolute Logos. What he then adds, "Body and Logos and Soul" may appear remarkable on account of its awkward position at the end of the sentence. The position of the Logos between body and soul is also odd,

\* Adv. Prax. c. 30.—Sed hæc vox carnis et animæ, id est hominis, non sermonis nec spiritus, id est non Dei.

† Cf. De Carne Christi, 12; De Anima, 12.—Nos autem animum ita dicimus animæ concretum, non ut substantia aliam, sed ut substantiæ officium.

‡ § 10.—Μεγαλειότερα μὲν οὖν πάσης ἀνθρωπείου διδασκαλίας φαίνεται τὰ ἡμέτερα διὰ τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον τὸν φανέντα δι' ἡμᾶς Χριστὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν.

since the soul is subordinate to the Logos, and superior to the body. On this account it has been suspected that a later hand made a correction or at least added the ψυχή, in order to complete Justin's deficient orthodoxy. But as Justin wrote very loosely, that is not a sufficient reason; he might mention the soul last, because it was of less importance to his argument. If the reading be correct it contains the following view; he admits three parts in the person of Christ: he considers the ψυχή as equivalent to the ψυχή ἄλογος, i.e. the principle of animal life as opposed to the ψυχή λογική, i.e. the νοῦς or πνεῦμα; the Logos in Christ occupies the place of this higher rational power as it exists in other human beings. Justin therefore appears to have held already the trichotomical theory of the person of Christ which Apollinaris carried out in the fourth century.

CLEMENT of Alexandria argues against Docetism, that the Son assumed real humanity in order to show to man the possibility of obedience to the divine commands, easily fulfilling\* them himself, because he was the power of the Father. But as Clement regarded the sensuous affections, the feelings of pleasure and disgust, pain and sickness, &c., as consequences of the fall and of the dominion of matter over man, he is led to a view bordering on Docetism. He maintains† that Christ assumed human nature without these defects; that he was not subject to hunger and thirst; pleasure and disgust; that he was altogether raised above sensuousness. Notwithstanding this, he held the sensuous affections in Christ not to be merely apparent; he admitted that Christ eat and drank, but without being compelled by the cravings of nature; that he submitted to them with freedom and with a special reference to men: he was not subject to φθορά; his body was supported by a holy power. Christ therefore felt and acted as man, but not that he shared the wants or desires of human nature, a view similar to that of Valentine that Christ performed what was sensuous in a

\* Strom. vii. p. 704.

† Ibid. vi. p. 649.—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ Σωτῆρος τὸ σῶμα ἀπαιτεῖν ὡς σῶμα τὰς ἀναγκαίας ὑπηρεσίας εἰς διαμονήν, γέλως δὲν εἶη· ἔφαγεν γὰρ οὐ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δυνάμει συνεχόμενον ἁγίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὡς μὴ τοὺς συνόντας ἄλλως περὶ αὐτοῦ φρονεῖν ὑπεισέλθοι· ὥσπερ ἀμίλει ἥσπερον δοκῇσιν τινὲς αὐτὸν πεφανερῶσθαι ὑπέλαβον· αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπαξ ἀπλῶς ἀπαθὴς ἦν, εἰς δὲ οὐδὲν παρεισδύεσθαι κίνημα παθητικόν, οὔτε ἡδονή οὔτε λύπη. Cf. Laemmer, *Clementis de λογικῇ Doctrina*.



different way from men in general. Clement fell into this error through the strong influence of Neo-Platonism and its doctrine of the ὕλη. Christ must be an example of ἀπάθεια; and connecting the dogmatic and the ethical, Clement says the γνωστικός must imitate Christ, so that what in Christ was natural ἀπάθεια, he must acquire and accomplish by moral exercise. With this representation of the less sensuous appearance of Christ, the notion that he was ill-favoured might seem to be at variance, yet Clement adopted this view, and managed to connect it with another, since it appeared to him to convey the admonition to attach no importance to the outward form and to rise from it to the divine. Christ, he says,\* was in the flesh without form and comeliness, that we might be led to fix our regards on the supersensual of the divine causes. TATIAN as a Gnostic had written a treatise on perfection after the example of Christ (περὶ τοῦ εἰς τὸν σωτῆρα καταγρησμοῦ) in which he laid down the doctrine of ἀπάθεια, and reckoned celibacy to belong to that perfection in which Christ is to be imitated. To this Clement objects that what constituted Christ's specific pre-eminence excluded marriage, and that in this point he could not be an example for all. The Church is his bride, and it did not belong to the Son of God to beget children according to the flesh.† Clement regarded Christ's whole life as something parabolical as far as he represented the super-terrestrial in a terrestrial form. To those who were not able to understand him on account of the weakness of the sensuous flesh, he could not appear as he really was. It was not that he presented himself differently according to different standpoints, but generally by means of an accommodation of the Divine to the sensuous standpoint.‡

ORIGEN has gained great reputation by his development of this doctrine. The apologetic interest induced him to defend the doctrine of the God-Man against heathens and heretics. His philosophic spirit which led him to distinguish the different functions of human nature, also occasioned his thinking of methods by which opposing difficulties and objections might be settled. He combats the view§ of the heathen philosophers,

\* Strom. iii. p. 470.

† Ibid. iii. p. 446.

‡ Ibid. vii. p. 704.—οὐ γὰρ ὃ ἦν τοῦτο ὠφθη τοῖς χωρῆσαι μὴ δυνάμενοι διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός.

§ C. Cels. iv. § 15.—Εἰ δὲ καὶ σῶμα θνητὸν καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην

that Christians worshipped a God in a mortal body and thought that he was subject to the sufferings and changes of human nature. Origen distinguishes the more sharply the qualities of the divine and human natures in Christ. The divine Logos was in no wise subject to alteration, but at the Incarnation remained unchangeable in his essence. In another passage he adds, We Christians do not hold the mortal body of Jesus nor the soul of which it is said, "My soul is exceeding sorrowful even unto death," to be God, but as God employed the souls and bodies of the prophets as his organs so the Logos revealed himself in the person of Jesus. The analogy is therefore employed of the connexion of the divine Logos with souls which he uses as his special organs. He was induced by his Neo-Platonic ideas to develop the doctrine still further. Ammonius Saccas is said so to have explained the connexion of the soul with the body, that it lay in the nature of spiritual beings to connect themselves with other beings, and yet to remain undisturbed in their own. As he has written nothing it may be doubted whether this assertion ever proceeded from him. Yet Nemesius who reports it, might have received the tradition through a trustworthy channel, and what he communicates agrees with the character of the Neo-Platonic school. Porphyry, in his miscellaneous writings, also says, that it is very possible for a being to unite himself with one of a different kind and yet the superior being to remain unaltered. According to these fundamental ideas Origen regards the soul as the natural organ of the Logos; to receive into itself and to represent his operations, is its highest destiny. What in other persons only happens in single moments, becomes habitual in those highest human souls which the Logos takes possession of. As it was important to Origen, to suppose pre-existent spirits to be originally all equal and that all differences among them, all moral pre-eminence and divine communications are founded on free will, so he also maintained of the soul of Christ, that it attained to this close connexion with the Logos not according to an arbitrary divine determination nor by any pre-eminence of Nature, but owed it to its love to him and the constant tendency of its free will towards God. He applied

*ἀναλαβὼν ὁ ἀθάνατος θεὸς λόγος δοκεῖ τῷ Κέλσῳ ἀλλάττεσθαι καὶ μεταπλάττεσθαι, μανθανέτω, ὅτι ὁ λόγος τῇ οὐσίᾳ μένων λόγος, οὐδὲν μὲν πάσχει ὧν πάσχει τὸ σῶμα ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ.*

to it Ps. xlv. 8., "Thou lovest righteousness and hatest iniquity—wherefore God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." The cordiality and indissolubleness of this connexion\* which he calls *ἑνωσις* shows itself by the participation in his name, in the divine honours and joint glorification (*συγχευματίσαι, συνδοξασθῆναι*). As the Logos is the mediator between God and the world of spirits, so is that soul between the Logos and all other souls. The efficiency of the Logos spreads itself from communion with that to all other human souls. Origen distinguishes in the human spirit, the *νοῦς*, the power of becoming conscious of God, from the *ψυχή*, the tendency of the spirit which bears reference to Time and the Finite, the capacity of knowing the material world. Before the fall, the spirit was pure *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*, the *ψυχή* was formed in the cooling of divine love (*ψυχή* is connected with *ψύχεισθαι, ψυχρός*) when the soul was connected with the body, and incorporated with the world. The *πνεῦμα* of man is not affected by evil, but where the *ψυχή* and its worldly tendency predominates, the consciousness of God is repressed and the *πνεῦμα* is hindered from acting. If in holy men doing and suffering proceed from the *πνεῦμα*† which operates through the lower powers, this is in the highest sense the case with Christ. The point of distinction in Him is, that by the assumption of human nature everything else is determined by the *πνεῦμα*. Since the existence of the *ψυχή* in Christ appears not to have been brought about by a fall, so the connexion with it is to be considered as an act of condescension on the part of the *πνεῦμα*, which thus made an entrance into humanity possible. Origen regards Christ's body as one strictlv

\* *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, ii. 6, § 3.—Unde et merito pro eo vel quod tota esset in Filio Dei, vel totum in se caperet Filium Dei, etiam ipsa cum ea, quam assumeret carne, Dei Filius et Dei virtus, Christus et Dei Sapientia appellatur.—In *Matth.* xix. 5, p. 187, ed. Lommatzsch.—ἡ γὰρ νοητὴ ἀνάστασις ἐκείνης τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερπεπήδηκε καὶ πάντας τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ, ὡς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἤδη ἔφθασε πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν Θεόν.

† In *Joann.* xxxii. § 11.—Ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἅγιος ζῇ πνεύματι προκαταρχοῦντι τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν, καὶ πάσης πράξεως καὶ εὐχῆς, καὶ τοῦ πρὸς Θεὸν ὕμνου· οὕτως πάν ὁ, τίποτ' ἀν ποιῇ, ποιῇ πνεύματι, ἀλλὰ εἴαν πάσῃ πάσχει πνεύματι. Εἰ δὲ ὁ ἅγιος, πόσῃ μᾶλλον ταῦτα λικτίον περὶ τοῦ τῶν ἁγίων ἀρχηγοῦ Ἰησοῦ, οὗ το πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν τῷ ἀνεληφέναι αὐτὸν ὅλον ἀνθρώπον, τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ διέεισε τὰ λοιπὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπινα.

human,\* subject to all sensuous affections ; but as he ascribes to every soul according to its constitution a harmonious relation to its body, and on the other hand to the ὕλη as the undetermined material, that its various qualities may be imparted, according to the kind of essence connected with it, so he supposed an irradiation of the higher essence through Christ's body, which was most complete after the Resurrection, but existed in various degrees before his death. As the Logos generally, reveals himself in different ways according to various steps of development, so in Christ he presents himself to the bodily eye according to the different standpoints—from one standpoint in his beauty and glory,—from another in his humiliation and uncomeliness ; † to those Apostles who were most intimate with him, he revealed himself in the Transfiguration in the true light shining through the ὕλη. He explains this narrative allegorically : Christ showed himself in his glory to those who could rise with him, and for them illuminated the whole Old Testament. ‡ On account of this quality many did not know him, as Judas was obliged to give a sign to those who were sent to apprehend him. Here then is an approach to Docetism. Christ's body by its connexion with the divine nature after the Resurrection was spiritualized and acquired ethereal and divine properties. Origen was the first to assert the Ubiquity of the glorified Christ.§

The doctrine of a rational soul in Christ was not developed by any one so clearly as by Origen, not even by Tertullian. It was introduced on the occasion of the dispute with Beryllus of Bostra, in the Monarchian controversy. Origen maintained the distinction of the different parts of the person of Christ, in opposition to those, who under the pretence of glorify-

\* C. Cels. ii. § 23.

† Ibid. vi. § 77.—πῶς οὐχ ἑώρα (ὁ Κελσος) τὸ παραλάττον τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ὁρώσι δυνατόν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρῆσιμον, τοιοῦτο φαινόμενον ὁποῖον ἰδεῖ ἐκάστῳ βλέπεσθαι ; Καὶ οὐ θαυμαστὸν, τὴν φύσει τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν, καὶ εἰς πάντα ἃ βούλεται ὁ δημιουργὸς ὕλην μεταβλητὴν, καὶ πάσης ποιότητος, ἣν ὁ τεχνίτης βούλεται, δεκτικὴν ὅτε μὲν ἔχειν ποιότητα, καθ' ἣν λέγεται τὸ "οὐκ εἶχεν εἶδος, οὐδὲ κάλλος" ὅτε δὲ οὕτως ἐνδοξον καὶ καταπληκτικὴν καὶ θαυμαστὴν, ὥς ἐπὶ πρόσωπον πεσεῖν τοὺς θεατὰς τοῦ τηλικούτου κάλλους, συνανελύοντας τῷ Ἰησοῦ τρεῖς ἀποστόλους.

‡ C. Cels. ii. § 64 ; iv. § 16.

§ Gieseler., *Commentatio qua Clement. Alexandr. et Origenis doctrinæ de corpore Christi exponuntur* : Gott. 1837. 4to.

ing Christ, were not willing to distinguish what belonged respectively to the *πνεῦμα*, to the *ψυχή*, and to the *σῶμα*. These were manifestly the adherents of the old, undefined doctrine which also Beryllus held. The synod convened on his account, declared its recognition of the rational soul in Christ. But Origen now exposed himself to the charge of having, like the Artemonites, denied the true unity of the Divinity and Humanity, and, like the Gnostics, admitted a higher and a lower Christ. He strongly protested against this, and said, that though he made this distinction he never separated the Son of God from Jesus.\* Among the charges against which Pamphilus had to defend him, this was one.† In the controversy with Paul of Samosata, it was required to establish the true union of the Logos with the human soul. The Manicheans maintained that in Christ there was only one simple light-nature in a sensuous apparition, and thereby gave occasion for their opponents to insist on the distinction of the two natures in Christ. Accordingly, we find in the development of this doctrine the germ of an opposition; on the one hand, the different parts of the Person of Christ, the distinction of the Divine and the Human; and, on the other hand, the unity of the Person, were brought forward.

#### d. ON THE REDEMPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

W. C. L. ZIEGLER, *Historia dogmatis de redemptione inde ab ecclesiæ primordiis usque ad Lutheri tempora*. Gottg., 1791, in his *Comment. Theol.* ed. Volthusen, v. 227. K. BÄHR, *d. Lehre der Kirche v. Tode Jesu in den ersten 3 Jahrh.*: Salz. 1838. F. CH. BAUR, *d. Christ. Lehre v. d. Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung v. d. ältesten Zeit bis auf die neustre*: Tüb. 1838.

The mode of contemplating the work of Christ is necessarily connected with the views taken of Anthropology, and the Person of Christ, and hence will be modified by the differences of opinion on these subjects. Where the Jewish-Christian tendency made its appearance in an unmitigated form, as when opposed by the Apostle Paul, the agency of the Messiah was regarded only as the restoration of the Messianic kingdom. Hopes were entertained of his founding the millennial kingdom, without any need being felt of thinking of him as a Redeemer. It was thought that men could be justified by the works of the law, and that Christ, indeed, had added some new laws to the

\* C. Cels. ii. § 9.

† Neander's *Church History*, vol. ii. p. 381; Apol. 4, p. 232, 235.

old, or at the most, bestowed many new gifts on humanity, but there was no idea of the moral transformation of mankind by him; here the doctrine of the Messiah was only grafted on the existing Jewish standpoint. In this relation Ebionitism stood diametrically opposed to Gnosticism. The latter, indeed, could acknowledge a communication of divine life proceeding from the Messiah, but the redemptive importance of his life and sufferings was not understood, since his humanity was altogether lost sight of. We have already noticed a mixture of these contrarieties relating to the doctrine of Christ in a Cerinthus and a Basilides; but in the last-mentioned the importance of the humanity of Christ in the work of redemption, is very much kept in the background. Redemption, strictly so called, proceeds from the higher spirit who is connected with him, and reveals the perfect God in this limited world. The establishment of communion with him for the Pneumatici is the most important matter, while the significance of his life and sufferings is subordinate. Basilides held the confined Jewish notion of justification; there was no forgiveness of sins, through grace, but from merit; all evil must be atoned for in a natural way; no sufferings are undeserved, hence none are redemptive. All suffering pre-supposes sin, and is its necessary purification. When the sufferings of Christ were objected to him,\* he would not venture to assert that he

\* Strom. iv. p. 506.—εἰθ' ὑποβὰς καὶ περὶ τοῦ Κυρίου ἀντικρυς, ὡς περὶ ἀνθρώπου λέγει· ἰὰν μέντοι παραλιπὼν τούτους ἀπαντας τοὺς λόγους, ἔλθης ἐπὶ τὸ δυσωπεῖν με διὰ προσώπων τινῶν, εἰ τῶχοι, λίγων, Ὁ δεῖνα οὖν ἡμαρτεν· ἔπαθε γὰρ ὁ δεῖνα· ἰὰν μὲν ἐπιτρέψῃς, ἐρῶ· οὐχ ἡμαρτεν μὲν, ὅμοιος δὲ ἦν τῷ πάσχοντι νηπίῳ· εἰ μέντοι σφοδρότερον ἐξεύσαιο τὸν λόγον, ἐρῶ ἀνθρωπον, ὅντιν' ἂν ὀνομάσῃς, ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, δίκαιον δὲ τὸν Θεόν· καθαρὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὥσπερ εἰπέ τις ἀπὸ ῥύπου· ἀλλὰ τῷ Βασιλείδῃ ἡ ὑπόθεσις προσημαρτήσασάν φησι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἐτέρῳ βίῳ, τὴν κόλασιν ὑπομένειν ἐνταῦθα· τὴν μὲν ἐκλεκτὴν ἐπιτίμως διὰ μαρτυρίου, τὴν ἄλλην δὲ καθαρομένην οἰκείᾳ κολάσει.

This view of the significance of the Redeemer is modified by the account of Hippolytus. Jesus as a pneumatic man, born of the Virgin, filled with the powers of the highest *νύσσης* Θεοῦ, which descended from the region nearest God, and, bringing the powers of heaven with it, reached him, although the Supreme Spirit himself did not leave his place—is a microcosmic compendium of the universe. With the matter which he bore, he had also sin in the abstract, and atoned for it in his sufferings. But his death had also a cosmical significance. As his life represented the Union of the Elements, so was his death the dissolution of them. Each went to its place; the material, the

had sinned, but even here he could not reconcile suffering, absolute sinlessness and rejoined that as all men brought them the ἀμαρτητικόν from a former state, so in Christ must have been a predisposition for sin to which the soul stood in relation. The separation of the divine and the human was rendered more decided by this idealistic tendency; he went to the length of denying and dispersing the history of Christ. The Pseudobasilidians went beyond their master in this tendency, and said that they who professed Jesus crucified were no Christians but remained in Judaism; only were Gnostics who believed in an invisible πνεῦμα, which could enter into all forms, and was to be conceived as dwelling actually in Christ. One party among the Ophites required the initiated a denial of the man Jesus. And where the milder Docetism was maintained, as in the view held by the Valentinians of a σῶμα ψυχικόν of the Redeemer, the conditions were wanting under which human virtue exists; it did not share everything with humanity. Alexander, a Gnostic of this school, asserted, contrary to the doctrine of the church, that Christ must appear in a real human form, in order to conquer sin—that then he himself must have been dwelling with sin in order to overcome sin. A hylic body, in the opinion of the Gnostics, necessarily included sin. A sameness of the work of Redemption for all men was denied by the Gnostics, and communion with the Redeemer was granted to the Pneumatics, Redemption became exactly the opposite of what it should have been—a cause of separation among men. It is strange that Marcion could persist in Docetism, since he still adhered so zealously to Paul's doctrine which attributed such great importance to the bearing

psychical to the kingdom of the Archons, and the pneumatical. The place which he took in his own person, was repeated during the further operation of Redemption in the Universe. Consequently the third υἱός, left behind in the πανσπερμία, was set at liberty, and gradually took its place on the second stage in the super-terrestrial region. In the same manner all the germs of the πανσπερμία were developed and obtained their proper position in the ranks of Being; the σπέρμα ἀρχικὴ is ended, and the order of the Apocatastasis is effected. ] ὅλη αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις σύγχυσις οἰοῦναι πανσπερμίας καὶ φυλοκρ καὶ ἀποκατάστασις τῶν συγκεχυμένων εἰς τὰ οἰκεία. Τῆς οὖν φινύσεως ἀπαρχὴ γέγονεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, καὶ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ὑπὲρ (st. ὑπὸ) τοῦ φυλοκρινηθῆναι τα συγκεχυμένα.—[J]

Christ's sufferings, and since, moreover, the doctrine of the Divine in the form of a servant must have been in consonance with his views. Here is shown the contrariety between his Christian feeling, and his speculative views which he was never able to reconcile. He set out from the doctrines which he already found prevalent in the Church. Baur erroneously thinks that many common ideas first passed from him and the other Gnostics to the teachers of the Church. Such positive influence is at most to be recognised among the Alexandrians; the rest of the church teachers rather formed their dogmas in opposition to Gnosticism. Ideas common to both, are therefore rather witnesses to what Marcion found already existing in the Church; we bring forward principally two points, one is the representation that Christ, on his appearing in humanity, was not recognised by evil spirits as the Son of God, owing to the humiliation in which he was veiled. Hence the devil could bring about the crucifixion of Christ; he knew not against whom he was sinning. Thus the passage in 1 Cor. ii. 8, was explained, that the *ἀρχαὶ τοῦ κόσμου*, if they had known, would not have crucified the Lord of Glory. And so the devil was deceived and suffered damage by urging his claims on the guiltless. Hence, not by mere force, but justly, he has been deprived by God of his proprietorship over humanity. This view rests on the idea that the Redeemer must appear in a sinful nature, and in it conquer sin, and that he could not do it otherwise. In the second place we may notice the doctrine of the descent of Christ into Hades, the *descensus ad inferos*, deduced from 1 Peter iii. 19. It contains the assumption of the efficient power of Redemption on those who lived before Christ's Incarnation. Possibly there had been a preparation for the doctrine in the Jewish Messianic representations. Reflection on the state of the dead in past ages, and their relation to the Messianic promises might lead men's thoughts in that direction. Justin Martyr quotes the following passage from an apocryphal work,\* "The Lord, the God of Israel, remembered his dead who slept in the land of the Grave, and went down to them in order to announce his salva-

\* Dial. c. Tryph. § 72, p. 246, ed. Otto.—'Εμνήσθη δὲ κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ Ἰσραὴλ τῶν νεκρῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν κεκοιμημένων εἰς γῆν χώματος, καὶ κατέβη πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀναγγελίσασθαι αὐτοῖς τὸ σωτήριον αὐτοῦ. See OTTO on the passage.



tion to them." Irenæus who quotes the words with the clause slightly varied, "The Lord, the Holy One of Israel, remembered," ascribes it sometimes to Isaiah,\* sometimes, as Justus does, to Jeremiah;† but they are found neither in the one nor the other. The meaning hardly can refer to the appearance of the Messiah on earth, but rather to his descent to the lower world. In attributing this agency to Christ, it was commonly supposed that the pious under the Old Testament dispensation were thereby redeemed and admitted to Heaven. In the Apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus it is poetically represented how Christ appeared unknown in Hades, and exercised his power. Marcion fashioned both doctrines in the following manner. The Demiurgos had promised a Messiah to the Jews in the Old Testament prophecies. He was to establish an earthly kingdom among the Jews, and several judge the heathen, representations which by no means apply to Christ. But the good God, who only shows compassion, sent his Son in order to rescue the poor heathen from the destruction threatened them by the Demiurgos. The Son of God came merely as an apparition, unknown to the Demiurgos who took him for his own Messiah, and, at first, did not prevent his forming a party. Marcion applied that passage in the Epistle to the Corinthians to the Demiurgos and his powers. When Jesus had already, by his deeds of love, drawn many to himself, the Demiurgos saw that he had been deceived and that his kingdom was shaken, and so stirred up the Jews to crucify him. But this was to happen in accordance with the divine plan. Christ descended into Hades and freed, not the believers of the Old Testament who were self-justified, but led up to heaven the heathen in whom he found faith. The Demiurgos was enraged more than ever; but Christ now manifested himself to him in his divine nature, sat in judgment upon him, and referred him to his own law, that whoever sheds innocent blood was himself worthy of death. The Demiurgos could make no defence, and humbled himself; thus Christ's object was attained, and the kingdom of the Demiurgos overthrown.‡ All the Gnostics, however, did not receive the

\* Dial. c. Tryph. iii. 20, 4.

† Ibid. iv. 22, 1.

‡ See Marcion's Confession of Faith, given by Archbishop Esmig in the fifth century, and translated from the Armenian by Neumann in *Illgen's Zeitschrift für Histor. Theol.* 1834. 1 Heft.

doctrine of the descent into Hades. On the contrary, they rejected it, and explained the passage in the Epistle of Peter, of the appearance of Christ upon earth. It was, therefore, requisite to bring forward the doctrine on the part of the Church, and this happened earlier than has been supposed, before the fourth century. Rufinus in his exposition of the Apostles' Creed, says that this doctrine was certainly in the recension of the Church of Aquileia, but not in others; for example in the Eastern and Roman. The omission might be an indication that this doctrine did not belong to the essence of the Christian faith.

The Church teachers in opposition to Gnosticism brought forward the ideal of pure human virtue which Christ had presented in a real human body, and his true redemptive sufferings. Ignatius says,\* even the Angels could not escape condemnation if they did not believe in the sufferings of Christ. It might be inferred from these words that Ignatius thought that all higher beings needed Redemption and therefore that the Angels were not free from defects; but we are not warranted in carrying out his representations so logically; it was rhetorical extravagance, occasioned by controversy, without a clear consciousness of what was implied in the language. In general, the Church teachers were at that time far from a systematic development of the doctrine of Redemption. Their representations were still chaotic; the germ of the idea of an active and passive satisfaction indeed existed, but without any clear development of its meaning. On this head, there has been a two-fold mistake, sometimes the existing beginnings of many later elaborated dogmas have been overlooked; or, on the other hand, it has been attempted to point out with literal distinctness Church doctrines as if already developed.

Irenæus shows how in the proper sense the Logos is the Image of God; in Christ, therefore, the likeness of God is realized and the Image of God appears in perfection.† The ideal of Humanity is presented in Him. Through the Logos

\* Ad Smyrn. 6.—Καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ ἡ δόξα τῶν ἀγγέλων, καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες ὄρατοι τε καὶ ἀόρατοι, ἐάν μὴ πιστεύσωσιν εἰς τὸ αἷμα Χριστοῦ, κἀκείνοις κρίσις ἐστίν.

† Adv. Hær. iii. 88.—Quando incarnatus est et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in seipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem præstans, ut quod perdideramus in Adam, id est, secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse Dei, hoc in Christo Jesu reciperemus.

alone could God be revealed, but to reveal him to men the Logos must be human and visible.\* By sin we had fallen into *φθορά*; Christ communicated to Humanity an imperishable life, *ἀφθαρσία*, since he was the mediator between God and Man he must be related to both; he had filled his human nature with divine life, and passed through every stage of human life, to sanctify each stage. The holy life of Christ is set in opposition to the sin of the first man.† By the obedience of one man must many be made righteous: he rendered that obedience which God's moral government required; in order to destroy Sin and to banish it from Humanity he assumed the sinful nature of Man. Irenæus also adopted the view that Christ had given himself to redeem the captive, since he represented that Satan had been deprived by God of his power over men not forcibly but according to equity.‡

TERTULLIAN has been adduced as the first writer who applied the term *satisfactio* to the doctrine of Redemption. Yet this is not correct; he never uses it in the sense of a substitutionary satisfaction by Christ.§ It is worthy of notice that he opposes the representation that Satan did not know Christ as the Son of God; he appeals to the narrative of the Temptation and the utterances to the demoniacs.|| LACTANTIUS gives special prominence to what Christ performed as a teacher of perfect Truth, which at the same time he realized. He had to show that it was possible for men to lead good lives, to which the Philosophers could never train them.¶

Among the Eastern Teachers the Author of the Epistle to

\* Adv. Hær. iii. § 7.—ἤνωσεν οὖν, καθὼς προέφαμεν, τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ Θεῷ. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησε τὸν ἀντίπαλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐνίκηθῃ ὁ ἐχθρός. Πάλιν τε, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐδώρῃσατε τὴν σωτηρίαν, οὐκ ἂν βεβαίως ἔσχομεν αὐτήν. Καὶ εἰ μὴ συνηνώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἡδυνήθη μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας. Ἐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν καὶ Θεῷ μὲν παραστήσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώπους δὲ γνωρίσαι τὸν Θεόν. Compare c. 20, § 4; v. 1, 21.

† Ibid. c. 28, § 7.

‡ Ibid. v. c. 21, 3.

§ See Hagenbach's *Dogmengesch.* p. 148, ed. 3.

|| C. Marcion, 5, 6.

¶ Instit. iv. 11.—Ergo quum statuisset Deus doctorem virtutis mittere ad homines, renasci eum denuo in carne præcepit, et ipsi homini similem fieri, cui dux et comes et magister esset futurus.

Diognetus, who was older than Justin, deserves notice for his representation of this doctrine. He guards against a misunderstanding of the idea of Reconciliation; it is not like the reconciliation of two men, as if God had before hated man; God was always good, gracious and without wrath, but he formed an inexpressible purpose which he communicated only to the Son. As long as he had not revealed Him, God appeared not to care for men; but this was not in consequence of unconcern, but in order to convince them that they could not attain to salvation by their own power. When they had been made sensible of their own weakness, then God revealed his grace; he took our sins upon himself, instead of punishing those who deserved punishment; he gave his Son for men for their redemption. To the sin of men this writer opposes the righteousness of Christ; they must be captivated by his love and love him who first loved them.\*

JUSTIN teaches, that after man had fallen by Sin into *φοβρά*, Christ by his life and death freed human nature from death and imparted to it divine life. To his victory over evil spirits belongs also the victory over the sin and delusion of Humanity.† By means of it man has acquired confidence to resist the Evil One. The curse of the Law had come upon all men; Christ took it upon him and endured its suffering.‡ In consequence of the connexion of the ideas of the Victory of Christ over Evil, he opposes purification through the blood of Christ to confidence in a magical purification from sin by the Jewish lustrations. With the victory over sin is connected the Resurrection, for Christ suffered that by rising he might conquer death.§ Justin con-

\* Ch. 8 and 9.—*αὐτὸς τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ἀπέδοτο λύτρον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τὸν ἄγιον ὑπὲρ ἀνόμων, τὸν ἀκακὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν, τὸν δίκαιον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδίκων, τὸν ἀφθαρτον ὑπὲρ τῶν φθαρτῶν, τὸν ἀθάνατον ὑπὲρ τῶν θνητῶν. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἡδυνήθη καλύψαι, ἢ ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη; ἐν τίνι δικαιωθῆναι δυνατὸν τοὺς ἀνόμους ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀσεβεῖς, ἢ ἐν μονῇ τῷ νύμφῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ;*

† *Apol. ii. 6.*

‡ *Dial. c. Tryph. § 95.*—*εἰ δὲ οἱ ὑπὸ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον ὑπὸ κατάραν φαίνονται εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντα φυλάξαι, οὐχὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντα τὰ ἔθνη φανήσονται ὑπὸ κατάραν ὄντα, καὶ εἰδωλολατροῦντα καὶ παιδοφθοροῦντα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενα; εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ Χριστὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων τὰς πάντων κατάρας ἀναδείξασθαι ἐβουλήθη, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀναστήσει αὐτὸν σταυρωθῆντα καὶ ἀποθανόντα, κ.τ.λ.*

§ *Apol. i. 63.*—*νῦν δὲ—διὰ παρθένου ἀνθρώπος γενόμενος κατὰ τὴν*

siders the spread of Christianity among the heathen as a sign of the victory of Christ over the kingdom of the Evil One.\*

CLEMENT of ALEXANDRIA places the redemptive work of Christ, in his revealing God to men, leading the erring to righteousness, reconciling the disobedient sons to the Father and conquering Death. Christ realized the Ideal of morality and proved the possibility of carrying it out into practice.†

ORIGEN regards the temporal appearance of Christ as an image and revelation of what he is and effects eternally as the divine Logos. It was the *ἐπιδημία αἰσθητή*, the temporal representation which in the *ἐπιδημία νοητή* he continually accomplishes in a spiritual manner for the salvation of susceptible souls. On account of the needs of sensuous men‡ who cannot conceive of him as the Logos in the abstract, he must present himself in this sensible form. When through Christ we are led to communion with God and obtain from him the spirit of adoption, we learn truly to know God as our Father. The highest object of Christ's temporal appearance therefore is to raise the sensuous to the ideal standpoint and to form a life in accordance with it, which is the function of Gnosis. Although Origen treats this subjective operation as the principal thing, yet he does not exclude a peculiar objective purpose involved in the work and sufferings of Christ. By virtue of a spiritual communion Christ has taken upon himself the consequences of sin and a participation in the sufferings of Humanity.§ He refers to this, Christ's expression of his soul being troubled even unto death, and the like.|| He was

τοῦ πατρὸς βουλὴν ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας τῶν πιστευόντων αὐτῷ καὶ ἔξουθενήθη καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέμεινεν, ἵνα ἀποθανῶν καὶ ἀναστὰς νικήσῃ τὸν θάνατον.

\* Dial. c. Tryph. § 121.

† Strom. vii. 703, 704.

‡ C. Cels. § 68.—"Ὅστις ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ὦν, διὰ τοὺς κολληθέντας τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ γενομένους ὅπερ σὰρξ, ἐγένετο σὰρξ, ἵνα χωρηθῇ ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ δυνάμενων αὐτὸν βλέπειν καθὼς λόγος ἦν, καὶ πρὸς Θεὸν ἦν, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν. Καὶ σωματικῶς γε λαλούμενος καὶ ὡς σὰρξ ἀπαγγελλόμενος, ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν καλεῖ τοὺς ὄντας σάρκα ἵν' αὐτοὺς ποιήσῃ πρῶτον μορφωθῆναι κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν γενόμενον σάρκα, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτοὺς ἀναβιβάσῃ ἐπὶ τὸ ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν, ὅπερ ἦν πρὶν γένηται σὰρξ.

§ In Joann. xxviii. § 14.

|| Ibid. ii. § 21.—ὥστε αὐτοὺς ὠφεληθέντας, καὶ ἀν' αβάντας ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ σάρκα εἰσαγωγῆς, εἰπεῖν τὸ "εἰ καὶ Χριστὸν ποτε κατὰ σάρκα ἐγγνώκαμεν, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκομεν."

obliged to operate in this manner, in order to free Humanity. Origen could not express himself from his standpoint in the same manner as the other Church Teachers. The question occurred to him, to whom did Christ surrender his life, his *ψυχή*, for human Redemption, and in answering it, he allowed himself to entertain the idea that his soul was given into the grasp of Satan, who lost his power when he would have exercised it upon him.\* Here he assumed that Satan did not fully know Christ, or otherwise he would not have attempted to make himself master of his soul. But in another passage he asserts that he knew him up to a certain degree.† It agrees with his view that he maintains that Christ in his death succumbed to no force, but voluntarily surrendered his life. The proofs he adduces are, that Christ's death was so early before crucifixion in the usual course would have caused it, and that his bones were not broken.‡ In order to illustrate the effects of redemptive suffering he appealed to the general representation that the sacrifice of the guiltless for the guilty could effect their deliverance.§ He concluded that if this were true in other cases much more would it be in the self sacrifice of Christ. The effects of Redemption he thought would continue until evil in all fallen creatures was perfectly blotted out, and therefore to the period of a General Restoration.

#### THE CONNEXION OF REDEMPTION AND SANCTIFICATION.

The ideas prevalent at this period of the connexion of Redemption and Sanctification may be easily inferred from the preceding statements. By faith man is brought into communion with the Logos and obtains a share in the divine life that proceeds from him. The divine life (the *ἀφθαρσία*) which Christ has revealed and presented in human nature, is exalted

\* In Matth. xvi. § 8. P. iv. p. 27, Lomm.—*τίνη δὲ ἔδωκε τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πάντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ Θεῷ μήτι οὐν τῷ πονηρῷ; οὗτος γὰρ ἐκράτει ἡμῶν, ἕως δοθῇ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῷ λύτρον, ἢ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ψυχῇ, ἀπατηθῇντι, ὥς δυναμένῳ αὐτῆς κυριῶσαι, καὶ οὐχ ὀρωντα, δὲ οὐ φέροι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ κατίχειν, βάσανον. Διὸ καὶ θάνατος αὐτοῦ δόξας κεκυριευκίναί, οὐκέτι κυριεύει, γενομένου ἐν νεκροῖς ἐλευθέρου, καὶ ἰσχυροτέρου τῆς τοῦ θανάτου ἔξουσίας.*

† In Joann. xxviii. § 13, p. 343. Lommatzsch.

‡ Ibid. xix. § 4, p. 172. Lommatzsch.

§ Ibid. vi. § 34; xxviii. § 14, fin.

equally above Sin and Death. Thus man is now freed from theoretical and practical evil, especially from idolatry and the moral corruption of Heathenism. The appropriation of Christianity was regarded as an exit from the kingdom of Evil, and the ceremonies at baptism referred distinctly to this fact. But the Church teachers expressly advocate the connexion between Redemption and Sanctification. They deduced new and sincere obedience from faith in Redemption, and repudiated the separation of the forgiveness of sins from Sanctification. CLEMENT of Rome, says in a Pauline spirit,—Called by the will of God in Christ, we can be justified, not by ourselves, not by our own wisdom and piety, but only by faith, by which God has justified all in all ages. But shall we on this account cease from doing good, and give up charity? No, we shall labour with unwearied zeal as God who has called us, always works, and rejoices in his works.\* IRENEUS contrasts the new joyful obedience which ensues on the forgiveness of sins, with the legal standpoint. The Law which was given to bondmen formed men's souls by outward corporeal work, for it coerced men by a curse to obey the commandments, in order that they might learn to obey God. But the Word, the Logos who frees the soul, and through it the body, teaches a voluntary surrender. Hence the fetters of the Law must be taken off, and man accustom himself to the free obedience of love. The obedience of freedom must be of a higher kind; we are not allowed to go back to our earlier standpoint; for he has not set us free, in order that we may leave him; this no one can do who has sincerely confessed him. No one can obtain the blessings of salvation out of communion with the Lord; and the more we obtain from him, so much the more must we love him; and the more we love him, so much greater glory shall we receive from him.†

TERTULLIAN says,—This is the power of the blood of Christ, that those whom it has cleansed, it preserves pure if they continue to walk in the light.‡ Therefore a man cannot obtain purification through Christ unless he always continues in communion with him.

Although in general the connexion between redemption and sanctification was preserved in the consciousness of the

\* I. Epist. ad Cor. c. 32, 33.

† Ibid. iv. c. 13, § 2, 3.

‡ De Pudicit. 19.

Church, and expressions are not wanting which confirm and recognise the truth, that with faith a new life is also given ; yet it cannot be denied, that a lowering of the idea of faith spread more and more, and the Pauline view was relinquished for the Jewish standpoint, according to which, faith is a faith of authority, an historical belief and acceptance of Church dogmas. This unspiritual idea the Alexandrians had an eye to, when they described their Gnosis as a higher standpoint. From such a view it followed that, though the internal unity of Faith and Life were granted, yet it was so expressed, as if love and the fulfilling of the Law were still to be superadded to Faith. To this was joined the alteration in the view of the Law since the Jewish standpoint was confounded with the Christian, and the notion was adopted that men could do more than the law required, the *consilia evangelica*. The revolution in the ideas of the Church and the Priesthood, the notion of a necessary outward mediation for union with Christ, furthered the confounding of the proper Christian standpoint with the Jewish. In this lay the germ of the Catholic element. Men transferred to the outward, what ought rather to have been assigned to the total act of Faith : this was exemplified in the doctrine of the Sacraments, especially of Baptism. What ought to have been ascribed to the continuity of the Christian Life, the progressive appropriation in the faith, was restricted to certain outward ceremonies. All this must have had a great effect on the view of Sanctification.

On this side MARCION may be considered as the first representative of a Protestant reaction. In distinction from other Gnostics he made Faith the foundation of all genuine Christian life, and hence did not come forward with a Gnosis which pretended to exalt itself above the general Christian standpoint. Since he wished to restore the original and pure Christianity of Paul, and to separate the Jewish elements by which he saw it was corrupted, he combated the Jewish alteration in the idea of faith and gave prominence to the Pauline, although his opposition to the former led him into Gnostic errors



## 6. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

H. TH. C. HENKE, *Historia Antiquior Dogmatis de Unitate Ecclesie*: Helmet. 1781. R. ROTH, *D. Anfänge der christl. Kirche u. ihrer Verfassung*: Wittenb. 1837. J. MÜLLER, *Die unsichtbare Kirche Deutsche Zeitschr. für. chr. Wissensch. u. chr. Leb.*: 1850. J. KOSTLIN, *D. Katholische Auffassung von der Kirche in ihrer ersten Entwicklung Deutsche Zeitschr.*: 1855, 1856.

THE doctrine of the Church was a new and essential mark of the Christian spiritual creation. In Judaism the idea of the kingdom of God was presented in a national form, and the kingdom of God was necessarily connected with a particular form of civil polity. Persons first became members of the Theocracy externally by having a share in the Commonwealth and its outward Institutions. On the standpoint of Heathenism there was no self-subsistent independent religious community which could propagate itself, free from all relation to a political whole, but, as in Judaism, the Religious was placed above the Political, so here the Political had the control of the Religious. Hence everywhere in Antiquity there was priestly domination or a State religion, and since there was no religious community which prevailed over all the differences of mental culture, the distinction was necessarily formed of an exoteric and esoteric religious doctrine, the one a religion of the People, the other of the Philosophers. The Christian idea of a Church stands in diametric opposition to all this; it is a living community forming itself from an internal principle, from faith in the Redeemer; it establishes itself independent of all outward forms, and is paramount to all the differences of national peculiarities and culture, since it is destined to embrace all nations, and all classes among them, cultivated or uncultivated. All must acknowledge themselves to be equally dependent on the one original source of life in Christ, and receive it in the same manner from him.

Christ laid the foundations of the Church in the community which he formed while on earth. But during his sojourn here only the external framework existed, as it depended on the outward connexion with him. The internal essence of this community, the all-pervading divine life, was not yet present. The Existence of the Church, therefore, really commenced when the outward model was internally realized in the consciousness of a united Christian life. This common consciousness revealed itself at first outwardly in the phenomena which accompanied the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Here was

the birth-place of the Church, and as from this event, the communion of the inner life in Christ, the Church was formed, so in its internal essence it will always rest on faith in Jesus as its unchangeable foundation.

Its adaptedness for universality was shown in the apostolic age, when the two great divisions of the Church, outwardly very different, the Jewish-Christian and the Gentile-Christian, were joined together by the Apostles as one communion, as far as by their agreement in their internal constitution they shared in a participation of the higher life. Rothe has erroneously asserted that in the earliest apostolic times there was no concrete Church, because the outward bond of unity was wanting; but that which formed the bond of the concrete unity, the consciousness of fellowship in the Redeemer, was never stronger than it was then; and at the time when the outward bond of Unity was formed, the inward Unity was encroached upon. We know how powerfully the idea of Christian fellowship, how strongly the feeling of the common Christian spirit manifested itself, so entirely different from the particularism of the Jews, and the isolation of the Gentiles, and what attention it attracted towards the Christians. Hence also the necessity of asserting afresh the essential principles of this fellowship against such tendencies as threatened to dissolve it, and to bring in again the ancient separation.

One of these tendencies is seen in the Gnostics, who by the distinction between the esoteric and exoteric doctrines of religion would have destroyed the essence of the Church, and in its stead would have introduced a multitude of theosophic schools and secret orders, who, while providing for themselves a priestly mysterious doctrine, would make over the rest of mankind to a mythical popular religion. Hence CLEMENT with good reason says,\* that the Gnostics boasted of superintending Schools rather than Churches. In the midst of conflicts and persecutions the consciousness was developed so much the more vividly among Christians that they belonged to a body destined for Eternity, and to be victorious over all human things. But here the mistake was easily made of confounding the inward and the outward Unity,—the vessel and its contents, which were not necessarily confined to any particular form. Since in these definite forms of the Church

\* Strom. vii. p. 755.

men were conscious of this fellowship, and felt blessed in it, they connected the essence and internal communion with Christ with this outward fellowship consisting in a definite form. In consequence, for the development of this fellowship from within by the relation of the religious consciousness to Christ, they substituted an outward necessary medium of fellowship through this outward visible Church. In proportion as the idea of the Church diverged from its original spiritual significance, the Christian element was exchanged for the Jewish; and in this was the germ of Catholicism. Thus the Jewish standpoint which at first had been overcome, made its way into the Church in another form. It was too hard a task for Humanity to keep itself up to the spiritual elevation of Christianity; and this mixture of the Jewish and the Christian was wrought into a systematic form in order that the pure development of the Christian consciousness might come forth with so much greater power at the Reformation.

IRENÆUS shows the first germs of this perversion; it was matured by CYPRIAN. IRENÆUS regards the Church as the conservator of the doctrine which had been committed to it as Tradition. As it is preserved in life by the Church, so by means of it the Church always renews its youth. We have already noticed that Irenæus ascribed too much to the outward framework of this principle; in the Church fellowship with Christ through the Holy Spirit was to be found; it was in possession of the way to God. It might seem that he derived fellowship with Christ only from the traditionary faith of the Church. This, however, was not the case; but he allowed it to depend on participation in outward fellowship; persons could not share in the operations of the Holy Spirit who renounced the Church; membership with the Visible Church coincided with the internal spiritual fellowship; the outward medium was indispensable.\* It is true he had immediately in his thoughts those who excluded themselves from the Church on internal grounds by erroneous doctrine or immoral conduct; but in his opinion there was always an internal ground when any one separated from the great Church. Where the Church is, there, he says, is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit is, there is the Church and all grace. The order of the ideas in this passage is more important

\* Adv. Hær. iii. 24.

than may appear to many. If reversed, and faith and participation in the Holy Spirit were placed first, then we should have the idea of the Church as a communion forming itself from within; but if the idea of the Church is presented first to the consciousness, it must be for the reason that fellowship with Christ is bound up with this definite form, and so this as well as the possession of the Holy Spirit is made to depend on belonging to this Church form. By the body of Christ he understands the whole great Church on earth. In the Church he beholds the communion of Love which transcends all other gifts.\* Irenæus directed his Polemics against an egoistic, wilful separatism; but it led to his recognising neither faith nor love out of the pale of the Church.

TERTULLIAN goes a step further in attaching merely external characteristics to the idea of the Church. He carried out the principle that, whoever separated himself from connexion with the outward communion, which was of apostolic origin, and had at its head the *sedes apostolica*, in so doing renounced Christ. The outward *communicatio* with this Church was the mark of genuine Christianity, and he opposed it to all the self-will of the Heretics.

We must add to this, the alteration which the idea of the Christian priesthood underwent in the second Century. Originally this was conceived of, in opposition to the Old Testament, in its universality, founded on the recognition of Christ as the only High Priest for all ages, but now, the Old Testament point of view was applied to the Christian Church, and a particular, mediating priesthood was considered as belonging to it, a priestly caste who stood between Christ and believers, and on whom the development of the kingdom of God was made to depend. This was an important element in the alteration of the conception of the Theocracy and in producing an intermixture of the Old Testament with the New. The development of the Episcopal System had, moreover, great influence. Bishops were regarded as organs for the communication of the Holy Spirit, as the special successors of the Apostles, and the medium for becoming connected with the divine Institution of the Church. Here the idea of the Theocracy appears altogether stripped of its spirituality, and the development of the kingdom of God made to depend

\* Adv. Hæres. iv. 33, 8.

on such outward forms. It was CYPRIAN who adopted and matured these ideas ; and through him chiefly the monarchical Episcopal system obtained the ascendancy. He contended for upholding outward Unity against the schismatic parties of FELICISSIMUS and NOVATIAN, and composed on this occasion his celebrated treatise *De Unitate Ecclesiæ*. If we refer what he says in it, to the invisible Church, we shall find much genuine Christian truth directed against separatism and the isolation of the Christian life ; a consciousness that fellowship is absolutely necessary for Christians ; as the branch, torn from the tree, can bear no fruit, so the Christian apart from communion with the Church can bear no fruit ; the Christian life can only flourish in connexion with the Christian community.\* But in consequence of confounding the ideas of the visible and invisible Church he referred all this to communion with this definite, external Body. In his view the Church was an outward organism founded by Christ, of which the bishops were the pillars ; to them the Holy Spirit was communicated through the ordination of the Apostles, and hence they were the indispensable links for connecting the Church with Christ. Only through them could the Holy Spirit be imparted, and out of the Church no one could be saved. *Extra ecclesiam hanc visibilem nulla salus*. It is of no avail, says Cyprian, what any man teaches : it is enough that he teaches out of the Church. It can be only human outrageous wilfulness to substitute anything for a divine institution, to erect a human altar instead of the divine.†

It would have been possible to have stopped at this definition of Unity, but the outward conception of Unity easily led to the desire for an outward representative of it. This was supposed to be found in the Apostle Peter. Cyprian was, indeed, very far from attributing a higher authority to him than to the other Apostles ; yet in the fact that Christ especially committed to Peter the power to bind and loose, he saw a reference to the Unity of the Church which seemed to be represented in him. Now this could be conceived in an ideal manner as if Peter were ordained by Christ to be the representative of Church Unity for all ages. Irenæus had regarded the Roman Church as having been founded jointly by Peter and Paul ; yet afterwards the view was formed that in a

\* C. 5.

† C. 17.

special sense it was the church of Peter, and that the Roman bishops were his successors. Cyprian speaks of it as if it were destined to represent the Unity of the Church throughout all ages. To prove that this was his opinion we need not refer to the passage in the *De Unitate Ecclesiæ*, in which the reading is doubtful;\* it unquestionably is at the basis of Cyprian's reasonings and illustrations, and is elsewhere expressly stated by him.† Notwithstanding this, he is very far from attributing to the Roman Church a higher authority over the other Churches, for he connected no definite idea with this representation though he readily acted in agreement with the Roman Church. But in the minds of the bishops of Rome this idea had already given rise to greater pretensions. The political world-wide ascendancy of Rome was exchanged by them for the idea of a primacy of the Roman Church. This was attested by the conduct of Victor (about A.D. 190) in the disputes respecting Easter, and of Stephen in the differences about the baptism of heretics. But Cyprian who himself suffered from Stephen's arrogance would not yield, but declared that no one had a right to be judge over the bishops, but that each of them ought to act independently according to his own conscience. He firmly maintained, therefore, the collegiate position of the bishops.‡ Thus we see, how from an externalized idea of the Church proceeded the idea of a necessary outward unity, and from that the necessary representation of it and transference to the Roman Church. Such was the germ of the Roman Papacy. If once the spirit of the Gospel is abandoned, and the germ of an error admitted, the door is thrown open for greater and more important aberrations.

Still, there were not wanting reactions against this deterioration of the Church. One such proceeded from the ALEXANDRIAN GNOSIS; its deeper and more spiritual conception of doctrine connected with the ability to discriminate ideas

\* Cap. 4.—Qui ecclesiæ renititur et resistit (qui cathedram Petri, super quem fundata est ecclesia, deserit) in ecclesia se esse confidit, &c.!

† Epist. 55. Baluz. Goldhorn. c. 19.—Petri cathedram atque ecclesiam principalem, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est.

‡ Epist. 72, c. 4.—Qua in re nec nos vim cuiquam facimus aut legem damus, quando habeat in ecclesiæ administratione voluntatis suæ arbitrium liberum, unusquisque præpositus rationem actus sui domino redditurus.

more scientifically, led to a reaction, and to a more spiritual idea of the Church. CLEMENT calls the Church, a community of men who are led by the divine Logos, an invincible city upon earth which no force can subdue, where the will of God is done as it is in Heaven.\* The earthly assembly of believers is an image of the Heavenly.† The Church is the true temple of God, founded by means of knowledge to his glory. It is formed into a temple by the will of God; I do not now speak of the Church as a material building, but the collective body of the chosen.‡ It is true that an error proceeding from the Alexandrian Aristocraticism was attached to this spiritual conception, since this Church was supposed to consist pre-eminently of the *γνωστικοί*. And as from the standpoint of the Catholic Church a false Aristocraticism was established to the injury of Christianity through the idea of a Jewish priesthood, so here from an intellectual standpoint.

The opposition against the first error was conducted still more energetically by ORIGEN, occasioned by the hierarchical pretension of DEMETRIUS, Bishop of Alexandria. He combats those who would derive the episcopal power from the words of Christ to Peter in Matthew xvi., that he would found his Church upon him. These words, he says, refer not to Peter personally, or to a dignity specially bestowed on him, but to Peter only as far as he had spoken in the name of all believers. It applies therefore to all those who acknowledge Christ as the Son of God; the true Church is founded on all true Christians who are in doctrine and conduct such that they will attain to salvation. All these followers of Christ are therefore *Πέτροι*, Rock-men, just as being members of Christ they are called Christians. The kingdom of God consists of such true disciples; it is not here or there; this is the Church against which the gates of Hell shall not prevail.§ The Church is here evidently understood to be a community which does not propagate itself from without, but is formed from within.

CYPRIAN himself had to combat with a reaction of the simple Christian consciousness against his idea of the Church. It proceeded from those who were unwilling to subject them-

\* Strom. iv. p. 543.

† Ibid. p. 500.

‡ Ibid. vii. p. 715.

§ In Matth. xii. § 10, 11. On the Lord's Prayer, § 28.

selves to this outward unity of the Church—since they appealed to Christ's words in Matthew xviii. 20: "Where two or three are met together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." The Protestant idea of the Church is here assumed, but Cyprian would not admit it, but maintained that the words were torn from their connexion, and misunderstood. They could not agree who were not in agreement with the body of the Church. They must be connected with the body of Christ, with the Church; only of such did Christ speak.\*

MONTANISM combated on one side, the externality of the Catholic Church, as far as it made everything dependent on the succession of bishops; on the contrary, it placed something internal in the first rank,—the operation of the Holy Spirit in its new effusion on the Prophets on which the true development of the Church depended. Hence TERTULLIAN says,† the words of Christ to Peter (Matt. xvi. 18, 19) do not refer to Peter alone, nor to his personal dignity, but to Peter as far as he was enlightened and purified by the Holy Spirit. They apply to him as the representative of all the enlightened, and therefore to all who like him have been enlightened by the Holy Spirit. The Church in a peculiar and exalted sense is the Holy Spirit himself; and after Him, men animated and sanctified by the Spirit are so called. Hence Tertullian opposes to the *ecclesia* as *numerus episcoporum*, the *ecclesia* as *spiritus per spiritalem hominem*. According to this, it would appear that Montanism regarded the spiritual internal fact as the main and fundamental thing, and therefore opposed a Protestant element to Catholicism; it seems as if it would say, *ubi spiritus ibi ecclesia*. But the agreement with Protestantism is only in the opposition; the principle is different. The reference here is not to such an

\* De Unit. Eccles. c. 12.

† De Pudicit. 21.—Secundum enim Petri personam spiritualibus potestas ista conveniet aut apostolo aut prophetæ. Nam et ecclesiæ proprie et principaliter ipse est spiritus, in quo est trinitas unius divinitatis pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Illam ecclesiam congregat, quam dominus in tribus posuit. Atque ita exinde etiam numerus omnes, qui in hanc fidem conspiraverint, ecclesia ab auctore et consecratore censetur. Et ideo ecclesia quidam delicta donabit; sed ecclesia spiritus per spiritalem hominem, non ecclesia numerus episcoporum. Domini enim, non famuli est jus et arbitrium Dei ipsius, non sacerdotia.



operation of the Holy Spirit as is accomplished in every one through faith in the Redeemer, but of the extraordinary agency of the Spirit through the new class of Prophets; those who are under the influence of that agency are the true *spirituales*, which character is also transferred to those who acknowledge the new Prophecy. Montanism sets out from the same idea of the Catholic Church, since it derives it from the *sedes apostolicæ*, only it gives prominence to the contrariety of the true and the false Church. Therefore, the element of externality and the confounding of the Jewish and Christian standpoints are to be found in it, only in a different manner. From the Catholic standpoint everything depends on the Episcopal Succession; here the development of the Church is carried on by order of Prophets: in the former, the Old Testament idea of Priesthood is conspicuous; in the latter, that of a prophetic order. There is an important distinction which passed over from Montanism to the Catholic Church. We have already noticed in treating of the doctrine of Tradition, that Montanism set itself against a fixed unalterable Tradition. The Catholic Church adopted its own view, for which we may observe a preparation made by Cyprian. If at an earlier period the Catholic doctrine was simply conservative, a progressive element was now added to it,—the constant development of the Church guided by the Holy Spirit, only with this difference, that Montanism derived it from new extraordinary revelations, but the Catholic standpoint from the internal development of Christianity, from the organic operation of the Holy Spirit in the Church. What was effected according to Montanism through the medium of the new Prophetic order, was to be brought about in the Catholic Church through the organism already existing,—the Episcopal order. From this quarter the tenet went forth that the convocation of the Bishops was the organ for this operation of the Bishops. As early as the third century the Provincial Synods were regarded as the channels of spiritual illumination. It was only through the conferences of the Provincial Synods that a general conformity could be obtained at this period. A universal organ of this kind was not possible till the succeeding age.

A reaction of Separatism against the Catholic idea of the Church proceeded from the followers of NOVATIAN. The

*principle* of externality was at the basis of this opposition to the Catholic *form* of externality. Novatian maintained that the Church in order to preserve its purity and holiness must exclude all the unworthy members who had broken their baptismal vow by deadly sins, and never readmit them; otherwise it would be itself defiled and lose the character of Catholicity, and all the immunities granted to it by Christ. If we consider the mutual relation of the two tendencies, they both set out with confounding the visible and invisible Church, since they assign the predicates which belong to the Church as a divine institution to a definite visible Church out of which there is no salvation. They maintain that this visible Church was as such pure, but that this characteristic did not attach to any community out of her.\* Both lay peculiar stress on the idea of the Church, but the predicates belonging to it stand in the two systems in inverse relation. On the Catholic standpoint the idea of Catholicity presupposes and maintains that the Church carried on through the succession of Bishops is the Catholic; the idea of purity and holiness is subordinated to Catholicity, the Catholic Church remains the pure Church which nothing can render impure. Novatian, on the contrary, made purity and holiness the primary qualities of the Church, and subordinated to them its Catholicity; only a pure and holy Church could be Catholic. The controversy with this party might have led to distinguishing more accurately the various ideas of the constitution of the Church; the issue of the controversy would have been more satisfactory if the predicates of purity and holiness had been referred to the invisible Church, but this distinction was not understood. Cyprian opposed to Novatianism the different condition of the Church in this and the future life: *here* the worthy and unworthy are mixed together; *there* they are separated from one another; he reproached them with arbitrarily attempting to effect that separation here which can only take place in the future.

#### f. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS.

The doctrine of the Sacraments bears an analogy to that of the Church, since there is in it a combination of two things: something internal and divine, and an outward sign. Thus in the Church we must distinguish between the internal fellow-

\* Neander's Church History, i. 344.

ship and the representation of the Church in a definite form. Our attention is therefore called to two objects: the manner in which the consciousness is developed of the nature of the internal reality, and the relation of the internal to the external. The consciousness of the essential nature of the Sacraments might be pure, and yet an external conception be formed of them, as we have noticed in Irenæus's idea of the Church. We might expect similar results in the doctrine of the Sacraments, since the same mental tendencies were in operation, as concerning the doctrine of the Church. In reference to this externalism two forms may be distinguished: either the outward was firmly retained and the inward altogether forgotten, or the two were mixed together,—a superstitious confounding of the inward and outward, such as easily attaches itself to vivid religious feeling. To this externalism was opposed a one-sided internalism,—a falsely spiritual and idealistic tendency. In the former case, too much was attached to the outward signs, because the mind, absorbed with what was divine in the Sacrament, was incapable of distinguishing the inward from the outward. In the other case, things were separated which ought to have been kept together; the former error is found on the Catholic standpoint, the latter belongs especially to Gnosticism.

Vossius  
1691

### 1. THE DOCTRINE OF BAPTISM.

G. J. VOSSIUS, De baptismo disput. 20. Opp. Amst. 1701. t. vi. C. St. MARTIN, Baptismat. expositio biblica histor. dogmatica. Berol. 1831. J. W. HOLLE, Das Sacram. der Taufe nebst andern damit Zusammenhängend. Acten der Initiation. Erlg. 1846. 2 Th. W. WALL, History of Infant Baptism. Lond. 1707. Lat. vert. J. L. SCHLOSSER: 1748, 1753. 2 t. J. G. WALCH, Historia paedobaptismi 4 prior. sæculor. Jen. 1739. 4to.

As baptism forms the initiation into the Christian community, everything was transferred to it which belongs to the latter, whether Negative or Positive: freedom from the power of evil, and regeneration to a new divine life, entrance into fellowship with Christ, and the participation of the Holy Spirit. The reception of the Divine was distinguished from the conditions necessary thereto: faith, the avowal of obligation, to lead a new divine life, forsaking a sinful life, and entrance into the *militia Christi*. But at a very early period Regeneration was connected too much with the outward sign. This may be traced in the Myth contained in the Shepherd of

Hermas, where we are told that the Apostles descended into Hades in order to baptize the Old Testament saints.\*

Baptism must have been deemed of great consequence by the Gnostics, to judge by the importance which they attached to Christ's baptism. Baptism enabled the Pneumatici by the spirit communicated with it, to attain to a consciousness of their nature and to that development of a higher life in which they were free from the power of the Demiurgos. In the system of Basilides there was no room for the forgiveness of sin at Baptism, since a punishment was allotted to every sin without remission. The Gnostics, as may be seen in the Marcosians, had a strong inclination for sensuous splendour, which was not inconsistent with their idealistic tendency. They performed the baptismal rite with much pomp. Only a few among the Gnostics were induced by their opposition to the sensuous, to reject outward baptism as well as other externals of worship, as a degradation of divine things. Theodoret mentions such. Tertullian speaks of a party of Cajanites who rejected outward baptism. These have been supposed to be the Gnostic Cainites; but according to his description, we find many things among them that were anti-Gnostic, and nothing of the extravagance and fanaticism of the Cainites. On the contrary, they gave the pre-eminence to faith, and grounded on that their opposition to outward baptism. Probably we may discern in them a one-sided spiritualism called forth by an over-valuation of ritualism in other quarters. They alleged in support of their views, that Christ had declared Faith to be the principal thing; that the Apostles were not baptized, and that Abraham was justified by faith. The Gnostics would not have spoken thus.

Originally baptism was administered to adults; nor is the general spread of Infant baptism at a later period any proof to the contrary; for even after Infant baptism had been set forth as an Apostolic Institution, its introduction into the general practice of the Church was but slow. Had it rested on Apostolic authority, there would have been a difficulty in explaining its late approval, and that even in the third century, it was opposed by at least one eminent Father of the Church. Paul's language, in 1 Cor. vii. 14, is also against its Apostolic origin, where he aims at proving that a Christian

woman need not fear living in wedlock with a heathen, since the unbeliever would be sanctified by the believing wife; as a proof of this he adds, otherwise the children of Christians would be unclean, but now are they *ἁγία*, therefore, the children of Christian Parents are called *holy*, on account of the influence of Christian fellowship. Had Infant baptism been practised at that time, the argument would have had no force; for they would have been *ἁγία* by means of their baptism. Infant baptism, therefore, cannot be regarded as an Apostolic Institution. Yet in that passage, certainly lies the ideal ground of Infant baptism, as far as the Christian life must form itself in the child who is born in a family already belonging to the Christian church. The mingling of the inward and outward at baptism may be perceived in the intimate blending of Regeneration with outward baptism. This is found even in Irenæus, who sets Regeneration by baptism against the corruption occasioned by the first sin.\* By the holy Spirit, received at Baptism, we obtain fellowship with Christ as the ground of a divine life, the *ἑνωσις πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν*. The Christian cannot enter into union with Christ without the Holy Spirit, as the parched tree can bear no fruit without rain from above. What the Holy Spirit effects on the soul, the water effects on the body.† Thus he assumes a spiritual and corporeal influence, by which a principle of divine life is infused into both soul and body. He considers water as the instrument,—as already purifying for the future Resurrection. In Irenæus we find the first trace of Infant baptism. He says,‡ “Christ came to save all who are regenerated by him, infants, and little children, and boys, and youths, and elders.” Thus he went through every age; for infants he became an infant, sanctifying them; for the *parvuli* he became a *parvulus*, showing a pattern of Christian virtue and obedience. If by the phrase *renasci in Deum*, baptism is intended, it contains a proof of Infant baptism. *Infantes* and *parvuli* are dis-

\* Adv. Hæres. v. 15, 3.

† Ibid. iii. 17, 2.

‡ Ibid. ii. 22, 4.—Omnes venit per semet ipsum salvare, omnes, inquam, qui per eum renascuntur in Deum, infantes, et parvulos, et pueros, et juvenes, et seniores. Ideo per omnem venit ætatem, et infantibus infans factus sanctificans infantes, in parvulis parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes ætatem.

tinguished; the latter possess a developed consciousness, hence to them Christ is a pattern of piety, while to the *Infantes* he merely gives an objective sanctification; we must, therefore, understand the latter to mean quite little children. At all events the Idea is here expressed, out of which Infant baptism must be formed, that human nature, from its earliest development, has been sanctified through Christ. It has a good foundation in the spirit of baptism and in the idea of Regeneration; but the externalism of the conception also favoured it, and it is surprising that this did not earlier occasion its introduction.

TERTULLIAN distinguishes in Baptism two elements: first the negative, which consists in the remission of sins and punishment; this is received by faith, on the invocation of the Trinity; secondly, the positive, the impartation of the Holy Spirit, whereby God enters again into union with man, and which is especially connected with the laying on of hands by the Bishop. Thus he joins Baptism and Regeneration, by which the Soul is freed from the covering of sin.\* Now human nature first attains its free activity. The soul beholds its whole light; the body follows the soul, wedded to the spirit as part of the dowry, the servant, not of the soul but of the spirit. When he attacked the Cajanites† (in his work *De Baptismo*), he showed a strong bias in favour of the outward, and laid great stress on the sanctifying power which was communicated to the water. Still he considered it of importance to enforce the spiritual conditions for securing the efficiency of Baptism. Hence he combated the view, partly heathenish, partly Jewish, that Baptism secured a magical forgiveness of sins; without deep repentance, he says, there can be no hope of forgiveness; it would be like taking goods without paying for them.‡ He also expresses his disapprobation of those who deferred baptism till in danger of

\* De Animâ, 41. — Proinde quum ad fidem pervenit reformata per secundam nativitatem ex aqua et superna virtute, detracto corruptionis pristinæ aulæo, totam lucem suam conspicit. Excipitur etiam a spiritu sancto, sicut in pristina nativitate a spiritu profano. Sequitur animam nubentem spiritui caro, ut dotale mancipium et jam non animæ famula, sed spiritus. O beatum connubium, si non admiserit adulterium.

† Neander's Church History, ii. 154, 390.

‡ De Pœnit. 6.

death, and on the other hand, of those who were over-hasty in administering it, as he thought, by allowing the baptism of Infants. From his language respecting the magical power of baptism it might be expected that he would favour infant baptism, and therefore his opposition to it tells so much the more against its apostolic origin, and must have proceeded from the great importance which he attached to its spiritual conditions. He says,\* "Children ought first to learn Christ, before they are incorporated with him. Why should the innocent age hasten to the forgiveness of sins? How can we think of intrusting heavenly things to that age to which we cannot intrust earthly things?" He met the objection that Christ said, "Suffer little children to come unto me," by remarking that children can only be brought to Christ by instruction and teaching, and that baptism ought not to be administered to them till they know Christ. We should never intrust a person with property unless he knew its value. Nor would the use of Sponsors justify the baptism of Infants, since the issue is uncertain, and they might easily promise more than they could perform. He also proposes the question: How, if any one should die before baptism? In this case, he answers, faith is sufficient for salvation. Many persons have maintained that Tertullian does not speak against Infant baptism absolutely, but only means that it should not be practised generally, so that it is not forbidden in cases of necessity: this is not, however, what Tertullian says. The expressions we have quoted force us to the conclusion that he was an unconditional opponent of Infant baptism. Thus we recognise in Tertullian the tendency of the advancing Christian spirit, which led to the introduction of Infant baptism and, also, that which opposed it. In theory, the tendency in favour of it soon obtained the victory in the Western Church; the magical notion of baptism, and the doctrine of Original Sin procured its reception in the North African Church, and it was henceforward regarded as an Apostolic Institution. Cyprian,† in his epistle to Fidus, attests this, and his testimony is of so much greater weight, because it was confirmed by a Synod of sixty-

\* De Capt. 18.

† Neander's Church History, i. 434. Epist. 64. Goldhorn, 59. Baluz.

six bishops. He assumes Infant baptism to be necessary, because the mercy and grace of God must be denied to no one. If the vilest sinners obtain forgiveness through faith how much more those who have only original sin and not their own sins? This view also implies that unbaptized children would suffer damnation. He considers baptism as analogous to circumcision. In another passage\* he deduces the necessity of baptism from Christ's words in John iii. 5, 6.

## THE ORIENTAL CHURCH TEACHERS.

JUSTIN describes baptism as a λουτρὸν τῆς μετανοίας καὶ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ,† on account of the conversion and knowledge of God connected with it, and so far he contrasts it with the Jewish lustrations. On this subject he says,‡ “As man comes at first into the world, according to a natural law, and grows up in evil habits, so, in order that he may not remain a child of necessity and ignorance, if he longs after regeneration, he is baptized in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. And this bath is called φωτισμός because it enlightens the mind of the Christian.”

CLEMENT calls baptism χάρισμα, λουτρόν as purifying from sin, φώτισμα τελειον. He opposes the knowledge of God attained in baptism, to ignorance and its effects.§ The βάπτισμα λογικόν effects Redemption. Notwithstanding this designation of the spiritual nature of baptism, he does not clearly separate outward baptism from regeneration; hence, also, he adopts the myth in the Shepherd of Hermas, about the descent of the Apostles into Hades.||

ORIGEN, like TERTULLIAN, distinguishes in baptism the negative element, that is, the baptism of repentance and the positive, or the impartation of divine life, into which repentance is transformed by the Holy Spirit. It is the type of universal Regeneration; and in it mysteriously begins that which shall afterwards be perfected.¶ Its highest purpose

\* Test. iii. 25.

† Dial. c. Tryph. c. 14.

‡ Ap. i. § 61.

§ Παιδαγ. i. 95.

|| Strom. ii. 379.

¶ In Joann. t. vi. § 17.—Χρὴ δὲ εἶδέναι, ὅτι ὥσπερ αἱ κατὰ τὰς γεγενημένας ὑπο τοῦ Σωτῆρος Θεραπείας τεράστιοι δυνάμεις, σύμβολα τυγχάνουσαι τῶν αἰεὶ λογῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀπαλλαττομένων πάσης νόσου καὶ



is, to represent symbolically the permanent purifying power of the divine Logos, the purification of our fallen nature. Yet a special sanctifying operation is connected with outward baptism, which is obtained through the operation of the Trinity. Still he regarded it as essential to view everything in connexion with the disposition; the turning-point of salvation is the surrender of the soul to God, and without Repentance, baptism only leads to greater condemnation, because many do not come to baptism with a right disposition; they are not yet regenerated, and the agency of the Holy Spirit is not to be recognised in them. He opposes the operation of baptism to the *μυστήριον τῆς γενήσεως*, inasmuch as every one, as a fallen spirit, brings sin with him into the world. Here, also, the vindication of Infant baptism finds a point of support. We find some expressions upon it in Origen's work, but only in Latin translations, which may have been modelled by a later orthodoxy. Yet, as we have them, not only through Rufinus, but also through Jerome, their authority is so much more to be depended upon. He derives Infant baptism from the Apostles.

MANI,\* also, referred to Infant baptism as a common practice among the Persians. It was therefore regarded, in the third century, in the North-African, Alexandrian, and Syro-Persian Churches, as an Apostolic Institution. But yet we see that it was not the established practice before the fifth century.

As to the question respecting the validity of baptism, differences arose as early as the second century; about the middle of the third a controversy upon it began in the Roman Churches, against the North-African and Asiatic Churches. From the standpoint of the latter, Cyprian maintained that an ecclesiastical rite could only be valid when performed within the pale of the Catholic Church; hence baptism administered in an heretical church was invalid; and, therefore, persons belonging to heretical sects must be re-baptized

*μαλακίας, οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ σωματικῶς γενομένην ὦνησαν, εἰς πίστιν προσκαλεσάμεναι τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας· οὕτως καὶ τὸ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος λουτρὸν, σύμβολον τυγχάνον καθαρσίου ψυχῆς πάντα ῥύπον ἀπὸ κακίας ἀποπλυνομένης, οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τῷ ἐμπαρέχοντι ἑαυτὸν τῇ θείᾳ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐστὶν ἡ χαρισμάτων θείων ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ· “διαίσεις γὰρ χαρισμάτων εἰσιν.”*

\* August. c. Julian, iii. 187.

on passing over to the Catholic Church.\* On the contrary, the view taken by Stephen, bishop of Rome, was, that the validity of baptism depended, not on the subjective character of the baptized, but on the objective character of the baptismal act. Hence baptism possessed an objective validity if it were performed in a right manner, with the invocation of the Holy Trinity, or in the name of Christ. In the Shepherd of Hermas, we find the formula—*baptizari in nomine Domini*; this expression seems to indicate that the baptismal form, in the name of Christ, was the one originally used, and that the other came into use at a later period, in which the reference to the two other divine personalities was developed. Stephen called his opponents *rebaptistæ*, a name which they refused to accept, because they did not acknowledge the baptism of heretics to be a baptism at all.

In baptism we have to notice the germ of the sacrament of confirmation. The imposition of hands by the Bishop was originally a symbol of the communication of the Holy Spirit. Occasions presented themselves of separating from baptism this act, which was originally connected with it. When, for instance, heretics wished to be received into the Church, they were not rebaptized, only the bishop's hands were laid upon them for the impartation of the Spirit. Added to this, there was a desire to distinguish the Bishop from the Presbyter, as the special successor of the Apostles, by this act, and hence the power was assigned to him of communicating the Spirit by the laying on of hands. Thus the doctrine of regarding this act as the seal of the impartation of the Holy Spirit (*signaculum, σφραγίς*). Cornelius, the bishop of Rome, says of Novatian, who had received baptism while on a sick bed, but without the rite of confirmation,—How could he have received the Holy Spirit since he had not obtained the *σφραγίς* from the bishop?† To such lengths, even at that period, had the narrow-mindedness and arrogance of Rome advanced!

\* See Cyprian's Epistles, 69, &c., and the Epistle of Firmilianus of Cæsarea, in Cappadocia, 75, in Cyprian's Epistles. Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 7, 2—9.

† Euseb. Hist. Eccles. vi. 43.

## 2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

A. ERRARD, *Das Dogma v. Abendmahl u. s. Geschichte.* K. F. A. KAHNE, *D. Lehre v. Abendmahl.* 1851. J. DÖLLINGER, *D. Lehre v. d. Eucharistie in den ersten Jahrh.* 1826. J. W. F. HOFLING, *D. Lehre der ältesten Kirche v. Opfer im Leben u. Kultus der Christen.* 1851.

EVER since the Reformation, the examination of this subject has occasioned many violent and perplexing controversies; and in modern times it has again been made an instrument of party interest. For our part, we see no cause for such perplexity; nor can we proceed on the assumption that the correct view of it is that which is found in the earliest Church teachers. For we have already discerned causes which early brought confusion into the doctrine of the Church and of Baptism. If the water of baptism was regarded as a medium for spiritual and bodily fellowship with Christ, how much more readily would men regard as such the symbols which are used at the Lord's Supper. There was a mental tendency which naturally led them to attach too much importance to outward signs.

At this period different representations of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper were held; the conflict with Docetism was the first occasion of their development. As from that standpoint no reality was attributed to the sensuous appearance of Christ, nothing could be said of a participation of his body; and the notion of the impartation of an unchangeable principle of life to the entire human nature could not be entertained by those who denied the resurrection of the Body. The arguments on the other side we find in passages of the Ignatian Epistles which bear the strongest marks of genuineness. They are directed against those who would not partake of the Lord's Supper because they did not believe that the *εὐχαριστία* was the body of the Redeemer.\* The writer calls the Lord's Supper the medicine of Immortality, an antidote to death, a means of everlasting life in communion with Christ.† As Irenæus represented the effect of baptism to be, that it made the participation in the body of Christ immortal, so here the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper is regarded as a means by which the seed of Immortality is deposited in the

\* Ad Smyrn. 7.

† Ad Ephes. c. 20.—*ἕνα ἄρτον κλῶντες, ὃς ἐστὶ φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, ἀντίδοτος τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ ζῆν ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ διὰ παντός.*

human body. Irenæus \* charged the Gnostics with a twofold inconsequence when they celebrated the Lord's Supper, since they did not acknowledge the identity of the God who revealed himself in Christ, with the Creator of Nature; and yet the Lord's Supper was certainly taken from the gifts of Nature. How illogical, he says, is it to consecrate bread and wine to God, if Nature be not acknowledged as the work of God; and then, secondly, the body of believers is supposed to receive at the Lord's Supper the body of Christ, and yet is not destined to eternal life. On the other hand the doctrine of the Catholic Church is perfectly logical; for it takes these gifts from nature which belongs to God—the God who has revealed himself in Christ and confesses the union of the Body and the principle of an unchangeable life.”† The meaning of these words is rendered plainer, and the view we have taken of them is confirmed, by the following passage:‡ “As the earthly bread after consecration is no longer common bread, but consists of earthly and heavenly bread, so also the bodies which partake of the Eucharist are no longer transitory, but are nourished by the body and blood of the Lord.” He expresses in a previous passage the same thought, “How should the body of the believer not receive the gift of God, eternal life, since he has been nourished by the body of the Lord and is his member?” The conception of this Church teacher is, therefore, that the bread and wine by virtue of the consecrating Prayer is pervaded by the body and blood of Christ, and by actual communication of the latter, unchangeable life is imparted to those who partake of it.

The origin of the conception of the Lord's Supper as a

\* H. Thiersch. *D. Lehre des Irenäus v. d. Eucharistie aufs neue untersucht in Guericke u. Rudelbach Zeitschr. f. Luth. Theol.* 1841.

† Ibid. iv. 18, 4, 5 —The Greek text has here *ἐγερσις*, but this is a gloss. *πνεῦμα* denotes in this Church teacher, the divine essence and principle of life.

Compare, also, the edition of Irenæus by Stieren, who regards as spurious, and it seems on good grounds, the whole clause, *καὶ ὁμολογούντες σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος ἔγερσιν*, which is wanting in the Latin version.

‡ Ibid. § 5.—ὥς γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄρτος προσλαμβανόμενος τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκέτι κοινὸς ἄρτος ἐστὶν ἀλλ' εὐχαριστία ἐκ δύο πραγμάτων συνεστηκυῖα, ἐπιγίγειν τε καὶ οὐρανίου, οὕτως καὶ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν μεταλαμβάνοντα τῆς εὐχαριστίας, μηκέτι εἶναι φθαρτὰ, τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς εἰς αἰῶνας ἀναστάσεως ἔχοντα.

Sacrifice is deserving of notice, as it contains the germ of the later doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass. At first this idea had no relation to the body and blood of Christ, but to the natural productions of the earth that were used at the Lord's Supper. As the President of the assembly of believers commonly received the bread and wine as gifts, he elevated them and presented them to God with a thanksgiving prayer, thus testifying that the congregation thanked God for whatever they had, and were ready to employ it for his service. Thus in the sense of a spiritual thank-offering and an act of the universal Christian priesthood, the Lord's Supper was called Sacrifice. Thus IRENÆUS, who contrasts it as a thank-offering with the sacrifices of the Jews and Gentiles, says,\* "Christ gave his disciples an intimation to present to God the first fruits of his creatures as signs of their thankfulness, and as the Church received this from the Apostles it consecrates to God the first fruits of his gifts." The Jews,† who regarded God as their Lord, presented him with tithes, a definite proportion but Christians, his children, present him with all. Instead of any reference to a particular priesthood, we only find the mention of the universal Priesthood. On that account,‡ he says, it is not the sacrifice that sanctifies the Man, but the disposition of the offerer is the cause of God's being well pleased with the Sacrifice. There is only one passage which favours the view of the later Catholic Theologians, and which has been made special use of by them, where according to one reading,§ it is said, *Verbum quod offertur Deo*, which must mean the Logos which is presented to God; therefore, the sacrifice would refer to the presentation of Christ himself. Yet we can hardly make up our minds to accept this as the opinion of Irenæus, who always says, that Christians must consecrate all to God in Christ's name; for example, *Ecclesia offert per Jesum Christum*. We cannot doubt, that the other reading is the correct one, *Verbum per quod offertur Deo*.

We find also in JUSTIN, this spiritual view in the descrip-

\* Ch. iv. 17, 5.

† Ch. iv. 18, 2.

‡ Ibid. § 3.

§ Et hanc oblationem ecclesia sola puram offert fabricatori, offerens ei cum gratiarum actione ex creatura ejus. Judæi autem non offerunt, manus enim eorum sanguine plenæ sunt; non enim receperunt verbum, per quod offertur Deo. Stieren has admitted the various reading *verbum quod*, yet with much hesitation, and explains *verbum* as referring not to the Logos, but to the prayers offered up at the Supper.

tion of the Lord's Supper as a Sacrifice. He says,\* " God receives sacrifices from no one unless through his priests ; but all Christians when purified from their sins are the true priestly generation." He mentions a twofold object in the presentation of the bread and wine ; the grateful commemoration of the redemptive sufferings of Christ and of the gifts of Creation. These two topics are referred to, because by the former all which had been given to Man, but through Sin had lost its just relation to him, is now given back to him. Both objects, therefore, are brought forward in the thanksgiving prayer at the Lord's Supper. According to this, Justin's view contains nothing but what is consistent with the universal Christian priesthood. The Sacrifice in the Lord's Supper is an act belonging to it which the Bishop performs in the name of the congregation. It is not the introduction of a Jewish mode of thought, but of one directly opposed to it.

But we are not to conclude from the spiritual and symbolical construction of the idea of Sacrifice that Justin attached only a symbolical idea to the Lord's Supper. By no means ; for he says,† We do not call this common bread, nor common drink, but as Jesus Christ our Saviour was made flesh and blood by the word of God for our salvation, so also we have been taught that the food blessed by the word of prayer proceeding from him, by which our flesh and blood are nourished (*κατὰ μεταβολήν*), is the flesh and blood of Jesus made flesh. Justin, therefore, had the same view substantially as Irenæus, that by virtue of the consecration the flesh and blood of Christ were really combined with the bread and wine. In Justin there is also a train of thought which is continued in the sentence that follows,—the *λόγος εὐχῆς*, namely, which produces this wonderful effect, alludes to the Logos, by whom the Incarnation was directly accomplished, and who here produces the flesh and blood of Christ. It is not represented that Christ himself is present with his flesh and blood, but that by the

\* Dial. c. Tryph. § 16.

† Apol. i. 66.—Οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον διὰ λόγου Θεοῦ σαρκοποιηθεὶς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἡμῶν ἔσχεν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφήν, ἡ ἡς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολήν τρέφονται ἡμῶν, ἐκείνου τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ καὶ σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐκιδάχθημεν εἶναι.

operation of the Logos who once appeared in Christ, flesh and blood were produced, a reiterated Incarnation, and so far an identity of Christ's body.

The North African doctrine made an advance towards a more spiritual conception. Tertullian sometimes uses expressions as if the bread and wine were only symbolical signs; Christ made the bread his body, i.e., called it his body, to wit, *figura corporis*;\* further, "Christ consecrated the wine in remembrance of his blood."† Yet expressions of an opposite kind are also found in his writings, as for instance, *vescitur opimitate dominici corporis*;‡ yet phraseology of the first kind is most frequent. As sensuous representations are to be looked for in Tertullian, there is greater occasion for endeavouring to reconcile the two modes of expression; especially since his language elsewhere shows that he believed a supernatural element was connected with the outward signs. It was customary in the North African Church to take home the consecrated bread, and eat it early in the morning. This proceeded from a deep Christian sentiment—that the whole life of the believer ought to be sanctified by continual connexion with Christ. Many, however, were not satisfied with the spiritual view of this practice, but believed that a supernatural sanctifying power and a magical effect were connected with the food. To this Tertullian assents,§ for he describes a supernatural effect which passes from the body to the soul. The body, he says, receives the body and blood of Christ, in order that the soul also may be nourished by God. Here he seems to point out two elements: the spiritual communion with Christ in his essential nature, and a sanctifying contact with his body. This explanation is confirmed by his exposition of the Lord's Prayer.|| The prayer for our daily bread

\* C. Marc. iv. 40.—Acceptum panem et distributum discipulis corpus suum illum fecit, hoc est: corpus meum dicendo, i.e. *figura corporis mei*.

† De Animâ, 17.—Vini saporem, quod in sanguinis sui memoriam consecravit.

‡ De Pudic. 9.

§ De Resurrect. Carn. 8.—Caro corpore et sanguine Christi vescitur, ut et anima de Deo saginetur.

|| De Orat. 6.—Christus enim panis noster est, quia vita Christus et vita panis. Ego sum, inquit, panis vitæ. Et paulo supra: Panis est sermo Dei vivi, qui descendit de cœlis. Tum quod et corpus ejus in

may be understood spiritually, as far as Christ is to our spiritual life what bread is for our bodies, and as far as the body of Christ is signified in the bread. Here, then, he distinguishes from the spiritual communion with Christ that which is effected through the medium of his body given in the bread. He supposes that through the Lord's Supper there is an indissoluble connexion between the body of Christ and the Church. Accordingly, taking all things into account, we perceive that Tertullian, though he certainly admitted no combination of the bread and wine with the body and blood of Christ, and regarded the bread and wine in themselves as symbols of the body and blood of Christ, maintained the existence of a supernatural element in the Lord's Supper and a supernatural connexion with the body of Christ for the sanctification of the whole man.

CYPRIAN speaks of the blood of Christ which is drunk, and is in the wine,\* but the force of this expression is weakened by the context, since he is aiming to prove that the mixture of water and wine is necessary, against those who merely used water at the Lord's Supper. The water is a symbol of the Church, and by its being mixed with the wine, the union of the Church with Christ is signified. It might be inferred from this language, that he held the wine to be only a symbol of the blood of Christ. But his comparisons are not to be taken too strictly; he likens the effects of the Lord's Supper to the usual effects of wine; the heart of man is exhilarated by the Lord's Supper; it is no more rendered gloomy by Sin, but attains to joy in the divine grace.† Cyprian also thought, that a certain sanctifying contact with the body of Christ was connected with the Lord's Supper. Christ, he says, is the bread of those who touch his body; to be excluded from the Lord's Supper is to be far from the sanctifying power of

*pane censetur: Hoc est corpus meum. Itaque petendo panem quotidianum perpetuam postulamus in Christo et individuitatem a corpore ejus.*

\* Ep. 63, c. 2, 13.—Non quia nos omnes portabat Christus, qui et peccata nostra portabat, videmus, in aqua populum intelligi, in vino vero ostendi sanguinem Christi. Quando autem in calice, vino aqua miscetur, Christo populus adunatur, et credentium plebs ei, in quem credidit, copulatur et conjungitur.

† C. 11.



Christ and his body.\* Cyprian's views were probably similar to those of Tertullian. That he admitted a supernatural element in the Lord's Supper is evident also from his legendary narratives of the consequences of partaking unworthily of it.†

Infant communion was introduced along with Infant baptism, and in this practice there was assumed to be a sanctifying operation independently of an intelligent reception. As the unconditional necessity of baptism was inferred from our Lord's conversation with Nicodemus, so from the words in the 6th chapter of John's Gospel respecting eating and drinking the flesh and blood of Christ it was concluded that no one could have eternal life without partaking of the Lord's Supper, and hence it was given to children immediately after baptism. Cyprian adopted this view,‡ yet still held it necessary, immediately to guard against the moral indolence which might arise from so objective a conception of the Lord's Supper, and to require that Faith should show itself active in works. In Cyprian we first observe the transition from the idea of a spiritual sacrifice to the later catholic view. The sacrificial act at the Lord's Supper he refers to the sacrifice of Christ; the Body and Blood of Christ are offered (*sanguis Christi offertur*). Hence he requires § a correspondence between the sacrificial act and the sacrifice offered by Christ in order to a right celebration of the Lord's Supper. And with this view, notions of magical efficacy were connected. The Christian priesthood formed on the model of the Old Testament, seemed to require a sacrifice and one of a higher kind: the celebration of the Lord's Supper was regarded as a presentation of this sacrifice, and thus was formed the germ of the Catholic idea of the Mass. In addition to this, in the thanksgiving prayer at the Lord's Supper, special mention was made of those who had brought gifts, and prayer also was offered for those who had died in the faith, for whom their relations brought gifts on the day of their death. The conjunction of

\* De Orat. 18.—He also explains the petition for our daily bread, in the Lord's Prayer, as referring to the Supper.

† De Lapsis, c. 25, 26.

‡ Testim. iii. 25.

§ Ep. 63, c. 17.

THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL went a step farther in the direction of Symbolical construction. The general distinction maintained by it of the *μῦθος* and the *αἰσθητόν*, of the idea and the Symbol, finds also its application in the Lord's Supper. CLEMENT says, "To eat the flesh and blood of Christ is to part in the divine life of Christ by eating and drinking Him; it is to receive the life of Christ."

\* Παιδαγ. i. p. 102. Strom. v. p. 579.  
† Ibid. ii. p. 161.—ή δὲ ἀμφοῖν αὐθις κρᾶσις, ποτοῦ τε καὶ Λόγου,  
ἀλαμβάνοντες ἁγιαζονται καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν· τὸ θεῖον κρᾶμα τὸν  
μένειν ψυχῇ· ἡ δὲ σὰρξ, τῷ Λόγῳ δι' ἣν ὁ Λόγος ἐκείνεται τῇ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ  
In Matth. § 14, towards the end.  
In Joann. xxxii. § 16.—νοεῖσθε δὲ ὁ ἄρτος καὶ τὸ ποτήριον τοῖς μέν  
νωτέροις, κατὰ τὴν κοινοτητα περὶ τῆς εὐχαριστίας ἐκδοχὴν· τοῖς  
υἱότερον ἀκούειν μεμαθηκόσι, κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ

says,\* "When Christ called his body bread, we are to understand by it the Word which nourishes the soul, which comes from heavenly bread; he did not call that visible bread his body, but the Word, the participation of which is represented by the breaking of bread and the pouring out of wine." His representation then is, that as the bread is broken and given for nourishment, thus Christ communicates himself through the Word of Truth which proceeds from him. The communication of this element is a symbol of the communication of the Logos through the Word of Truth. This is the highest esoteric import of the Supper, and known only to the Gnostics (*οἱ γνωστικοί*). But still the outward Supper has its own peculiar reference. The bread used at the Supper, Origen says, becomes by prayer a holy and sanctifying body for those who partake of it with a right disposition. He therefore ascribes the sanctifying influence to the consecration, but assumes, as in baptism, a susceptible state of mind as a necessary condition, and therefore differs from those who ascribe a sanctifying influence to the Elements in themselves.† As not that which goes in at the mouth defiles a man so neither can a man be sanctified by what goes in at the mouth, although simple-minded persons regard the so-called bread of the Lord as something sanctifying. The cause of receiving benefit is the good disposition of the individual, but it is the uttered prayer which is of use to him, who worthily partakes of the Supper.

To sum up the whole: we recognise in this period a three-fold gradation, with various transitions from the more sensuous realistic conception to the more spiritual. On the first stage there was a peculiar penetration of the substance of the bread and wine by the body and blood of Christ effected in a supernatural manner, the participation of which was the means of preparing the bodies of believers for the Resurrection; this view supposes that not the glorified Christ himself is present, but a repeated Incarnation of the Logos takes place, which

\* Opp. iii. p. 898, Ru.

† In Matth. xi. 14.—*καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄρτου τοίνυν τοῦ κυρίου ἡ ὥφελια τῷ χρωμίνῳ ἴσθιν, ἱκανὴν ἀμιάντω τῷ νῷ καὶ καθαρᾷ τῇ συνειδήσει μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ ἄρτου. Οὕτω δὲ οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ φαγεῖν, παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ φαγεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγιασθέντος λόγῳ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐντεύξει ἄρτου, ὑστεροβόμηθα ἀγαθοῦ τινος, οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ φαγεῖν περισσεύομεν ἀγαθῶ τινι· τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τῆς ὑστερήσεως ἡ κακία ἴσθι καὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα· καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς περισσεύσεως ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἴσθι καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα.*

produces mediately body and blood, as at first immediately the corporeal substance of Christ. This would consist with the view of Christ's Incarnation, according to which a connexion of the Logos merely with a human body without a human soul, was supposed. On the second stage no such penetration of the elements by the body and blood of Christ was admitted, but a certain supernatural sanctifying contact with the body of Christ, and inherent to the outward symbols, by the spiritual communion with Christ. The third stage, which Origen occupies, held the symbol and the significance apart, and rejected the representation of a supernatural element inherent in the bread and wine.

The general idea of *Sacrament* was given neither in the New Testament nor in the oral tradition of the Apostles. Had it been formed with scientific precision, the two only symbols of this kind which were instituted by Christ, might have been compared, and what was common to them both might have been sought for; but the idea was formed with too little reflection and very unconsciously from ecclesiastical practice, and thus was applied, not with clear consciousness, but with an arbitrary extension. *Sacramentum* is a translation of *μυστήριον*, and is very ambiguous; it may seem to signify *omnis res sacra*. Hence the term is applied to things of so many different kinds—sacred doctrine and sacred symbols—the whole of Christianity as a sacred Institution—the vow which is taken at baptism as *sacramentum militiæ Christianæ*. No attention was paid to the number of sacred symbols which were regarded in the Church as Sacraments. We have seen how *Confirmation* was added to the two New Testament symbols, owing to special inducements that arose in the practice of the Church. Through such peculiar conditions two other catholic Sacraments were subsequently introduced, of which we find the germ at this Period; the *Ordination* of Bishops, to which, according to the doctrine of a Priesthood, peculiar importance must be attached, since Consecration imparted to the Priesthood the power of conferring the Holy Spirit; the first traces of the Sacrament of *Penance* also make their appearance. As Regeneration and Baptism were not kept apart, and the remission of Sins was attached to the baptismal rite, without its being perceived that the objective of the forgiveness of sins cannot be appropriated by a rite, but by the subjective of

faith through a whole life—the notion arose that the forgiveness of sins which is obtained through Christ, referred only to sins committed before baptism. The question was now started, What would happen if the baptismal covenant were violated by gross sins? It was believed that for sins after baptism the divine justice required another satisfaction, namely, good works and voluntary penances; the continued performance of good works obtained the forgiveness of the *peccata venalia*. Thus Cyprian\* speaks of the continued performance of good works as a kind of repeated baptism by which the divine grace was obtained. This expression of a baptism continued through the whole life might harmonize with evangelical representations, but he explains it to mean, that good works must make good, what baptism had promised, and constantly render satisfaction. An erroneous view of good works is here implied, since they are not understood to be in connexion with faith. But good works alone could furnish no satisfaction for *peccata mortalia*; further punishments voluntarily undergone were required; a juridical view of penance and the spiritual judgments it imposed, of which traces are to be found in Tertullian.† Absolution was awarded to those who had rightly performed penance; here the representation of Absolution as a priestly act finds a point of connexion, inasmuch as the power of the keys conferred on the Apostles, belonged to the bishops and gave them the right to absolve the penitent. Controversies at this period were connected with these errors in reference to penance and absolution; there was a strict party which became established through Montanism and Novatianism, and in opposition to one more lax, maintained that since the forgiveness of sins granted by Christ referred only to sins before baptism, the Church was not empowered to announce it afresh to those who had forfeited forgiveness by *peccata mortalia*. They might indeed be exhorted to repentance, but they could not be absolved by the bishops; hence the maxim maintained in the Novatian controversy, that, if

\* De Op. et Eleem. 2.—Et quia semel in baptismo remissa peccatorum datur, assidua et jugis operatio baptismi instar imitata Dei rursus indulgentiam largitur.

† For example, De Pœnit. c. 5, per delictorum poenitentiam Domino satisfacere.

the Church received such into its communion, it would forfeit the appellation of the pure Catholic Church,

#### g. ON ESCHATOLOGY.

GIESSEL, *Dogmengeschichte* herausg. Von Redepenning. 1855.

In this doctrine we must distinguish between what relates to the development of the Church as a whole till its completion, and the development of individual believers after death. The New Testament has given only fragments of the Dogma, and thus leaves greater room for the private opinion of individuals; it is also easier to fall into error, since men are disposed to assert too much, regardless of the limits of human knowledge. The words of Christ have this pre-eminence over the words of every other teacher, that they go beyond the development of centuries and anticipate them. We cannot say of their contents that they must be best understood in the first ages of the Church, for the progress of development itself must contribute to reveal the inexhaustible truth of these words. This remark applies to the parable in which the kingdom of God is compared to leaven. The lesson it teaches that Christianity acting from within must pervade and ennoble all the branches of human life, could not clearly be understood in the first ages; the whole development of Christian morals is nothing more than the unfolding of what is contained in these words. With this is closely connected what Christ has spoken of his advent in Humanity as the closing point of all which is to be effected through Christianity as a leaven for its development. In the first age the earnest gaze of believers was directed only to the last coming of Christ; they overlooked all intervening objects, the windings of the road. This anticipation of the end was, perhaps, necessary for that age, for eschatological errors had in them something not unnatural; it belonged to them that the conflict of the Church on earth was looked upon only as a conflict against the Pagan world; the opposition of the Pagan State was believed to be perpetual, and it was never imagined that it would readily subordinate itself to the Church, in consequence of her internal development. Origen first formed the idea, that the powers of earth would at last be necessitated to bow to the inherent power of Christianity. From the standpoint of others, it was the return of Christ which would realize this event, by its supernatural

and immediate operation. The idea was formed, which contained a great truth, that the conflict with the world would become more intense, and Evil would reach its culminating point in Antichrist, and then Christ's wondrous advent would effect the triumph of the Church. The first persecution of the Christians by Nero had made a great impression upon them, and even among the heathen, the notion was prevalent that he was not dead. This fabulous rumour assumed a Christian form, and it was believed that he would come again as Antichrist; we find this in the pseudo-Sibylline books. To the idea of the conflict and victory of the Church, through Christ, another was added, that the Church on earth would enjoy an intervening period of triumph and of sovereignty, until the complete establishment of the reign of Heaven. The idea of a millennial reign proceeded from Judaism, for among the Jews the representation was current, that the Messiah would reign a thousand years on earth,\* and then bring to a close the present terrestrial system. This calculation was arrived at, by a literal interpretation of Ps. xc. 4, "A thousand years are in thy sight as one day." It was further argued that as the World was created in six days, so it would last six thousand years, the seventh thousand would be a period of repose, a sabbath on Earth, to be followed by the destruction of the World. The doctrine of the Millennial reign, or Chiliasm, was not held everywhere in the same form. By many it was held spiritually, and clashed not with the Christian spirit, and the doctrine of Scripture respecting a future life, as it was made to consist only in the predominance of goodness and the union of all the pious; thus we find it in the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas.† But a sensuous rude fancy formed gross images of this reign; and such products of Jewish imagination passed over to the Christians. In Phrygia, representations of this kind appear to have spread widely, being favoured by the national character, which was inclined to enthusiasm and superstition. An instance of this is to be found in PAPIAS, bishop of Hierapolis, in the first half of the second century. He occupied himself with collecting the sayings of Christ from tradition, and put them together in his

\* Corrodi, *Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus*, 3 Th. 1781—94.  
W. Munscher, *Entwicklung der Lehre vom tausendjährigen Reich in den 3 ersten Jahrhunderten*, in Henke's *Magazin*, iv. 233.

† C. xv.

work, entitled, *κυριακῶν λογίων ἐξηγήσεις*.\* He interpreted the words of Christ with a gross literality, and favoured the most monstrous representations of the rebuilding of Jerusalem, and the colossal vines and grapes of the millennial reign. Such a Chiliasm promoted a fleshly Eudamonism, and thus contributed to present Christianity to cultivated heathens in a false light. One extreme called forth another, the Gnostic spiritualism, by which again, in its turn, Chiliasm was strengthened. Meanwhile we must guard against judging of the religious standpoint, on which we find such representations made, altogether according to them. We must distinguish between what had its foundations in the depths of the soul, and the inadequate form which proceeded from a different course of training, or in other words, between the generous wine of Christianity, and the rude skin into which it was poured. Certain coarse representations might co-exist with a depth of Christian life, and would not warrant our imputing them to a thoroughly fleshly disposition. How unjust this would be, we may see from the instance of IRENÆUS, a man assuredly of a truly Christian spirit, as is manifest from the tenor of his thinking. He had most correct ideas of the nature of salvation; he made it to consist in perfect communion with God, and the development of the divine life, and was very far from making the love of God subservient to the gratification of the senses: he regarded the millennial reign as a preliminary step towards a higher development. It is true, he received the traditions of Papias, such as the monstrous fiction of the millennial vines,† and thus exemplified the injurious influence of an uncritical use of tradition. We see that Chiliasm was propagated from Lesser Asia through Papias, Irenæus and Justin,‡ but our knowledge of the times is too defective to enable us to assert, that at any one period it was universally prevalent. Irenæus § shows us a trace of opponents of Chiliasm, who were distinct from the Gnostics. He vindicates against them the literal sense of biblical passages which they interpreted spiritually. Monism countenanced Chiliasm; it was its favourite idea. It corresponded with its abrupt Supernaturalism, which admitted

\* Euseb. Hist. Eccles. iii. 39. Cf. Iren. Adv. Hær. v. 33, 3.

† Iren. Adv. Hær. v. 33, 3.

‡ Dial. c. Tryph. § 80, 81.

§ Adv. Hær. v. 32.



no harmony between the divine and human, but only prominence to their contrariety, to represent the triumphant Christianity, as coming from without, with the sudden advent of Christ, and the erection of a millennial reign. But the form in which Montanism favoured the millenarian appears to be of a different origin from Judaism; for Chiliasm that originated in that quarter, and the contrary opinion, supposed that Jerusalem would be the seat of the kingdom; but the Montanists expected that a magnificence of prodigious size, the heavenly Jerusalem, would descend upon the earth. Not that all the Montanists entertained such sensuous representations; Tertullian, at least, placed the happiness of that period in the enjoyment of spiritual blessings of all kinds, and combated the carnal expectations of the Chiliasm. The opposition against Montanism was one principal cause of the proscription of the sensuous Chiliasm. The zealous opponents of Montanism were also those of Chiliasm, and we see, in the Roman Church, that the opposition against the two was simultaneous; perhaps this hostile tendency had existed from an earlier date, but had not till this time appeared as open opposition. Caius the Presbyter, in his work against the Montanist Proculus,\* pointedly combated Chiliasm, and he, to make it odious, traced to Cerinthus; he accused him of indulging in sensuous representations of the happiness of the millennial reign, and of having forged, under the name of the great Apostle, a revelation, said to have been communicated by Angels. It is a question whether Caius referred to an apocryphal work, or to the Apocalypse, under the name of the great Apostle. As the adherents of Chiliasm supported it by the Apocalypse, its opponents would be easily prejudiced against that book. Both agreed in interpreting all its contents with gross literalness. The second opposition against Chiliasm proceeded from the Alexandrian School. We find it in Clement; and it is continued still further by Origen, who opposed his gnostic allegorical mode of Interpretation to the sensuous mode of the Chiliasm. He dreaded the prejudice which these views would rouse in the heathen against Christianity. In those parts of Egypt where the Grecian colonization had not reached, among the Coptic population, a very strong opposition was made to Origen. After his death, Nepos, a bishop in the house of Arsinoë,

\* Euseb. Hist. Eccl. v. 20, iii. 28. Cf. vii. 26.

at the head of this party; in a work entitled, ἑλιγχος τῶν ἀλληγοριστῶν, he defended Chiliasm with explanations and confutations from the Apocalypse, and his expositions were regarded as oracular. After him, the presbyter Coracion was a leader of this party, and the Church was threatened with a grievous schism; but the liberality and moderation of Dionysius the bishop of Alexandria, in which he showed himself worthy of his teacher Origen, overcame the opposition. Instead of carrying matters with a high hand, he invited the clergy and congregations of the Alexandrian Church, who had introduced heretical opinions, to a conference; he listened patiently to their arguments which he set himself to refute, and after a discussion which lasted three days, they confessed themselves overcome, and abjured their opinions. In consequence of this he wrote a work περὶ ἐπαγγελιῶν.\* By the co-operation of these powerful influences Chiliasm fell into disrepute, and at the end of this period its only representatives were Lactantius, and Victorinus, bishop of Petavium, in his work *De fabrica mundi*. Some persons renounced these notions and joined the Roman Church.

As the millennium was regarded as a sort of intermediate state in reference to the collective development of believers, so for individuals the sojourn in Hades was looked upon as an intermediate state† between their earthly existence and the life consequent on the Resurrection. The Gnostics were opponents of this doctrine, as with the exception of Marcion they denied the *descensus Christi ad inferos*. They understood by the *infern*i the kingdom of the Demiurgos, and thought that Christ had obtained for believers the power to enter heaven after death. So far Marcion agreed with them, since he maintained that those who stood in communion with Christ were freed from the power of the Demiurgos by his descent into Hades.

IRENÆUS† vindicated the doctrine of the Intermediate State in Hades against the Gnostics, but, as it appears, not against

\* Euseb. Hist. Eccl. vii. 24.

† J. F. Baumgarten, *Historia Doctrinæ de Statu Animarum a Corpore Separat.*: Hal. 1754. 4to. J. A. Ernesti, *De Veter. Patr. Opinione de Statu Animarum a Corpore Sejunctis. Excurs. in lect. Academ. in Epist. ad Hebr.*: Lips. 1795.

† V. 21.

them only; he speaks of persons who were in other respects orthodox, but did not assent to this doctrine, so that it seems to have experienced a reaction perhaps in connexion with Chiliasm, with which it might easily have been mixed up. Tertullian also combats those who thought that believers, after death, would immediately be taken to heaven: \* he wrote a book upon it, which is lost. He only makes an exception in favour of Patriarchs, Prophets, and Martyrs—for whom the *baptismus sanguinis* was equivalent to a second baptism—that they enter Paradise at once, because they do not need purification like the rest. But according to him, this state is not, properly speaking, the kingdom of Heaven—into which they will not enter till after Christ's Advent—but corresponds to the state of happiness enjoyed by the first man. In the distinction here paid to the Martyrs, we may perceive that overvaluation of Martyrdom against which Cyprian had to contend. In reference to the rest, Tertullian admitted that in the intermediate state they had a foretaste either of happiness or of impending punishment.

With this representation of an intermediate state in Hades, it was not difficult to connect the notion of a continued penance and purification of believers after death. The source of this is to be sought for in the East, namely, in the ancient Persian doctrine of a purifying conflagration which was to precede the victory of Ormuz, and consume everything that was impure. It passed from them to the Jews, and then to the Christians. The notion of such a fire is found in the pseudo-Sibylline books, and the Clementine Homilies. It implies the belief that evil is inherent to matter, and must be purged out of it. At the same time a practical injury resulted from its connexion in the Homilies with an unspiritual idea of Monotheism and of faith. They made it the privilege of all who believed in the true God, even though they led bad lives, to attain salvation by this purifying process. In the Western Church, the doctrine of a purgatory was held in connexion with that of Hades. Hence TERTULLIAN explains Matt. v. 25, that even the least sin may be atoned for in Hades by a delay in the Resurrection.† Among

\* De Anim. c. 55.—Habet etiam de Paradiso a nobis libellum, quo constituimus, omnem animam apud inferos sequestrari in diem Domini.

† Ibid. c. 58.—In summa, quum carcerem illum, quem evangelium

the Western Church Teachers, CYPRIAN \* is the first in whom we find the trace of a belief in a purifying fire. Yet his meaning is disputable, since the words might apply to a purification through repentance in the present life, though it is more probable that they relate to the state after death. Certainly, for the words *purgari diu igne*, there is another reading, *purgari diutine*. In the Oriental Church, we find the idea refer to the purifying fire which must precede the consummation of the kingdom of God. Clement of Alexandria † speaks of a purification of the wicked by fire. Origen declares himself against the literal interpretation; ‡ the expression of an *ignis purgatorius* must be understood figuratively; it is a fire which every one brings upon himself by his own sins. God places souls in such situations as to render the anguish for their sins more poignant. Also the words in 1 Cor. iii. 13, which by many are referred to the purgatorial fire, he interprets symbolically. § He urges as a reason, that if this passage is understood literally, the plainest contradictions would follow.

It was natural for the Christians of this age, who were converted from the midst of heathenism, to feel particular

demonstrat, inferos intelligamus et novissimum quadrantem modicum quoque delictum mora resurrectionis illic luendum interpretemur, nemo dubitabit, animam aliquid pensare penes inferos salva resurrectionis plenitudine per carnem quoque.

\* Ep. 55. Baluz. 52. c. 17.—Aliud est ad veniam stare, aliud ad gloriam pervenire, aliud missum in carcerem non exire inde, donec solvat novissimam quadrantem, aliud statim fidei et virtutis accipere mercedem, aliud pro peccatis longo dolore cruciatum emundari et purgari diu igne, aliud peccata omnia passione purgasse, aliud denique pendere in diem iudicii ad sententiam Domini, aliud statim a Domino coronari.

† Strom. v. p. 549.—οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας μαθὼν τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων.

‡ Homil. in Jerem. ii. 3. See Guericke, De Scholâ Alexandrinâ, ii. 294.

§ περὶ ἀρχῶν, ii. c. 10, § 4. Contra Cels. iv. 13.—Εἰ τροπολογεῖται τὰ τοῦ φαύλου ἔργα λεγόμενα εἶναι ξύλα ἢ χόρτος ἢ καλάμη, πῶς οὐκ αὐτόθεν προσπίπτει ποδαπὸν πῦρ παραλαμβάνεται, ἵνα τὰ τοιαῦτα ξύλα ἀναλωθῇ; Οὐκοῦν ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν πῦρ καταναλίσκων ἐστίν, ὡς ἀποδεδωκάμεν; καὶ οὕτως εἰσπορεύεται, ὡς πῦρ χωνευτηρίου, χωνεύσων τὴν λογικὴν φύσιν, πεπληρωμένην τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας μολύβδου, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκαθάρτων ὑλῶν, τὴν τοῦ χρυσοῦ (ἐν οὕτως ὀνομάσω) φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τὴν ἀργύρου, δολωσάντων.

sympathy for the fate of the heathen. The question was forced upon them, what lot awaited those heathens who lived before the advent of Christ? The prevalent view was that of an unconditional condemnation of the heathen, in accordance with the stern opposition to paganism, and the literal exposition and isolation of the passages respecting the condemnation of unbelievers. Marcion belonged to the few who came to a different conclusion, since he regarded the *descensus ad inferos* as intended to benefit the heathen who were in need of redemption. Perhaps in the legend of the descent of the Apostles to Hades, there might be a vague notion of the restoration of those who had not arrived at the knowledge of Christ in the present life. The Alexandrian Church Teachers expressed this opinion very distinctly.\* According to them discipline and reformation were the only ends of punishment, so that it could not be eternal; the final end is ἀποκατάστασις, the entire freedom from evil. Hence Clement says: "If in this life there are so many ways for purification and repentance, how much more should there be after death! The purification of souls, when separated from the body, will be easier. We can set no limits to the agency of the Redeemer; to redeem, to rescue, to discipline, is his work; and so will he continue to operate after this life."† Clement did not deem it proper to express himself more fully respecting this doctrine, because he considered that it formed a part of the Gnosis. Hence he says: "As to the rest I am silent, and praise the Lord."‡ Origen infers from the variety of ways and methods by which men are led to the faith in this life, that there will be a diversity in the divine modes of discipline after death; notwithstanding this, however, he considers it extremely important that every one should in this life become a believer. Whoever neglects the Gospel, or after baptism commits grievous sins, will suffer so much heavier punishments after death.§ The doctrine of a general restoration he found explicitly in 1 Cor. xv. 28. Yet he reckons this among the Gnostic (or esoteric)

\* J. F. Cotta, *Historia Succincta Dogmatis de Pœnalium Infernalium Duratione*: Tüb. 1774. J. A. Dietelmaier, *Commenti Fanatici ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων* *Historia Antiquior*: Altorf, 1769.

† Strom. vi. p. 638.

‡ Ibid. vii. p. 706.

§ In Joann. vi. § 37, p. 267. Lomm

doctrines, for he says, "It would not be useful for all if they had this knowledge; but it is well, if at least fear of a material hell keep them back from sin."\*

The doctrine of the *Resurrection* and *continued personal existence*,† is not an isolated truth in Christianity, but has a close connexion with the whole Christian scheme. The human personality in its whole extent is destined to be resuscitated in a higher form. Christianity, which will not annihilate but transform, refers this transformation to all the parts in which the human personality presents itself, and therefore to the body; the process of transformation begins in this earthly existence, and will be completed at the resurrection. The form in which the doctrine of immortality was conceived, according to which it was extended to the earthly body, was important at this time, in order to maintain the reality of immortality in opposition to an over-refined spiritualism. This controversy had been carried on with the Gnostics, but it had become more intricate, and the opposition of the Gnostics was roused afresh by the crude sensuous form in which the identity of the body had been asserted, while its advocates were not led to more spiritual conceptions by 1 Cor. xv. This is proved by the writings of JUSTIN, ATHANASIUS and TERTULLIAN. The latter was deeply penetrated with the importance of this doctrine in the scheme of Christianity; in his treatise, *De Resurrectione Carnis*, he defends it against the Gnostics, and makes many excellent hermeneutical observations on the Gnostic perversions of the Scripture. But his Realism obtrudes itself in his sensuous modes of representation. Origen has the merit of greater spirituality of conception, and he endeavoured to find a medium between the views of a heretical gnosis and the sensuous contractedness of the common Church mode of contemplation. Hence he distinguishes between the essence and the special form belonging to the earthly existence—between the material substance as it presents itself in this world and that which constitutes the essence of the body as the organ of the soul. He says:‡

\* In Jerem. Hom. xix.

† Ch. W. Flügge, *Geschichte d. Lehre v. Zustände des Menschen nach d. Tode*, 1799, 1800.

‡ *Selecta in Psalmos*, P. xi. p. 388. Lomm.—Οὐ κακῶς ποταμὸς ὠνόμασται τὸ σῶμα, διότι ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀκριβὲς τάχα οὐδὲ δύο ἡμερῶν τὸ

"Even in this life the body, in a material respect, is not always the same, but what constitutes its peculiar essence as an organ of the soul is an *εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον*, in which the peculiar character of the soul is presented, so that such a body should correspond to such a soul; therefore only this peculiar impress and essence of the organ need be restored, though in a higher form, suited to the higher standpoint to which the soul's existence has advanced. The doctrine stands in connexion with his opinion, that the *ὕλη* is nothing definite, but may be presented in various forms, either higher or lower, according to the different rank of the rational nature. We have already remarked, that at a council in Arabia, he refuted the opinion that the soul dies with the body. Thus in these regions a revolution on this subject was effected by him, though his views of the resurrection soon called forth fresh opponents of a sensuous mode of thinking, such as ΜΕΤΗΟΔΙΟΣ.

πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν.—"Ὅπερ ἐχαρακτηρίζετο ἐν τῇ σαρκί, τοῦτο χαρακτηρίσθησεται ἐν τῇ πνευματικῷ σώματι.

## THE SECOND PERIOD,

FROM CONSTANTINE THE GREAT TO GREGORY THE GREAT.  
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE FOURTH TO THE END OF THE SIXTH  
CENTURY.)

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### THE DOGMATIC POLEMIC, AND SYSTEMATIZING PERIOD.

#### GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

THIS period, taken in conjunction with the former, constitutes the foundation of the entire subsequent development of Christian Dogmas. Both together include the development in the Roman and Grecian nationalities. But the first was apologetic, and served chiefly to exhibit the peculiar character of Christianity in its general outlines and in special doctrines, as it stood opposed to the religions of Antiquity. In the conflict against Judaism and Paganism, and the heresies in which Jewish and Pagan elements were mingled, the leading doctrines became more sharply defined; at the same time various modifications of them sprang up. Divergent tendencies were formed, which though they were unanimous in opposing what was antichristian, gave a peculiar prominence to one or the other specific phase of doctrine. From these different tendencies—though all assuming the same foundation of the general Christian consciousness—the further development of the Christian doctrines necessarily proceeded. As from the fourth century the Church was relieved from its conflict with the Athenian power of the state, obtained political ascendancy, and was left to itself, these doctrinal differences, which were no longer connected with the general question of Christianity, came into collision with one another. From the conflict of these contrarieties it was needful that a higher unity should be formed; there was consequently a striving after reconciling them, and after the construction of a dogmatic foundation. It is, therefore, the characteristic of the age to be dogmatically



polemic and systematizing. ORIGEN, who marks the point of the apologetic period, with the spirit of which he was strongly imbued, forms, at the same time, the transition to the systematizing age. The contrarieties of this period are not merely the Christian consciousness in general, but more distinct reference to particular doctrines. As, then, the former period was most important for the development of what was distinctively Christian, so was the latter for laying a systematic foundation. It was unavoidable, and not in itself injurious, that dogmatic contrarieties should be made subjects of debate. It was impossible to remain stationary at the original apostolic simplicity; nothing living and permanent could have unfolded itself; the process of historical development would have been checked, and nothing left but a living tradition. The most hurtful thing was, that dogmatic one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness which denied the universal character of the consciousness that lay at the basis of these contrarieties, and carried on controversy without tending towards a common ground of unity. The consequence was, that the more proportion as men disputed, they stood at a greater distance from each other. It was injurious, moreover, that the points of controversy were not estimated in relation to the essential nature of Christianity, but whatever was the subject in dispute of equal importance was attached to it. Another evil was that no sufficient distinction was made between Dogma and Life between the diversities of dogmatic conception and the Christian life, especially in the Oriental Church; and hence a one-sided dogmatic tendency which was so destructive to Christian life. Here and there individuals appeared, who at least strove against the excesses of this dogmatism, although even they had not found the right standard for estimating the points of controversy. In the fourth and fifth centuries we find the germ of another extreme in a party which valued little the importance of dogmatic questions in relation to Christian life; it evinced a one-sided practical tendency which led into error respecting the real nature of what was practical in Christianity. To persons of this class Dogma was of no importance; the essence of Christianity consisted in Moral life as if this did not derive its value from Dogma. They are reminded of a passage in the Epistle to the Philippians where it is said that it mattered not if only Christ were preached. This part

first known under the name of Rhetorians;\* and afterwards under that of Gnosimachians.†

The greatest injury, however, did not arise from the intervention of the controversies, but from a foreign influence, namely, *the union of the State and its politics with the Church*. The free internal development of the latter was endangered. Disputes were to be settled by imperial decrees. Thus a variety of passions intermingled with and troubled the dogmatic interest. Hence results followed dogmatic controversies which could not be derived from the development of contraries.

Before the contrarieties had been fully expressed, one or the other party was put down by external influence. The point in dispute perhaps depended on a single word, which had been introduced under peculiar circumstances, and before consequences were expressed, the question was decided. It would be overshooting the mark, if we concluded from these premises, that all these controversies depended not on dogmatic interests, but on the influence of court-parties and foreign influences, and that only the power of the State had produced certain dogmas. When a dispute arose about dogmas, it was not mere logomachy; if a religious interest had not been involved, the verbal dispute would not have excited so much sympathy. Worldly passions at a later period were intermingled, but even these were not sufficient to account for the universal interest. The verbal dispute was a signal which set in a more conspicuous light, dogmatic differences that had existed long before. The genetic development of these controversies enables us rightly to understand them, and teaches us that important differences in theological tendencies were then made apparent which are repeated even in our own times: Moreover, by the caprice of a court, one dogmatical tendency might for a certain time gain the victory, but it could not be supposed that external despotism could control the minds of men for ever. The spirit of the Church manifested in energetic movements against arbitrary impositions.

Athan. c. Apollin. § 6. Philastrius Hær. 91. Prædestinatus . 72.

Joh. Damasc. Hær. 88.—Οἱ πάση γνώσει τοῦ χριστιανισμοῦ ἀντι-  
στοντες, ἐν τῷ λέγειν αὐτοῦς, ὅτι περισσόν τι ποιοῦσιν οἱ γνώσεις  
εἰς ἐκζητοῦντες ἐν ταῖς θείαις γραφαῖς. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ζητεῖ ὁ  
παρὰ χριστιανῶν, εἰ μὴ πράξεις καλὰς.

It belongs to the history of Dogmas to represent everything in connexion with the natural development of dogmatic tendencies ; but, on the other hand, it must not be overlooked that since dogmatic schools were hindered by outward force from expressing themselves freely, the true reconciliation of these differences could not be effected. And for this reason we must endeavour to discover the difference that often exists unconsciously in the germ. This applies especially to the Eastern Churches ; for the Western Churches were more independent, and acted more as a counterpoise to the power of the State, and hence the conflicts and the subject-matter of dogmatic development among them were less exposed to corrupt influences.

The principal dogmatic differences of this period were determined by the influence of nationalities which was mixed up with the development of Christianity. We have noticed the difference of the Greek and Roman mind, which had been conspicuous from the beginning ; among the Greeks there was a more versatile and excitable disposition, a scientific productiveness ; among the Romans we find a rigidity, a practical tendency, to which the scientific element was originally foreign. It resembled the relation of the Roman mind to Philosophy, which came to them from the Greeks. The advantage on the side of the Greek Church was scientific reflection and progressive development ; the disadvantage was the preponderance of the dialectic and the speculative to the neglect of the practical. Hence they were disposed, amidst dogmatical differences, to forget the interests of the essential truths of Christianity and their practical bearing. An unbridled love of novelty exposed them to the danger of involving the Christian faith in a web of dialectic sophistry. In the Roman Church, the mobility, the progressiveness, and the scientific spirit were wanting ; a one-sided adherence to the letter led them to reject novelties, and to charge more liberal views with heresy. Thus the scientific development of theology was received from the Greek Church, till Augustin's great creative mind gave a peculiar, new scientific form to the doctrines of Christianity. But the advantage was a faithful adherence to Tradition, simplicity in the conception of Christian Truth, and a more practical character in opposition to the dogmatical wilfulness of the Greeks. And thus

the remarkable phenomenon is presented, that while the Greek Church, distracted by controversies, set up one confession of faith after another, the Western Church, on the other hand, held fast to the form once delivered to it, and had already attained a certain Unity. The Church teachers belonging to the latter had attained to a conception of the Truth which the Greek Fathers only reached after a prolonged conflict. And so it happened, that the champions of orthodoxy in the Greek Church found a support in the Western. That dogmatic unity afterwards won the victory among the Orientals, and then enjoyed the results of doctrinal disputes in a definite representation of Unity. The character of the two Churches may be recognised even in the subjects of their Controversies. In the Greek Church men's minds were more occupied with questions which related especially to speculative points, such as the Trinity and the two natures in Christ; on the other hand, the great importance attached to practical questions in the Western Church gave rise to controversies that proceeded from the central point of the Christian consciousness, from the Christian anthropology in connexion with the doctrine of redemption. This tendency was important in its results in reference to Dogma and the Life of the later Western Church, as it was the means of preserving in it the peculiarly practical spirit of Christianity, and the consciousness of the connexion between the Dogmatic and the Ethical. From this peculiar dogmatic tendency, which appeared with great force at the beginning of the fifth century, proceeded the reaction at the Reformation against the foreign elements of the Catholic doctrine. We will now contemplate each of the Churches in their peculiar development.

**THE ORIENTAL CHURCH.** In the fourth century **ATHANASIUS**,\* bishop of Alexandria, was conspicuous,—a man of Christian energy and depth, superior to Origen in dialectic acuteness and systematic talent, but not his equal in free historical development. His influence over the Oriental

\* Opp. ed. Bened. (Montfaucon): 1689—98, 2 t. fol: 1777. Opp. *Dogmatica Selecta*, ed. Thilo: 1852. The Letters of Athanasius, published in Syriac by Cureton, in German by Larsow. See Jacobi, *Deutsche Zeitschr.*: 1852, No. 40. Tellemont, *Mémoires*, &c. t. viii. Möhler, *Athanasius d. Gr. u. d. Kirche sr. Zeit*: 1827, 2 vols. 1844.

Church was very powerful, and it was owing especially to his exertions, that in the Arian controversy, the victory was won for deeper Christian views and dialectic consistency. This conflict contributed very much to the further preponderance of the dogmatic and the dialectic. In Athanasius, as well as in his opponent Arius,\* we may discern the influence of Origen: Arius took up one element from Origen; Athanasius also wished to follow Origen, and was anxious to show that the latter was not to be regarded as the forerunner of Arius. Those eminent Cappadocian Fathers of the Church, BASIL of Cæsarea,† his brother GREGORY of NYSSA,‡ and GREGORY NAZIANZEN,§ were all trained under the influence of Origen. He prompted them to the study of classical antiquity, to make use of their classical culture for the development of Christian doctrine, and led them to greater freedom of thought and moderation in controversies. Gregory of Nyssa, the deepest thinker of these three Fathers, developed the ideas of Origen in a peculiar manner. The intermediate position which EUSEBIUS of CÆSAREA|| took in the controversy is also to be traced to Origen. He was inferior as a Dogmatist, but agreed for the most part with Origen in his apologetic tendency. Almost the only decided opponents of Origen during this period were those who were the enemies of free scientific development, or of spiritual views. They held fast to the

\* Fragments from the writings of Arius are to be found in Athanasius, especially from the *Θαλεία*, in the Oratt. contra Arian., and De Synodis Arimin. et Seleuceus. c. 16, his letter to Alexander of Alexandria. See his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, in Epiphanius, H. E. 69, 7. Theodoret. H. E. i. 4.

† Opp. ed. Fronto Ducæus et Morellius: Par. 1618—38, 3 t. fol.; ed. Bened. 1688, 3 t. fol.; Garnier, 1721—30, 3 t.; De Sinner: Par. 1839, 3 t. J. E. Feisser, De Vita Basilii Dissert. Hist. Theol.: Gron. 1828. L. R. W. Klosse, Basilii d. Gr. nach s. Leb. u. s. Lehre, 1835. A. Jahnius, Basilii M. Platonizans: Bern. 1838, 4. Animadvers. in Basil. Opp.: Bern. 1842, fasc. 1.

‡ Opp. ed. Morellius: Par. 1615, 2 t. fol. Appdx. by Gretser, 1618, ed. Bened., the first vol. 1780. A. Maji, Scriptor. vet. nov. Collectio: Rom. 1834, t. viii. J. Rupp, Greg. v. Nyssa Leb. u. Meinungen, 1834.

§ Opp. ed. Morellius: Par. 1630 (Lips. 1690), 2 t. fol. ed. Caittau: Par. 1840, 2 t. Ullmann Greg. v. Naz. der Theologe, 1825.

|| *προπαρασκευή εὐαγγελική*, l. xv. ed. Heinichen, 1842, 2. t. Gaisford, 1843, 4 t. *Ἀπόδειξις εὐαγγ.* l. xx. *πρὸς Μαρτίλλον*, libb. 2. *περὶ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς θεολογίας*, libb. 3, ed. R. Montacutus: Par. 1623, fol. 1688.

letter of tradition, like EPIPHANIUS of Salamis,\* in Cyprus, or were the advocates of a coarse Anthropomorphism, which still had its friends among the monks. A more cultivated opponent of Origen was MARCELLUS, bishop of Ancyra,† in Galatia, a man who adhered to the Scriptures as the standard of his religious belief, and was indisposed to the mingling of philosophy and theology practised by Origen. The Platonic philosophy, the influence of which on the Church, was chiefly owing to the instrumentality of Origen, was still predominant among the philosophically trained teachers of the Church. And ever since the Christian principle has subordinated more completely the Platonic element; even where the forms have been Platonic, the material influence of Christianity has preponderated; only, now and then, certain mixtures of Platonic and Christian elements have appeared in a kind of religious Idealism, which served for many as a transition to Christianity. This was the case with SYNESIUS,‡ to whom Christianity first presented itself as a symbol for the ideas of his Platonic standpoint. In the spurious writings of DIONYSIUS the Areopagite,§ we find a mystical Theology resulting from a mixture of the Platonic and Christian mind, which turned the whole constitution of the Church, its external rites and its

\* Opp. ed. Dion. Petavius: Par. 1622; Lpz. 1682, 2 t. fol.

† *περί τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ ὑποταγῆς*. Fragments in Eusebius of Cæsarea. Replies *πρ. Μαρκελλόν* and *περί τῆς ἐκκλ. θεολογ.* See Marcelliana, ed. H. G. Rettberg: Göttg. 1794. Athanasius De Synodis, § 26. Apolog. contr. Arian. § 24—35. Cyrill. Hieros. Catech. xv. 27—33. Epiphani. Hær. 72. L. R. W. Klose, *Gesch. u. Lehre des Marcellus u. Photinus*: 1837. Baur, *Gesch. d. Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit*, i. 525.

‡ Opp. ed. Petavius, 1612, 1640. C. Thilo, *Commentatio in Synesii Hymn. ii.*: Hal. 1842, 4to. Oratt. et Homill. Frgmt. ed. Krabinger: Landsh. 1851. A. Th. Clausen, *De Synesio Philosopho*: Havn. 1831. B. Kolbe, *Synesius v. Cyrene*: Berl. 1850.

§ *περί τῆς οὐρανίας ιεραρχίας. περί τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ιεραρχίας. περί μυστικῆς θεολογίας. περί θείων ὀνομάτων, ἐπιστολαί*. Opp. ed. Corderius: Antv. 1634; Par. 1644, 2 t. fol.; ed. Venet. 1755, 2 t. fol.; translated by Engelhardt: Sulz. 1823. J. Dallæus, *De Scriptis quæ sub Ignat. et Dionysii Nominib. circumferuntur*: Genev. 1666. Engelhardt, *De Dionysio Plotinizante*: Erl. 1820. De Origin. Scriptor. Areopag. 1822. Baumgarten-Crusius, *Opp. Theol.*: Jen. 1836, p. 265. Ritter *Gesch. d. Christl. Philosophie*, ii. 519. According to Niedner (*Kirchengesch.* p. 330), there is in the Pseudo-Dionysian writings the exhibition of a pretended Athenian Gnosis, but rather Antiochian, which reconciles the pure Hellenic Neo-Platonism and the Church doctrine more faithfully than the older Gnosis.

dogmas, into a Symbol of its ideas. But by degrees the Aristotelian Element made itself felt against the Platonic ; we have already noticed its peculiar influence among the Artemonites. Platonism favoured a tendency for deeper Christian contemplativeness, the rights of faith were respected, and that Dogmatism was discountenanced which would bring all things within the limits of the Understanding. But at this period, a confined tendency of the Understanding was developed which was hostile to the intuitive Element in Theology. In ARIUS we find an antagonism to the prevalent Dogma, not merely in his doctrine respecting Christ, but in a more general reference, which is palpably evident in his attempt to bring the doctrine of the Trinity within the comprehension of the Understanding. But the most eminent representative of this mental tendency is his follower EUNOMIUS,\* a man of more logical mind than himself. An opponent of whatever was inconceivable and transcendental, he pursued knowledge in a one-sided direction, not deeply speculative, but proceeding from an empirical understanding to make everything clear, which was his principal aim. In short, he advocated an intelligent Supranaturalism in which a rationalistic tendency was concealed, similar to what we find in Socinus. This tendency of an external Dogmatism was strenuously opposed by Gregory of Nyssa. Even Heathens, he says, can dispute about dogmas ; but correctness in dogmas does not make a Christian. Christianity is rather grounded in the religious life. Here we have that which constitutes the radical difference between heathens and Christians. By him and the other great Cappadocian teachers,† and by CHRYSOSTOM,§ the distinction between believing and knowing was maintained against Eunomius, also the rights of independent faith, the Inconceivability of God ; the relation of faith and intuition, and the practical foundations of religious knowledge.

\* *ἑκθεσις τῆς πίστεως*, in Socrates, v. 10, ed. Valesius. *ἀπολογητικός*, ed. Fabricius, *Biblioth. Græc.* viii. 262. Fragments from the book *περὶ τοῦ νοῦ*, in Maji Collect. vii. 1, 202.

† Philostorg. *H. E.* lib. vi. Epiph. h. 76. The replies of Gregory of Nyssa and Basil. C. R. W. Klose, *Geschichte u. Lehre des Eunomius*.

‡ Greg. Naz. Orat. 33. De Theologia, i. 34. *Initium Greg. Nyssa. De Animâ et Resurrectione*, t. iii p. 238, ed. Mor. 1638.

§ Homilies on the Inconceivability of God. Opp. i. p. 544, ed. Montf. in 1 Cor. Homil. 34, 1, 2 ; vol. x. p. 310, &c.

Although the influence of ORIGEN was extended over the whole Oriental Church, yet his school at Alexandria did not retain its original character.\* Its last representative, in the fourth century, was Didymus,† who, though blind from childhood, was the most learned man of his age. Afterwards the school was removed to Sida in Pamphylia, and became extinct. In the Alexandrian Church only one element of Origen's spirit was retained, the speculative mystical, as exhibited by Athanasius in opposition to Arianism; but the other side, the historically literal tendency of Origen, met with no encouragement in Alexandria. Gradually an opposition was formed against the Alexandrian tendency: it proceeded from a new dogmatic school, the Antiochian,‡ which in its fundamental elements may likewise be traced back to Origen, for the impulse he had given to learned pursuits in general, and his zeal for sound biblical study were transferred to Antioch. The first foundation of this school was exegetical, and was laid by DOROTHEUS§ and LUCIAN,|| in the fourth century by EUSEBIUS of Emesa,¶ and especially by DIODORUS of Tarsus,\*\* and THEODORUS†† of Mopsuestia. The Exegetical direction of this

\* On the characteristics of the various theological schools at this period, see Niedner, *Kirchengeschichte*, p. 317, &c.

† De Spiritu S. in Jerome's Latin vers. De Trinitate, libb. iii. ed. Mingarelli: Bonon. 1769, fol. Adv. Manichæus in Combefisii Auctuar. Gr. P. ii. Expositio vii. Canonic. Epistolar., the fragments in Lücke, *Quæstiones ac Vindicæ Didymianæ*: Göttg. 1829—32, 4 t. See Cölln. Hall. *Encyclop.* xxiv. art. Didymus.

‡ On the Antiochian school, see Neander's *Der Heilige Chrysostomus u. die Kirche, besonders des Orients in dessen Zeitalter*. 2 Th. 1821, 1832. Neander's *Ch. H.* iii. 212.

§ Euseb. H. E. vii. 32.

|| Euseb. H. E. viii. 13; ix. 6. Hieronym. *Catal. Script. Illustr.* c. 77.

¶ Hieronym. *Catal.* 91, 119. Socrates, H. E. ii. 9. Sozom. iii. 6. Thilo *üb. d. Schriften des Eusebius von Alexandriæ u. Eusebius v. Emesa*: Halle, 1832.

\*\* Hieronym. *Cat.* 119. Socrates, vi. 3. Suidas, s. v. *Διόδωρος*. Assemani, *Biblioth. Oriental.* iii. 1, 28. In the *Spicileg. Solesm.* p. 269, fragments are given of a work by Victor of Capua, which must have been taken from a Commentary of Diodorus on the second book of Moses. In the fragments themselves there is no reason to the contrary. Other fragments are Marcus Mercator and Photius, cod. 122.—[JACOBI.]

†† Comment. in Proph. xii. Minores in Theod. Mops. quæ supersunt, ed. Wegnern. t. i. A. Magi, vi. 1. Commentar. in Epist. ad Roman. in A. Magi, *Spicel.* iv. This large fragment, with smaller ones from



school continued to be its prominent characteristic, according to which Dogma, independently of Tradition, was to be derived from Holy Writ. Allegory was the medium for bringing the Bible into harmony with every tradition; but here the Exposition of Scripture was formed from its own contents by an unprejudiced, grammatical, and logical method. The Antiochian method of Exposition formed the right medium between the allegorizing method, and that grossly literal style of interpretation by which alone it had hitherto been opposed. With this was connected a more liberal method in the criticism of the Canon, and in the consideration of the historical relation of the Old and New Testament; there was also an endeavour to contemplate Christ in his earthly appearance, not according to a preconceived dogmatic scheme, but as he is represented in the Gospels. Altogether, there was a striving after clearness and rational development; after a knowledge of the divine in connexion with the natural. In the opposition between this and the Alexandrian School, we notice the most divergent tendencies of the theological spirit; the supranatural and the rational element, only that neither were of an exclusive character. In Alexandria the greatest stress was laid on the supernatural in dogma; those formulæ were preferred in which this was most strongly expressed, and all attempts at explanation were rejected. The Antiochians did not deny the supernatural; there were among them men of the deepest

the Commentaries on the other epistles of Paul, is in Th. Episc. Mops. in N. T. Commentaria quæ reperiri potuer. colleg. O. F. Fritzsche: Turic. 1847. In the Spic. Solesmens. i. 49, Latin Commentaries are to be found on the Epistles to the Galatians, &c., as far as Philemon; those on the Epistles to the Galatians, Ephesians, and Philemon, are complete. Pitra, the Editor of the Spicileg., ascribes this work to Hilary of Poitiers. But there is no doubt that they are translations of the Commentaries of Theodorus. See Jacobi's Deutsche Zeitschr., 1854, and his Programs, Hal. 1855, 1856, for the Commentaries on the Epistles to the Philippians and the Colossians. Other fragments are in Facund. Hermian. Pro Defens. Trium Capitul. libb. xii. in Bibl. Patr. Lugduni xii. Galland xi. For Catalogue of his writings, see J. A. Assemanni Bibl. Orien. iii. 1, 30. Ernesti Opusc. Theolog. p. 502. Miniter, Ständlin and Tzschirner, Archiv. f. Kirchengesch. i. 1. R. E. Klener, Symbolæ Litter. ad Theod. Mops. Episc. Pertinentes: Gött. 1836. O. F. Fritzsche, De Theod. Mops. Vita et Sceptis.: Hal. 1836. T. L. Sieffert, Theod. Mops. vet. Tti. sobr. Interpretandi Vindex: Regiom. 1827.—[JACOBI.]

Christian spirit, such as Chrysostom\* and Theodoret;† but they aimed at making their views of divine things as perspicuous as possible and in unison with reason. Between these tendencies there was necessarily a complete antagonism; this might be seen in their anthropology; but in accordance with the character of the Greek Church, it was most strikingly apparent in their speculative Christology.

THE WESTERN CHURCH. After the first period of scientific dependence on the Eastern Church, HILARY of Poitiers‡ was the first who appeared in the West as a professed Dogmatic writer. Before he became involved in the Controversies of the East, he had arrived, in his own way, at his dogma respecting the Trinity. JEROME,§ who long resided at Bethlehem, occupied an important position as mediator between the Eastern and the Western Church, which latter he had enriched with the learning of the East. He is distinguished as a learned collector, and for certain ingenious ideas, but had little talent for the formation of a dogmatic system. AMBROSE of Milan,|| also, whose peculiar excellence lay in the direction of practical ethics, was largely indebted to the Greeks.

In the preceding period, the African Church had already begun to develop the Western mind in a scientific manner. And in this age also, North Africa had manifested scientific productiveness. AUGUSTIN¶ formed a new system within the

\* Opp. ed. Montfaucon: Par. 1718—38, 13 t. fol.; Par. 1834—39, 13 t.

† *ἱερανοστής ἦτοι πολύμορφος*, libb. iv. *ἐλληνικῶν Θεραπευτικῇ παθημάτων*, Disputatt. xii. Hæretic. Fabular., comp. libb. v. Opp. ed. Sirmond: Par. 1649, 4 t. fol. t. 5; add. Jo. Garnier: Par. 1684; ed. Schulze et Noesselt: Hal. 1769—74, 5 t. 8. J. F. Richter, *De Theodoret Epist. Paulin. Interpret.*: Lips. 1822.

‡ *De Trinitate*, libb. xii. *De Synodis*. *De Synodis Arimin. et Seleucensis*. Commnt. in Psalm. Matth. Opp. ed. Bened. (Constant): Par. 1693; Maffei, Veron. 1730, 2 t. fol.; Oberthür. Wirceb. 1785, seq. 4 t.

§ Opp. ed. Erasmus: Bas. 1516; ed. Bened. (Martianay): Par. 1693—1706, 5 t. fol.; Vallarsi Veron. 1734—42, 11 t. f.; Venet. 1766—72, 4 t.

|| *Hexæmeron de Incarnationis Dominicæ Sacramento de Fide*, libb. v. *De Spiritu S.* libb. iii. ed. Bened.: Par. 1686—10, 2 t. f. Böhringer, *Die Kirche u. ihre Zeugen*. 1 Abth. 3.

¶ Opp. ed. Erasmus: Bas. 1529; Bened.: Par. 1659—1701, xi. t.; Antwp. 1700—1703, xi. t., with Appendix by Le Clerc, 1703. Brudemann, d. h. Augustin, Th. 1: Berl. 1841. Poujoulat, *Geschichte d. h.*

sphere of scientific development. His influence may be compared with that of Origen in the East, but it was more general and enduring in the West. He was one of those great men of world-wide celebrity, whose agency is not limited to their own times, but is felt afresh at various epochs in the lapse of centuries. His position in reference to Theology was similar to that of Plato and Aristotle in the department of Philosophy. On the one hand, the development of the Catholic dogma which appears in the writings of the schoolmen proceeded from him, and, on the other hand, a reaction of the pure Christian consciousness against the foreign elements of the Catholic dogma. Those tendencies within the pale of the Catholic Church from which a new Christian life emanated connect themselves with him. Even the more complete reaction at the Reformation, and the various revivals which the evangelical Church has experienced may be traceable to the same source. He resembled Origen in his turn for speculation, but surpassed him in originality, depth, and acuteness. Both passed through Platonism in the process of their culture; he did not, however, like Origen, mingle the Christian and Platonic elements, but developed the principles of Christianity independently of Platonism, and even in opposition to it. But Origen excelled him in greater mental freedom and erudite historical culture, while Augustin's mind was fettered by a definite Church system. The union of their mental elements would, without doubt, have made the most complete Church teacher. Nevertheless, many qualities were united in Augustin, which we find scattered in separate tendencies of theological development, and hence we see the various periods of the Church shadowed forth in his mental career. He was born at Tagaste, in Numidia; \* the first seeds of Christianity were sown in his heart by his pious mother Monica. His great powers, his ardent temperament and powerful impulses needed to be attempered and refined by the Gospel. Hence, he had to pass through many a stormy conflict, and to be led through an intricate path, ere he could attain mental repose and steady development. In his youth he came to Carthage to study Rhetoric, and became intimately conversant with the

Augustin, translated into German by Hurter: Schaffh. 1847. 2 Th. Böhringer, i. 3.

\* See Confession. libb. xiii. cum præfat. A. Neandri: Berol. 1823.

classical writers of Rome, an important point in his education. He also attempted Grecian Literature, but his taste for the study of languages was not strong enough, and owing to this, he read the Bible only in the Latin translation. Had he made himself acquainted with the Scriptures, and the Oriental Fathers in the original languages, his views would have been modified in various respects. Surrounded by the moral corruption of a great city, he lost all deep sense of religion; lawless passions were kindled; worldly pursuits, noisy amusements and pleasures suppressed the divine germ in his heart; but the power of the seed of divine life, was evinced in counter-working the tendency to evil. It happened that a passage he accidentally met with in the Hortensius of Cicero in praise of Philosophy, presented the glory of such a life with such force to his soul, that he resolved to devote himself to the investigation of Truth. The Ideal rose before his view, but there was much to be overcome which prevented its attainment. This longing after the divine reminded him of his Christian education, and he turned to the Bible. But he had not the requisite disposition to understand its depth and simplicity. It was not congenial to his taste which had been formed by the study of classical literature, and he was offended by the demand the Church made on his belief. The large promises of the Manicheans appeared to him far more attractive, as they did not require faith, but gave hopes of discoveries and comprehensive knowledge. Moreover, the direction of their thinking, and of his own, agreed in one point, which had occupied him from the first; as, on the one hand, he had experienced the power of sinful desires, so, on the other, he had been attracted by the ideal of a higher life; the question, therefore, was early forced upon him, Whence this disunion in man? Whence came Evil? Manichæism promised a solution. Thus Augustin became a zealous Manichean, and knew no higher aim than to reach the degree of an *electus*. The sceptic Bayle, who, in the article of his Dictionary on Manichæism has urged the difficulties which beset a Theodicy as contrasted with Dualism, remarks that the cause of Manichæism would have gained much, had so acute a thinker as Augustin adhered longer to it. He might have discovered much to justify Dualism, and in his treatise *De apto et pulchro* (of which, however, we know nothing but the title) he has made the attempt. But Augustin

was too clear a thinker, and too truth-loving, to allow himself to be for ever enthralled in Manicheism. After spending ten years in this sect, he found out that he had been deceived, and maintained only an outward connexion with it. But after being freed from this delusion, he was in danger of falling into universal scepticism, had he not been kept by the remains of his general religious faith. At this crisis he became acquainted with a Latin translation of certain Neo-Platonic writings. He was attracted by their apparent harmony with those Christian ideas which from his childhood had still retained their hold upon him. Thus Platonism became an important point of transition in his philosophical and religious development. He experienced a reaction of an immediate religious belief against Scepticism, of Monism against Dualism. The conception of Evil as something not positive was a transition to his later view of it. The spiritualizing of his mode of thinking was of prime importance, after having been misled by Manicheism to indulge in sensuous representations. Platonism substituted the spiritual contemplation of Ideas to the representations of the Imagination; his longing after the Ideal was again kindled. He formed an association with some of his friends for the investigation of truth; but in striving after this object, he was made sensible of certain obstacles in his own soul. He was prompted by the Platonic ideas which bore an affinity to Christianity to apply himself afresh to the study of Christian truth and of the Bible, for understanding which he was now better prepared by his inward experience. His study of Paul's Epistles made a powerful impression upon him; Paul's personal development resembled his own course; by means of it he understood the conflict between the flesh and the Spirit. Yet, as an enthusiastic Platonist, he did not regard the New Testament as the highest source of religious truth, but only expected to find in it a confirmation of Platonic doctrines. He placed the superiority of Christ chiefly in his making those truths the common property of mankind which hitherto had been the exclusive possession of philosophers. The faith of the Church he regarded as a preparatory school for the higher, philosophic knowledge; they bore the same relation to each other as the Platonic *δόξα* and *πίστις*, the one being the exoteric doctrine, the other, the esoteric. He had it in contemplation to construct a peculiar religious Idealism, and to

incorporate it with Christianity. But the Spirit of the Scriptures, especially of Paul's Epistles, overpowered him; Christian truths became more to him than he expected; religious faith, the Christian consciousness as the common property of all Christians, gradually overcame his individual philosophic training. From being a Platonic religious philosopher he became a believing Christian, who, on the foundation of faith, sought to raise a superstructure of knowledge. In addition to this, he attended at Milan on the preaching of AMBROSE, from which he acquired a more correct knowledge of the doctrines of the Church than from the caricatures of the Manicheans. He was still agitated by a fierce internal conflict, when some one told him of a man of the world, who had given up everything in order to devote himself entirely to Religion. This filled him with shame, and brought his self conflict to a crisis; in this state he heard the words TOLLE! LEGE! He opened his Bible, and lighted on Romans xiii. 13, 14. This decided him; he now gave all his energies to Christianity. In his further development, it became apparent how the Christian Spirit had worked its way out of Manicheism and Platonism. In this view his treatises *De vera religione*, and *De utilitate credendi* are very important. If, at an earlier stage, he had set knowledge in opposition to the faith of authority, he now maintained it as a first principle that Christian knowledge could proceed only from faith. As long as a man continues opposed to divine things in his disposition, they must appear strange and unintelligible to him, hence what the Manicheans affirm, that knowledge must precede faith, is the reverse of the truth. Man must first of all, by the surrender of his heart, enter into divine truth, and then the enlightened reason will discern the contents of Christian truth. True knowledge must also proceed from the experience of the life which is founded on Faith. Hence the maxim, *fides præcedit intellectum*. On this, Augustin founded an independent scientific Dogmatic, which had for its basis Christian faith and Christian experience, and, therefore, the Christian consciousness, and in which the office was assigned to enlightened reason, of developing the contents of Christianity. Accordingly, there were two principal points to which he applied himself; in the first place, to maintain the independence and dignity of Faith against a profane speculation, and secondly, to promote a

rational knowledge in Religion, and to prove the connexion of Faith with Reason. He originated not only a practical, but a peculiar speculative development, one that was rooted in the Christian consciousness and vital experience. On this side, there was a connexion between his ideas and Scholasticism. The reconciliation of rational and scientific knowledge with the essential truths of Christianity, formed a counterpoise to that one-sided faith of authority which had hitherto prevailed in the Western Church, and had treated every free mode of thought as heretical. At first, indeed, when under the influence of Platonism, and engaged chiefly in the controversy against Manicheism, Augustin was, in many respects, more free and susceptible than, at a later period, when, indeed, he developed the Christian system in opposition to Platonism, but also became more inflexible in his systematic and ecclesiastical tendencies. His School maintained itself amidst the ravages of the Vandals down to the sixth century, and sent out men who ably vindicated the dogmatic standpoint of Augustin; such as FACUNDUS, bishop of Hermiane,\* and FULGENTIUS,† bishop of Ruspe, both in Numidia. We also recognise the wide-spread influence of Augustin's scientific and dogmatic spirit in LEO the Great, bishop of Rome,‡ and GREGORY the Great.§ Gregory who closes this period as the last classical teacher of the West shows, along with the strong sensuous element of the religious spirit which characterizes Catholicism, a deep reflective piety which harmonizes with the Augustinian view of Christianity, and in both respects exerted an influence on after ages.

\* Pro Defensione Trium Capitulorum, libb. xii. Contra Mucianum. Opp. ed. Sirmond: Par. 1629, 8. Biblioth. P. P. Gallandi, t. xi.

† De Veritate Prædestinationis et Gratiae, libb. 3. Bibl. Patr. Lugd. ix.

‡ Opp. ed. Quesnel: Par. 1675, 2 t. 4; Ballaini: Venet. 1755—57, 3 t. fol. Avenet. Leo. d. Gr. u. s. Zeit. Mainz. Pecthel, Leb. u. Lehren des Papster Leo: Jen. 1843.

§ Expos. in Job s. Moraliū. libb. 35. Liber Pastoralis curæ, Dialogor. de Vita et Miracul. Patr. libb. iv. Epp. libb. 14. Opp. ed. Bened.: Par. 1705, 4 t. f.; Galliccioli: Venet. 1768, 17 t. 4. Pauli Warnefordi (775), De Vita S. Gregorii Papæ, libb. 4. Joannis Diaconi Eccles. Rom. (875), De Vita S. Gregorii, libb. 4. G. F. Wigger, De Gregorio M. ejusque Placitis Anthropologicis: Rost. 1838. See also his Essay in D. Zeitschr. f. Histor. Theol. 1853. Lau, Gregor. I. nach s. Leben u. s. Lehre, 1845. Pfahler, Gregor. d. Gr. u. s. Zeit.: Fkf. 1853.

## THE SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

### A. THE HISTORY OF INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS.

#### B. ON THE SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

##### 1. REASON AND REVELATION.

THE question, whether Reason or a Supernatural Revelation, is the highest source of religious knowledge, had already been discussed in the former period. Rationalism appeared most strongly in Manicheism. The Antiochian and Alexandrian Schools were distinguished by a rationalist and supernaturalist tendency. But both held the Bible to be the highest source of religious knowledge. Augustin endeavoured to establish the claims of revelation in opposition to his earlier Manicheism and to Platonism, and on the other hand to prove the harmony of *ratio* and *fides*. In his epistle to Consentius, who maintained that not Reason, but the Authority of the saints was to be followed, he says, that he ought to retract his accusations against Reason, and endeavour to discern by the light of Reason what he already maintained on the ground of faith. Far be it from us to imagine that God hates that in us, by which he has distinguished us from all other living creatures. In fact, we could not believe, if we had not souls endowed with Reason.

##### 2. SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

WE have seen that in the preceding period, Tertullian in the Western Church regarded Tradition as the controlling principle, and made the Exposition of Scripture dependent upon it; while on the contrary, the Alexandrians, who were the representatives of the Greek standpoint, regarded Holy Writ

\* Ep. ad Consentium, 119, 120.—Vide ergo secundum hæc verba tua, ne potius debeas, maxime de hac re, in qua præcipue fides nostra consistit, solam sanctorum auctoritatem sequi, nec ejus intelligentiæ a me querere rationem. Corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem respuas, sed ut ea quæ fidei firmitate jam tenes, etiam rationis luce conspicias. 3. Absit namque ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis animantibus excellentiores creavit. Absit, inquam, ut ideo credamus, ne rationem accipiamus sive quæramus, cum etiam credere non possemus, nisi rationales animas haberemus. Ut ergo in quibusdam rebus ad doctrinam salutarem pertinentibus, quas ratione nondum percipere valemus, sed aliquando valebimus, fides præcedat rationem, qua cor mundetur, ut magnæ rationis capiat et perferat lucem, hoc utique rationis est.



independently of Tradition, and advocated a more free interpretation of it.

We can trace the same difference pervading the period now under review. As to the doctrine of the normative value of Holy Writ, there were several among the Oriental teachers who expressed themselves most decidedly on the authority that was due to it alone; thus Cyril of Jerusalem commends the Creed\* because it was taken directly from the Bible. As all were not able to read the Sacred Volume, the whole doctrine of faith was here comprised in a few words; the Creed was confirmed by the whole of Scripture. Respecting the doctrines he further says,† that we must not believe the least point without evidence from Holy Writ. Chrysostom and the other Antiochian Teachers gave prominence to the authority of Scripture. He represents it frequently as the highest source of knowledge to which all persons must resort for instruction;‡ thus he says, Suppose a heathen comes to me and says, I wish to become a Christian; but I know not to whom I must join myself; there are so many sects among you Christians, and I know nothing of the Scriptures. This, he rejoins, is exactly in our favour; if we required you to follow our reasonings, you might be perplexed; but we tell you, that we believe in Holy Writ. If a person objected that one man maintains that it stands thus in Scripture, and another that it is different, Chrysostom does not refer him to the authority of the Church, but asks him, "Hast thou no reason? do what thou oughtest according to the voice of thy Conscience; seek truth from God in a rational manner, and he will certainly reveal it to thee." We find similar authority attributed to the Holy Scriptures by the Western Teachers in various passages: thus Augustin says,§ "The writings of the Prophets and the Apostles are the only ones, on which we do not venture to pass sentence, but according to which we must judge all others." Further, "we show honour to Holy Writ, in allowing no possibility of error to it; and if we find something apparently erroneous, either there is a mistake in the manuscripts, or we do not understand the passage; we believe other writers because they prove what they affirm either from

\* Cateches. 5, 12.

† Ibid. 4, 17.

‡ Hom. in Acta, 33, 4, p. 258.

§ Contr. Cresconium Donatist. ii. 39.

Holy Writ or from Reason.”\* Yet we should conclude too much if we inferred that he admitted of no other source of knowledge of Christian doctrine but the Bible, and depended entirely upon that. In the West generally, Tradition and the Authority of the Church were of peculiar weight, and Augustin himself was led by the course of his mental training to join in their recognition. Bewildered by Scepticism, he was met by the thought, Must not God have made provision for the erring, and given them a sure external authority by which they may obtain the confident knowledge of the Truth? He expected to find such an authority in the Church; and having searched after the truth it was no longer doubtful to him, whether Christ was to be really acknowledged as a teacher of truth; even the Manicheans allowed this; the point in dispute was, where the true doctrine of Christ was to be found. The Manicheans asserted that this doctrine had been already falsified in all the apostolic writings by Jewish elements and interpolations. Hence the question shaped itself to Augustin, “Where am I to find the genuine original records of the Christian doctrine?” Critical aids and principles were wanting to him by which he might have been rendered independent of Tradition; he had therefore no resource left, but to find a pledge for the true form of the Canon in the tradition of the Church. The spread of Christianity,—the victories of the Church over all persecutions and heresies,—the fact that through it the highest truth had become the common property of the people at large,—all the signs by which proofs might be found for the divine origin of the Gospel, were to him arguments for the divinity of the Church.

This determined him to resign himself entirely to the authority of the Church, and to receive from it the Canon and

\* Ad Hieron. ep. 82, cap. 111, tom. ii. frag. 144.—Ego enim fateor caritati tue *solis eis* Scripturarum libris, qui jam canonici appellantur didici hunc timorem honoremque deferre, ut nullum eorum auctorem scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam. Ac si aliquid in iis offendero literis, quod videatur contrarium veritati, nihil aliud, quam vel mendosum esse codicem, vel interpretem non assecutum esse quod dictum est, vel me minime intellexisse, non ambigam. Alios autem ita lego, ut quantalibet sanctitate doctrinaque præpolleant, non ideo verum putem, quia ipsi ita senserunt, sed quia mihi vel per illos auctores canonicos vel probabili ratione, quod a vero non abhorreat, persuadere potuerunt.

the doctrines of the Faith, and it was specially the African Church to which he thus submitted himself. The maxim *fides precedit intellectum* was applied by him in the following manner: A man must first of all humbly receive and practice the doctrines of the Faith on the authority of the Church, and then he will be capable of developing genuine Christianity by Scripture and Reason.\* And this continued to be the Catholic doctrine till the Reformation. On this ground we are enabled to understand that pregnant sentence, *Ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicæ ecclesiæ commoveret auctoritas*.† Protestant Theologians have been disposed to explain it as meaning, "I was first led to the Bible by the tradition of the Church;" but without doubt it rather means, "The authority of the Church is the witness for the divinity of Holy Writ; how could I convince unbelievers, if I were not permitted to appeal to the authority of the Church? I must depend upon it to know what the canon of Holy Writ is, and its right Interpretation." It deserves notice in what a circle he moves; for in arguing against the Donatists he proves the authority of the Church from the Scriptures. When they, according to their subjective tendency, appealed on behalf of the authority of their Church, to the miracles wrought within it, he would allow no argument to be valid but the objective one taken from the Scriptures. We also, he says, lay claim to Faith; we do not assert that we form the Church of Christ, because our church is recommended by an Ambrose and others, or because it is rendered illustrious by the councils of bishops; we do not even appeal to the miracles which are performed throughout the world but to the testimony of Holy Writ. Christ, who after his resurrection allowed his body to be touched by his disciples, nevertheless appealed to the testimony of the Law and the Prophets.‡

In the preceding period, persons might abide by the general Tradition of the Church as they would by a more private one; but in this age a special organ of that Tradition was added;

\* De Utilit. Cred. cap. 21.—Nam vera religio nisi credantur ea quæ quisque postea, si se bene gesserit dignusque fuerit, assequatur atque percipiat et omnino sine quodam gravi auctoritatis imperio iniri recte nullo pacto potest.

† Contr. ep. Manich. cap. 6.

‡ De Unitate Eccles. 50.

the General Councils, of which the decisions expressed the general Church consciousness as witnesses of the truth. For if the bishops, as successors of the Apostles, were the organs of the Holy Spirit, and their convocation a representation of the Church, it seemed that the guidance of these organs by the Holy Spirit might be relied upon. The decisions of the General Councils were therefore esteemed as the certain utterances of the Holy Spirit. Hence a subjective view, which at an earlier period might be held without the reproach of being heretical, became a heresy after the decision of a General Council, since it appeared to be the duty of every one to submit to that judgment in which the voice of the Holy Spirit was heard. The opinion of individuals which would assert its claims against such a general decision would be condemned as subjective self-will. We find this principle developed in Augustin; it was not his view, that Truth was revealed to the Council by a fresh inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but that by continued theological inquiry under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the result was evolved, and that the Councils were only the organs ordained by God to express this result. He ascribes to General Councils the prerogative of correcting the expression of individual Church teachers of eminence. Yet he also says: General Councils will be improved by later ones, if truth comes to light by investigation.\* He, therefore, regarded them as relatively the most perfect expression of the Christian consciousness for the time being. But in what does he suppose this improvement to consist? Probably he only thought that additions were made, or did he admit that errors which occurred in former decisions might be corrected?

Next to Augustin, in reference to the doctrine of the Catholic Church on Tradition, we have to notice a distinguished writer, VINCENTIUS LIRINENSIS, who shortly after Augustin's death, about A.D. 435, wrote his *Commonitorium*, or *Tractatus pro Catholicæ fidei Antiquitate et Universitate adversus Profanas Novitates*, in which he systematically carried out Augustin's principles. He sets in opposition to the Heretics, the authority of the Divine word, and the Tradition of the Catholic Church. He starts the question, If the Bible be the only sufficient source of knowledge, of what use

\* De Baptismo c. Donatist. ii. 3.

is the authority of the Church? His answer is, because Holy Writ, on account of its higher meaning, may be explained in so many ways. A Rule is required for its Interpretation, and this he calls the *Sensus Catholicus et Ecclesiasticus*. He seeks for it outside of the Scriptures, because he cannot recognise it in the Scriptures themselves. The *Sensus Catholicus* must be recognisable in all ages in all parts of the Church, and by all persons. Its criteria are therefore *antiquitas*, antiquity; *universalitas*, universality; *consensus*, agreement, i. e., the agreement of the General Councils and the great teachers of the Church, which must all be in unison in order to determine the genuineness of a true Tradition. Whatever any Church teacher, however holy, might maintain in opposition to this universal and objective truth, could only be regarded as his private opinion. Vincentius admitted a progressive development of the Church; the only point of importance was that it should be a healthy growth. This is required in every Being, that it should continue unaltered in its essential character, and only be developed in accordance with that. Accordingly, the Church must always hold fast the same fundamental doctrines, on which its soundness depends; but it must advance gradually in the knowledge and clear development of these truths. Heavenly truth cannot change, but it may become more distinctly apprehended. This progressive development is connected with the definite organs of the General Councils, by which the simplicity of the Faith has always been determined with progressive clearness in opposition to error.

In the writings of FACUNDUS of HERMIANE, we find a very able exposition of the relation between the general Christian consciousness and the gradually formed doctrinal views of individuals. He compares it with the general moral consciousness, with the internal law of consciousness, and the doctrinal distinctions with particular laws. He sets out from the point, that the moral law is implanted in the heart as a whole; this internal law is more powerful than any external letter, and all special laws together cannot go beyond the measure of that internal rule; but since man has deviated in heart from the moral law, so on that account a testimony of outward, special, written words is given against its despisers. Thus there is now nothing more powerful than the expression

of the universal Christian consciousness; but for this reason written testimonies which subserve that consciousness, and never go beyond it, must be given against those who have falsified the meaning and bearing of the Creed.\* In reference also to the authority of the General Councils, he agrees with Vincentius, Christ cannot be wanting to the priests assembled in his name.† General Councils have this advantage, that what cannot be apprehended by the understanding is credited on authority.‡ But the agreement of these councils proceeds from the previous controversies.

In the Oriental Church the doctrine of the Church's authority was not maintained so systematically and absolutely, but in practice the authority of Tradition prevailed in the interpretation of the Scriptures. It was opposed by MARCELLIUS of ANCYRA. When the dogmas of the Fathers were brought against him, he replied that the word *δόγμα* denoted a human opinion;§ he would acknowledge no authority but the Divine declarations of Holy Writ. In the Greek Church the views of the mystic theology respecting the holiness of certain things which could not be expressed, and respecting higher truths which could not be generally understood, promoted the belief in the obscurity of the Scriptures, and the notion that in order to understand them, a traditionary interpretation was needed, not granted to every one. As at an earlier period reference was made to a Gnostic secret tradition, so now certain higher dogmatic truths which were not committed to writing, but were only to be silently propagated, were distinguished from such as were publicly announced; a distinction was made between *δόγμα* and *κρύπτεμα*.|| Thus many esoteric deeper truths which were not developed in Holy Writ, were said to have found their expression, and to have been propagated in the sacred usages and symbols of the Church. Hence such usages were employed as proofs of dogmas of which they presupposed the existence. It was certainly true, that certain Church usages might serve as testimonies of the contents of the universal Christian consciousness, but as genuine and foreign elements might mingle

\* Pro Defensione Trium, cap. viii. c. 7.

† Ibid.

‡ Neander's Ch. Hist. iii. 251.

§ Ibid. iv. 448.

|| Euseb. Demon. Evgl. ἀγραφὰ θεσμοί. Basil M. de Spir. S. c. 27, cf. Suicer Thesaur. s. v. *δόγμα*.

in their development, the same thing might happen in the expression of them which was given in the usages of the Church.

### 3. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION.

Neither in this nor the former period was there any precise determination of the Idea of Inspiration and its adjuncts. Still the view of it was very much modified, consciously or unconsciously, by the diversities of exegetical tendencies. On the allegorical method of Interpretation, discrepancies in the Bible gave little trouble; every impediment was easily removed by it. It well agreed with an idea of Inspiration which was extended to everything equally, since in all it sought in the same manner the divine and the mysterious. On the other hand, the grammatical and logical Exegesis rendered it needful to distinguish the divine and the human; it took notice of difficulties which opposed that extravagant idea of Inspiration. But this sounder method of Interpretation which took more account of the connexion, the historical reference, and the characteristics of the writers, and distinguished more exactly the divine causes from the human, was able to solve difficulties, which could not be obviated by the allegorical method. It was principally the Antiochian School which adopted this plan between extreme literality and allegory. It offered, indeed, no systematic development of the idea of Inspiration, but made various important suggestions which led to modifications of the previous method.

CHRYSOSTOM\* notices the objection against the divine origin of the Gospels, taken from the discrepancies they contain. He was too unprejudiced to deny them altogether, and says

\* Chrys. in Matth. Hom. i. § 2. Op. vii. p. 5.—*αὐτό μὲν οὖν τοῦτο μέγιστον δείγμα τῆς ἀληθείας ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ πάντα συνεφώνησαν μετὰ ἀκριβείας, καὶ μέχρι καιροῦ, καὶ μέχρι τόπου, καὶ μέχρι ῥημάτων αὐτῶν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπίστευσε τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ὅτι μὴ συνελθόντες ἀπὸ συνθήκης τινὸς ἀνθρωπίνης ἔγραψαν ἅπερ ἔγραψαν· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῆς ἀπλότητος τὴν τοσαύτην συμφωνίαν νυνὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ δοκοῦσα ἐν μικροῖς εἶναι διαφωνία, πάσης ἀπαλλάττει αὐτοὺς ὑποψίας, καὶ λαμπρῶς τοῦ τρόπου τῶν γραψάντων ἀπολογεῖται· εἰ δὲ τι περὶ καιρῶν ἢ τόπων διαφόρος ἀπήγγειλαν, τοῦτο οὐδὲν βλάπτει τῶν εἰρημένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὥς ἂν ὁ Θεὸς παρέχη, πειρασόμεθα προϊόντες ἀποδείξαι· ἐκείνοι μετὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀξιούντες ὑμᾶς παρατηρεῖν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς κεφαλαίοις καὶ συνέχουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα συγκροτοῦσιν, οὐδαμοῦ τις αὐτῶν οὐδὲ μικρὸν διαφωνήσας εὐρίσκεται.*

even these are great evidences of the truth, for if there was a perfect agreement in every particular, opponents would allege this as a proof of concert in the writers. But these discrepancies in unimportant matters free the writers from all suspicion. He attributes these differences to the nature and peculiarity of historical composition as a human art. Hence he adds, since truth may pervade the narratives notwithstanding these differences, it is a proof of its power. If an important contradiction had been found, Christianity would long ago have perished; for every kingdom divided against itself cannot stand. But the power of the Divine Spirit is shown in unimportant differences, inasmuch as it prompts men to unanimity in what is essential and necessary, and not to be misled into Unbelief by differences in subordinate particulars. This view is founded on the idea of Inspiration as a general enlivening by the Divine Spirit, so that unity is preserved, but yet the human and the fallible is apparent in particular things. Yet we cannot say that Chrysostom always followed out to its consequences the principle which his language involves.

JEROME, owing to his more exact investigation, could not help remarking many things which were not to be explained by the divine causality, but only by the peculiar characteristics of the human organs. To this cause he attributes the defects of the Hellenistic dialect of the Apostles; \* he notices in Paul solecisms, hyperboles, and abrupt periods. His statements on this subject are remarkable, though what he finds defective in Paul's style must be regarded from a higher standpoint only as the garb of a powerful spirit. He goes still further in his observations on Gal. v. 12; he thinks that the language of the Apostle indicates the mixture of human passion not altogether

\* Comm. in Ep. ad Ephes. c. 3, *init.*—Puto autem quod et vitiosa in hoc loco elocutio sit. Si vero quis potest etiam juxta sermonis et eloquii contextum docere apostolum fuisse perfectum, et in artis grammaticæ vitia non incurrisse, ille potius auscultandus est; nos quotiescunque solecismos aut tale quid annotamus, non apostolum pulsamus, ut malevoli criminantur, sed magis apostoli assertores sumus, quod Hebræus ex Hebræis absque rhetorici nitore sermonis et verborum compositione et eloquii venustate numquam ad fidem Christi totum mundum transducere valuisset, nisi evangelizasset eum non in sapientia verbi sed in virtute Dei. Iste igitur qui solecismos in verbis facit, qui non potest hyperbaton reddere sententiamque concludere, audacter sibi vindicat sapientiam, et dicit, &c.



pure. We cannot be surprised,\* he says, if the Apostle as a man, still in the weak vessel of the body, should allow himself the use of such an expression, for we are acquainted with other instances of holy men who have done the same thing. He thus held the opinion that as Paul was not yet perfectly holy, the reaction of sin might still show itself in his writings; consequently, he did not extend the idea of Inspiration so far as to suppose that this was prevented by the Holy Spirit.

A controversy respecting the Epistle to Philemon is deserving of notice; to many persons, owing to their extreme views of Inspiration, which took no account of human co-operation, it seemed not to possess the character of an inspired writing, as it was occupied entirely with the common relations of social life. Hence, without denying its genuineness, they were disposed to exclude this Epistle from the Canon. In confirmation of their opinion, they alleged that Paul had not always spoken in such a manner as if Christ ever spoke in him; that human weakness could not have borne such an incessant operation of the Holy Spirit. They regarded this uniformity of divine influence as the prerogative of Christ, which distinguished him from all others. Even in Paul's life there were moments to which his language—"I live, but not I, but Christ liveth in me"—would not be applicable; this was the case in whatever related to the satisfaction of his bodily wants. Was it a mark of the indwelling of Christ, when he charged Timothy to bring his cloak with him? On the other hand, Jerome† said, that on the same principles which led them to reject this Epistle, they might reject other Epistles of the Apostle. Paul himself in 1 Cor. vii. distinguishes between what he said from his own standpoint, and what Christ commissioned him to say. And if bodily necessities claimed attention at certain times, the operation of the Holy Spirit was not thereby denied. He added, that those who knew not how to harmonize the great and the little, must, if they would be consistent, maintain, like the Gnostics, that there is one Creator of ants and flies, and another of the

\* *Nec mirum esse, si apostolus ut homo et adhuc vasculo clausus infirmo vidensque aliam legem in corpore suo captivantem se et ducentem in lege peccati, semel fuerit hoc locutus; in quod frequenter sanctos viros cadere perspicimus.*

† *In Epist. ad Philem. Proem.*

heavens and earth, and of the Angels. Chrysostom developes still more plainly than Jerome, in his vindication of this Epistle, the congruity of the devine and human. He says,\* if any one leads a spiritual life, his whole appearance, and gait, and speech, bear the impress of spirituality and edify observers.†

THEODORUS of MOPSUESTIA would enable us to understand still more fully the peculiarities of the Antiochian School in this respect, if more of the Commentaries of this liberally minded man had come down to us.‡ While the advocates of the common Hermeneutics were disposed to find the

\* Hom. in Philem. t. xi. p. 773.—“Ὅταν τις πνευματικῶς ζῇ καὶ σχήματα καὶ βαδίσματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ πράγματα τοῦ τοιοῦτου καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὀφείλει.

† Compare also the admirable vindication of the Epistle to Philemon by Theodorus of Mopsuestia, who regards it as a specimen of apostolic humility and wisdom.

‡ This opinion of Neander's has been confirmed since the above-mentioned Commentaries have been discovered. Their whole method is very instructive in reference to the standpoint of Theodorus. We extract from them the following general remarks. Respecting the settlement of the historical portions, and the designed idea of the biblical writers on allegorical interpretation, he remarks on Gal. iv. 24, p. 81: Qui studium multum habent intervertere sensus divinarum scripturarum, et omnia quæ illuc posita sunt intercipere fabulas vero quasdam ineptas ex se confingere, et allegoriæ nomen suæ ponere desipientiæ; hac voce apostoli abutentes, quasi hinc videntur sumsisse potestatem ut et omnes intellectus divinæ exterminent scripturæ, eo quod secundum apostolum per allegoriam dicere nituntur. Et ipsi non intelligentes, quantum differt, quod et ab illis et ab apostolo hoc in loco dictum sit. Apostolus enim non interimit historiam, neque evolvit res dudum factas, sed sic posuit illa, ut tunc fuerant facta, et historia illorum quæ fuerant facta, ad suum usus est intellectum. Isti vero omnia e contrario faciunt, omnem divinæ scripturæ historiam somniorum nocturnorum nihil differre volentes. Nec enim Adam Adam esse dicunt, quando maxime eos divina spiritaliter enarrare acciderit.

For his view of the inspiration of the New Testament writers, his remarks on Paul's style and feelings are deserving of attention. On Gal. v. 12, p. 88: Et ad plenum quis considerans illa, quæ in hac sunt epistola, tum quæ extra probationem sunt, sive ad Galatas dicta sive ad adversarios, inveniet densam eam esse et sensus varietate illustratam, nunc quidem ista, nunc vero illa dicentem, quod proprium est illorum qui irascuntur. Ita ut et multa contingant, et omnia frequenter et compendiose dicant, nullo in loco sensum dilatantes. In Philemon v. 16, p. 158: Est quidem obscurum quod dictum est ob nimium compendium, eo quod Apostolus sæpe cupiens aliqua compendiose explicare, obscuritate dicta sua involvit. [JACOBI.]

New Testament in the Old, which was easily effected by the allegorical exegesis, Theodorus laid particular stress on the difference between the Old Testament and the Christian standpoint. He developed ideas, which had been propagated by the Gnostics, but adopted a far more sound and scientific method. He opposed the arbitrary allegorical method of interpreting Scripture, and, while he adhered to the historical and grammatical method, endeavoured to satisfy the religious and the scientific necessities of the case. Thus he arrived at a remarkable idea of the inspiration of the Old Testament; he distinguished between what the Authors had expressed consciously under certain definite relations, and the higher meaning which might be discovered in it from the Christian standpoint. Many expressions were hyperbolic\* in relation to the objects to which they were primarily applied; they find their verification in Christ. Hence, the notion that Theodorus formed of Inspiration was, that the Divine Spirit imparted to these writers ideas of which they were not clearly conscious, and which were susceptible of a higher application than they could make of them. He combated those who saw the doctrine of the Trinity clearly expressed in the Old Testament, and maintained on the contrary† that neither that, nor the doctrine of the Messiah as the Son of God, were yet revealed in it. The Apostles, in the Interpretation of the Old Testament, were not always infallible according to the letter; they were guided by the Holy Spirit only in understanding the higher meaning. Hence, he did not place the Old Testament quotations on a level

\* Comment. in Zachar. ix. v. 9, 10. Wegnern, p. 618.

† In Joel ii. 28. Wegn. p. 154.—τοῦτο γὰρ λέγει τὸ ἐκχεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματός μου, τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς παλαιᾶς διαθήκης πνεῦμα μὲν ἄγιον μοναδικὸν ἐν ὑποστάσει κεχωρισμένως τῶν λοιπῶν Θεοῦ δὲ ὃν καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ οὐκ ἐπισταμένων, πνεῦμα δὲ Θεοῦ καὶ πνεῦμα ἄγιον καὶ πᾶν, ὃ, τι δῆποτε τοιοῦτο τὴν χάριν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν κηδεμονίαν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν καλούντων, κ.τ.λ. In Sachar. i. 7. Wegn. 539:—δηλοῦ ὄντος, ὅτι τῶν πρὸ τῆς τοῦ δεσπότης Χριστοῦ παρουσίας οὐδεὶς ἠπίστατο πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν οὐ πατέρα Θεὸν υἱοῦ Θεοῦ πατέρα, οὐχ υἱὸν Θεὸν υἱὸν πατρὸς Θεοῦ τοῦτο ὄντα ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ πατήρ, ἅτε καὶ ὄντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ· ἐπειδὴ πατρὸς μὲν ὀνομασία καὶ υἱοῦ ἐπὶ παλαιᾶς ἦν διαθήκης, πατρὸς μὲν κοινῶς κατὰ κηδεμονίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ λεγομένου τῶν τῆς ἐκείθεν ἐπιμέλειας ἀξιουμένων ἀνθρώπων, υἱὸν δὲ τῶν ἔχοντων τι πλεον κατὰ οἰκείωσιν Θεοῦ· πατέρα δὲ Θεὸν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἔφην ἤδη, υἱοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ υἱὸν Θεὸν Θεοῦ πατρὸς ἠπίστατο τῶν τότε καθάπαξ οὐδεὶς.

a with those from the New. Occupying this historical standpoint, he prosecuted an historical genetic development of Revelation, which was the first approximation to the idea of biblical Dogmatics. The method also was peculiarly his own in which he explained the ecstasies recorded in Holy Writ, as necessary\* under certain circumstances. As we obtain the most accurate information when we direct our senses entirely to an object, so the gaze of the holy writers was given up to the contemplation of divine things, and the consciousness of the external World retired before that of the internal. With this was connected his opinion that the Visions in Holy Writ were not at all sensuous, but perceptions of an inner sense in which instruction was imparted by the Holy Spirit. In these views many important germs of later development were contained.

#### B. THE DOGMAS OF DOGMATICS STRICTLY SO CALLED.

##### a. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

DURING this period the whole doctrine of God underwent a revolution, owing to the controversies respecting the Trinity; we shall, therefore, deviate from the order, we followed in the first period, and begin with the history of the doctrine of the Trinity.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

##### 1. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SON OF GOD.

THE Unity of the Christian consciousness of God was developed in conflict with the old Subordination system of the Trinity. In the East the Subordination System as elaborated under the influence of Origen, maintained its ground; in the West, the doctrine prevailed of one divine essence in the Father and the Son; *una substantia, μία οὐσία, ὁμοούσιον*. We have seen the controversy break out between the Roman and Alexandrian Churches, and how it was settled by the moderation of

\* In Nahum, c. i. Wegn. p. 397.—Οὕτω τὸν μακάριον Πέτρον λέγει ἐν ἐκστάσει γεγονότα τὴν σινδόνα ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταφερόμενην, ἐπειδὴ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος χάρις πρότερον αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀποσπάσασα τῶν παρόντων τότε προσανέχιν τῇ θεωρίᾳ παρесеύασε τῶν δεικνύμενων, ἢ ὥσπερ ἐξ τῆς παρουσίας γινόμενοι καταστάσεις καθ' ὑπνοῦς τῶν ἀποκαλυπτομένων δεχόμεθα τὴν θεωρίαν, οὕτω πως τῇ μεταστάσει τῆς διανοίας ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος καθιστάμενοι χάριτος τῶν δεικνύμενων ὑποδέχοντο τὴν θεωρίαν.

Dionysius of Alexandria. Perhaps it would not now have come to an open rupture if an extreme party had not appeared which was at a still greater remove from the Western system of Unity than the prevalent view of the Eastern Church. We have remarked traces of it already during the preceding Period in the opposition against the Monarchians, which gave prominence to the distinction between the essence of the Father and that of the Son. It stamps special importance on the appearance of ARIUS, that he gave the watchword to the controversy by an unmodified expression of a similar view.

ARIUS, Presbyter of a church affiliated to the principal church in Alexandria, was certainly not the man who was disposed to establish a new dogma. He had not the talents requisite to give a new direction, and, doubtless, believed that he was only maintaining the ancient doctrine of the Church, and vindicating it against errors. He was animated by a sincere zeal for what he acknowledged as true, and withal a strong predilection for logical clearness and intelligibility, but with a certain contractedness of mind, a want of the speculative element; he possessed no depth of religious intuition or apprehension of Christian truths, and hence had not the disposition fitted for receiving several dogmas. His mental training had been influenced on the one hand, by the School of Origen, and on the other, by the Antiochian, at the head of which, in his day, stood the Presbyter, Lucian. But the tendency of Arius was too foreign to the system of Origen, to be more deeply affected by it than in some individual points; he received his peculiar exegetical direction from the Antiochian School; but the higher faculty of intuition was undeveloped, and the deeper understanding of biblical ideas was wanting, and thus he was obliged to confine himself to single expressions. This is shown in the scheme of his doctrine of Christ, in which the terms expressive of subordination in the New Testament, are considered and applied in an isolated, onesided manner; it is the same with his view of the constitution of Christ's person. Against the Sabellians he maintained a sharp conflict, in which he had the support of the Antiochian school, which was distinguished by its zealous opposition to the Monarchians. In the doctrine of the Homocousion, he saw nothing else; either the idea of Son of God must be understood in a gross anthropopathic sense, or Christ could only be conceived of as

a created being.\* The profound idea expressed by Origen, of an eternal, beginningless generation of the Son was inconceivable to his matter-of-fact understanding. The production by God could signify nothing else than creating a being out of nothing by his own will. Hence the Logos is placed in the class of created beings; he was created out of nothing; his existence had a beginning; there was a moment, in which he did not exist. If a beginningless existence were ascribed to him, then two original Beings must be admitted, two Gods equal to each other. Now he granted that the World and Time were correlative ideas, that the Son of God, though a creature, was far exalted above all others; God had made him his instrument for creating all other beings;† he was, therefore, begotten, created, established by God before the World and Time. In this way he thought that he agreed with Scripture. Notwithstanding these characteristics of a creature, Arius had no scruple to call him God, and found no contradiction in his being at once God and a created being; he applied the designation in a figurative sense, and appealed to passages in the Bible, where Elohim is so used. It did not escape his observation that the idea of a creature implies that of mutability, and he did not exempt the Son of God from this; for when he calls him the unchangeable God (*ἀναλλοίωτος Θεός*) he refers this attribute not to his essence, but to the moral immutability of his Will. In the stress laid on Free-will, we may perceive the influence of Origen. This was the foundation of the divine dignity which was ascribed to him before all other created beings; for God, who, by virtue of his

\* Arii Ep. ad Euseb. Nicom. in Theodor. H. E. i. 5.—*διδάσκομεν, ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀγεννήτου κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον, οὐδὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινός· ἀλλ' ὅτι θελήματι καὶ βουλῇ ὑπέστη πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων πλήρης Θεός, μονογενής, ἀναλλοίωτος, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι, ἤτοι κτισθῆναι, ἢ ὀρισθῆναι, ἢ διμελιωθῆναι, οὐκ ἦν· ἀγέννητος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν· διωκόμεθα ὅτι εἶπαμεν, ἀρχὴν ἔχει ὁ υἱός, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἀναρχός ἐστιν . . . καὶ ὅτι εἶπαμεν, ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐστὶν οὕτω δὲ εἶπαμεν καθότι οὐδὲ μέρος Θεοῦ οὐδὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινός.*—*Θαλεία* in Athan. c. Ar. Or. i. 9.—*οὐκ αἰεὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν ἀλλ' ὕστερον γέγονεν· οὐκ αἰεὶ ἦν ὁ υἱός, οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῆναι· οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑπέστη καὶ αὐτός οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιος τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας.*

† *Exordium Thalix* in Athan. c. Arian. i. 5.—*ἦν γὰρ φησι, μόνος ὁ Θεός καὶ οὐκ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ σοφία· εἴτα θελήσας ἡμᾶς δημιουργῆσαι, τότε δὴ πεποίηκεν ἕνα τινά, καὶ ὠνόμασεν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ σοφίαν καὶ υἱόν, ἕνα ἡμᾶς δι' αὐτοῦ, δημιουργήσῃ.*

prescience foresaw his sinless life,\* gave him this dignity as he gives to every created being what belongs to it. Arius explained Philipp. ii. 8, of the exaltation of Christ, in consequence of his undeviating obedience to his Father's will. Origen referred what he affirmed of conditionality depending on the Will, not to the Logos, but to the human soul connected with it; Arius, on the other hand, conceived of the Incarnation of the Word only as the assumption of a human body, not of a proper, human soul; he did not even distinguish between the divine and the created natures of the Logos, and attributed directly to the Logos, what the Holy Scriptures state as characteristic of subordination.

As Arius disseminated his doctrines in sermons and theological conferences, a controversy arose respecting them among the Clergy, in which Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, who was devoted to the system of the *ὁμοούσιον*, took part. He accused Arius of not acknowledging Christ in the true sense as a Redeemer, because he regarded his nature as mutable; how then could he redeem natures that were subject to change? Arius, on the other hand, accused Alexander of having fallen into Sabellianism. The distance between them gradually widened, and in A.D. 321, Arius was excommunicated and deposed by Alexander at a synod, composed of a hundred members.† After this, he composed a half poetical work, entitled, *Thalia*, in which, as had been done by others for the spread of their doctrines, he brought forward his own peculiar sentiments in songs for sailors, millers, and travellers. The controversy excited a strong sensation, and men of note appeared as mediators, such as Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, and Eusebius of Cæsarea. The latter, who, by the teaching of Pamphilus, was an adherent of Origen, agreed neither with Arius nor with Alexander, considered it pernicious, in accordance with a maxim of Origen, to dispute openly on such subjects, which could only be rightly treated by men whose hearts were devoted to God. He endeavoured to convince both, that they held the views of their opponents to be worse than they really were, and that they agreed in essentials, in the general belief in the divinity of Christ. Arius would have been inclined to be reconciled to his bishop; for although he had the intention of making his doctrine predominant at

\* Neander's Church History, iv. 6.

† Ibid. iv. 10.

last, yet he would have been content at the time with its being merely tolerated. But Alexander held the difference to be too important to admit of such a settlement. Constantine also, who after his victory over Licinius, had obtained the sovereignty, had his attention directed to the controversy; the confusion was to him annoying; he wrote to both parties,\* and upbraided each for bringing before the public subjects which the multitude could not understand. The controversy appeared to those who drew up the Emperor's letter, as not very important, and this view of the matter suited his Eclecticism; he blamed them for being willing to disturb the Unity of the Church for such things; and held out the example of the schools of Philosophy as a pattern, who would not divide on account of every point of difference. To him it appeared that the acknowledgment of a Providence ought to be enough to unite them. This letter could not attain its end, because both parties took a different view of the point in dispute. Constantine himself could not help being influenced by the theologians who were in his vicinity, and hence did not always maintain his opinion of its unimportance. The opponents of Arius represented that his doctrine was blasphemous, and that the true dignity of Christ called for an assertion of the Unity of Essence. On this account he convoked a General Council of the Bishops at Nice in Bithynia. As far as relates to the dogmatic proceedings of this Council, we have no authentic Acts; we possess only the accounts given by approvers † of it, and their opponents. ‡ It is evident from the characters of Athanasius and Eusebius of Cæsarea, that both accounts are partial; for the former was interested in representing the decisions of the Council as the result of free deliberation, and hence showing that the Oriental Churches, if they did not remain faithful to this creed, must have apostatized from their own convictions; on the other hand, Eusebius wrote a letter, in which he gives an account of the Council, to his own Church, in order to excuse himself for accepting the

\* Euseb. Vita Const. ii. 64.

† Athanasii Ep. ad Afros.; ad Episcopos Ægypti et Libyæ; De Decretis Syn. Nicæn.—Eustathius Antiochen. in Theodoret. Hist. Eccl. i. 8. Compare also the Fragments of the Liber Synodicus in the Coptic language, in Spicileg. Solesm. i. 513.

‡ Euseb. Cæs. Vita Constan. iii. 10, Ep. ad Cæsar. in Theodoret. Hist. Eccl. i. 2.



creed, though he did not strictly agree with it. But yet he could understand and estimate the sentiments of the majority of the assembly better than Athanasius, because he held a dogmatic standpoint in common with them. The historical connexion also is in favour of his representation in preference to that of Athanasius. If we consider the earlier development, we cannot doubt that the majority of the Oriental Bishops, from whom the settlement of the *ὁμοούσιον*, in the Nicene Creed, must have proceeded, were interested against this Dogma. And if we look at the sequel, it would be impossible to explain why the Oriental Church should strive so long against this Creed, if the adoption of it had been the result of an unfettered discussion. But the whole affair is clear if we credit Eusebius, that their decision was not arrived at by free consent but by an influence from without on the Council. The disappointment at the result deeply affected Athanasius; from his standpoint there could only be, by logical consequence, either friends of the *ὁμοούσιον* or Arians; since many of the persons present declared themselves against Arianism, he inferred that they agreed with the Nicene *ὁμοούσιον*; while yet the majority were attached to a middle system, which allowed the greatest affinity possible between the Father and the Son, short of the unity of essence. The opponents of Arius brought forward expressions in which the distinction of the Father from the Son was implied, and which, torn from their connexion, did violence to the religious feeling, and they might easily have obtained the condemnation of the Arian statements, if Eusebius of Cæsarea had not come forward as mediator. He attempted to show that the expressions of Arius had a less offensive meaning, when taken in their connexion, and proposed to the Council a Creed respecting the Divinity of Christ, that employed indefinite designations, such as God of God, Light of Light, which even Arius could adopt, and desired that this creed, which contained the doctrine of the Oriental Church, might be received. Arius would willingly have acquiesced, had his opponents shown themselves equally ready; the difference would have been concealed, and the controversy settled for a time; but the difference might afresh be rendered sensible in the opposition against the Western Church, and must also soon break out again in the Oriental. It was impossible to remain fixed on the standpoint of development

where they then were. Meanwhile, Eusebius was unsuccessful; the opponents of Arius refused, and insisted on additions which made it impossible for him to explain the general expressions, according to his own meaning; to *Θεός ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ* they required *ἀληθινός* to be added; and to *γεννηθείς*, in order to exclude the idea of the Creation of Christ out of nothing, the phrase *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and the negative *οὐ ποιηθείς*; the Arian doctrine of Christ as a *κτισμα*, would be condemned by the words *ἢ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*. Constantine, convinced that it was necessary to maintain the Divinity of Christ, proposed that the clause, Christ is *ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ*, should be added. Eusebius at first opposed it; at last he consented to it for the sake of peace, and satisfied his mind by affixing his own sense to the terms. The majority of the Bishops followed his example, and the Creed was accepted.\* But, very soon, a dispute arose on the interpretation of the Creed, between those who had received it voluntarily, and those who had received it by compulsion; and the latter, of course, were desirous of getting rid of it.

In order to gain over the Emperor, who had no settled convictions, it was represented to him, that the doctrine of Arius was, after all, not so very objectionable, and that the controversy had been owing chiefly to the passions of those who had engaged in it. He adopted this view of the matter, and allowed Arius to lay before him a new creed in self-justification. He professed his faith in the Logos as *Θεός ἐκ Θεοῦ*, and begotten before all time, and represented the dispute as an idle one. The Emperor was satisfied. Arius was permitted to return from exile in 328, and the zeal of his opponents only con-

\* The *Symbolum Nicænum*, in a letter of Eusebius. Theodoret. Hist. E. i. 12.—πιστεύομεν εἰς ἓνα Θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητὴν· καὶ εἰς ἓνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, καὶ ὥς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ· δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο· τὰ τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα, καὶ σαρκωθέντα, καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. Καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ὅτι ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι, τρεπτόν ἢ ἀλλοιωτόν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἀγία καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία.

firmed the Emperor in his opinion, that they were self-willed disturbers of the peace. Athanasius, who meanwhile had become bishop of Alexandria, was ordered to receive Arius again into the Church, but strenuously refused. He and the Nicene Creed were now the objects of the attacks that proceeded from the majority of the Oriental Churches, with whom Arius had united himself. They prevailed on the Emperor to banish him, about the year 336, to Gaul. Here in the Western Church, the development of doctrine had received a form resembling that of his own Dogma, and owing to this circumstance he met with a friendly reception. On Constantine's death in 337, Constantine II., who governed the West, recalled him to Alexandria; but Constantine, the Emperor of the East, became the tool of the Anti-Nicene party, who again effected the deposition of Athanasius. Yet the Oriental Bishops were quite ready to be on terms of harmony with the West, and, hence, at Antioch (341—345) put forth five creeds, in which they sought to clear themselves from the suspicion of Arianism, and explained their middle course, which was afterwards distinguished by the names of the *ὁμοιούσων*, and Semi-Arianism. They approximated, as far as possible, to the Western Church in these Creeds; only they were unwilling to adopt the *ὁμοούσιον*. In the second Creed, drawn up at Antioch, which is said to have been framed on the plan of one of earlier date, by the well-known Presbyter Lucian, Christ was called the unchangeable image of the Deity, of the essence and will, the power and glory of the Father.\* In the fourth Creed,

\* The Creeds are in Walch's *Biblioth. Symbolica Vetus*, p. 109. Munscher (i. p. 210) has taken them from Athan. *De Synodis Arimini et Seleuciæ Habit.* The second § 23.—*τὸν υἱὸν—τὸν μονογενῆ Θεόν, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα, τὸν γεννηθέντα πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, ὅλον ἐξ ὅλου, μόνον ἐκ μόνου, τέλειον ἐκ τέλειον, λόγον ζῶντα, σοφίαν ζῶσαν,—ἀτρεπτον τε καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, τῆς Θεότητος, οὐσίας τε καὶ βουλῆς, καὶ δυνάμειος, καὶ δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα,—τὸν ὄντα ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν λόγον Θεόν, κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν τῇ εὐαγγελίῳ· καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος,—δηλονότι πατρὸς ἀληθῶς πατρὸς ὄντος, υἱοῦ δὲ ἀληθῶς υἱοῦ ὄντος, τοῦ δὲ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἀληθῶς ἁγίου πνεύματος ὄντος, τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐχ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲ ἀρχῶς κειμένων, ἀλλὰ σημαινόντων ἀκριβῶς τὴν οἰκίαν ἐκάστου τῶν ὀνομαζομένων ὑποστάσιν τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ δόξαν· ὥς εἶναι τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἓν. Πᾶσαν αἵρετικὴν κακοδοξίαν ἀναθεματίζομεν,—εἰ τις—διδάσκει—ἡ χροὸν, ἡ καὶρὸν, ἡ αἰῶνα, ἡ εἶναι, ἡ γιγνέναι πρὸ τοῦ γεννηθῆναι τὸν υἱόν—καὶ εἰ τις λέγει τὸν υἱὸν κτίσμα ὡς ἐν τῶν κτισμάτων, ἡ γέννημα ὡς ἐν τῶν γεννημάτων, ἡ ποίημα ὡς ἐν τῶν ποιημάτων.*

which agreed, for the most part, with that proposed by Eusebius at Nice, the Arian doctrine was more expressly condemned, and it was explicitly declared that Christ was perfect, and in his nature, God like the Father. But the Western Bishops would not give their assent, but adhered to the Nicene Creed, and the rupture was widened. In order to heal the breach, it was proposed to hold a General Council; this, however, did not take place; but the Eastern Bishops met at Philippolis, in Thrace, and the Western at Sardica.\* The former explained themselves in accordance with the fourth Antiochian Creed; at Sardica new definitions were proposed, but they were not approved, as it was thought unwise to make so many forms of belief. Through the influence of Constans, the Sardican decisions were enforced in the Oriental Church, and Athanasius was once more restored to his office. But all things were changed by the political revolutions in which Constans lost his life, and Constantius became sole ruler. At first the dogmatic question was not brought forward; it was only attempted to set aside Athanasius. To accomplish his condemnation, the East and West were to be brought into a forced union. About the year 356, he was banished, and thus the opposition in the Nicene Council triumphed both in the East and West. But the victory was disastrous in its consequences. It was effected by a coalition of the Oriental majority, and of the strict Arians who joined in a common opposition to the Nicene Creed. As soon as the object of their coalition was attained, the opposition between the heterogeneous elements which composed it broke out, and was increased by the appearance of Eunomius, who developed the doctrine of Arius in still more decided terms. The adherents of the moderate tendency gradually strengthened the Nicene party. A means was sought for, to prevent an absolute disruption, and a Creed was proposed which maintained only in general terms the similarity of the Father and the Son, but determined nothing respecting the relation of the *οὐσία*, because the Holy Scriptures had settled nothing respecting it. Such a Henotikon could well proceed from men of various parties and interests. Its authors, among whom Acacius,

\* Yet see my Essay on the Festive Letters of Athanasius, from which it appears that the date of these Synods was earlier.—[JACOBI.]

Bishop of Cæsarea in Palestine,\* deserves special notice, were perhaps convinced, that it was not right to dispute on such incomprehensible subjects; the strict Arians also joined them, to whom it was of prime importance to get rid of the distinctions which stood in their way. But the formula they proposed had the common fate of Henotica, and only made the disunion more intense and complex; for the adherents of the formula constituted a new party. In order to give authority to the Creed, an Oriental Council was assembled, about the year 359, at Seleucia, in Isauria, and a Western one at Ariminum (Rimini) in Italy; clandestine efforts were made on both sides, by the Homoiousians at Seleucia, and by the adherents of the Nicene Council at Rimini. As they met with opposition, they attempted to intrigue at court, and by its aid succeeded, owing to the unacquaintedness of the Western Church with the affairs of the Eastern, and the weakness of the Orientals, in bringing matters to such a point that a Creed was adopted as a kind of Henoticon, A.D. 360. The Churches seemed to be reconciled, but in a short time, great disturbances arose from the smothered opposition; those who had received the Creed from fear or ignorance, were regarded by the more resolute party as betrayers of the Truth. The death of Constantine put an end to this state of things. It was salutary for the dogmatical development of the Church, that Julian never troubled himself about party disputes. Every Dogma no longer supported or kept down by outward force, might now be treated according to its intrinsic value, and its relation to the natural development of the Church. The Arians had rendered themselves odious to the Homoiousians by their conduct, and hence the latter were disposed to regard the advocates of the Nicene Creed in a more favourable light. The union of these two parties was promoted, since under the reign of Valens the Arians were inclined again to oppress their adversaries by despotic measures. The zealous efforts of those distinguished Church Teachers of the East, the three Cappadocian theologians, contributed greatly to the spread of the Nicene doctrine. As under Theodosius I., the ruling power had decided in its favour, this doctrine was no longer pressed upon the Oriental Church from without, but its reception was left to depend on its own development. And thus,

\* Neander's Church History, iv. 70—72.

at the second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381) the Nicene Creed was confirmed, and, with a few alterations, received. The continued opposition of the Arian doctrine to the Christian consciousness gradually led to its own suppression; for as the Arians made use of biblical and church phraseology, the words were understood in a different sense from that which they intended, and thus they involuntarily subserved the very cause which they opposed.\* From this time, their doctrine met with acceptance only among barbarous tribes, chiefly those of German origin, to whom such a form of doctrine might be more agreeable, and who would not be dissatisfied with its want of logical consequence; it served them as an intermediate stage to a deeper view of Christianity.

In reference to the cultivation bestowed on these different systems within the circle of their respective parties, we may observe that the most distinguished advocates of the Nicene doctrine were **ATHANASIUS**\* in the East, and **HILARY** of Poitiers in the West. Its development by the former was closely connected with his warfare against the Arians and Semi-Arians. When the Arians maintained that the Son of God was only distinguished from other created beings by the fact, that God created him first of all, and then all other beings by him; Athanasius, on the contrary, said, It is a narrow-minded representation, that God must require an instrument for Creation; it looks as if the Son of God came into existence only for our sakes; and by such a representation we might be led to regard the Son of God, not as participating immediately in the divine essence, but as requiring an intermediate agency for himself. What then could that agency be, between him and God? Grant that such existed, then that would be the Son of God in a proper sense; nothing else, indeed, than the divine essence communicating itself. If we do not stand in connexion with God, through the Son of God, as thus conceived of, we have no true communion with Him, but something stands between us and God, and we are, therefore, not the children of God in a proper sense. For in reference to our original relation we are only creatures of God, and He is not in a proper sense our Father; only so far is He our

\* Hilarius Pictav. adv. Arian. et Auxentium, § 6.

† See especially his Orat. contr. Arian.; De Decretis Syn. Nicæan.; De Synodo Arimin. et Seleucena.

Father as we are placed in communion with the Father, through Christ, who is the Son of God by a communication of the divine essence: without this doctrine, it could not be said that we are partakers of the divine nature.\* Thus in Athanasius the ideas of redemption, adoption, and communion with God were connected with the idea of Jesus as the true Son of God. As the Arians believed that they ought to pay divine honour to Christ, according to the Scriptures, he charged them with inconsistency, since, on their principles, men were made idolaters and worshippers of a creature. The Arians objected to the Nicene doctrine, that the idea of the Son of God could not be distinguished from that of a created being, unless anthropopathical notions were admitted. Athanasius replied, that certainly all religious expressions are symbolical, and have something anthropopathical at their basis, which we must abstract from them in order to get the correct idea. But the same is the case with the idea of Creation which the Arians are willing to maintain; we should fall into error, if we tried to develop this according to human representations. In like manner we must abstract from the ideas *Son of God*, and *begotten of God*, what belongs to sensuous relations, and then there is left to us the idea of Unity of Essence, and derivation of Nature.

Athanasius objects to the Semi-Arians that the ideas of likeness and unlikeness suit only creaturely relations; in reference to God we can speak only of Unity or Diversity. It belongs to the idea of Creation that something is created out of nothing, *ab extra*, by the will of God; to the idea of the Son of God belongs derivation from the essence of God. It was a difficulty to the Semi-Arians in general, as well as to the Arians, that the Son of God was asserted to maintain his existence not by a direct act of the Father's will, and both parties urged against the Niceans the dilemma that either

\* Orat. contr. Arian. 1, 16.—ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδιον αὐτοῦ σύμπαν εἶναι τὸν υἱόν· τὸ γὰρ ὅλως μετέχεσθαι τὸν θεόν, ἴσδον ἐστὶ λέγειν ὅτι καὶ γεννᾷ· τὸ δὲ γεννᾶν τί σημαίνει ἢ υἱὸν; αὐτοῦ γοῦν τοῦ υἱοῦ μετέχει τὰ πάντα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος γινομένην παρ' αὐτοῦ χάριν, καὶ φανερόν ἐκ τούτου γίνεται, ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ υἱὸς οὐδενὸς μετέχει, το δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μετεχόμενον, τοῦτό ἐστι ὁ υἱός· αὐτοῦ γὰρ τοῦ υἱοῦ μετέχοντες τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχειν λεγόμεθα (“ἵνα γένητε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως”—“οὐκ οἴδατε, ὅτι υἱὸς θεοῦ ἐστε;”—“ἡμεῖς γὰρ υἱὸς θεοῦ ἴσμεν ζῶντος,” 2, 59).

God brought the Son into being by his own will, or that he was, begotten against his will by necessity. Athanasius emphatically maintained the doctrine they impugned. If the will of God be supposed to be the origin of the Son's existence, then the Son of God belongs to the class of creatures. The existence of the divine Logos precedes all particular acts of the divine Will, which are all effectuated only by the Logos, who himself is the living divine Will. Our opponents think only of the contrast between will and compulsion; they ignore what is higher, namely, the idea of that which is founded in the divine essence. We cannot say, God is good and merciful first of all, by a special act of his will; but all the acts of the divine will presuppose the Being of God. The same holds good of the Logos and the acts of God's will.\*

In the views of the Semi-Arians various modifications existed; they agreed in opposition both to the Homousion and the Heterousion, and in maintaining the Homoiousion, and the distinction of the Son of God from created beings. The party generally assented to the fourth Antiochian Creed, and to that of the Synod held at Ancyra in the year 358. Two eminent men belonging to it are deserving of special notice. The first is Eusebius of Cæsarea, whose system was derived chiefly from Origen, and hence in its main outlines was fixed before the Nicene Council, as it is evident from his earlier works, especially the *ἀπόδειξις εὐαγγελικῇ*. He calls the Son of God the reflection of the first eternal light, and distinguishes

\* Orat. contr. Arian, ii. 2.—καὶ ἀναιροῦντες δὲ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, πῶς τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν προηγέσθαι θέλοντες, οὐκ ἐρυθριῶσιν; εἰ δὲ τὰ ἐκτός καὶ οὐκ ὄντα πρότερον, βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτὰ εἶναι, δημιουργεῖ, καὶ γίνεται τούτων ποιητής· πολλῶ πρότερον εἴη ἂν πατὴρ γεννήματος ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας· εἰ γὰρ τὸ βουλευσθαι περὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων διδάσκει τῷ Θεῷ, διὰ τὴν μὴ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον τῆς βουλῆσεως οὐκ ἐπιγινώσκουσι τοῦ Θεοῦ; ὑπερναβίβηκε δὲ, τῆς βουλῆσεως τὸ πεφυκέναι καὶ εἶναι αὐτὸν πατέρα τοῦ ἰδίου λόγου εἰ τοίνυν τὸ πρότερον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν, οὐκ ὑπῆρξε κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀνοίαν, πῶς τὸ δεύτερον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ βούλησιν, γένοιτο· ἂν; πρότερον δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ δεύτερον ἡ κτίσις· ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ πλείονα τολμῶσιν οἱ ἀσεβεῖς· δι' αὐτοῦ γὰρ γέγονεν ἡ κτίσις· καὶ δῆλον ἂν εἴη, ὅτι ποιητής ὢν ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τὸν δημιουργικὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐξωθεν ἀλλ' ἴδιον ἑαυτοῦ· πάλιν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ρητέον· εἰ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἔχει, καὶ τὸ βούλημα αὐτοῦ ποιητικὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρκεῖ τὸ βούλημα αὐτοῦ πρὸς σύστασιν τῶν γινομένων· ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ποιητικὸς καὶ δημιουργός· οὐκ ἀμφίβολον, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς ζῶσα βούλη, καὶ ἐνούσιος ἐνέργεια, καὶ λόγος ἀληθινός, ἐν ᾧ καὶ συνίστηται καὶ διοικεῖται τὰ πάντα καλῶς.



by a kind of subordination the first and second light, the first and second *οὐσία* ;\* but the Son of God is in every respect similar to the Father. It is true, he had received from Origen the idea of a Generation not in time ; but, in order to distinguish the Son from the Father, he maintained that he was not eternal like the Father in an absolute sense, and that the Father existed before the Son. The Generation of the Son of God was an idea, to the conception of which only the acutest understanding was adequate. He was begotten not in any specific time, but existed before all time in an incomprehensible manner. Eusebius calls the Son *τέλειον δημιουργημα τοῦ τρισίου* ("the perfect workmanship of the Perfect One") ; but it does not follow from this, that he held him to be a creature. At that time the language of theology was not so precise, and he afterwards expressed himself decidedly against such an opinion, as not corresponding to the nature and dignity of the Son of God, and as unscriptural. But even the Homousion did not correspond to the true relation of the Son to the Father, and was not founded in Scripture. He made use, by preference, of biblical phraseology, and eagerly insisted on what was practically important, while he pointed out the incomprehensibility of those things which men ought not to define too exactly. As we cannot conceive, he said, how God made the world out of nothing, how can we expect to explain the manner in which the Son was brought into existence by the Father? We men know not even what lies straight before our eyes. Christ tells us what is needful to be known respecting himself ; he who believes on him hath everlasting life ; but *how* he is the Son of God, that is not necessary for us to know. From this standpoint we may understand his conduct in the Arian Controversy, and his moderation, which, however, was influenced by the imperial authority. When Arius acknowledged that the Son was begotten by the Father, this might appear sufficient from the standpoint of Eusebius, but he could not honourably assent to the Homousion, and it was acting unjustly when he wished to impose his point of view on all other persons, and charged the more decided adherents of the Homousion with obstinacy.

CYRILL of Jerusalem† agreed with Eusebius in his opposition against Arianism and the Homousion, and in his Catechism

\* *Præpar. Evang.* 7, 12. *Eccles. Theol.* i. 89. † *Catech.* iv. 87 ; xi. 4.

equally combated the views of those who separated the Son of God from the Father, and those who confounded the Father and Son. But he approached nearer than Eusebius to the views of the Nicene party; he taught that Christ was eternal, begotten from all eternity, without beginning and ὁμοιος in every respect to him who begat him. He endeavoured to avoid asserting that the generation of the Logos was consequent on an act of the divine Will, and not less the denial of such an act; in order to escape the difficulty, he only says that God did not determine on the generation of Son by previous deliberation, but always had the Son along with himself. Like Eusebius, he enters a protest against defining too much on this doctrine; it can only be spoken of negatively; the mode cannot be determined. He was always amazed at the forwardness of those persons who advanced too boldly, and with a pretended religious zeal, arrived at impious conclusions. Many things are to met with in the Bible which we cannot understand; why should we make the attempt? It is enough for us that God has begotten a Son; let us check ourselves from wishing to know the inconceivable. Christ himself says, "He who believeth on him, hath everlasting life"—not he who knows how the Son is begotten of the Father.\*

As to the Arians, strictly so called, Arius had already given a very logical representation of his doctrine; he had asserted the infinite distance between God and the creature, and classed the Son with created beings.† Only sometimes he was induced to express himself more mildly, as when in his letter to the Church at Alexandria he impugns those who held that the Father had begotten the Son not in truth, but in appearance. But this language implied no change in his own views; for the true Generation, according to his representation, differed in nothing essentially from Creation. When he says of the Son that he was not like a creature, he means to except him as being the most perfect of all creatures. He maintains that the Father begat the Son as unchangeable, but that this idea is founded not in his essence, but in his agency. In a fragment which Athanasius has preserved, he says,

\* Catech. xi. 12.

† Athan. c. Arian. Or. 1, 6.—καὶ πάντων ξένων καὶ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τοῦ Θεοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀλλότριος μὲν καὶ ἀνόμοιος κατὰ πάντα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ἰδιότητος ἑστῶς.

Christ is the Logos in a metonymical sense,\* namely, in distinction from Reason as immanent in God; the Father is incomprehensible to the Son; he knows him only in conformity with his peculiar nature. These doctrines were expressed still more clearly and broadly by Eunomius, a Deacon of Antioch, afterwards Bishop of Cyzicus, as he had no such interest, as Arius originally had, to connect himself with the Homoiousians, but maintained his dogma equally against them and the Homousians. God, the only unoriginated Being, is infinitely exalted above all in nature, power and might; the Son cannot be said to be like him, since, as Athanasius had already asserted, likeness and unlikeness can only be predicated of created beings; but the Homousion necessarily leads to the acknowledgment of two original beings. Generation from the divine Essence seemed to him inconceivable, and to involve a sensuous emanation and a separation of the divine essence; eternal Generation he regarded as unimaginable, and a heathenish representation derived from Platonism. The divine essence or nature is simple; the will is the mediating principle between the essence of God and his agency, and every act of the will necessarily has a beginning and an end.† The Son of God, consequently, was created according to God's will; he was eternally with God only as predestinated; he was created before all the rest of Creation, which he brought into existence as the organ of God. The natures of creatures differ according to God's will; the Son of God must attain among them the highest possible perfection. According to God's will he is the image and reflection of the Father,‡ the only begotten God. In support of his

\* Contr. Arian. i. 5.—*δύο γοῦν σοφίας φησὶν εἶναι, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ συνυπάρχουσαν τῷ Θεῷ, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ταύτης μετέχοντα ὀνομάσθαι μόνον σοφίαν καὶ λόγον· ἡ σοφία γάρ, φησι, τῇ σοφίᾳ ὑπῆρξε σοφοῦ Θεοῦ Θελήσει· οὕτω καὶ λόγον ἕτερον εἶναι λέγει παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ τούτου μετέχοντα τὸν υἱὸν ὀνομάσθαι πάλιν κατὰ χάριν λόγον καὶ υἱὸν αὐτόν.*

† Greg. Nyssa, Orat. viii. t. ii. 650.—*πάσης γεννήσεως οὐκ ἐκ ἀπειρον ἐκτεινομένης, ἀλλ' εἰς τι τέλος καταληγουσας ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τοὺς παραδεξαμένους τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν γέννησιν, τό τε πεπαῦσθαι τοῦτον γεννώμενον, μηδὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπίστως ἔχειν.*

‡ But differing from Arius.—*Οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ὑπακοῆς προσλαβὼν τὸ εἶναι υἱὸς Θεός, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ υἱὸς εἶναι καὶ γεννηθῆναι μονογενὲς Θεὸς γενόμενος ὑπήκοος ἐν λόγοις ὑπήκοος ἐν ἔργοις.* Gregor. Nyss. Orat. ii. c. Eunom. 470, differing also in Apolog. § 24.—*τίς γάρ αὐτόν τε*

opinion of the Son's subordination he appealed to Christ's words, that he did not his own will, but the will of his Father and to the fact that Christ prayed to God.

We have to notice another person who at one time was among the most zealous advocates of the Nicene Creed, but afterward withdrew from the party, Marcellus, Bishop of Ancyra. In his zeal against the Arian Asterius he became a violent opponent of Origen, to whom he traced Arianism, though Origen was rather the forerunner of the middle party. But Marcellus allowed of no mean between the Nicene Homousion and Arianism. The Arians maintained that the term *Logos* was applied only in a metonymical sense to the Son of God, for the proper *Logos* was the indwelling reason of God. He opposed the Homousion to the utmost, and said that the term *Logos* was the only one which could be employed as an adequate designation of the divine nature in Christ; that it was only possible to speak of an eternal existence of the *Logos* in God, and that every idea of subordination must be excluded. When the Arians appealed to passages of Scripture which expressed a certain dependent relation of Christ, that he was the Image of God, the *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως* and the like, he allowed they were right in the notion of dependence, but maintained that these passages referred not to the *Logos* in himself, but only to his human appearing. He was, indeed, the first person who referred all the expressions in Col. i. 15, &c., and in the Epistle to the Ephesians, to Christ as a man, and to the Creation brought into existence by him. Image, he said, denotes something visible, hence Christ could only be so called, as far as he represents God in humanity; *κτίσις* was the new moral creation proceeding from him, and he was its *πρωτότοκος* as the first being on the new standpoint. He distinguished the *Logos* according to his eternal being in God and his coming

τὸν μονογενῆ γινώσκων, καὶ πάντα τὰ δι' αὐτοῦ γενόμενα καταμαθὼν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν [ἐν] αὐτῷ θεωρεῖσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς δύναμιν;

\* Euseb. contr. Marcellum, ii. 3, p. 44, ed. Colon.—οὐ τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ ἀγιώτατος λογος πρὸ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως ὠνόμαστο· πῶς γὰρ δυνατόν, τὸν ἀεὶ ὄντα πρωτότοκον εἶναι τινος; ἀλλὰ τὸν πρῶτον καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἰς δὲ τὰ πάντα ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι ἐβουλήθη ὁ Θεὸς τοῦτον αἱ θεῖαι γραφαὶ πρωτότοκον πάσης ὀνομάζουσι κτίσεως.

out from God, or as ἡσυχάζων and as ἐνέργεια δραστική\* formed by a πλατύνεσθαι of the Logos; the Deity remained an indivisible unity, but by virtue of such an agency the Logos was extended outward. This is another mode of expression for the older phrases λόγος ἰνδιάθετος and προφορικός. Marcellus referred the whole Creation to this δραστική ἐνέργεια, and included in it the generation of the Logos as far as he communicated himself outwardly. But he referred the operation of the ἐνέργεια more especially to Christ's Incarnation. Hence, the name Son of God was applicable not to the Logos in himself, but to the ἐνέργεια δραστική by virtue of which he acted among men in order to make them the children of God. Christ called himself the Son of Man† because he wished to signify that he was the Son of God only in relation to humanity, in which he wished to employ that agency. The charge of Sabellianism which the Arians brought against him was therefore not unfounded, especially as he had objected to the mention of three hypostases as infringing on the divine unity.‡ He was first of all deposed at Constantinople A.D. 336, by the majority of the Oriental Church, when they set themselves in opposition to the Nicene doctrine, and Eusebius of Cæsarea was commissioned to refute his doctrine.§ At a later period many adherents of the Homousion declared themselves against him.|| Marcellus, however, adopted these erroneous

\* Euseb. contr. Marcellum, lib. ii. 2, p. 39.—πρὸ τῆς δημιουργίας ἀπάσης ἡσυχία τις ἦν, ὡς εἰκός, ἐν τῇ Θεῷ τοῦ λόγου ὄντος. P. 41.—οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος προτερον ἢ Θεοῦ μόνου, πάντων δε διὰ τοῦ λόγου γίγνεσθαι μελλόντων, προηλθεν ὁ λόγος δραστικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὁ λόγος οὗτος τοῦ πατρὸς ὢν—πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, ἦν ὁ λόγος ἐν τῇ πατρὶ ὅτε δὲ ὁ Θεὸς παντοκράτωρ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς προὔθετο ποιῆσαι, ἐνεργείας ἢ τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις εἰδείτο δραστικῆς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐτέρου πλην τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντα· γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι, τότε ὁ λόγος προελθὼν ἐγένετο τοῦ κόσμου ποιητής.

† Ibid. ii. 2, p. 42.—οὐχ υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἑαυτὸν ὀνομάζει, ἀλλ' [ἄνθρωπον], ἵνα διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμολογίας θέσει τὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν κοινωνίαν υἱὸν Θεοῦ γενέσθαι παρασκευάσῃ καὶ μετὰ τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως αὐθις ὡς λόγος ἐνωθῇ τῇ Θεῷ, πληρῶν ἐκείνο τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀποστόλου προεφημῶν, τότε αὐτὸς ὑποταγέσεται τῷ ὑποτάξαντι αὐτὸν πάντα, ἢ οὐ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσι Χριστός [Θεός] (1 Cor. xv. 28) ἔσται γὰρ τῇ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅπερ πρότερον ἦν.

‡ Eccl. Theol. iii. c. 4.

§ Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 50—52.

|| Epiph. Hær. 72, 4.

representations involuntarily, and had no intention of being a Sabellian, but his pupil Photinus (*Φωτίνος*), probably Bishop of Sirmium, put the Dogma in a more logical form, and approached nearer to Sabellianism and Samosaténism.\* He taught that the Logos was truly in the Father, but as such was not the Son, that Christ was not the Son of God from Eternity, but only in virtue of his human appearance; and that the pre-existence with God which belonged to him according to the New Testament, referred only to his predestination. In his views of the human appearance of Christ, he differed from his teacher. Both were deposed from their offices by the Synod at Sirmium, A.D. 351.

## 2.† THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

It must excite surprise that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is only adverted to in very general terms in the Nicene Creed. Why was the Homousion doctrine not applied to it? It has been alleged that at that time there was no controversy respecting it. But this ground is not correct; for it is evident from the express statement of Athanasius,‡ that Arius applied the doctrine of subordination to the Holy Spirit; he placed the same distance between the Son and the Spirit as between the Father and the Son. According to him, the Holy Spirit was only the first of created beings, brought into existence by the Son as the organ of the Father. Or should we be justified in saying that attention had not been sufficiently directed to this point? that it was not held to be of sufficient importance? The true reason rather consists in this, that the Oriental Church was at that time much less

\* Athan. De Syn. Arim. et Seleuc. § 26. The Formula Antiochena, 4, § 27. Formula Sirmiensi Antith. 5.—*εἰ τις κατὰ πρόγνωσιν πρὸ Μαρίας λέγει τὸν υἱὸν ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πρὸ αἰώνων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννημένον πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι τὰ πάντα, ἃ, ζ. 6. "Εἰ τις τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ πλατύνεσθαι ἢ συστέλλεσθαι φάσκει, ἃ, ζ. 7. "Εἰ τις πλατυνομένην τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν υἱὸν λέγει ποιεῖν, ἢ τὸν πλατυσμὸν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ὀνομάζει, ἃ, ζ.*

† Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 84.

‡ Orat. contr. Arian. i. 6.—*καὶ ὅτι μεμερισμένοι τῇ φύσει καὶ ἀπεξεγνωμένοι καὶ ἀπεσχοινισμένοι καὶ αλλοτριοὶ καὶ ἀμέτοχοι εἰσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ οὐσίαι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ἐφθεγξάτο ἀνόμοιοι πάντες ἀλλήλων, ταῖς τε οὐσίαις καὶ δοξαῖς εἰσὶν ἐκάποροι· τὸν γοῦν λόγον φησὶν εἰς ὁμοιότητα δόξης καὶ οὐσίας ἀλλότριον εἶναι παντελῶς ἑκατέρων, τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.*

fitted to admit the Homousia of the Holy Spirit as part of its doctrine, and if it had been urged, its opposition against the Homousion would have been still greater. EUNOMIUS developed this doctrine more logically. He represented the Holy Spirit to be the first created being brought into existence by the agency of the Son, according to the command of the Father. He denied his possession of creative power, but attributed to him sanctifying and enlightening power, from which resulted a remarkable separation of the Intellectual and the Moral in Religion. His unspiritual \* Subordinationism is shown in the following expressions,—the Holy Spirit cannot be compared either with the Son, or with other created beings; he is neither God nor Lord; he is the servant of Christ his God, since he sanctifies and enlightens rational creatures, and puts them in mind to keep Christ's command. He supports the weakness of our prayers; he forgives the sins of the penitent at the command of Christ, and leads them to a true knowledge of him; he makes known what he has received from Christ; he speaks not of himself, and confesses Christ as his Lord and God. But even as late as A.D. 380, great indistinctness prevailed among different parties respecting this Dogma, so that even GREGORY NAZIANZEN could say,† “Some of our theologians regard the Spirit simply as a mode of divine operation, others as a creature of God, others as God himself; others, again, say that they know not which of these opinions to accept, from their reverence for Holy Writ, which says nothing upon it.” HILARY of Poitiers, a Nicene theologian, acknowledges that the Holy Ghost exists, and that faith in him is necessarily connected with confessing the Father and the Son, and to know this is sufficient. If any one ask‡ what the Holy Spirit is, and is not satisfied with the answer that he is through Him and from Him through whom are all things; that he is the Spirit of God, and his gift to believers, even Apostles and Prophets will not satisfy such a person, for they only assert this of him, that he is. He does not venture to attribute to him the name of God, because the Scripture does not so call him expressly,§ yet it says, that

\* A. Maii Scriptt. Vett. Collectio Nova, t. iii. fragm. 3.

† Orat. 37, cap. 12, p. 595, ed. Colon. 1690.

‡ De Trinitate, 2, c. 29.

§ Ibid. 12, c. 55.—Nulla te (Deum) nisi res tua penetrat nec pro-

the Holy Spirit searcheth the deep things of God, it follows that he partakes of the divine essence. Though Basil of Cæsarea wished to teach the divinity of the Holy Spirit in his church, he only ventured to introduce it gradually. The subject was brought more distinctly under discussion, when many of the Homoiousians showed themselves ready to adopt the Nicene doctrine, but could not make up their minds to extend the Homousion to the Holy Spirit. In order to remove their objections, Athanasius, who from the first had been consequential on this dogma, composed his letter to Serapion, bishop of Thmuis.\* His arguments are the following:† “How can the Holy Spirit belong to the same class as the beings who are sanctified by him? The Holy Spirit is the source of true life; when he is imparted to us, we attain to communion with God. This would be impossible if the Holy Spirit were foreign to the divine nature. If he were not divine but of a created nature, then something created would be admitted into the Trinity. Arianism could not be logically rejected if the Homousion were not also ascribed to him.” Subsequently, this dogma was defended by Gregory Nazianzus,‡ Gregory of Nyssa,§ Basil of Cæsarea,¶ Didymus,|| and Ambrose of Milan.\*\* Its impugnors were called Pneumatomachi, and Macedonians after Macedonius, a semi-Arian bishop of Constantinople. In opposition to them, likeness of essence was ascribed to the Holy Spirit first of all by the

*fundum majestatis tuæ peregrinæ atque alienæ a te virtutis causa metitur.*

\* Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 86. Athan. Epp. i. 3, 4. Opp. tom. i. p. 2.

† Ep. i. § 24.—*εἰ κτίσμα δὲ ἦν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ ἂν τις ἐν αὐτῷ μετουσία τοῦ Θεοῦ γένοιτο ἡμῖν· ἀλλ' ἡ ἀρα κτίσματι μὲν συνηπτόμεθα, ἀλλότριον δὲ τῆς Θείας φύσεως ἐγινόμεθα, ὡς κατὰ μηδὲν αὐτῆς μετέχοντες· νῦν δὲ, ὅτε λεγόμεθα μέτοχοι Χριστοῦ καὶ μέτοχοι Θεοῦ, δείκνυνται τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν χρίσμα καὶ ἡ σφραγίς, μὴ ὅσα τῆς τοῦ γεννητοῦ φύσεως, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ διὰ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ πνεύματος, συνάπτοντος ἡμᾶς τῷ πατρὶ. 1 Joh. iv. 13.—εἰ δὲ τῷ τοῦ πνεύματος μετουσίᾳ γινόμεθα κοινωνοὶ Θείας φύσεως, μαίνεται ἂν τις λέγων τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς κτιστῆς φύσεως καὶ μὴ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐν οἷς γίνεται, οὗτοι Θεοποιούνται· εἰ δὲ Θεοπαῖ, οὐκ ἀμφίβολον, ὅτι ἡ τούτου φύσις Θεοῦ ἐστὶ.*

‡ Orat. 37, 43.

§ Oration against Eunomius.

|| περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος πρὸς Ἀμφιλόχιον.

¶ De Spiritu Sancto, translated by Jerome.

\*\* De Spiritu Sancto, libb. 3.



Synod held at Alexandria about A.D. 362; for those who maintained that he was a creature could not consistently reject Arianism. An Illyrian Council, A.D. 375, and the Ecumenical at Constantinople, confirmed the Nicene Creed, with the addition of ascribing the Homousion to the Holy Spirit; \* "We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord who makes alive, who proceedeth from the Father, and equally with the Father and the Son is to be worshipped and glorified."

In these doctrinal definitions lay the germ of a difference between the Eastern and Western Church. In the East it was customary to contemplate God as the efficient cause in the Trinity, and to make this essential to the Monarchy. The Logos was looked upon as the mediating principle, and hence the representation was formed that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father through the Son. The relations of causality in the Triad were supposed to be such, that all things originated with the Father, were brought into existence by the Son, and completed by the Holy Spirit.† The existence of all Spirits proceeds from the will of the Father, by the Son they are brought into existence, and they attain perfection by the character imparted to them by the Holy Spirit; there are not three *ἀρχαὶ ὑποστάσεις*, but there is one *ἀρχή*, God the Father, who creates all things by the Son, and completes them by the Holy Spirit. Thus the way was opened for giving special prominence to the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from the Father. Another occasion for maintaining it was found in the controversy with the Pneumatomachi, against whom it was maintained that the Holy Spirit had his existence from the Father in the same manner as the Son. Theodore of Mopsuestia adopted this view, which was now established in the East. In his confession of faith, he says: "The Spirit derives his essence from the Father; we do not look upon him as the Son, nor do we admit that he received his being through the Son."‡

In the West, on the contrary, while asserting the Homousion of the Father and the Son against the Arians, it was also held

\* Καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τὸ κύριον τὸ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν.

† Basilii De Spir. S. 38.

‡ Walch Bibl Symb. p. 204.

that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son as well as from the Father. AUGUSTIN\* illustrates the doctrine of the Triad by the analogy of the Trinity in the human spirit. *Being* corresponds to God the Father; *knowing*, as a self-representation of *being*, to the Son; and *willing*, or love in which *being* and *knowing* embrace each other, to the Holy Spirit. Hence, the idea that in the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son embrace each other, and that he proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Trinity appeared to him† to be a law of all existence; for in all things he distinguished the universal Being, the special form of Being, and the unity of both. He did not conceal from himself that this was only an analogy; ‡ we know the Triad in this manner as far as it is possible, as in a glass darkly. Of the Holy Spirit in particular he says, that he is the Spirit of the Father and the Son, sent by both. He is that whereby we stand in connexion with God and with one another; he is the Love with which the Father and the

\* Conf. 13, cap. 11.—Vellem ut hæc tria cogitarent homines in seipsis. Longe aliud sunt ista tria quam illa Trinitas: sed dico ubi se exercent et ibi probent, et sentiant quam longe sunt. Dico autem hæc tria: esse, nosse, velle. Sum enim, et novi, et volo; sum sciens et volens; et scio esse me, et velle; et volo esse, et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita, et una vita, et una mens, et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio, et tamen distinctio, videat qui potest.

† De Vera Religione, 13.—Qua Trinitate quantum in hac vita datum est cognita, omnes intellectualis et animalis et corporalis creatura, ab eadem. Trinitate creatrice esse in quantum est, et speciem suam habere et ordinatissime administrari sine ulla dubitatione perspicitur, non ut aliam partem totius creaturæ fecisse intelligatur Pater, et aliam Filius et aliam Spiritus Sanctus, sed et simul omnia et unamquamque naturam Patrem fecisse per Filium in dono Spiritus Sancti. Omnis enim res vel substantia vel essentia vel natura, vel si quo alio verbo melius enuntiatur, simul hæc tria habet, ut et unum aliquid sit et specie propria discernatur a ceteris et verum ordinem non excedat.

‡ Serm. 71, 18.—Nostis carissimi in illa invisibili et incorruptibili Trinitate, quam fides nostra et catholica ecclesia tenet et prædicat, Deum Patrem non Spiritus Sancti Patrem esse sed Filii, et Deum Filium non Spiritus Sancti Filium esse sed Patris: Deum utem Spiritum Sanctum non solius Patris aut solius esse Filii Spiritum, sed Patris et Filii. Et hanc Trinitatem quamvis servata singularum proprietati et substantia personarum, tamen propter ipsam individuum et inseparabilem æternitatis, veritatis, bonitatis essentiam vel naturam, non esse tres Deos sed unum Deum.

Son love one another.\* Augustin contends against those who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father to the Son, and from the Son proceeds and passes on to sanctify in the Creation. Yet we find that he admits a modified representation; he considers it allowable to say, that the Spirit proceeds *principaliter* from the Father. The difference of these views, which had been formed involuntarily, was the subject of open discussion in the Eastern Church. Cyrill of Alexandria, in his anathemas against Nestorius, pronounced condemnation on those who did not derive the Holy Spirit from Christ. Theodoret, in his refutation of these anathemas, rejoined, that if by this it is meant that the Spirit is of the same essence with Christ and proceeds from the Father, we give our assent. But if it be intended that he has his existence through the Son, this is impious. He appeals to 1 Cor. ii. 12, *τὸ πνεῦμα ᾧ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*. After all, Theodoret had no intention to oppose the current doctrine of the Western Church, but contended against the Pneumatomachi, and in the Western Church an opposition was openly expressed, when the West-Gothic Church under King Reccared renounced Arianism for the Catholic confession at the Synod of Toledo in A.D. 589. At that time the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed was adopted, with the addition in reference to the Holy Spirit; that he proceeded from the Father and the Son, and those were condemned who denied this. But here again, the opposition was not against the Eastern Church, but the Arians; still, in these declarations, the germs of difference are already discernible.

We must now take a glance at the ideas of the Church doctrine respecting the unity in essence of the Trinity.

\* De Trinit. 15, 27.—Satis de Patre et Filio, quantum per hoc speculum atque in hoc enigmate videre potuimus, locuti sumus. Nunc de Spiritu Sancto, quantum Deo donante videre conceditur, disserendum est. Qui Spiritus Sanctus secundum scripturas sacras nec Patris solius est nec Filii solius, sed amborum, et ideo communem, qua invicem se diligunt Pater et Filius, nobis insinuat caritatem.

† Ibid. 15, 29.—Et tamen non frustra in hac Trinitate non dicitur Verbum Dei nisi Filius, nec donum. Dei nisi Spiritus Sanctus, nec de quo genitum est verbum et de quo procedit principaliter Spiritus Sanctus nisi Deus Pater. Ideo autem addidi, principaliter, quia et de Filio Spiritus Sanctus procedere reperitur. Sed hoc quoque illi Pater dedit, non jam existenti et nondum habenti; sed quidquid unigenito verbo dedit, gignendo dedit. Sic ergo eum genuit ut etiam de illo donum commune procederet et Spiritus Sanctus spiritus esset amborum.

Setting out from Subordinationism in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and, therefore, with the representation of three independent persons, the transition would not be difficult to regard the unity of the three hypostases as the unity of species belonging to three individuals. Such comparisons actually occur in the Fathers, since they seem to distinguish the Persons only by *γνωριστικὰ σημεῖα* or *ιδιώματα*, as beings belonging to a species, distinguished by specific marks. Yet, as we cannot suppose their views to be so exactly defined, we must not infer too much from these comparisons. It is evident that they did not mean to apply the idea of species literally, and did not consider the categories under which temporal beings are arranged, as exactly corresponding to those of the divine. Basil\* directly opposes such a view; indeed, we could not suppose them so absurd as to regard the Deity merely as an idea of species. The Unity of the essence of the Triad is something higher than numerical unity; the Monad is only a designation of the simple and incomprehensible essence of God. We recognise the influence of Augustin in giving prominence to the divine Unity, in the form of the so-called Athanasian Creed, which most probably originated in the fifth century in the North African Church, when the renewed conflict with the Arians under the rule of the Vandals called for a more decided statement of the orthodox doctrine. Probably, Vigilius of Tapsus was the author.

In the Eastern Church, during the sixth and seventh centuries, fresh investigations respecting the Unity in the Triad were entered upon, owing to the excitement produced by an acute monophysite theologian Johannes Philoponus†

De Spir. Sancto, 17.

† De Civit. Dei, 11, 24.—Credimus et tenemus et fideliter prædicamus quod Pater genuerit Verbum, hoc est. Sapientiam, per quam facta sunt omnia, unigenitum Filium unum, æternus cœternum, summe bonus equaliter bonum: et quod Spiritus Sanctus simul et Patris et Filii sit Spiritus, et ipse consubstantialis et cœternus ambobus; atque hoc totum et Trinitatis sit propter proprietatem personarum, et unus Deus propter inseparabilem omnipotentiam: ita tamen, ut etiam cum de singulis quæritur, unusquisque eorum et Deus et omnipotens esse respondeatur; cum vero de omnibus simul, non tres dii vel tres omni potentes, sed unus Deus omnipotens; tanta ibi est in tribus inseparabilis unitas, quæ sic se voluit prædicari.

He revived the doctrine of Johannes Arcusnages, and applied the ideas of Aristotle, whose philosophy he had closely studied, to this dogma. At that time the proper idea of *φύσις* was much disputed, and the sense in which *a divine nature* might be spoken of. Philoponus connected with it the Aristotelian definition of *ἰδος*, the general idea which is expressed in individual objects. Either the divine nature might be spoken of as the Universal which is contained in individual persons who are distinguished by specific marks; or individual divine natures might be spoken of in the individual hypostases. From this it would appear, that he confounded the common divine essence in the Triad with the idea of species, and fell into Tritheism. On this side he was open to attack.

#### THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONTROVERSY.

The consequences of this controversy were first noticeable in the general tendency of the dogmatic spirit. A revolution would have been effected in the entire method of dogmatic thinking by those of whom EUNOMIUS was so extreme a representative, if they had not been kept back by the superior force of their opponents. He was blamed for denying the incomprehensibility of God, which even Arius maintained, who also allowed that the creation of the Son of God could be comprehended by no human mind; but Eunomius in this respect differed widely from him. This could not be considered as the mere forced inferences of opponents, since his devoted pupil, the Church Historian Philostorgius,\* mentions it to his credit that in his point he differed from Arius. Besides, Eunomius himself says in a fragment,† that the intellect of those who believe in the Lord rises above all sensible objects, nor even remains stationary at the generation of the Son of God, but rises to God himself. Against this assertion Gregory

\* Hist. Eccl. 2, 3, 10, 2.

† Greg. Nyss. Orat. 10. Contr. Eunom. Op. 2, pp. 674, 675.—'Ο γὰρ νοῦς τῶν εἰς τὸν κύριον πεπιστευκότων πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν καὶ νοητὴν οὐσίαν ὑπερέψας, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ γεννήσεως ἵστασθαι πέφυκεν. Ἐπέκεινα δὲ ταύτης ἔσται πόθῳ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς ἐντυχεῖν τῷ πρώτῳ γλιχόμενος.

of Nyssa says, If eternal life be not in the Son, he spoke falsely who said, "I am eternal life." Eunomius\* asserted that his opponents who denied the comprehensibility of God, were not worthy the name of Christians; since for what purpose did Christ come if we knew nothing of God, like the heathen. But here his own unfair reasoning is evident, since it does not follow from the denial of perfect knowledge, that there is none at all. As he erroneously placed the seat of Religion in knowledge, Dogma and Dogmatic, logical clearness were the main thing to him, and his adherents persisted in exalting the Dogmatic above the Practical, while his opponents attached greater importance to living according to the ordinances of the Church. He maintained† that piety consisted not in a reverence for names and mystical symbols, but in accuracy of doctrines; to this Gregory of Nyssa replied, that whoever is not born again cannot enter the kingdom of Heaven; he who does not eat the Lord's flesh and drink his blood cannot have eternal life; everything depends on communion with Christ. This controversy would have led, had it been prolonged, to discussions on the relations of faith to knowledge, and on the limits of knowledge and its relation to life. GREGORY of NYSSA says, we must entirely give up the investigation respecting the origin of things; even the most enlightened men have perceived that they must abide on the standpoint of faith. In Heb. xi. 11, it is said that we know by faith that the

\* Greg. Nyssa. Orat. 11. Adv. Eun. p. 704.—Μηδὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χριστιανῶν προσηγορίαν οἰκείως ἔχειν τοὺς ἀγνωστον ἀποφαινομένους τὴν θείαν φύσιν, ἀγνωστον δὲ καὶ τὸν τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπον.

† L. c.—οὔτε τῇ σεμνότητι τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὔτε ἐθῶν καὶ μυστικῶν συμβόλων ιδιότητι κυροῦσθαι τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον, τῇ δὲ τῶν δογμάτων ἀκρίβειᾳ.

‡ Greg. Nyssa. De Anima et Resurrectione, iii. p. 238, ed. Paris, 1638.—ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ζήτησιν τὴν περὶ τοῦ πῶς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον γέγονεν, ἐξαιρετικόν πάντῃ τοῦ λόγου· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν προχείρων ἡμῖν εἰς κατανόησιν, ὥς τὴν ἀντίληψιν δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔχομεν, δυνατόν ἂν γένοιτο τῷ διερευνομένῳ λόγῳ, τὸ πῶς ὑπέρστη τὸ φαινόμενον κατανοῆσαι, ὡς μήτε τοῖς θεοφορομένοις καὶ ἁγίοις ἀνδράσι τὸ τοιοῦτον ληπτὸν νομισθῆναι· πιστεῖ γὰρ νοοῦμέν, φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος, κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας ῥήματι θεοῦ, εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὰ δρώμενα γεγόναι· οὐκ ἂν ὡς οἶομαι τοῦτο εἰπὼν, εἴπερ ῥῆτο γνωστὸν εἶναι διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν τὸ ζητούμενον· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν θελήματι θεῷ καταρτίσθαι αὐτὸς τε ὁ αἰὼν καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἐν αὐτῷ γεγένηται· ὅστις οὖν ἂν εἴη οὗτος ὁ αἰὼν, ᾧ παραθεωρεῖται πᾶσα ὁρατὴ τε καὶ ἀόρατος κτίσις; τοῦτο πεπιστενέκται φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος· τὸ δὲ πῶς ἀφῆκεν ἀδιερεύνητον

worlds were made. This the writer would not have said if he had thought that we could comprehend it by the understanding.

The Arian controversy had special consequences in reference to particular doctrines. The contrast between that which has its basis in the nature of God, and what is created out of nothing, *ab extra*, by his will, became more sharply defined, and at the same time the doctrine of Creation was more exactly determined as an act of the divine will, in opposition to the Oriental doctrine of emanation, and to the speculative Cosmogony in general. This was a victory of the Christian faith over the heathen element, and an assurance of the practical tendency of Christianity. The assertion of Arius that, on the Nicene standpoint an eternal Creation must be admitted, caused Athanasius in opposition to assert more distinctly the production of Creation out of nothing, and to prove that a beginning is implied in the very idea of a created being. Let any one ask, he says,\* why God did not create from all eternity, none but a madman would think of attempting to explain it. But in order to give a reason for it, we say that it belongs to the nature of creatures not to be eternal, although it were possible for God always to create. For they were created out of nothing, and were not till brought into being. How, therefore, could they have existed from the beginning with the ever-living God? Augustin endeavoured to disjoin all ideas of Time from the idea of Creation.† He distinguishes the divine eternity from

\* Contr. Arian. Or. i. 29.

† De Civit. Dei. xii. c. 15.—Ubi enim nulla creatura est, cujus mutabilibus motibus tempora peraguntur, tempora omnino esse non possunt. Ac per hoc etsi semper fuerunt, creati sunt; nec si semper fuerunt, ideo creatori cœterni sunt. Illi enim semper fuit æternitate immutabili, isti autem facti sunt. Sed ideo semper fuisse dicuntur, quia omni tempore fuerunt, sine quibus tempora nullo modo esse potuerunt; tempus autem quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, æternitati immutabili non potest esse cœternum.

Conf. xi. 11.—Quis tenebit cor et figet, ut paululum rapiat splendor em semper stantes æternitates, et comparet eum temporibus numquam stantibus, ut videat esse incomparabilem et videat longum tempus, nisi ex multis prætereuntibus motibus, qui simul extendi non possunt, longum non fieri; non autem præterire quid quam in æterno, sed totum esse præsens; nullum vero tempus esse præsens; et videat omne præteritum propelli ex futuro et omne futurum ex præterito consequi et omne præteritum ac futurum ab eo, quod semper est præsens, creari et ex currere?

an endless Becoming. In reference to God we cannot speak of any priority; he preceded Creation not by virtue of a changeable temporal duration, but by virtue of his unchangeable eternity, and because without Creation no time whatever can be imagined. In discussing the idea of an endless Becoming, he says,\* we do not answer those who ask what God did before he created the World, as some one did, with the witty sarcasm, "He prepared Hell for over-curious speculators." He then shows the difficulties on both sides, and maintains that God by the elevation of his Eternity as an ever-enduring Present, preceded all time, and that at all events an endless Becoming was not equivalent to an unchangeable Eternity. Augustin's conception of the relation between the creative and upholding agency of God were determined by his idea of Creation. Creation was not to be thought of as a temporal act, beginning and ending, but as ever continuous; hence God's upholding agency came to be regarded as a continued Creation. His religious consciousness led him to the same view, by giving him the idea of the perpetual, absolute dependence of the Creature on God in opposition to the deistical notion of the relation of God to the world. He has expressed many deep reflections on this subject. God governs his whole creation by his own hidden might. "The Father worketh hitherto;" these words of Christ (John v. 17) he understands of God's upholding as a continued Creation.† It is God who works by the rain, and the labours of the husbandman. God cannot leave his work, like a builder, after its completion; the world would not last a moment without his guidance; if the secret agency of God‡ were withdrawn from Nature, to which it has given existence and preservation, Nature would at once sink into nothing. From this point of view, he combats§ the mechanical conception of the relation of God to the World, whatever proceeds from the hidden and unseen laws of Nature is to be traced back to the agency of God, which operates henceforth and for ever. Therein is the Law expressed; and what is effected by the course of Nature, is only a work of God's creative power; he appoints their laws and powers constantly afresh, and works through them. If the upholding and creative agency of God

\* Cap. xii.

† Ibid. 9, 27.

‡ De Genesi ad Litter. 4, 22, 5, 40.

§ Ibid. 5, 20, 10.



were thus conceived of, and the immediate agency of God in the whole Creation admitted, the idea of miracle would be specifically determined. Augustin was very far from regarding a miracle exceptionally as an immediate operation of God. How he viewed it in relation to the course of Nature, and the creative immediate agency of God, appears from the following expressions :\*—Besides those operations which take place in the natural course of things, the Creator has reserved to himself the power, out of all these powers, to make something different than what was founded in the original laws of Nature, but nothing which is contradictory to them. For God's power is not arbitrary; but as He is Allmighty, so also he is Allwise; he allows in the course of time that to proceed from every natural being, of which he had previously implanted the tendencies in nature. He has also granted to creatures, the possibility of such miraculous operations arising from them which, though not contradicting them, could not be derived from their natural powers. Nature has been so constituted, that it must be subject to an Allmighty will. Augustin, therefore, regarded miracles as operations which could not proceed from natural powers; but these powers are so constituted as to be capable and ready to receive higher powers into them as God has determined in his scheme of the World. Therefore, miracles, as well as natural operations are referable to an immediate agency of God in the Creation. Hence, Augustin says, God the Creator of Nature, does nothing against Nature,† for that which God does is what is agreeable

\* Ibid. 9, 32.—Super hanc autem notum cursumque rerum naturalem potestas creatoris habet apud se posse de his omnibus facere aliud, quam eorum quasi seminales rationes habent, non tamen id quod non in iis posuit, ut de his fieri vel ab ipso possit.—Neque enim potentia temeraria, sapientiæ virtute omnipotens est et hoc de unaquaque re in tempore suo facit, quod ante in ea fecit, ut possit.

† Contra Faustum, 26, 3.—Deus Creator et conditor omnium naturarum nihil contra naturam facit; id enim erit cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit, a quo est omnis modus numerus, ordo naturæ.—Sed contra naturam non incongrue dicimus aliquid Deum facere, quod facit contra id quod novimus in natura. Hanc etiam enim appellamus naturam, cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturæ, contra quem Deus cum aliquid facit mirabilia nominantur. Contra illam vero summam naturæ legem a notitia remotam sive impiorum sive adhuc infirmorum tam Deus nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit.

to the nature of every being. If we say of anything that it is against nature, this only signifies the common course of nature, that which is known to us; but if we speak of the highest law in Nature, God does nothing against that, since he cannot contradict himself. Augustin, therefore, distinguishes here between the common course of Nature, and Nature in an ideal sense, the divine scheme of the World. In the same way he determines the aim and design of miracles;\* in all Nature there is a wonderful because immediate agency of God. But as these wonders, by their commonness, have lost their importance in the eyes of men, so that no one, for instance, regards as wonderful the process of germination in a grain of wheat, God has reserved some things which he performs on a suitable occasion, and which take place out of the common course of Nature, in order to arouse the attention of men. Not as if these were greater wonders, they are only more uncommon, which must awaken men to pay Him homage. Much depends on the moral bearing of miracles.† We cannot call every uncommon event a *miraculum*; something more enters into the idea of a miracle in a religious sense. For along with it, there is a Revelation of the divine love and grace, by which the attention must be led from the sensuous appearance to the Divine which is revealed to the spirit. This view of miracles was of great importance for the Christian development of succeeding ages. The traces of it are discernible in the tradition that reached even to the times of a more sensuous tendency. Gregory the Great belongs to those who transmitted it to a later age. The genuine Christian view of miracles shines through the sensuous element, in connexion with the whole course of the development of the kingdom of God. Miracles take place, he says, in order to lead the souls of men to what was internal; what is wonderful in the Visible must serve as a medium to promote faith in the wonderful Invisible. Paul, in an island full of unbelievers, healed the sick by his prayers,‡ but Timothy required no outward miracle, because he was already spiritually alive and sound.§ The Church daily

\* Tractat. 24, in Evang. Joann.

† De Util. Credendi, 34, cap. 16.

‡ Neander's Ch. Hist. v. 202. In Job. lib. 27, cap. 37, § 36, t. i. p. 869, ed. Bened.

§ In Ev. lib. ii. Homil. 29, 3, 4.

accomplishes spiritually what it once performed bodily through the Apostles, for how could believers who publish holy mysteries, and celebrate the praises of God, do otherwise than speak with new tongues? Those who daily come to the aid of the brethren whom they see weak in good works, what do they do but lay their hands on the sick? These miracles are the greater, because they are of a spiritual kind, and because not bodies, but souls are resuscitated by them. Such miracles ye may perform when ye will, by the power of God.

b. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST,  
(OR CHRISTOLOGY.)

THE doctrine of a human soul in Christ as established by TERTULLIAN and ORIGEN, met with varied opposition at the end of the preceding period, which was prolonged to this. It may be generally asserted of the standpoint of ARIUS, that it placed itself in opposition to the progressive development of Christian truth, and confined it to an earlier and crude form. This is verified in his doctrine of the Person of Christ. He made the Incarnation to consist only in the assumption of a human body. The Logos differing, as he conceived, merely in degree from other spirits, could submit to all the limitations which were implied in the fact, that he was considered as being the sole animating principle. It was formerly supposed that Eunomius differed in this respect from Arius. In his confession of faith we find it stated, the Logos had assumed Man, consisted of body and soul; this, however, not only surprises us, on account of the other peculiarities of his doctrine, but it is evident from comparing it with a passage quoted by Gregory of Nyssa, that an *ὄν* must have been dropped by the transcriber, so that the true reading is, The Word appeared in the flesh, but not a man consisting of body and soul. This is confirmed by a fragment lately published by A. Mai, in which it is said that the Logos did not assume *animam et corpus*, because in John's Gospel only the *σάξ* is mentioned. From this standpoint the Arians charged their opponents who separated the predicates of the divine and human nature, with denying the true Unity of Christ, and admitting both a divine

\* Contr. Eun. Or. 2, tom. ii. frag. 482.—τὸν ἐπ' ἰσχύων τῶν ἡμερῶν γενομενον ἀνθρωπον, οὐκ ἀναλαβόντα τον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀνθρωπον.

and a human person.\* Indeed the Arians, when accused of idolatry, because they worshipped a creature in Christ, might also have retorted this charge on the Orthodox, as far as they separated the Man Christ from the Son of God. On the other side, Athanasius vindicated the doctrine of the Church.† Marcellus and Photinus occasioned new Controversies in reference to this dogma. According to Marcellus, the appearance of the Logos in Humanity (*ἐνσυννομία*) was an effect of the *ἐνέργεια δραστική*, beaming forth from the divine Unity. The indwelling of the Logos also, according to his notion, took place not in a perfect human nature, but only in a body; hence he must, like Sabellius, have regarded the whole human consciousness of Christ, his entire spiritual personality as a beaming forth of the *ἐνέργεια δραστική*, which first became hypostatic in Christ. And this beaming forth was to return to the divine Unity. To this he referred 1 Cor. xv. that God after the kingdom of Christ had obtained its end, would be all in all. The manifestation of the Power (*ἐνέργεια*) as a Person could only serve for redemption, that is, for communicating the divine and unchangeable life of which Christ was a partaker. But here he was met by a difficulty—if, on the return of the Power to the Father, the personality of Christ would be nullified, what would become of Christ's glorified *σῶμα*? He did not conceal this from himself; but it was characteristic of him, that he set bounds to his speculations, and easily reposed in the declarations of Holy Writ, though he explained them according to his dogmatic prepossessions. Here, too, he allowed the discrepancy, which he knew not how to escape, to remain unsolved, and confessed,‡ that in Holy Writ nothing determinate could be found respecting it, and it must be left undecided. The doctrine of his pupil Photinus appears, from several accounts, to have been like the Samosatensian, as far as he attributes the existence of the Son of God to the descent of the Spirit on the Virgin Mary. On the other hand, the terms in which his doctrine was denounced by the council of Sirmium, point rather to Sabellianism; § namely, that he taught

\* Gregor. Nyssen. contr. Eunom. Orat. 4. Opp. ii. p. 578, A.

† Ep. ad Adelphium. Opp. tom. i. p. 729.

‡ Euseb. contr. Marcell. ii. 2, 4.

§ Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 95.—Εἰ τις πλατυνομένην τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν υἱὸν λέγοι ποιεῖν ἢ τὸν πλατυσμένον τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ὀνομάζει.

and maintained a *πλατυσμός* of the essence of the Logos, that the Word was changed into flesh. According to this, he supposed that the *δραστική ἐνέργεια* of the *λόγος* had formed a personality at the conception of Christ, so that the spiritual in Christ was nothing else than an irradiation of the Logos in the *σάρξ*. Consequently, he substituted this hypostasizing of the Logos for a human soul in Christ, and his personality was a manifestation of the *δραστική ἐνέργεια* of the Logos. He differed only from Marcellus in maintaining that the personality would not cease, but exist to all Eternity. On this account his doctrine, at a later period, was described, though not quite correctly as Samosaténism.

The completeness of the human nature in Christ was now insisted on, in opposition to Arianism; and in another direction against what was called Photianism, the true union of the divine Logos and Man was asserted in opposition to the view that Christ was to be placed in the same class as the Prophets. The articles of the Council of Alexandria, A.D. 362, were directed against both.\* They determined that the Logos was not related to Christ in the same manner as to the Prophets, but had himself become Man; but he had not assumed a *σῶμα ἄψυχον*; for the salvation of the soul is effected by the Logos; the Son of God became also Son of Man; he who raised Lazarus from the dead was no other than he who asked after him. On both points the bounds of orthodoxy were fixed, and those who stood at the head tried to prevent all further definitions, so that diversified views might be held without producing a disruption. Hilary of Poitiers† supported a peculiar view—that Christ had assumed a soul *ex se*, and a body *per se*; that is, a soul specially allied to himself, derived in a certain manner from his divine essence, and a body so formed by his divine agency, that it was not subject to the defects of a sensuous nature, and therefore did not necessarily suffer pain or hunger, &c. But he did not explain

\* Athan. ad Antioch. Opp. i. p. 615, sqq. cap. vii.—ὡμολόγουν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σῶμα ἄψυχον, οὐδ' ἀναισθητον, οὐδ' ἀνόητον εἶχεν ὁ σωτήρ, οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν, τοῦ κυρίου, δι' ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπου γινομένου, ἀνόητον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ σώματος μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ σωτηρία γέγονεν υἱός τε ὦν ἀληθῶς τοῦ Θεοῦ, γέγονε καὶ υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου.

† De Trinitat. lib. 9, 10. Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 96.

the passages in the Gospel referring to Christ's body docetically, but maintained that Christ really subjected himself to all his bodily sufferings voluntarily, and for the salvation of men.

The peculiar manner in which the three Cappadocian Fathers, and especially GREGORY of NYSSA and GREGORY NAZIANZUS elaborated the doctrine, had a great influence on the development of the Oriental Church. Like Origen, they aimed at proving that the Logos had united himself with a sensuous nature, by means of a rational human soul. The essential point in this union, the mark of a true personal unity, they made to consist in all the parts of human nature being penetrated by the divine Essence. This penetration took place at the birth of Christ, but its complete consequences were not developed till after the Resurrection, and with the glorification of Christ his body also was glorified. Gregory of Nyssa, in combating Eunomius, says,\* The divine Essence is unchangeable; even the sensuous nature has its peculiar qualities; but when taken into fellowship with the divine, the human no longer retains its peculiar marks and properties, but as wood is consumed in the fire so is the human in the divine. Thus we may speak of a true unity in the God-Man. As a mark of this union he adduces the reciprocal transference of the predicator of the divine and human natures, the ἀντιστροφῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων.† He expresses himself so strongly in reference to the penetration of the human by the divine, as to maintain that the body of Christ, by its amalgamation with the Divine Essence after its glorification, laid aside all the qualities of the human nature, and from this fact he inferred the ubiquity of Christ's human nature. Christ is with us in all parts of the World, as he is in Heaven. Gregory Nazianzus does not go quite so far, but only says‡ that Christ has no longer a strictly sensuous nature, though his body has not become a spiritual being; but concerning the constitution of his glorified nature in the body penetrated by the divine, nothing precise can be determined.

This peculiar doctrinal type was likely to give offence, especially where the principles of Origen's theology were not

\* Contr. Eunom. Orat. 3, tom. ii. p. 589.

† Ep. ad Theophilum contr. Apollinarem, tom. iii. p. 265.

‡ Or. 40, tom. i. p. 671.

adopted. Opposition to it was called forth from an altogether different quarter, in the doctrine of APOLLINARIUS of Laodicea.\* He was a man of much acuteness; he subjected the doctrine to a fresh scientific examination, pondered its difficulties, and tried to surmount them by a scheme which presented the Unity of the two natures in the God-man with mathematical precision. The greatest difficulty appeared to him to consist in the union of the divine person of the Logos with a perfect human person. Two perfect wholes could not be united in one whole.† Setting out from Anthropology, he asserted that the essence of the rational soul consists in its self-determination. If this characteristic were retained in connexion with the divine nature, there could be no true personal union, but only such a divine influence on Jesus as might be experienced by any other man. On the other hand, if the soul forfeited this characteristic, it would renounce its essential peculiarity.‡ On the first point he objected to the School of Origen, that it admitted no true union of the divine and the human, but made instead two Sons of God, the Logos and the Man Jesus.§ Hence he thought the rational human soul must be excluded from the God-man, and, in this, the old undefined doctrine was on his side. For the human soul he substituted the Logos himself as the *νοῦς Θεός*. He developed this doctrine with originality and acuteness. The scheme of human nature which he made use of, was the common trichotomical one, of the *ψυχὴ λογικὴ* (*νοερά*), *ἄλογος* and the *σῶμα*. That an animal principle of life, a *ψυχὴ ἄλογος*, must be admitted to exist in human nature, he thought might be proved from Paul's

\* The writings of Apollinaris *περὶ σαρκώσεως λογίδιον* (*ἀπόδειξις περὶ τῆς Θείας ἐν σαρκώσεως*)—τὸ κατὰ κεφάλαιον βιβλίον—*περὶ ἀναστάσεως*.—*περὶ πίστεως λογίδιον*. Fragments in Gregory of Nyssa, especially in his *λόγος ἀντιρρητικός πρὸς τὰ Ἀπολινάριον* (374—80), ed. Zacagni in *Collectan. Monum. Veter. Eccl. Gr. Romæ*, 1698, 4, rec. in Gallandi, *Bibl. P. P. t. vi. p. 517*. See also, A. Mai, *Coll. Nova*, t. vii. *Gregor. Naz. Ep. i. et ii. ad Ædonium*, tom. i. p. 737. Athanasius, C. Apollinaristas, i. 2. Epiphanius *Hæres.* 62. Theodoret *Hæres.* fab. 4, 8; *Dialog.* 3. Leontius Byz. in Canisius *Barnasse*, i. 600.—Catena in *Ev. Joh.* ed. Corderius, 1630.

† *Antirr.* cap. 39, p. 323.—*εἰ ἀνθρώπων τελείῃ συνήφθη Θεὸς τέλειος δύο ἂν ἦσαν*.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 245.—*φθορὰ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου ζῶον τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτεξούσιον οὐ φθείρεται δὲ ἡ φύσις ὑπο τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτὴν*.

§ *L. c.* 42.—*εἰς μὲν φύσει υἱὸς Θεοῦ, εἰς δὲ Θεός*.

Epistles, in the passages where he speaks of the Flesh lusting against the Spirit, for the body in itself has no power of lusting, but only the soul that is connected with it. It is not self-determining, but must be determined by the ψυχή λογική which with it ought to govern the body. But this result is frustrated by Sin; and conquered by it, the reason succumbs to the power of the irrational desires. In order to free Man from Sin, the unchangeable Divine Spirit must be united with a human nature, control the *anima*, and present a holy human life.\* Thus we have in Christ as man, the three component parts, and can call him the *ἄνθρωπος ἱπουράνιος*, only with this difference, the Divine occupies the place of the human *νοῦς*. The character of Christ's life also proves this, for from the first he was wise and holy, while it belongs to the human spirit to acquire these qualities by conflict and earnest endeavour. But how did APOLLINARIS conceive of the divine Logos? If the Patripassians believed the whole divine essence to be united with the human body, and acting as a substitute for the soul, such a representation cannot appear very strange in these people who had a strong practical tendency. And for the Arians who regarded the Logos only as a subordinate Spirit, it must have been easier to include his whole being in a human body. But as to a man of such acuteness as APOLLINARIS, it seems strange how he could regard the totality of the infinite Logos as the animating principle of the human body without the intervention of a human Spirit. The fragments of his own writings, and the statements of his opponents which have come down to us, render little aid in the solution of the difficulty. But that Apollinaris studied it, and endeavoured to obviate it, is evident from a remarkable passage in which he says of the relation of Christ to the Father,†—that Christ separated his agency from that of the Father, in reference to his bodily existence, but placed it on an equality in reference to the divine nature of the Logos. He insists on equality in respect of power, and on the distinction of agency

\* L. c. p. 225.—Οὐκ ἄρα σώζεται τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος δι' ἀναλήψεως νοῦ καὶ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ διὰ προσλήψεως σαρκὸς, ἥ φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονεύεσθαι, ἰδεῖτο δὲ ἀτρέπτου νοῦ, μὴ ὑποπίπτοντος αὐτῇ διὰ ἐπιστημοσύνης ἀσθίνειαν, ἀλλὰ συναρμόζοντος αὐτὴν ἀδείαστως ἑαυτῷ.

† Antirr. c. 29, p. 194.—Διαχωρῶν μὲν τὴν ἐνέργειαν κατὰ σάρκα, ἰξισῶν δὲ κατὰ πνεῦμα.



in reference to the corporeal. It would seem that he did not regard the Logos in his totality, but a certain *εισδυα* proceeding from him, as constituting the soul in Christ. A further development of this speculation must have led him to Sabellianism or Photianism. But this he was desirous of avoiding, because it seemed to him to derogate from the true dignity of the God-Man, and thus, though he approached very near it, he never explicitly adopted it. By means of his theory APOLLINARIS believed that he not only fully represented the God-Man, but also maintained the true Unity of the Divine and the Human in so intimate a connexion as to admit of an interchange of predicates; and yet he also wished to keep the two classes of predicates fairly apart, and regarded this point as giving his theory the preference to that held by the school of Origen and the Cappadocian teachers. As the human body remains unaltered in its connexion with the soul, so also it retained its peculiar characteristics in its connexion with the divine Logos, while, according to *their* doctrine, Christ's body underwent an Apotheosis. But now, through fellowship with the God-Man, power is bestowed on men to overcome the opposing influences of the lower soul; in the Christian faith alone, he said, we find the whole man who is accepted by God unto salvation. At first APOLLINARIS adopted the common Church phraseology respecting the three component parts of Christ's person, and his delegates subscribed the creed of the Synod of Alexandria, A.D. 362, which expressly asserted the doctrine of a human soul in Christ. But though he avowed his agreement with this creed in a letter to the Council at Dio-Cæsarea, yet, at the same time, he explained the peculiar sense in which he accepted it. Deceived by this formal assent, his opponents began with attacking not himself, but his disciples. ATHANASIUS wrote against them his Epistle *ad Epictetum*.\* APOLLINARIS did not regard these attacks as personal, because they were directed against representations which were not altogether his own. Yet, as time advanced, he could not keep clear of the controversy; he was accused of departing from the simplicity of the faith, and of adulterating it by arbitrary speculations. He rejoined, that it was of prime importance to examine what the true Faith really was; that an unexamined faith resting

\* Opp. i. p. 720.

on tradition, would contain in all likelihood heathen or Jewish notions; the doctrine of the Person of Christ, especially, without careful examination would unavoidably be injured by Jewish conceptions of Christ, or by the heathen representation of a deification of his human nature. ATHANASIUS, in opposition to the Apollinarian theory, asserted that the true Christ could not be described by the human understanding.\* Christ, he further said, could not exhort us to imitate him, if his human nature had not been like ours. If he had not perfectly assumed this, he could not have redeemed it. He appealed to the affections and acts of Christ, which could not be conceived to exist apart from a human soul; his feelings of sorrow and agony, his praying, and his descent into Hades. It has been often asserted that APOLLINARIS denied this doctrine of the *descensus ad inferos* as not in agreement with his principles, and that this occasioned its insertion in the Creed; but this latter point is an anachronism. It is certainly difficult to perceive how APOLLINARIS could give his assent to it; yet we are not justified in asserting that he did not acknowledge it, though ATHANASIUS does not specially refer to it. In the Catena on the Octateuch, attributed to NICEPHORUS,† there is a passage which contains the assertion of an APOLLINARIS, that this act of Christ, belonged to the true death of his human nature. There was, indeed, a CLAUDIUS APOLLINARIS, an apologist of the second century, who possibly might be intended. When APOLLINARIS argued from the holy constitution of Christ's person, that the divine *νοῦς* occupied the place of the human reason, ATHANASIUS rejoined that were it really so, that Christ could not have assumed human nature as sinless without doing it violence—it would follow that sinlessness was opposed to human nature. But the very opposite is the case; Christ has represented human nature in its original state—in its innocence and freedom. But in their ideas of freedom there was a difference between these two men. APOLLINARIS made it consist in a freedom of choice between good and evil; ATHANASIUS in a self-determination for good. GREGORY NAZIANZEN also maintained against the former, that according to his theory, the human soul would have been destitute of true redemption by Christ. The Logos connected himself with human nature, in

\* Contr. Apollinarist t. i. p. 736, cap. 18.

† Published at Leipzig, 1772, 2 vols. fol. vol. i. p. 1475.

order not merely to reveal himself to man in a visible manner, but to redeem and to save it in its totality, and therefore none of its essential parts could be wanting to him. If his opponent urged that in the New Testament it is said, *λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, he replied, that the word *σὰρξ* is there used synecdochically, so that it denotes the whole of human nature. In this controversy many novel distinctions were formed by the Church teachers, especially by the two GREGORIES, the principal of which were these—that in Christ there was not a mere divine co-operation (*συνέργησις κατὰ χάριν*) but an essential connexion, so that the two natures were blended in one (*ἑν*). Against APOLLINARIS, the completeness of the two natures was maintained; against PHOTINUS, that not two different subjects (*ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*), but only different relations of Unity (*ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*) were to be distinguished in Christ. But this was still so indefinite, that new controversies were necessarily started. Moreover, there was the uncertain use of the words *φύσις* and *ὑπόστασις*; the interchange of predicates which was formerly maintained against Photianism, was rendered suspicious, ever since APOLLINARIS had made use of it. Then there was the designation of the VIRGIN MARY as *Θεοτόκος*; some persons took offence at it, and would only call her *ἀνθρωποτόκος*.

By degrees, a difference was more distinctly developed in the mode of treating the doctrine of Christ's person, even after the warfare had been commenced against Apollinarism and Photianism. In the first case, the point of interest was the keeping asunder, in the second the unity of the divine and human in Christ. Thus various dogmatic types were formed in connexion with the existing fundamental differences of theological tendencies. Minds of one class would attach importance to the distinction of the two natures, while those of another would insist on their Union. The tendency of the Understanding is to distinguish and separate; the mystical element is opposed to a false separation. This difference marks the two leading Schools of the East, the Antiochian and the Alexandrian.

During this period, the Alexandrian School withdrew more and more from the peculiar scientific element of Origen. In the Arian controversy, the prevailing tendency was to give prominence to the divine nature in Christ, and to keep the human in the background. It was the habit of this school to

shun whatever was rationalistic; to dwell by preference on what was wonderful and supernatural in the Dogma of Christ's person, and which could not be grasped by any effort of the understanding. Their favourite formula was, that the one Christ consisted of (*ἐκ* not *ἐν*) two natures which, in an inexpressible (*ἀφράστως*) and inconceivable (*ἀπειρολήτως*) manner, were united with one another. As they laid the greatest stress on the unity, though willing to distinguish, *in abstracto*, the divine and human predicates, they referred both equally to the one incarnate Logos. In the actual Christ the two natures were not to be distinguished; they could not be contemplated separately, but in the wonderful union of both in Christ, all belonged to the *μία φύσις* of the Logos. Owing to the indefiniteness of the terms *φύσις* and *ὑπόστασις*, the Alexandrians were more easily induced, on account of the one *ὑπόστασις*, to allow only one *φύσις* in Christ, and urged the *ἰνωσις φυσική* against those who spoke of two natures. The *ἀντιμεθίστασις τῶν ὀνομάτων* (the interchangeableness of the predicates) was to them the mark of the doctrine of one nature, and in this they indulged their disposition to choose paradoxical expressions for the wonderful; hence, among other things they called the VIRGIN MARY *Σειστόκος*. They did not wish by expressions which attribute the Divine to Christ as a man to teach a transformation of his divine nature, but they believed themselves warranted in using them by their representation of the union of the two natures.

The Antiochian School, represented principally by DIODORUS of Tarsus and THEODORE of Mopsuestia, cultivated its Christology, chiefly in opposition to Gnosticism and Apollinarism. Thus, on the ground of the intellectual scientific tendency of this School, a disposition was cherished by it, to separate sharply the Divine and the Human, which, to these theologians, seemed the best method of confuting Arianism. If the Alexandrians gave prominence to the *ὑπὲρ λόγον*, they gave it to the *κατὰ λόγον*, since they brought the supernatural as near as possible to intellectual apprehension. They proposed to themselves the question, How the special relation of God to the human nature in Christ must be thought of? It was not their design to deny the miracle or to explain the union; but they wished to find analogies and categories to aid their contemplation of this divine act. Among the possible modes of

representing it, the *ἔνωσις κατ' οὐσίαν* suggested itself to them, that the Logos dwelt in human nature only according to his essence. This seems not admissible; for according to his essence he is omnipresent. Or there was the *ἔνωσις κατ' ἐνεργίαν*, but according to his energy or operation the divine Providence extends over all things. Therefore, it seemed necessary to find a particular formula, for the peculiar union into which God entered with a rational nature. The suitable expression for this purpose appeared to be *κατὰ χάριν* or *κατ' εὐδοκίαν*. The connexion of the Logos with human nature was not thereby lowered to the divine agency in the Prophets, but the two were compared together only with a reference to the fact that this peculiar act was not a natural necessity, but proceeded from the resolve and free grace of God. They expressly declared that the agency of the Logos in Christ, was something far higher than in other men; God operated in him not as in the Prophets, and all other righteous men, but as in his own Son. Theodore marks the pre-eminence of Christ before all other men by his *υιοθεσία* (*adoptio*). He meant to assert that Christ, according to his humanity was taken into connexion with God, in distinction from the dignity of the Logos, who was the Son of God by his essence and nature. From this standpoint the Alexandrian doctrine of an *ἔνωσις κατ' οὐσίαν*, seemed something quite anthropopathic, by which the unchangeableness of the divine nature was denied; on the other hand, the Antiochians appeared to the Alexandrians to place Christ only in the class of enlightened men; a representation which they most vehemently opposed. The Antiochians considered the connexion of the divine Logos with the human nature, to take place at the miraculous conception; but the connexion at first was only potential, and gradually manifested itself in the human development; the agency of the Logos in his human nature was developed in successive stages till his Resurrection. Since they had also paid attention to the purely Human and Historical, and were unfettered in their exposition of the New Testament, they regarded the purely human in him as a mark of the human nature developing itself according to its own laws, and progressively revealing the agency of the Logos. On the other hand, the Alexandrians explained the Historical according to their scheme of the one nature of the Incarnate Logos, and obviated the difficulties belonging to it by means of

**Allegory.** For example, in reference to the passages in the Gospels which speak of Christ, "not knowing the day nor the hour,"\* CYRILL said that omniscience belonged to the one nature of the Incarnate Logos, and that his not knowing was only a seeming ignorance for special holy designs. The Antiochians on this point were influenced by the controversy with APOLLINARIS, who asserted that in Christ there was no conflict nor progressive development, from which it followed that he had no human soul, but had in himself the unchangeable divine Spirit. To them, on the contrary, the temptations, conflicts, and progressive development of Christ were important, in order to prove the identity of his nature with ours. In the system of THEODORUS this was connected with other important points, of which the foremost was the Free-Will, which, according to him, conditioned the development of the whole human race, and of all rational beings, and on which depended the reception of all the operations of divine grace, and advance in the divine life. Corresponding to a double standpoint of the whole Universe, and of the rational Creation, of the period of changeableness and of the unchangeable divine life, Christ also, by whom the exaltation of Humanity is effected from that lower to the higher stage, must represent both in his life, and according to the measure of his free self-determination will be the manifested activity of the divine Logos. For this reason, he passed through all the stages of human nature; only everything human was rendered more intense by its connexion with the Logos, everything proceeded more energetically, more powerfully, more rapidly; as for example, in childhood, his faculties expanded far more quickly. THEODORE distinguished as marked periods in Christ's life, the standpoint of the Law, and that of Grace which he entered upon at his baptism, and that of Glorification after his Resurrection. Thus his life in all its stages, till the Resurrection, presented points of analogy to that of believers. As after the Resurrection we first possess, in its fulness, the operation of the Holy Spirit, in which our whole life corresponds to it, yet by communion with God we already experience the first fruits of this operation, so Christ from the beginning had within him the divine Logos; but at first it did not effect everything in him, but only the greater part, as far as it was necessary for

\* Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 151.

the salvation of Mankind, till by his Resurrection he attained to the complete unchangeableness of the divine life; an end which he reached by persisting victoriously with free self-determination under temptations and conflicts. THEODORE therefore assumed that the divine Logos left the Man with whom he was united, to himself, in many respects, till death; the Logos, when it was needful, excited and strengthened him. Accordingly, he was one of the first who taught that the sinlessness of Christ was to be regarded as a *posse non peccare*, not as a *non posse peccare*. He would not allow the least degree of sin in Christ, but he asserted, against APOLLINARIS, that he was subject to temptations as far as he could be without sin, and overcame them by the determination of his own will. Christ would not have uttered to Peter the words, "Get thee behind me, Satan!" if, what that apostle said to him could not, by any possibility, have seduced him to unfaithfulness.

The Antiochians were indeed willing to admit a transference of predicates; but they never lost sight of the ἀσύγχυτον; hence they admitted the transference only with an exact definition of the altered sense;\* in a proper sense, the Divine belonged to the Logos, and the Human to the Man; only in an improper sense the one took part in the other. Theodore said, "In reference to the Union of Divinity and Humanity we acknowledge one person, just as we say of a man and his wife that they are one; but in reference to the distinction, we acknowledge two Natures and two persons (ὑποστάσεις), God and Man; for we cannot conceive of a perfect nature without a perfect person; and consequently he asserts, respecting the ἀντιμεθίστασις τῶν νομμάτων, Divine honour is due to Christ in reference to his divinity, and, in a certain sense, in reference to his humanity; for the proper Son of God made use of the Man Jesus as his organ, and dwelt in him as in a Temple; but the one is God, according to his essential nature, with whom the Man is united, and shares his name and honour.†

Such being the wide difference of the two standpoints, it

\* Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 119.

† See his Creed in Walch, Bibl. Symbolica Vetur. p. 203.—Καὶ οὕτε δύο φαμέν υἱούς, οὕτε δύο κυρίους, ἐπεὶ εἰς Θεὸς κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ Θεὸς λόγος, ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅπερ οὗτος συνημμένος τε καὶ μετέχων Θεότητος κοινωνεῖ τῆς υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τε καὶ τιμῆς· καὶ κύριος κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ Θεὸς λόγος, ὃ συνημμένος οὗτος κοινωνεῖ τῆς τιμῆς.

was of greater importance, for the further development of Dogmas, which of them should prevail. It would have been a salutary result, if the supernaturalist and the rationalist principles had mutually complemented and balanced each other. If they could have worked together with equal influence in the formation of Dogma, the whole form of the later Orthodoxy, both in the Eastern and Western Church, would have been different, and many a reaction would have been avoided. But amidst the prevalent arrogance, the heats of controversy, and the influence of political parties, this was impossible: every party regarded the rest only as objects of extreme aversion. The Alexandrians found Photianism (a name for Rationalism) among the Antiochians, who, in their turn, charged the former with Docetism. The controversy took an unfavourable turn from the first, since its issue depended not on a complete dogmatic view, but on a single word, though that was certainly connected with a difference in the view taken of the Incarnation of the Logos. Hence the fanaticism of the multitude was aroused, and so much greater room was given for the conflict of political passions.

NESTORIUS, a presbyter of Antioch, was raised, A.D. 428, to the patriarchate of Constantinople, a man not to be compared with THEODORE as a systematic thinker, and not so exact and distinct in his definition of terms, but certainly accustomed to the distinction of the two natures in Christ. The *ἀντιμεθεώσεως* of the predicates was now widely spread in the terminology of the Church. Many uneducated persons were partial to such expressions, because their pious feelings were excited, and they thought by the use of them to do honour to Christ. NESTORIUS found the designation of the VIRGIN MARY as *Θεοτόκος* very rife in Constantinople. His presbyter, ANASTASIUS, who was also educated at Antioch, took offence at it. It was not prudent, that he at once publicly denounced it, and averred that God could not be born of a human being. The controversy broke out; NESTORIUS was unable to quell it, and was himself drawn into it. He took the part of ANASTASIUS the more zealously, that the excessive reverence for the VIRGIN was promoted by such an epithet. As in his preaching he taught the doctrine of the one Christ,\* in whom the two

\* Fragments of it in Latin are to be found in Marius Mercator, a layman of North Africa; see his Works, ed. Garnier. Large fragments



natures were to be distinguished, he became himself exposed to obloquy, and was charged with holding the Samosatensian view of Christ's divinity. The laity also took an increasing interest in the movement. A respectable layman interrupted NESTORIUS while stating his views in a sermon, by saying, "The Logos who existed before all time, submitted himself to a second birth." The controversy became still more important when CYRILL, bishop of Alexandria, a man who stood at the head of the opposite party, entered the lists. He had, it is true, a dogmatic interest in it; but an unholy passion mingled with it from the first, jealousy against the Patriarch of Constantinople. He composed a work on true faith in Christ, addressed to the Emperor and the Princess Pulcheria, in which he attacked Nestorius without naming him. A correspondence soon followed between them. Both sides appealed to other bishops, especially to the first bishop of the West, CŒLESTIN of Rome. In the West, similarly to what we have seen in the Arian controversy, a mild conciliatory view of this doctrine had been formed which agreed with neither of the two extremes. This is evident from a brief prelude to this conflict, the dispute with the monk LEPORIUS.\* Hence, it was possible, in discussing this dogma, to accept intermediate statements by which extremes were reconciled without occasioning thereby a more general conflict. Yet in the preponderance of the immediate practical religious interest the Antiochian doctrine must have appeared more objectionable than the Alexandrian to the Western Church. It contributed to this, that CŒLESTIN received his first accounts of the controversy from CYRILL, who was politic enough to accompany his letters to him with a Latin translation, as the Greek was but imperfectly understood in the West. CŒLESTIN having been also prejudiced against NESTORIUS from another quarter, declared himself in favour of CYRILL, entrusted him with the preparation of a summons to NESTORIUS to recant, and with authority to excommunicate him, if he did not comply within a given time. But meanwhile the Churches in the eastern province of Roman Asia (the *ἀνατολίαι*) entered into the

in *Actis Synod. Ephes. Mansi*, iv. p. 1197.' Salig, *De Eutychnismo ante Eutychem*. 1723, 4.

\* Gennadius *De Scriptoribus Eccl.* 59. Cassian *De Incarnatione*, i. c. 4—6.

dispute, and expressed themselves with the greatest impartiality and moderation. The bishops of this class who approved the Antiochian doctrine endeavoured to hush up the controversy, and through the Patriarch, JOHN of ANTIOCH, impressed on NESTORIUS that while it was proper to guard against misconceptions, a single word was not of sufficient importance to justify so dangerous a quarrel. NESTORIUS replied to their satisfaction; he did not declare absolutely against the use of the epithet Θεοτοκος, provided it was used in a right sense of the union of the Divinity and Humanity; but since the terms Θεοτοκος and ανθρωποτοκος were liable to be misunderstood, he proposed that the expression Χριστοτόκος should be used as referrible to the whole Christ. But while he thus expressed himself, the dispute of individuals was made, through the arrogance of CYRILL, a dispute between two dogmatic schools. In the year 430, he demanded an express recantation, and set forth his errors in twelve condemnatory clauses, which contained the Alexandrian doctrine in the strongest and most paradoxical language.\* The αντιμεθίστασις τῶν ὀνομάτων was carried to an extreme; all divine and human predicates were to be referred without distinction to the one Incarnate Logos. The Incarnate Logos was born corporeally; the ἔνωσις or συναφεία φυσικῇ was opposed to the συναφεία κατ' ἁξίαν or κατ' αὐθεντίαν. This was an open attack on the Antiochian dogmas, and was so regarded. The leading men in the Anatolian churches felt themselves called upon to write to CYRILL; and among them, THEODORET more especially, Bishop of Cyrus on the Euphrates, in whom the Antiochian tendency appeared moderated, by a devout, practical, Christian spirit, formed by the study of the Scriptures. The contrast he formed to CYRILL, made the relation of their standpoints more striking. THEODORET rejected the ἔνωσις φυσικῇ, and taught a συναφεία, without χεῖρας, so that each of the two natures retained their peculiar features; hence, one Christ was to be adored in two natures. In making this distinction of natures, he was still very far from wishing to suppose a double Christ in one person. Only he did not distinctly keep apart the ideas of φύσις and ὑπόστασις. He also asserted a natural development of the Human in Christ; Christ manifested the indwelling divinity as much as he could, at all times. On the contrary,

\* Münscher, i. 290.

CYRILL maintained that whoever said that the form of a servant merely gave a manifestation of the indwelling divine Logos, made Christ a mere Prophet. The Asiatics distinguished more clearly between the strictly dogmatic and the liturgic phraseology, the *δογματικῶς* and the *παρηγορικῶς λαλεῖν*; hence THEODORET says,\* Whoever, in liturgical language, is disposed to carry matters to an extreme, and to lay emphasis on the greatness of the Mystery, may do it as his feelings may impel him; but dogmatical distinctions are to be differently treated, and require precision of thought. He allowed the epithet *θεοτόκος*, in the former case, but in the latter it was inadmissible.

The third Ecumenical Council at Ephesus, † A.D. 431, was to decide the controversy. From the manner in which it had been hitherto conducted a mutual understanding could hardly be expected, and CYRILL's arbitrary behaviour, placed greater hindrances in the way, and occasioned a violent rupture. Before the arrival of the Eastern bishops, he took the liberty of holding a council with his party, in order to condemn NESTORIUS, and to attach the authority of a creed to his anathemas. As soon as the other bishops reached Ephesus, they pronounced these proceedings to be nugatory, asserted the orthodoxy of NESTORIUS, and condemned CYRILL and his anathemas. Efforts were also made at Constantinople to bring about a reconciliation; but at court the influence of the Cyrillian party prevailed more and more, being favoured by the fanatical monks and female intrigue; at last a factious decision was passed against the Orientals; NESTORIUS was deposed and exiled, and CYRILL retained the greatest influence in the appointment to offices. Diplomatic and political theologians exerted themselves to rectify the hostile attitude in which the Syrian and Alexandrian Churches now stood to one another. CYRILL might, indeed, perceive that he was not, at the time, successful with his dogmas; but if he had been only right in practical matters, especially in the deposition of NESTORIUS, he might have allowed himself to infer, that his whole dogmatic tendency was condemned along with him. On the other hand, the leaders of the Orientals were ready to yield in practical matters if they could only maintain their ground substantially against the Alexandrian dogma. Hence,

\* Ep. 151.

† Mansi, iv. v. vii. Socr. vii. 29. Euagrius, i. 7.

CYRILL in A.D. 433, accepted articles of agreement,\* which in some of the statements opposed the Alexandrian dogma. It was prepared by the Orientals for the Council, in order to show their readiness to allow, in a certain sense, the appropriation of the epithet Θεοτοκος to the VIRGIN MARY, namely, that in Christ there was a union of the two natures without a mixture. It might be expected that the adherents of CYRILL would see in this compromise a betrayal of the truth. He was therefore obliged to explain the formula according to his own views. The two unmixed natures spoken of in it, were to be understood only *in abstracto*. This distinction of the divine and human predicates had never been denied: the point contended for was the reference to the one concrete nature of Christ, and the document contained nothing in opposition to it. The zealous Orientals were still less satisfied with the compromise, and were highly incensed at the ruin of NESTORIUS. Moreover, CYRILL had only made a temporary concession for prudential reasons, and ceased not on that account to counterwork his dogmatical opponents. His successor DIOSCUROS (A.D. 444), was of a still more despotic temper, and widened the breach by using all the means in his power to gain the ascendancy for the doctrine of one nature in Christ. Among the monks there was also a party who did not know and understand all the distinctions of the Egyptian doctrine, but yet were fond of the paradoxical expressions in the interchange of the predicates, and easily detected blasphemy in the distinction of the two natures. They maintained that they

\* Mansi, v. p. 303, ff.—'Ομολογοῦμεν τοιγαροῦν, τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸν μονογενῆ, Θεὸν τέλειον καὶ ἀνθρωπὸν τέλειον ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος· προ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν Θεότητα, ἐπ' ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα· ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν Θεότητα καὶ ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα· δύο γὰρ φύσεων ἔνωσις γέγονε· διὸ ἓνα Χριστὸν, ἓνα υἱόν, ἓνα κύριον ὁμολογοῦμεν. Κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τῆς ἀσυγχύτου ἐνώσεως ἔννοιαν ὁμολογοῦμεν τὴν ἀγίαν παρθένον Θεοτόκον, διὰ τὸ τὸν Θεὸν λόγον σαρκωθῆναι καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συλλήψεως ἐνώσαι ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς ληφθέντα ναόν· τὰς δὲ εὐαγγελικὰς καὶ ἀποστολικὰς περὶ τοῦ κυρίου φωνὰς ἴσμεν τοὺς Θεολόγους ἀνδρας τὰς μὲν κοινοποιοῦντας, ὡς ἐφ' ἐνὸς προσώπου, τὰς δὲ διαιροῦντας, ὡς ἐπὶ δύο φύσεων· καὶ τὰς μὲν Θεοπρεπεῖς κατὰ τὴν Θεότητα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, τὰς δὲ ταπεινὰς κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα αὐτοῦ παραδίδοντας.

only adhered to the Bible, although they used expressions that were quite unbiblical. The Logos, they said, became Flesh; this we firmly hold; it is an ineffable miracle. It was more than the assumption of human nature; the Logos had not changed himself; he was still the same; but everything human might be attributed to the Logos; God was born; God suffered; all was divine in Christ, even his body; but no human reason could explain *how*. The Abbot EUTYCHES stood at the head of the party in Constantinople. Against this monk THEODORET wrote his *ἐναντιστής* (or *Mendicant*, because this new heresy seemed to be made up of contributions from several ancient ones), or *πολύμορφος*, a work in three Dialogues, (i.) *ἀσύγχυτος*, on the unmixedness of the two Natures; (ii.) *ἀτρέπτος*, their unchangeability; (iii.) *ἀπαθής*, the impassibility of Christ in respect of his divine nature. Against the doctrine of the *ἐνωσις φυσική*, he adduced the views we have mentioned, of an union of the two natures according to the divine good pleasure and by means of grace, effected not according to a natural and necessary connexion, but by the free divine determination.

Meanwhile, a party had been formed which accepted neither the Antiochian nor the Alexandrian dogma in its extreme form; and between it and THEODORET a good understanding existed. FLAVIAN, the Patriarch of Constantinople, also belonged to it; EUTYCHES was accused before him, and he was obliged to investigate the matter. Such was the origin of the *Eutychian controversy*.\* EUTYCHES, who was not skilled in dogmatic distinctions, declared himself ready to grant that before the Incarnation there were two natures, but after it only one; and in saying this he meant nothing different from CYRILL. Furthermore, he objected to the assertion that the body of Christ was essentially the same with the bodies of men in general. As he declined giving the explanations that were required he was deposed and excommunicated, but he had patrons of rank, and FLAVIAN had powerful enemies. DIOSCUROS adopted the expedient of bringing about a new inquiry and decision. A council was again called at Ephesus, A.D. 449, and through the influence of DIOSCUROS, arrange-

\* Mansi, Concill. vi. vii. Liberati, Breviarium Causa Nestorianor. et Eutychianor. in Mansi, ix. 659. Walch's Ketzerhistorie, vi. Baur, Gesch. d. Lehre, v. d. Dreieinigkeit. i. 800. Dorner, Entwicklungsgesch. Der Lehre, v. d. Pers. Christi. ii. 99.

ments were made that gave him and his party the ascendancy. The expedient was adopted of pronouncing an anathema on all innovations which, taking the Nicene Creed as the standard, had been made in this doctrine. Everything relating to the two natures was condemned as Nestorianism. This Synod prepared the way for the ascendancy of the Egyptian party; matters were carried with a high hand; the decisions were forced, and the worthiest men were kept down. This temporary victory was gained by recourse to political power, and hence, as soon as political circumstances altered, a violent reaction would necessarily follow. THEODOSIUS II. died; PULCHERIA and her husband MARCIAN, were his successors; this was the signal for strengthening the influence of the other party. An appeal was now made to the Roman Church, and to LEO the Great, a man of great dialectic acuteness. He had already expressed his opinion in a noted letter to FLAVIAN;\* he adopted the mean between the two extremes, and gave the following exposition of his views:—The two Natures are united in one person, but so that each retains its peculiar properties, and but co-operates with the other. Thus the true God was born in a true and perfect human nature: he is complete in his own attributes, and complete in those of human nature; the *κένωσις* is referrible to the divine nature, and consists in its making itself visible out of compassion and grace. As God was not changed through his compassion, so the human nature was not destroyed by the dignity attached to it. Fresh conferences were now commenced, to which Leo became a party, and a new Council was arranged, the fourth Ecumenical

\* Ep. ad Flavian. c. 3. Mansi, v. 1359. —Salva proprietate utriusque naturæ et substantiæ et in unam coeunte personam suscepta est a majestate humilitas, a virtute infirmitas, ab eternitate mortalitas et ad resolvendum conditionis nostræ debitum natura inviolabilis naturæ est unita passibili ut—unus atque idem mediator Dei et hominum homo Jesus Christus et mori posset ex uno et mori non posset ex altero. In integra ergo veri hominis perfectaque natura verus natus est Deus, totus in suis, totus in nostris.—Assumsit formam servi sine sorde peccati, humana augens, divina non minuens.—Tenet enim sine defectu proprietatem suam utraque natura et sicut formam servi Dei forma non ademit, ita formam Dei servi forma non minuit.—Cap. 4. Sicut enim Deus non mutatur miseratione, ita homo non consumitur dignitate. Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est verbo scilicet operante quod verbi est et carne exsequente quod carnis est.

at CHALCEDON, A.D. 451. The design of the Emperor was not to crush either party, but to restore peace by their reunion; this, however, was impracticable; it was necessary to declare in favour of one or the other, and the only question was, which was to be the favoured party. In the dogmatic conferences there are many obscure passages, since only what passed in public lies before us, but not the private conferences; specially are data wanting in reference to the fourth and fifth. It is evident that a confession was drawn up which was more to the taste of the Alexandrian party. The prominent article was the acknowledgment that Christ consisted of two Natures. This the Egyptians could admit as far as the distinction it contained appeared to be expressed in *abstracto*. But the Roman and Oriental delegates, vehemently asserted their dissatisfaction with the expression, on which account at the fifth conference a new Creed, based on LEO's letter, was drawn up. The doctrine of EUTYCHES was rejected as well as that of NESTORIUS; of those also who refused to call Mary Θεοτόκος. By Nestorianism was understood the separation into two Natures or Sons of God; by Eutychianism the mixture of the two Natures. The positive decisions were; \*—that Christ the only Son of God is of equal essence with the Father according to his divinity; but like men in all things according to his humanity. The one and same Christ is in two Natures without mixture—without change—without division—without separation. One Oriental reading has *ἐκ δύο φύσεων*, but this is not the original one; for the whole con-

\* Mansi, vi. p. 108.—*ἐπόμενοι τοίνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱὸν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκουμεν, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐνθεότῃ καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, Θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἀνθρωπον ἀληθῶς, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν Θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας· πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν Θεότητα, ἐπ' ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς Θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν, υἱὸν, κύριον, μονογενῆ ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον οὐδαμῶς τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημκνης διὰ τὴν ἑνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης· οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον, ἢ διαιρούμενον, ἀλλ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν καὶ μονογενῆ, Θεὸν λόγον, κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν.*

troversy turned upon this point, whether Christ was to be regarded as consisting of two Natures according to the Egyptian mode of doctrine, or in two Natures. It was further added, that by the Union, the distinction of the two Natures was not taken away; both natures with their respective characteristics are united to one πρόσωπον and to one ὑπόστασις.

It cannot be said that this Council resulted in the establishment of a good understanding and a settlement of differences, but a mean was sought between them by saving clauses and negative distinctions on both sides. In respect of form, the Antiochian doctrine maintained its ground, inasmuch as the doctrine of the two natures unconfounded was distinctly stated. But the attempt of this School to explain the union of the divine essence with human nature by means of analogies, was repelled: hence also Agnoëtism remained under the brand of heresy. In a material reference the Antiochian spirit had no influence, but the Egyptian School prevailed, as appears in the adoption of the predicate Θεοτόκος, and in the general doctrinal development. We perceive a deep connexion in the historical development; as so important a theological element as the Antiochian could not retain its proper place, later reactions followed as in the Adoptianist Controversy,\* and after the Reformation in Rationalism. But as to the immediate results, peace could not be restored in the Eastern Church by the decisions of the Council; for the advocates of the strict Egyptian doctrine felt themselves encroached upon, and continued to maintain the doctrine of the one nature of the Incarnate Logos. Hence originated the Monophysite controversies, which were so injurious to the Greek Church by the confusion and barren formalism which they occasioned. Attempts to unite contending parties by feigned reconciliations have always been attended with the same consequences. Such an attempt the Emperor Zeno made by means of his *Henoticon*,† which avoided the words φύσις and ὑπόστασις from which the dispute arose, and asserted that Christ was of the same essence with the Father according to his Divinity, and with us according to his Humanity: that he was one and not two. The attempt was fruitless, and the Monophysites persisted in their separation. In the reign

\* Neander's Ch. Hist. v. 220—228.

† Evagrius, Hist. Eccl. iii. 14. Münscher, i. 306.



of JUSTINIAN the Chalcedonian creed gained a more complete victory, though a Monophysite party still continued to stand aloof. But since the distinction of the predicates in Christ was allowed by this party, and only that of the two natures was excluded, it may be easily understood how similar differences might arise among the Monophysites themselves, and in what position they stood in relation to the dominant Church; but these differences always degenerated into mere logomachies. There was among the Monophysites a more rigid and a milder party, who engaged in a dispute respecting the qualities of the body and soul of Christ. JULIUS of HALICARNASSUS was a representative of the former; he was held in high repute and taught the doctrine which has been distinguished as *Aphthartodocetism*; he maintained, very much like CLEMENT of ALEXANDRIA and HILARY of POICTIERS, that since the body of Christ was without sin it must have been different from those of other men; that  $\phi\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$  did not cleave to him; and that hence it followed that Christ could not have been subject to sensuous affections according to his bodily nature, but only  $\kappa\alpha\tau' \alpha\iota\sigma\chi\omicron\nu\mu\lambda\alpha\nu$ , voluntarily, for the salvation of men. To this party also belonged XENAYAS, or PHILOXENUS. In opposition to this tendency was that of SEVERUS, who taught that the body of Christ was precisely similar to that of other men. His party was styled by their opponents *Phthartolatrai*. Aphthartodocetism found some adherents among those who held the doctrine of two natures, and as such a sentiment had to the Emperor Justinian an appearance of piety, it seemed not unlikely that this doctrine would be introduced into the Eastern Church. But his death shortly ensued and prevented new and unspeakable disorders. Many among the Monophysites acknowledged the purely human of Christ's soul. The deacon THEMESTIUS distinguished the divine in Christ from his soul, and adopted the doctrine of Agnoëtism. He was disposed to interpret in a strictly literal sense all the passages of the New Testament, in which Christ's not knowing is spoken of. Agnoëtism was pronounced heretical as a consequence of Nestorianism. Among those who declared against it was GREGORY the GREAT.\*

The quiet development of this doctrine in the Western Church was now interrupted by the controversy with the Gallic monk

\* Epp. lib. x. 35, 39.

(already mentioned) **LEPORIUS**, about A.D. 426. His doctrine, in its development, defence, and results, bore a striking resemblance to that of **THEODORE** of **MOPSUESTIA**, though it cannot be proved that it was denied from his writings. He contended, like **THEODORE**, for the unconditional transference of the predicates of the human nature to the divine, and consequently for such expressions as "God was born"—"God died;" he taught likewise a progressive revelation of the divine Logos in the human nature to which he was united, and Agnoëtism. He was accused of denying the true Incarnation of the Son of God, and of admitting two persons in Christ; being excommunicated he retired to North Africa. **AUGUSTIN** endeavoured to settle the controversy, to make **LEPORIUS** sensible of what was objectionable in his peculiar views, and induced him to give an explanation\* with which the bishops of Gaul were satisfied. We see from this, what statements of this doctrine were regarded as essentially Christian in the Western Church before the Nestorian controversy; they were these—that in Christ two natures are joined in one substance; that the Word and the Flesh are so united that each substance remains with its proper completeness, without mutual encroachment; that the Divinity is communicated to the Humanity, and the Humanity to the Divinity; that Christ did not advance to Divinity through certain degrees and times, and was not in two different states before and after the Resurrection, but always possessed the same perfection and power. Whether a man so acute as **LEPORIUS** really altered his views, or only yielded to authority, is very doubtful. The reasons which **AUGUSTIN** employed: "I believe that God is unable to do only what he does not will to do, and that if he willed to be born—as it is certain that he did will it—he could be born, and that he did not believe it unworthy of himself to become man for our sake, since he did not think it unworthy of himself to create the human being by whom man must be born"—such reasons were certainly not sufficient to convince **LEPORIUS**, for the question with him was not respecting the Incarnation of the Logos generally, but, assuming the reality of that, whether such expressions as those referred to, were justifiable.

\* *Libellus Emendationis et Satisfactionis*, Mansi, iv. p. 519.  
 7. 2.

## C. ANTHROPOLOGY.

## 1. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

IN determining the nature of the human soul, a controversy arose between those who regarded it as something corporeal, and those who thought it to be spiritual. The former representation was not now founded, as in the case of TERTULLIAN, on an incapacity generally, to imagine the existence of a pure spirit; this sensuous limitation had been for a long while overcome; but the question in dispute was, whether any created spirit could be a pure spirit; whether the idea of a creature did not include that of corporeity. HILARY of POICTIERS shows a trace of this in his commentary on Matt. v. 8: "All creatures must have something on which their existence is founded (that is, a body)." DYDIMUS\* regarded the Angels as pure Spirits in relation to us, but as heavenly bodies as to their distance from the infinite essence of God. In the latter part of the fifth century a controversy arose in Gaul on this subject. FAUSTUS, the Bishop of REJ, in Provence, propounded the above-mentioned view in his work, *De Creaturis*.† He appears to have been led to adopt it by his opposition to Arianism, which had spread among the German tribes in his neighbourhood; for he tried to prove that if the Son of God was to be regarded as a creature, he must also be thought of as a corporeal being; either he was a Divine Being, or at an infinite distance from God, a creature limited in his nature and within the bounds of space and time. The difference between Spirit and Body belonged to the distance between God and the creature. If thought was adduced as a proof of the spirituality of the soul, he rejoined, that the essence and the acts of the soul must be distinguished; that thought belongs not to its essence, for it may be conceived to exist without thinking. CLAUDIANUS MAMERTUS, a Presbyter, of Vienne,‡ came forward as his antagonist,—a man of superior speculative talent, and well versed in Augustin's Metaphysics. He showed that thought

\* De Spir. S. ii. cap. 4.—Οἱ ἄγγελοι πνεύματα, καθὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀσώματοι, σώματα ἐπουράνια διὰ τὸ ἀπείρως ἀπέχειν τοῦ ἀκτίστου πνεύματος.

† Bibl. Patr. Lugdun. tom. viii.

‡ Three books, *De Statu Animæ*, to Sidonius Apollinaris. Biblioth. Patr. Lugdun. tom. vi.

is inseparable from the essence of the Soul, and that its spiritual activity is indestructible ; it is apparent, from dreams, that its activity is uninterrupted.

2. OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE ; OF SIN, GRACE, AND  
FREE WILL.

In the preceding period an antagonism had been developed between the Alexandrian Theologians who strongly advocated the doctrine of Free Will, and those of the Western Church who laid greater stress than the former on the depravity of man and the importance of Grace ; yet these tendencies had never been formed into exclusive contrarieties. The former still retained the preponderance in the East. In common with the Western Church there was an acknowledgment of the want of Redemption and the necessity of Grace : but the operation of Grace was always supposed to be conditioned by the Free Will. More precise distinctions were avoided. GREGORY of NYSSA, for example, was shy of everything which could encroach on Free Will. Unconditional predestination was decidedly denied ; a divine pre-science in reference to the free self-determination of Man was allowed, and the passages relating to it in Paul's Epistles were explained unnaturally with dogmatic prejudice. The Western Church pursued its own divergent path ; but till the Pelagian controversy arose, aimed at keeping Grace and Free Will in harmony with one another, so that there was no open opposition to the Orientals. This stage of the development is represented by HILARY of POICTIERS and AMBROSE of MILAN.

The ancient Latin translation of Rom. v. 12, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον by *in quo (Adamo) omnes peccaverunt* was not without influence on the doctrine of hereditary depravity, although this exegetical error would not have given rise to the doctrine, if there had not been in addition the general consciousness of sin. HILARY\* recognises an hereditary sin in connexion with the first sin ; he speaks of sins to which man is inclined by nature, and derives them from Adam's sin ; for he says † that

\* Tractat. in Pss. i. § 4.—Ad hæc nos vitia naturæ propellet instinctus.

† In Matth. 18, § 6.—Ovis una homo intelligendus est et vobis

in Adam's sin the whole race sinned, though without explaining precisely how. He contrasts original sin with regeneration by the Holy Spirit, through which man is freed from sinfulness. The consciousness of the need of Redemption is pre-supposed, and that forgiveness of sins is only a gift of divine grace.\* The forgiveness of sins, he says, which the Law cannot effect, is obtained through faith; faith alone justifies.† According to the old Latin version *justificatio* in the Latin Church was understood of making just or righteous, that is, of subjective sanctification, which continued in later times to be the Catholic doctrine; yet HILARY seems according to the connexion to have intended by it objective justification in the sense of the forgiveness of sins, especially if the words are compared.‡ “Works of righteousness do not suffice to merit perfect happiness if God's mercy in this willing of righteousness did not overlook the faults of human mutability.” Accordingly we must suppose that HILARY firmly held the Pauline doctrine, that no man can fulfil the requirements of the Law, but must always fall short of them. Yet on this point there is a remarkable contradiction. Before AUGUSTIN, no sharp distinction was made in the various applications of the idea of Law—the Mosaic Law in its historically defined form, and as a representation of the eternal Divine Law—the verbal and outward construction of it, and the moral law in a strict sense as an objective representation of all moral requirements. If regarded in that limited form, the result was, that the fulfilling of the Law was viewed as something imperfect, and there was a higher standpoint above it, with which was connected the doctrine of the *Consilia Evangelica*. Corresponding to this distinction, there was, according to HILARY, a twofold stage of Salvation.§ Thus he asserts a righteousness of the Law; which leads to

homine uno universitas sentienda est. Sed in unius Adæ errore omne hominum genus aberravit.

\* In Matth. ix. 2.

† In Matth. viii. 6.—Remissum est a Christo, quod lex laxare non poterat. Fides enim sola justificat. Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 281.

‡ In Psalm 51, § 25.

§ In Ps. 68, § 24.—Nec ambiguum est, eos in viventium libro esse qui antea sine ulla Christi cognitione pie in lege versati omnia prescripta legis impleverint. Scribuntur autem in libro justorum, quibus justitia Christus est factus.

acceptance in the Book of Life, and a righteousness through faith which raises to a Salvation that is absolutely perfect. To the first belong all the pious before the Christian Dispensation, since they fulfilled the commands—as Paul says in Rom. x. 5, (“For Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the Law, that the man which doeth those things shall live by them,”) a meaning indeed which is quite opposed to the Pauline application of the passage.—He emphatically asserted the harmonious connexion between Grace and Free Will, the powerlessness of the latter, and yet its importance as a condition of the operation of Divine Grace. “As the organs of the human body,” he says,\* “cannot act, without the addition of moving causes, so the Human has indeed the capacity for knowing God, but if it does not receive through faith the gift of the Holy Spirit, it will not attain to that Knowledge. Yet the gift of Christ stands open to all, and that which all want is given to every one as far as he will accept it.” “It is the greatest folly,” he says in another passage,† “not to perceive that we live in dependence on and through God, when we imagine that in things which men undertake and hope for, they may venture to depend on their own strength. What we have, we have from God; on him must all our hope be placed.” Accordingly, he did not admit an unconditional predestination; he did not find it in the passages in Rom. ix. commonly adduced in favour of it respecting the election of Esau, but only a predestination conditioned by the Divine foreknowledge of his determination of will; otherwise every man would be born under a necessity of sinning.‡

AMBROSE carries the approximation to AUGUSTIN a step farther. He says,§ “We have all sinned in the first man, and by the propagation of Nature, the propagation of guilt has also passed from one to all; in him human nature has sinned.” A transference of Adam’s guilt may seem to be here expressed; but in other expressions this is disowned.|| “At

\* De Trinit. ii. 35.

† In Ps. 51, § 20.

‡ In Ps. 57, § 3.—Sic Esau alienatus ab utero est, quum major minori serviturus etiam ante quam existeret nuntiatur, Deo futuræ non nescio voluntatis ipso potius hoc sciente, quam aliquo ad necessitatem genito naturamque peccati.

§ Apolog. David. ii. § 71.

|| In Ps. 48, § 9.

the last Judgment we shall be punished for our own sins and not for another's." Here he appears to acknowledge guilt only so far as man has yielded to hereditary sin by his own will. He distinguishes\* the enticement to sin which proceeds from hereditary depravity, and actual guilt. Redemption he represents, still more decidedly than Hilary, as a work of grace, independent of merit. "Redemption," he says, † "is freely given; it does not follow the merit of works, but takes place according to the freedom of the Giver and the choice of the redeemed. But it hinges on this,—that men received what is offered with Freedom; this must rest with them. Since ‡ all do not obtain the remedy, but the majority decline it, God saves those who are willing to be saved. The Lord calls the slothful, § and awakes the sleeping; he who comes and knocks at the door, is willing to enter; but it is our fault if he does not enter; whoever does not surrender himself to him, deprives himself of everlasting light." Hence it was that even AMBROSE admitted neither irresistible Grace nor an unconditioned Predestination; he admits Predestination, || but makes it, in so many words, depend on Prescience. Only in two passages he seems in contradiction to this view to maintain unconditioned Grace and Predestination—"God calls those whom he deigns to call; he makes him pious whom he wills to make pious, for if he had willed he could have changed the impious into pious," ¶ and "it is God's pleasure\*\* that that which is good in itself should appear good to us; for he will have mercy on whom he will; and hence he who follows Christ, if asked why he was willing to be in Christ, must conform because it so pleased himself, but in saying that, he does not deny that it so pleased God." This passage may be so understood that Man at conversion supposes that he only follows his own free will, while in fact he is determined by an unknown divine

\* L. 1.—*Magis lubricum delinquendi quam reatum aliquem nostri esse delicti.*

† In Ps. 43, § 47.

‡ De Interpellationis Davidis, 4, 4.

§ In Ps. 118, § 13.

|| De Fide, v. § 83.

¶ In Luc. 7, 27.

\*\* Ibid. 1, § 10.—Christus ut id quod bonum est nobis quoque videri bonum possit, operatur; quem enim miseratur, et vocat. Et ideo qui Christum sequitur potest interrogatus cur esse voluerit Christianus, respondere: visum est mihi. Quod eum dicit, non negat, Deo visum; a Deo enim preparatur voluntas hominum. Ut enim Deus honorificetur a sancto, Dei gratia est.

operation by Grace which in an irresistible manner lays hold of his corrupt Will. In that case the Freedom would be only apparent, and everything is ascribable to Grace operating unconditionally; but then between this and his above-mentioned doctrine there would be an irreconcilable contradiction. Yet it might have been possible to extricate himself in spite of his strong language. He might have admitted a *gratia præveniens*, and thus maintained the necessity of a co-operation of the Free Will. It is worthy of notice that AMBROSE, the teacher of AUGUSTIN, whose sermons gave him the first impulse to enter the Catholic Church, and whose writings Augustin diligently read, expressed himself in such a manner. AUGUSTIN in his work *De dono perseverantiæ*, sec. 49, appealed to these passages as testimonies in favour of his Doctrine of Grace.

### 3. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

The Commentaries of Pelagius on the Pauline Epistles preserved among the works of Jerome, ed. Martian. tom. v. Vall. tom. xi. They were recast under the direction of Cassiodorus, and on account of the omission of heretical passages, are no longer fully available as sources of information. His letter to Demetrius, a nun to whom he presents the model of the ascetic life, is valuable for its Anthropology and for its connexion with asceticism. Edited by Semler, Hal. 1775. His *Libellus fidei ad Innocentium I.* was held in the Middle Ages to be a Confession of Jerome, which he presented to Damasus, bishop of Rome; it is inserted under the title of *Explanatio Symboli ad Damasum* in Hieronymi, Opp. ed Mart. t. xi. p. 11. The confounding of Pelagius with Catholic writers proceeds in part from his intentional accommodation to the language of the Church Teachers, and still more to the real agreement between his own tendency and that prevalent in the Church, as to the doctrine of *consilia evangelica* and other points. Fragments of letters from his writings *de natura* and *de libero arbitrio* are to be found in the works of Augustin. Jerome and Marius Mercator, ed. Jo. Garnier. Fragments of the *Libellus fidei* of Cælestius are in Augustin *de pecc. orig.* v. 6, compare the charges brought against him at Carthage by Marius Mercator also in Augustin, t. x. Opp. pag. 42—Julian's v. Eklanum Works in Aug. *de nuptiis et concup.* lib. ii. : contra Julian; op. imperf. c. Jul.

Opp. Augustini, t. x., ed. Bened.; de peccatorum meritis et veniensione, de natura, de gestis Pelagii, de gratia Christi et peccato originali, de nupt. et conc. contra duas epp. Pelagian, contra Julian., lib. vi., and op. imperf. de grat. et lib. arbit.—Hieronymus: ep. ad Ctesiphontem 43 Mart., 133 Vall. 3 vol. dialog. c. Pelagian.—Pauli Orosii apologeticus, c. Pelag. Opp. ed. Haverkamp.—Marii Mercatoris commonitorium against Cælestius and against Pelagius and Cælestius. Cornelius Jansenius, seu doctrina G. Augustini, etc., adv. Pelagian, et Masilienses, Lowaini, 1640 fol. Henricus Norisius hist. Pelag. Opp. i. 1729.—F. W. Walch, Ketzehist. Bet. iv. v.—G. F. Wiggers Verf. einer pragm. Darst. des Augustinianismus und Pelagianismus, 1821.

THE different conceptions of the degree of the corruption of human nature, and on the other hand, of the importance of Grace and Predestination, which were exhibited by PELAGIUS and AUGUSTIN in most striking contrast, rested on



the difference in the general original tendencies of their minds, which were most closely connected with the differences of character and course of life. Let us picture to ourselves a man of sincere moral aims, but without great powers of mind or depth of feeling, who had not been agitated by severe interval conflicts—to whom the Moral System had not been presented in all its grandeur, who had no enthusiasm for a Moral Ideal, by which he might have learnt the inadequacy of his moral powers; and on the other hand, let us imagine a man of great endowments, of extraordinary elevation of mind, inspired with the sublimity of a Moral Ideal—but who had to combat with a wild energy in his own breast, before he could attain its realization:—the former would be soon settled; the latter would seek and combat long; the one would lead a quiet life devoted to Study; his activity would be confined within a narrow circle—the fulfilment of his duties would appear easy, and be soon attained;—the other would be agitated by the storms of Life and wrestle with them till he found power for victory in the Christian Faith. The former would easily trust too much to the moral powers of Man; and his own experience he would assume to be that of every man; soon satisfied he would not feel the need of Redemption; the latter on the contrary from his own deep inward experience would lay so much the greater stress upon it; he would point all to faith in the Redeemer, in whom he himself had found rest; in the consciousness of the sharp contrast of the new divine life to his former life, he would be likely to place Nature and Grace in opposition with intense onesidedness, and acknowledge Grace as everywhere supreme and subject to no conditions. In such terms may the general relation of PELAGIUS and AUGUSTIN be described.

At the crisis of his spiritual life AUGUSTIN occupied himself especially with the study of Paul's Epistles. Their ideas formed the foundation of his Anthropology; they were the central point of his doctrinal belief. His own life gave him a commentary on the form in which he here found Christianity exhibited—the opposition between Law and Gospel—Flesh and Spirit—Nature and Grace. His experience and LUTHER's, both resembled PAUL's. From the Pelagian and recently from the Rationalist standpoint, AUGUSTIN's Anthropology has been accounted for from his Manicheism. But this is contradicted

by the fact, that when he renounced Manicheism, he combated the absolute corruption of human nature and maintained the freedom of the Will against the Manicheans. At this first period he thought more moderately on these points. It would be more correct to say, that the peculiar tendency of his Anthropology had been shown in that which led him to Manicheism. His experience of a schism in human nature impelled him to the inquiry respecting the Origin of Evil. When he proceeded from Manicheism to Platonism, he endeavoured to prove against the former that Evil was not to be thought of as something absolute, but as a *μη ὄν*, not that he regarded it as a pure negation, as a mere transition point of development, but only asserted in opposition to Dualism that Evil might be considered simply as a defection from the Divine Will, and to this doctrine he always adhered. This tendency had an influence on his later system. In the construction of it, there is a double standpoint; the earlier form which may be learned from his treatises *de libero arbitrio* and *de vera religione* supposes everything in man to be conditioned by free will. In the present state of Man it is not in his power to be good, because he neither knows what he ought to be, nor, if he knew it, could he live in a manner corresponding to his knowledge. *Ignorantia* and *difficultas boni* are the roots of moral Evil. To admit this as the original condition of Man, cannot harmonize with the idea of a perfect Creator; it must rather be considered as the punishment of the first sin. Man who did not perform the good which he knew forfeited the knowledge of it, and the power of performing it. But how is it to be reconciled with the justice of God that in consequence of the original act, these obstacles should exist in human nature? We might justly complain, he says, if no man had ever overcome the power of error and of concupiscence. God is everywhere present, and in manifold ways through his creatures calls to himself Man who has apostatized from him, and teaches, and upholds him, if he exerts himself. Man will not be treated as guilty for unavoidable ignorance and defect, but only for his not striving after knowledge. Yet in his exposition of Rom. ix. (A.D. 394)\* AUGUSTIN expressly opposes a reference of that passage to absolute Predestination and the exclusion of free will. Man indeed could not merit

\* *Explicatio Propositionum Quarundam de Epistola ad Rom.*

divine grace by his works, for in order to perform works that are truly pious, he must have first a suitable state of heart, the inward *justitia*. But this source of goodness man has not from himself; only the Holy Spirit can impart it to him in Regeneration; antecedently to this all men are in equal estrangement from God; but it depends on themselves whether by believing they make themselves susceptible for the Holy Spirit, or not.\* God has chosen faith. It is written, God works all in all in men; but he does not believe all in all. Faith is man's concern.† From this point we can trace the gradual revolution in Augustin's mode of thinking to its later harsher form. Yet in his treatise *De 83 diversis questionibus* (written about A.D. 388), he says in explaining Rom. ix. 18, ("Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth" ‡): This will of God is not unrighteous, for it is conditioned by the most secret relations of congruity; all men indeed, are corrupt, but yet there is a difference among them; there is in sinners something antecedent by which they become deserving of justification or of hardening. The calling of individuals and of whole nations belongs to those high and deep things which Man does not understand if he is not spiritually minded. But it must be always maintained that God does nothing unrighteous and that there is no being who does not owe everything to God. The more AUGUSTIN advanced in a deeper perception of faith, the more he recognised it as a living principle and not as a mere faith of authority, and he acquired a stronger conviction that Faith presupposed a divine operation in the soul of Man and that the Bible referred it to divine agency. He was now easily impelled to the other extreme, and to give a onesided prominence to the divine factor in Faith. Resignation to God became his ruling principle, and looking back at his earlier

\* Cap. 60.—Quod credimus nostrum est; quod autem bonum operamur illius qui credentibus in se dat Spiritum Sanctum.

† Non quidem Deus elegit opera quæ ipse largitur quum dat Spiritum Sanctum ut per caritatem bona operemur; sed tamen elegit fidem.

‡ Quæstio 68, § 4.—Venet enim de occultissimis meritis, quia et ipsi peccatores cum propter generale peccatum unam massam fecerint, non tamen nulla est inter illos diversitas. Præcedit ergo aliquid in peccatoribus quo, quamvis nondum sint justificati digni efficiantur justificatione et item præcedit in aliis peccatoribus quo digni sunt obtusione.

life, he learnt more and more to trace everything to his training by divine Grace. He now allowed the conditioning element of free human susceptibility to vanish altogether. Add to this, that Theodicy now appeared to him untenable, which made the attainment of faith by individuals or nations or their remaining strangers to the Gospel dependent on their worthiness and the divine Prescience; in opposition to this view he now sought for a foundation in the secret absolute decrees of God, according to which one was chosen and another not. This view was confirmed by the opinion prevalent in the North African Church that outward baptism was essential to salvation. He now inquired how it was that one child received baptism and another not, and this seemed to confirm the unconditionality of the divine Predestination. The alteration in his mode of thinking occupied perhaps a space of four years. In the *diversæ questiones ad Simplicianum*, written about A.D. 397, this is shown most decidedly, as he himself says in his treatise *de dono perseverantiæ* that he had then arrived at the perception that even the beginning of Faith was the gift of God. In that work\* he derives all good in Man from the divine agency; from the words of Paul, "What hast thou, that thou hast not received?" (1 Cor. iv. 7,) he infers that nothing can come from man himself. "How can it be explained," he asks, "that the Gospel reaches one man and not another? and that even the same dispensations act quite differently on different persons? It belongs to God to furnish the means which lead every man to believe—consequently the reason of the difference can only be, that according to his own decree, it seems good to withhold it from one and not from another. All men, in consequence of the first transgression, are exposed to perdition; in this state there can be no higher movement, therefore none at all, in them towards conversion. But God out of compassion chooses some to whom he imparts divine grace, *gratia efficax*, which operates upon them, in an irresistible manner, but yet in accordance with their rational nature, so that they cannot do otherwise than follow it. The rest he leaves to their merited perdition."

From the preceding remarks it is clear that Augustin reached the standpoint fixed by his own experience; and we

\* Lib. i. quæstio 2.

perceive how false it is, that his System in this form was derived from his excessive opposition to Pelagianism, since it had been formed ten years before his conflict with it. We might rather affirm of PELAGIUS that he would not have developed his doctrine in its actual form, had he not been opposed to AUGUSTIN.

PELAGIUS was a man of mild temper,\* gentle development, and quiet studies; the ancient British Church from which he sprang, stood in connexion with the East. This might have induced him to have occupied himself early with the study of the Greek Church teachers. He studied them with deep interest, and the Anthropology of the Eastern Church unavoidably had an influence on his own. He was guided by a strong moral influence; this led him to Monkery, and was developed still further. He did not satisfy himself with the *opus operatum* of outward fulfilling of the Law and devotional exercises, but there was in him a real striving after internal holiness. But being regulated by monkish morality which introduced the standpoint of the Perfect which rendered more than the Law required, he was disposed to overrate the moral power of Man. He who imagined that he could do more than the Law required, could not fathom the depths of moral obligation. It was a leading object with Pelagius to arouse to moral efforts. He met with errors both dogmatic and ethical, which stood in the way of his striving after Christian perfection. Some persons, misunderstanding the doctrines of the corruption of human nature and of Grace, made them an excuse for their negligence in moral efforts; others proceeded on a false idea and estimate of Faith; it was not to them a principle of the inner life but a mere historical outward faith of Authority, separate from the disposition. Many satisfied themselves with such a dead faith, as they held the notion that they might be saved without being very particular about their practice, provided they believed. The Anthropological tendency of Pelagius was formed in his conflict with these erroneous views. To the first class he endeavoured to prove the indestructibleness of moral power; on the other hand, he lowered the importance of Grace, and giving prominence to the Ethical before the Dogmatic, he forgot the peculiar character of Christian Morals and the necessary connexion of these two

\* Jacobi, Die Lehre des Pelagius, 1842.

elements. On the other hand to those who rested in a dead faith, he believed it was necessary to show that such a faith would profit nothing. AUGUSTIN also combated this error in his treatise *de fide et operibus*. But when PELAGIUS in accordance with the view prevalent in the Church, demanded that to this faith good works should be superadded, AUGUSTIN showed that good works must proceed from a living faith. PELAGIUS by no means intended to found a new doctrine, but only designed to restore the old Church-doctrine and to guard against innovations. He did not perceive the contrariety of his doctrine to the Bible and the Dogma of the Church. As he denied the corruption of human nature in consequence of the first transgression, by which he thought to promote the interests of Morality, he would, if he had reasoned consequentially, have been led to reject supernatural Revelation and Redemption, yet he admitted inconsistently the doctrines of the Bible respecting the original state of Man, Revelation, and Redemption. His views were firmly fixed when in the beginning of the fifth century he came to Rome and published there a Commentary on Paul's Epistles. They are distinctly stated in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. By the death which is the consequence of Sin, he understood spiritual death; righteousness by the works of the Law he referred only to the Ceremonial Law. When he heard a bishop repeating the words from AUGUSTIN's Confessions, "My God, bestow on me what thou commandest, and then command what thou wilt!"\* he was irritated, as if they contained a denial of Free Will. Yet he was naturally little disposed to controversy, if he had been allowed to remain at rest; but having formed an intimacy with CÆLESTIUS an advocate, he induced him to retire from the World to an ascetic life, and also determined his dogmatic mode of thinking; and this person, being of a more systematic and polemic turn of mind, gave the first impulse to the controversy.

#### THE OUTWARD HISTORY OF THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

About A.D. 411, PELAGIUS and CÆLESTIUS went to Carthage; the former soon returned to Palestine; but the latter remained at Carthage, and by his asceticism gained such great respect,

\* Lib. x. cap. 29.

that he sought to be chosen Presbyter. But as in this part of the Church AUGUSTIN had great influence his attempt met with opposition, and PAULINUS, a deacon of Milan, accused him, A.D. 412, before a synod at Carthage. Six heretical propositions were laid to his charge, which were founded on this, that Adam's sin had injured only himself, and that men at their birth were in the same state as Adam before the Fall. CÆLESTIUS endeavoured to evade the charge, as if it related merely to a speculative point and did not affect the doctrine of the Church; the belief in hereditary depravity was connected with Traducianism, and since nothing was determined respecting the propagation of souls and the *tradux peccati*, every one might have his own opinion respecting it. Infant baptism, which at that time was universally regarded as an apostolic Institution, and which pre-supposed sinfulness existing at the birth, was objected to him. But CÆLESTIUS admitted the necessity of Infant baptism only not in the same doctrinal connexion, but because baptism gave a stronger title to salvation which could not be attained by mere moral efforts. The Synod was not satisfied with these explanations, and since he would not pronounce an Anathema on his own doctrine, he was excommunicated. AUGUSTIN's influence also withstood PELAGIUS in Palestine. JEROME who then shared the views of AUGUSTIN, lived at Bethlehem and entered the lists. The Spaniard OROSIUS, a zealous adherent of AUGUSTIN, appeared before a Synod at Jerusalem under the presidency of the bishop JOHN, and charged PELAGIUS with maintaining that Man could be without sin, if he would. Owing to the loose manner in which dogmas were held in the Oriental Church, it was supposed that the question related only to the connexion of Grace and Free Will, and as PELAGIUS declared that he held the *adjutorium Dei* to be necessary, the assembly was satisfied. Meanwhile two Gallic bishops, HEROS and LAZARUS, accused him about A.D. 415, before a second Synod held at DIOSPOLIS in Palestine, under the presidency of EULOGIUS, bishop of CÆSAREA.\* The charges consisted partly of propositions which he himself had advanced, partly of expressions used by CÆLESTIUS, and which might to some extent be more easily in an orthodox than in an heretical sense. Such was the assertion that any man could do more than what is prescribed in

\* De Gestis Pelagii, Opp. ed. Bened. t. x. p. 130.

the Law and the Gospel. Pelagius appealed to what is said in 1 Cor. vii. on celibacy, and since the doctrine of the *consilia evangelica* and its proof from that passage were generally approved, nothing could be said against his assertion. In reference to another charge, that at the final judgment no sinners will be spared, but all will be consigned to eternal punishment, it was still more difficult to point out anything heretical, as he appealed to the passages in the Bible on eternal punishment, and could represent the opposite doctrine as Origen's. He wished to combat those who imagined that by a mere dead faith without good works, and in spite of their vicious lives, they would escape eternal punishment and only have to pass through a purification in the *Ignis Purgatorius*. As to the third charge—that the kingdom of heaven was promised even in the Old Testament—he replied, that this might be proved from Holy Writ and none but Heretics denied it. But this sentiment was founded on another, which however was not noticed any further, that there was a legal righteousness different from the Evangelical, which led to eternal life. Heresy was more glaring in the assertion that all men were governed by their own will. But the Orientals were satisfied with the explanation that the Free Will was supported by God when it willed what was good, and that Man incurs guilt for sin by his own Free Will. As to the charge that man could be without sin if he would, Pelagius distinguished between *possibility* and *act* (*posse et actus*). God had placed in Man the possibility of being without sin; yet he would not assert that there was any one in existence who had never sinned from childhood to old age. Those who were converted from sin, might by their own efforts and God's grace succeed in being without sin, though temptations would not be entirely taken away. It was also understood that the Orientals only required that he should pronounce an anathema on those who held a different opinion. He pronounced it, but with this singular explanation, that he condemned them not as Heretics but as Fools, as it did not relate to a matter of doctrine. He intended therefore to say that it was only a matter of fact. But how could he pronounce an Anathema on mere *Stulti*? It is not clear, what he meant by stating that; this had no reference to Dogmatics; it is also doubtful to what proposition he referred;



whether he regarded those as *stulti*, who maintained that Man could keep himself free from Sin without the assistance of Grace, especially as that phrase is so indefinite; or whether he had in his mind the assertion that generally no man from the beginning has lived free from Sin; to maintain the contrary as a matter of fact would be against experience and foolish. Then indeed he could hardly be acquitted of self-contradiction and prevarication. The propositions of Cælestius which were laid before him he was ready to condemn, though among these were some which it was not easy to see how he could reject. But he was not required to make any more precise explanations, and was acknowledged as a member of the Oriental Church. His opponents meanwhile were not satisfied, and in their ulterior proceeding showed the differences of their characters. Jerome attacked the Orientals fiercely, and called the Synod a *Synodus miserabilis*.<sup>\*</sup> Augustin on the other hand, showed with greater tact that from their unacquaintance with the controversies of the West, they had been deceived by the ambiguous statements of Pelagius, and that the condemnation of their own doctrines was contained in the Anathemas they had required him to pronounce; though in this he falsely assumed that his doctrine of Grace and Predestination was the general one, and acknowledged also in the Oriental Church. The North African Church now interested itself more generally in the controversy, in order to counteract the influence of the Oriental decisions. At two Synods held A.D. 416 at Carthage and Milan,<sup>†</sup> the sentence passed on Pelagius and Cælestius was re-affirmed, and they were excluded from the communion of the Church unless they expressly abjured their errors. These Councils, besides Augustin and four bishops, reported their proceedings to the bishop of Rome, Innocent I., described the doctrine of Pelagius and Cælestius, and asserted that they denied the necessity of grace and of Infant Baptism for freedom from Sin. As Pelagius originally belonged to the West and the Roman Church, the affair had already been laid before Innocent I. by the Orientals. He avowed his agreement with the African Church. But since that related to a special

\* Ep. 81.

† See the reports of the African bishops, and the letters of Innocent and Zosimus in Marius Mercator.

point, it does not follow that he was entirely of the same sentiments as Augustin. The accused parties complained of the unfair representation of their doctrine, and sought to justify themselves to Innocent; Pelagius wrote a letter in which he wished to show that he acknowledged the doctrine of Grace and the necessity of Infant Baptism, and only maintained the Freedom of the Will; he accompanied it with a Confession of Faith\* which in reference to the matters in dispute was deemed unsatisfactory. Cælestius repaired to Rome about A.D. 417. In the meantime Innocent died, and his successor Zosimus, probably of Oriental descent, a man of little theological knowledge, and destitute of an independent judgment, was by no means partial to the Augustinian system. Cælestius presented a Confession of faith to him in which he admitted that children must be baptized for the forgiveness of sins, but denied the doctrine of hereditary depravity; but he submitted himself, he said, in all things to the judgment of the See of Rome. This pleased Zosimus. In his letter to the African bishops he declared that he could scarcely forbear shedding tears that such persons should be charged with heresy who so often made mention of the *gratia Dei* and the *adjutorium divinum*; he did not dissemble his surprise, and spoke of the forwardness of some persons to engage in controversy, who relied too much on their own *ingenium*, and wished to make a display of their acuteness; for the orthodoxy of the accused he desired no further evidence, and they would be regarded as members of the Church, unless their title to that position could be disproved within two months. But the North African bishops were too firm in their convictions and too independent, to alter their course of conduct. A Council at Carthage, presided over by the bishop Aurelius, A.D. 418, exposed the unsatisfactory statements of Pelagius and Cælestius; Zosimus they declared had been deceived, and the sentence which was expressed by former Councils and approved by Innocent ought to be binding, until the parties condemned by it should expressly declare that the Grace of God in Christ must assist men in all things both in knowledge and practice. Zosimus now began to give way and to propose a fresh investigation, but the African bishops had no inclination to wait for it. At a new Synod held at

\* Augustin, Opp. t. x. Append. p. 64, Bened.

Carthage,\* (A.D. 418,) they drew up nine canons against Pelagius, condemned the doctrine he taught, that death was not the consequence of Adam's Sin; and that the Grace of God, by which we are justified, refers only to the forgiveness of past sins, but not to preservation of future sins; that under *gratia justificans* is to be understood the grace of an internal justifying, a sanctification; Christ does not say, without me you can only with difficulty accomplish anything, but, "without me you can do nothing." The sentiment also was condemned that if Saints prayed for the forgiveness of their sins, this was only out of humility and not from actual necessity. The authority of this Council, the influence of those around him, and the issue of an ordinance against the Pelagians by the Emperor Honorius, had an effect on Zosimus, and he yielded more and more. He made arrangements for another investigation, but Cælestius would not stay at Rome for it, and issued a Circular, (*tractoria*) in which he adopted the resolutions of the African Council. This letter all the bishops were required by the Emperor to accept; and those who refused, were deposed. Such was the termination of the first stage in the Pelagian controversy. The result proceeded in a great degree from the internal development of the Church, and far less from the compulsion of external power than was often the case in the controversies of the Oriental Church. It was true that the final decision was given by an external authority; but that decision coincided with the general consciousness of the Western Church; its voice was on the whole, though not in favour of Augustin's system to its full extent, in agreement with his opposition against Pelagianism; hence no reaction followed this victory. Only the individual Theology of a few men of learning remained in opposition to the Church. The Pelagians were confessedly in the minority, but asserted that Reason, Learning, and Freedom were on their side; thus for example Julian of Eclanum, who blamed Augustin for maintaining a kind of aristocratic dogmatism; he advocated a *dogma popolare*, a doctrine for the People. The latter rejoined, that, certainly, he advocated the doctrine which Ambrose and others had not invented, but found already existing in the consciousness of Christians.

\* Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 324. Augustin, Opp. t. x App p. 71.





the 1990s, the number of people with a mental health problem has increased by 50% (Mental Health Foundation 1999).

There is a growing awareness of the need to address the needs of people with mental health problems. The Department of Health (1999) has set out a vision for the future of mental health care, which includes a commitment to 'improving the lives of people with mental health problems'. This vision is based on the principles of recovery, which focuses on the individual's strengths and abilities, rather than on their diagnosis and symptoms.

Recovery is a process, rather than a destination. It is a journey that involves working with the individual to identify their goals and aspirations, and then developing a plan to achieve them. This plan may involve a range of interventions, including medication, therapy, and social support. The key to recovery is that the individual is actively involved in the process, and that they have a say in the decisions that affect their care.

One of the challenges of recovery is that it is often a long and difficult process. It may take months or even years for an individual to achieve their goals. However, it is important to remember that recovery is not a linear process. There may be setbacks and relapses, but this does not mean that the individual has failed. It simply means that they need to continue to work with their care team to develop a new plan.

There are a number of factors that can influence the success of recovery. These include the individual's motivation, the quality of the care they receive, and the support they have from family and friends. It is important to ensure that the individual has access to all the resources they need to succeed. This may include financial support, housing, and employment opportunities.

One of the most important factors in recovery is the individual's relationship with their care team. This relationship should be based on trust and respect. The care team should listen to the individual's views and concerns, and they should work with them to develop a plan that meets their needs. It is also important to ensure that the individual has access to all the services they need, including therapy, medication, and social support.

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